A More Regional Look At Jobs

CommSec looked at employment across regions over the last year.

Despite the boom in jobs, the regional variations are quite stark, with some areas showing higher rates of unemployment, and difficult economic conditions

There is also a correlation between employment and mortgage stress, more on this when we release our latest monthly stress update next week.

CommSec says:

Generally people in metropolitan areas earn higher incomes than their cousins in the country, but employment outcomes vary considerably.

Unemployment has increased in several Queensland regional centres in recent years. Outback Queensland, which includes western and far north areas of the state, has the worst unemployment rate in the country. That said, Cairns’ average unemployment rate has improved to 5.9 per cent in 2017 from 7.8 per cent a year ago.

Queensland’s coastal regional centres such as Bundaberg, Maryborough, Gympie, Bundaberg and Hervey Bay, known more broadly as Wide Bay (average 9.0 per cent), together with Townsville (albeit lower at 8.5 per cent) have elevated jobless rates. Manufacturing jobs in Wide Bay have declined by 1,306 between 2010 and 2016 according to Regional Development Australia.

The average unemployment rate in Coffs Harbour-Grafton on the NSW Mid-North Coast deteriorated to 8.7 per cent over 2017. Pleasingly, the actual unemployment rate fell to 6.1 per cent by year-end. Construction jobs have increased, underpinned by the $3.3 billion Pacific Highway upgrade between Port Macquarie and Coffs Harbour. A further 2,970 workers are expected to be employed on the $4.36 billion Woolgoolga to Ballina road upgrade.

Unemployment also increased along the suburban fringes and city ‘spines’ such as Ipswich (8.1 per cent) in Brisbane and the western suburbs of Melbourne (9.0 per cent). Around 950 jobs were lost at Holden’s Elizabeth factory in Adelaide’s north in October, pushing up the area’s unemployment rate to 7.7 per cent.

Higher income metropolitan areas, especially in Sydney’s coastal suburbs, dominate the regions with the lowest unemployment rates. However, the corridor between Broken Hill and Dubbo has Australia’s lowest regional unemployment rate at 2.9 per cent, benefitting from agricultural, tourism and mining-related jobs growth.

Melbourne satellite city Ballarat has experienced faster and younger population growth than its regional Victorian peers, supporting jobs growth. The unemployment rate in Ballarat has fallen to 4.1 per cent from 5.3 per cent over the year to December.

In Western Australia, Mandurah, south of Perth, experienced a significant decline in the jobless rate to an average of 7.0 per cent in December from 11.2 per cent a year ago. Mandurah has benefited from job-creating projects such as the Dwellingup National Trails Centre and Quambie Park aged care expansion.

 

On Cryptocurrencies And Investor Protection

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Jay Clayton spoke at Stanford University’s Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance and discussed his first eight months at the SEC and his enforcement, examination, market, and capital formation priorities. His comments on cryptocurriences were revealing.

SEC is clearly monitoring Initial Coin Offers (ICO) , and is concerned about the lack of protection for investors. There is significant risk of price manipulation, yet the underlying blockchain technologies offer significant opportunity.

“What I see happening in the ICO market today is ‘let me have all of the disclosure freedom of a private placement and all of the secondary activity and ability to market this of a public offering. We decided in 1934: that [having both of these at once] led to a lot of problems.”

“I think we can say that wherever the date is, it’s passed,” he said when asked whether his commission has made ICO rules clear enough yet.

“There are a lot of protections in the way stock trades on exchanges… these platforms that you’re seeing where people are trading cryptocurrencies — there are none of these rules… The opportunity for price manipulation is at orders of magnitude.”

“Blockchain, distributed ledger tech — I don’t think any of us think it’s a fad… it clearly has a applications that are gonna add efficiencies.”

“If this market continues as it is, this will not be the last enforcement actions that we take,” he said of the three ICOs the S.E.C. has moved against so far.

“Some of the offerings that we’re seeing, if the lawyers are telling them it’s OK, they’re just plain wrong,” he said, adding that taking action against lawyers knowing giving advice to ICO issuers that is against current laws is a possibility.

Source: Axios

How anti-globalisation switched from a left to a right-wing issue – and where it will go next

From The Conversation.

The world is currently witnessing a new backlash against economic globalisation. Supporters of the UK’s exit from the European Union seek to “take back control” from Brussels, while Donald Trump’s economic ethno-nationalism has promised to put “America first”.

Trump arrives at the 2018 World Economic Forum in Davos after his administration claimed that US support for China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 was a mistake and having just announced large tariffs on imported solar panels. It is remarkable that the backlash that he represents emerged from the right of the political spectrum, in countries long recognised as the chief architects and beneficiaries of economic globalisation.

At the turn of the millennium, the primary opposition to globalisation was concerned with its impacts in the Global South. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist at the World Bank, wrote in his 2006 book Making Globalization Work that “the rules of the game have been largely set by the advanced industrial countries”, who unsurprisingly “shaped globalisation to further their own interests.” Their political influence was represented through dominant roles in organisations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and WTO, and the corporate dominance of their multinationals.

In the 1990s the anti-globalisation movement opposed neoliberal economic integration from a range of perspectives, with a particular emphasis on the Global South. The movement was populated by activists, non-governmental organisations and groups with a variety of concerns: peace, climate change, conservation, indigenous rights, fair trade, debt relief, organised labour, sweatshops, and the AIDS pandemic.

The big switch

Economic globalisation in the 21st century has evolved in ways that neither its extreme proponents nor its most vocal critics predicted. A big switch has occurred, and today’s backlash against globalisation emerged from concerns about its impacts in the Global North.

In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, UK prime minister Theresa May offered a sceptical assessment at the 2017 World Economic Forum at Davos, arguing that “talk of greater globalisation can make people fearful. For many, it means their jobs being outsourced and wages undercut. It means having to sit back as they watch their communities change around them.” The US, under Trump, subsequently began renegotiating NAFTA and withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

The polling company YouGov, in a 2016 survey of people across 19 countries, found that France, the US and the UK were the places where the fewest people believe that “globalisation has been a force for good”. In contrast, the survey found the most enthusiasm for globalisation in East and Southeast Asia, where over 70% in all countries believed it has been a force for good. The highest approval, 91%, was in Vietnam.

Most notably, China took a very different stance on globalisation than the US and the UK at the 2017 Davos gathering. China’s president, Xi Jinping, said that his country will assume the leadership of 21st century globalisation. Defending the current economic order, Xi said that China was committed to make globalisation work for everyone, which was its responsibility as “leaders of our times”.

At Davos in 2018, Narendra Modi, prime minister of India, has already warned against de-globalisation:

It feels like the opposite of globalisation is happening. The negative impact of this kind of mindset and wrong priorities cannot be considered less dangerous than climate change or terrorism.

What drove the switch?

Significant proportions of the US and other countries in the Global North have experienced limited, if any, income gains in the most recent era of globalisation. Leading global inequality expert Branko Milanovic has explored changes in real incomes between 1988 and 2008 to show who particularly lost out on relative gains in income. He found two groups lost most: the global upper middle class – those between the 75th and 90th percentiles on the global income distribution, of whom 86% were from advanced economies – and the poorest 5% of the world population.

A different picture emerges in the Global South. People living in Asia accounted for the vast majority of those who experienced relative income gains from 1988 to 2008. In comparison with the 1990s, the Global South now earns a much larger share of world GDP, has more middle-income countries, more middle-class people, less dependency on foreign aid, considerably greater life expectancy, and lower child and maternal mortality.

Emerging evidence indicates that increased global trade has played a role in economic stagnation or decline for people in the north, especially in the US. MIT economist David Autor and his colleagues suggest that the “China shock” has had major redistributive effects in the US, leading to declines in manufacturing employment.

Economists had previously argued that the “losers” from trade could be compensated by transfers of wealth. Autor and his colleagues found that while there have been increases in welfare payments to regions of the US hardest hit by the trade shock, they fall far short of compensating for the income loss.

Not just globalisation

Not all of the stagnation and decline experienced in the Global North can be attributed to economic globalisation. Technological change is a big factor and national policy choices around taxation and social welfare have also played key roles in shaping inequality patterns within countries. In such a context, “globalisation” has been deployed as a scapegoat by some governments, invoking external blame for economic problems made at home.

The current backlash is not just about economic globalisation. It has involved ethno-nationalist and anti-immigrant components, for example among supporters of Trump and Brexit.

Neither does less of a backlash in the Global South necessarily mean support for neoliberal globalisation – and the optimism in countries such as Vietnam may paradoxically be a result of an earlier rejection of it. China, in particular, has not followed the same approach to economic globalisation as that which was encouraged by the US and organisations such as the IMF and World Bank in the late 20th century.

Meanwhile, many of the world’s poorest in the Global South have seen very little improvement in quality of life in recent years, yet are much more marginal and less well positioned to express their frustrations than the “losers” in countries such as the US and UK. They must not be forgotten.

A key lesson from the late 20th century is to be wary of wholesale attacks on, and sweeping defences of, 21st century economic globalisation. In light of the difficulties of establishing solidarity between “losers” in different parts of the world, the challenge of our times is for an alter-globalisation movement which addresses all of them.

 

Authors: Rory Horner, Lecturer, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester; Daniel Haberly, Lecturer In Human Geography, University of Sussex; Seth Schindler, Lecturer, Department of Geography, University of Sheffield; Yuko Aoyama, Professor of Economic Geography, Clark University

More On Incentives For First Time Buyers In Victoria

The Victorian Government has reaffirmed their intent to shortly accept  applications for its shared equity scheme known as HomesVic from up to 400 applicants. This was first announced in March 2017.

As we said at the time:

… our analysis not only here but overseas is that they simply lifts prices by the same amount. It is a zero sum game.

Whilst we understand the political agenda, this move is unlikely to improve housing affordability and access to property.

Of course many will highlight that fact that buyers will be entering the market as prices being to go south, and might even suggest this is a further attempt to keep the property market afloat.

The scheme will allow young people to purchase a home with the state government providing up to 25 percent of the purchase price – reducing the size of the mortgage that must be taken out. When the house is sold, the government recoups its share of the proceeds.

The $50-million initiative aims to make it easier for first-home buyers to enter the market by reducing the size of their loan, hence reducing the amount they need to save for a deposit.

The initiative targets single first-home buyers earning an annual income of less than $75,000 and couples earning less than $95,000.

Eligible applicants must buy in so-called “priority areas” which include 85 Melbourne suburbs, seven fringe towns and 130 regional towns and suburbs.

In Melbourne, the list includes suburbs around Box Hill, Broadmeadows, Dandenong, Epping, Fishermen’s Bend, Footscray, Fountain Gate, Frankston, LaTrobe, Monash, Pakenham, Parkville, Ringwood, Sunshine and Werribee.

The scheme is not available in most of Melbourne’s bayside suburbs, the leafy inner eastern suburbs or some pockets of the inner north.

The state government said the locations were chosen in growth areas where there was a high demand for housing and access to employment and public transport.

Regional centres on the list include Ballarat, Bendigo, Castlemaine, Geelong, La Trobe, Mildura, Seymour, Shepparton, Wangaratta, Warrnambool and Wodonga.

Some of the locations are where mortgage stress, on our modeling is highest – we will release the January results next week.

The move was welcomed by HIA – “it is a positive scheme that addresses the rising problem of housing affordability and will help see young people achieve the Aussie dream of owning their own home faster,” senior spokesperson for HIA Kristen Brookfield said.

“HIA figures show that the typical stamp duty bill on homes in Victoria has risen by 4,000 percent since 1982. With the median price of a Melbourne dwelling at $720,417, this makes buying a house a pipe dream for so many low income young people.

“Buying a house gives an individual a sense of great pride and security. Although the HomesVic scheme is currently only open to 400 applicants, it is still a good start and we will watch its progress with keen interest,” Kristin Brookfield concluded.

U.S. Mortgage Rates Can’t Catch a Break

From Mortgage News Daily.

After taking just one day off from the prevailing move higher, mortgage rates were back at it today, heading back to the worst levels in more than 9 months.  The average lender is now back in line with the highs seen 2 days ago on Monday afternoon.  Over slightly longer time-frames, rates have risen an eighth of a percentage point since last week, a quarter of a point from 2 weeks ago, and 3/8ths of a point since mid December.  That makes this the worst run since the abrupt spike following 2016’s presidential election.

Unfortunately, this trend won’t necessarily stop simply because things have “gotten bad.”  While it’s true that the economic effects of higher and higher rates will eventually have a self-righting effect, that could take months–even years to play out.  While this doesn’t necessarily mean that rates will continue a linear trend higher in the coming months, it does mean the current trend is not our friend, and that it would take some huge changes in bond market trading levels before it made sense to lower our defenses.

Warnings On The Profitability Of Global Banks, Excessive Risk-taking and Leverage

The Committee on the Global Financial System  at The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has published an important report “Structural changes in banking after the crisis“.

The report highlights a “new normal” world of lower bank profitability, and warns that banks may be tempted to take more risks, and leverage harder in an attempt to bolster profitability. This however, should be resisted. They also underscore the issues of banking concentration and the asset growth, two issues which are highly relevant to Australia.

The report highlights that in some countries the 2007 banking crisis brought about the end of a period of fast and excessive growth in domestic banking sectors.  Worth noting the substantial growth in Australia, relative to some other markets and of particular note has been the dramatic expansion of the Chinese banking system, which grew from about 230% to 310% of GDP over 2010–16 to become the largest in the world, accounting for 27% of aggregate bank assets.

They also call out the concentration banking to a smaller number of larger players since the crisis.  The number of banks has fallen in most countries
over the past decade. Post-crisis reductions in bank numbers have been mainly among smaller institutions, aside from a handful of distressed large banks in the euro area and the retreat of some international banks from specific foreign markets. Concentration has also risen in some countries that were less affected by the crisis and where bank numbers have
continued to expand or remained steady (Australia, Brazil, Singapore).

The decade since the onset of the global financial crisis has brought about significant structural changes in the banking sector. The crisis revealed substantial weaknesses in the banking system and the prudential framework, leading to excessive lending and risk-taking unsupported by adequate capital and liquidity buffers. The effects of the crisis have weighed heavily on economic growth, financial stability and bank performance in many jurisdictions, although the headwinds have begun to subside. Technological change, increased non-bank competition and shifts in globalisation are still broader environmental challenges facing the banking system.

Regulators have responded to the crisis by reforming the global prudential framework and enhancing supervision. The key goals of these reforms have been to increase banks’ resilience through stronger capital and liquidity buffers, and reduce implicit public subsidies and the impact of bank failures on the economy and taxpayers through enhanced recovery and resolution regimes. At the same time, the dynamic adaptation of the system and the emergence of new risks warrant ongoing attention.

In adapting to their new operating landscape, banks have been re-assessing and adjusting their business strategies and models, including their balance sheet structure, cost base, scope of activities and geographic presence. Some changes have been substantial and are ongoing, while a number of advanced economy banking systems are also confronted with low profitability and legacy problems.

This report by the CGFS Working Group examines trends in bank business models, performance and market structure, and assesses their implications for the stability and efficiency of banking markets.

The main findings on the evolution of banking sectors are as follows:

  1. Changes in banking market capacity and structure. The crisis ended a period of strong growth in banking sector assets in many advanced economies. Several capacity metrics point to a shrinking of banking sectors relative to economic activity in several countries directly impacted by the crisis. This adjustment has occurred mainly through a reduction in business volumes rather than the exit of firms from the market. Banking sectors have expanded in countries that were less affected by the crisis, particularly the large emerging market economies (EMEs). Concentration in banking systems has tended to increase, with some exceptions.
  2. Shifts in bank business models. Advanced economy banks have tended to reorient their business away from trading and more complex activities, towards less capital-intensive activities, including commercial banking. This pattern is evident in the changes in banks’ asset portfolios, revenue mix and increased reliance on customer deposit funding. Large European and US banks have also become more selective and focused in their international banking activities, while banks from the large EMEs and countries less affected by the crisis have expanded internationally.
  3. Trends in bank performance. Bank profitability (return on equity) has declined across countries and business model types from the historically high rates seen before the crisis. At least in part, this reflects lower leverage induced by the regulatory reforms. In addition, many advanced economy banks, in particular banks in some European countries, are facing sluggish revenues and an overall cost base that has been resistant to cuts, including, in some cases, legacy costs associated with past investment decisions and misconduct.

The main findings regarding the impact of post-crisis structural change for the stability of the banking sector are related to three areas:

  1. Bank resilience and risk-taking. Banks globally have enhanced their resilience to future risks by substantially building up capital and liquidity buffers. The increased use of stress testing by banks and supervisors since the crisis also provides for greater resilience on a forward-looking basis, which should help support credit flows in good and bad times. In addition, advanced economy banks have shifted to more stable funding sources and invested in safer and less complex assets. Some of these adjustments may be driven partly by cyclical factors, such as accommodative monetary policy, and hence may diminish as conditions change. Qualitative evidence
    indicates that banks have considerably strengthened their risk management and internal control practices. Although these changes are hard to assess, supervisors point to significant scope for further improvements, in particular because of the inherent uncertainties about the future evolution of risks.
  2. Market sentiment and future bank profitability. Despite a recovery in marketbased indicators of investor sentiment towards larger institutions in recent years, equity investors remain sceptical towards some banks with low profitability. Simulation analysis carried out by the Working Group suggests that some institutions need to implement further cost-cutting and structural adjustments.
  3. System-wide effects. Assessing the impact of structural change on system-wide stability is harder than in the case of individual banks because of complex interactions within the system. Nonetheless, a number of changes are consistent with the objectives of public authorities and the reform process. First, banks appear to have become more focused geographically in their international strategy and tend to intermediate more of their international claims locally. Second, direct connections between banks through lending and derivatives exposures have declined. Third, some
    European banking systems with relatively high capacity have made progress with consolidation. Fourth, while the effect of less business model diversity arising from the repositioning of many banks towards commercial banking cannot be assessed yet, this trend has been accompanied by a shift towards more stable funding sources (such as deposits). A range of other reforms has also enhanced systemic stability (eg money market mutual fund reforms) and further progress has been made on resolution and recovery frameworks.

 

Changes in banking sector resilience have to be measured against the impact on the services provided by the sector. The main findings regarding the impact of changes on the efficiency of financial intermediation services are:

  1. Provision of bank lending to the real economy. Trends in bank-intermediated credit have been uneven over time and across countries, reflecting differences in their crisis experience and related overhang of credit. Credit declined significantly relative to economic activity in advanced economies that bore the brunt of the crisis, and in most countries started to recover only from 2015. But the adjustment is still ongoing
    in others, reflecting in part a legacy of problem bank assets that continues to hamper the growth of fresh loans. By comparison, advanced economy banking systems not significantly affected by the crisis continued to report solid loan growth, notwithstanding tighter regulations.Recognising the difficulty of disentangling demand and supply drivers, the
    evidence gathered by the group does not suggest a systematic change in the
    willingness of banks to lend. But, in line with the objectives of regulatory reform, lenders have become more risk-sensitive and more discriminating across borrowers. In contrast to many advanced economies, bank lending has expanded strongly in EMEs, raising sustainability concerns and prompting the use of macroprudential measures and the tightening of certain lending standards more recently.
  2. Capital market activities. Crisis-era losses combined with regulatory changes have motivated a significant reduction in risk and scale in the non-equity trading and market-making businesses of a number of global banks.
  3. International banking was one of the areas most affected by the crisis. Aggregate foreign bank claims have seen a significant decline since the crisis, driven particularly by banks from the advanced economies most affected by the crisis, especially from some European countries. By contrast, banks from other non-crisis countries have expanded their foreign activities, in some cases quite substantially, resulting in a significant change in the country composition of global banking assets.

The report highlights four key messages for markets and policymakers:

  1. Post-crisis, a stronger banking sector has resumed the supply of
    intermediation services to the real economy, albeit with some changes in
    the balance of activities.
    – Bank credit growth remains below its excessive pre-crisis pace in advanced economies but without indications of a systematic reduction in the supply of local credit. Lending to some sectors and borrowers has seen reductions, however, as banks have adjusted their risk profile, and policymakers should remain attentive to potential unintended gaps in the flow of credit.
    – Experience from crisis countries underscores the benefits of acting early in addressing problems associated with non-performing loans (NPLs).
    – The withdrawal of some banks from capital markets-related business has
    coincided with signs of fragile liquidity in some markets, although causality
    remains an open question.
  2. Longer-term profitability challenges require the attention of banks and
    supervisors, as they may signal risk-taking incentives and overcapacity. Low profitability partly reflects cyclical factors but also higher capitalisation and more resilient bank balance sheets. As such, banks and their investors need to adapt to a “new normal”. Market concerns about low profitability may deprive banks of an important source of fresh capital, or encourage risk-taking and leverage by banks, thus placing a premium on robust risk management, regulation and supervision. In some cases, low profitability might also signal the existence of excess capacity and structural impediments to exit for individual banks, requiring decisive policy action to apply relevant rules.
  3. Consolidation and preservation of gains in bank resilience requires ongoing
    surveillance, risk management and a systemic perspective. Key indicators
    show areas of improvement since the crisis, but also areas which are still a work in progress. Authorities and market participants should not become complacent. The system is adapting to a variety of changes, the interaction of which is difficult to predict. Authorities should monitor the ongoing adaptation and evolution in the nature and locus of risk-taking within the banking sector and the financial system more broadly. In this regard, the group sees scope for the international supervisory community to undertake a post-crisis study of bank risk management practices. In addition, ample buffers remain critical to coping with unexpected losses from new risks.
  4. Better use and sharing of data are critical to enhanced surveillance of
    systemic risk. Surveillance is crucial, given that the financial sector evolves
    dynamically and because future risks will likely differ from past ones. Although data availability has improved, there is a need to make better use of existing data to assess banking sector structural adjustment and related risks. This effort will likely require additional conceptual work, building on the data sets of national authorities and the international financial institutions. Areas that warrant further analysis include the potential for increased similarities in the exposure profile of banks to correlated shocks, the growing role and implications of fintech, and the migration of activity and risk to the non-bank sector.

 

Who Are The Winners Under The Revised Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal?

From The Conversation.

The revived trade agreement, now known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), has finally made it across the line. It’s a considerable win for Australian farmers and service providers, in a trading area worth about A$90 billion.

The 11 remaining countries from the initial Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement finally agreed to go ahead with the deal without the US, at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

The deal reduces the scope for controversial investor-state dispute settlements, where foreign investors can bypass national courts and sue governments for compensation for harming their investments. It introduces stronger safeguards to protect the governments’ right to regulate in the public interest and prevent unwarranted claims.

Despite earlier union fears of the impact for Australian workers, the CPTPP does not regulate the movement of workers. It only has minor changes to domestic labour rights and practices.

The new agreement is more of an umbrella framework for separate yet coordinated bilateral deals. In fact, Australia’s Trade Minister Steven Ciobo said:

The agreement will deliver 18 new free trade agreements between the CPTPP parties. For Australia that means new trade agreements with Canada and Mexico and greater market access to Japan, Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei.

It means a speedier process for reducing import barriers on key Australian products, such as beef, lamb, seafood, cheese, wine and cotton wool.

It also promises less competition for Australian services exports, encouraging other governments to look to use Australian services and reducing the regulations of state-owned enterprises.

Australia now also has new bilateral trade deals with Canada and Mexico as part and parcel of the new agreement. This could be worth a lot to the Australian economy if it were to fill commercial gaps created by potential trade battles within North America and between the US and China.

What’s in and out of the new agreement

The new CPTPP rose from the ashes of the old agreement because of the inclusion of a list of 20 suspended provisions on matters that were of interest for the US. These would be revived in the event of a US comeback.

These suspended provisions involved substantial changes in areas like investment, public procurement, intellectual property rights and transparency. With the freezing of further copyright restrictions and the provisions on investor-state dispute settlements, these suspensions appear to re-balance the agreement in favour of Australian governments and consumers.

In fact, the scope of investor-state dispute settlements are narrower in the CPTPP, because foreign private companies who enter into an investment contract with the Australian government will not be able to use it if there is a dispute about that contract. The broader safeguards in the agreement make sure that the Australian government cannot be sued for measures related to public education, health and other social services.

The one part of the agreement relating to the temporary entry for business people is rather limited in scope and does not have the potential to impact on low-skilled or struggling categories of Australian workers. In fact, it only commits Australia to providing temporary entry (from three months, up to two years) of only five generic categories of CPTPP workers. These include occupations like installers and servicers, intra-corporate transferees, independent executives, and contractual service suppliers.

The above categories squarely match the shortages in the Australian labour market, according to the Lists of Eligible Skilled Occupation of the Home Affairs Department.

Bits of the original agreement are still included in the CPTPP such as tariffs schedules that slash custom duties on 95% of trade in goods. But this was the easy part of the deal.

Before the deal is signed

The new agreement will be formally signed in Chile on March 8 2018, and will enter into force as soon as at least six members ratify it. This will probably happen later in the year or in early 2019.

The geopolitical symbolism of this timing is poignant. The CPTPP is coming out just as Donald Trump raises the temperature in the China trade battle by introducing new tariffs. It also runs alongside China’s attempts to finalise a much bigger regional trade agreement, the 16-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

Even though substantially the CPTPP is only a TPP-lite at best, it still puts considerable pressure on the US to come out of Trump’s protectionist corner.

It spells out the geopolitical consequences of the US trade policy switch, namely that the Asia Pacific countries are willing to either form a more independent bloc or align more closely with Chinese interests.

Will this be enough to convince the Trump administration to reverse its course on global trade? At present, this seems highly unlikely. To bet on the second marriage of the US with transpacific multilateral trade would be a triumph of hope over experience.

Author: Giovanni Di Lieto, Lecturer, Bachelor of International Business, Monash Business School, Monash University

Financial Advice Conflicts Still Exists In Vertically Integrated Firms

An Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) review of financial advice provided by the five biggest vertically integrated financial institutions has identified areas where improvements are needed to the management of conflicts of interest. 68% of clients’ funds were invested in in-house products.

This highlights the problems in vertically integrated firms, something which the Productivity Commission is also looking at.

The review looked at the products that ANZ, CBA, NAB, Westpac and AMP financial advice licensees were recommending and at the quality of the advice provided on in-house products.

The review was part of a broader set of regulatory reviews of the wealth management and financial advice businesses of the largest banking and financial services institutions as part of ASIC’s Wealth Management Project.

The review found that, overall, 79% of the financial products on the firms’ approved products lists (APL) were external products and 21% were internal or ‘in-house’ products. However, 68% of clients’ funds were invested in in-house products.

The split between internal and external product sales varied across different licensees and across different types of financial products. For example, it was more pronounced for platforms compared to direct investments. However, in most cases there was a clear weighting in the products recommended by advisers towards in-house products.

ASIC noted that vertical integration can provide economies of scale and other benefits to both the customer and the financial institution. Consumers might choose advice from large vertically integrated firms because they seek that firm’s products due to factors such as convenience and access, and recommendations of ‘in-house’ products may be appropriate. Nonetheless, conflicts of interest are inherent in vertically integrated firms, and these firms still need to properly manage conflicts of interest in their advisory arms and ensure good quality advice.

ASIC will consult with the financial advice industry (and other relevant groups) on a proposal to introduce more transparent public reporting on approved product lists, including where client funds are invested, for advice licensees that are part of a vertically integrated business. ASIC noted that any such requirement is likely to cover vertically integrated firms beyond those included in this review. The introduction of reporting requirements would improve transparency around management of the conflicts of interests that are inherent in these businesses.

ASIC also examined a sample of files to test whether advice to switch to in-house products satisfied the ‘best interests’ requirements. ASIC found that in 75% of the advice files reviewed the advisers did not demonstrate compliance with the duty to act in the best interests of their clients. Further, 10% of the advice reviewed was likely to leave the customer in a significantly worse financial position. ASIC will ensure that appropriate customer remediation takes place.

Acting ASIC Chair Peter Kell said that ASIC is already working with the major financial institutions to address the issues that have been identified in the report on quality of advice and management of conflicts of interest.

‘There is ongoing work focusing on remediation where advice-related failures have led to poor customer outcomes, and the results of this review will feed into that work,’ said Mr Kell.

ASIC is already working with the institutions to improve compliance and advice quality through action such as:

  • improvements to monitoring and supervision processes for financial advisers; and
  • improvements to adviser recruitment processes and checks.

ASIC will continue to ban advisers with serious compliance failings.

ASIC highlighted that the findings from this review should be carefully examined by other vertically integrated firms. ‘While this review focused on five major financial services firms, the lessons should be considered by all vertically integrated firms in the financial services sector.’

Download the report

What Australia can learn from overseas about the future of rental housing

From The Conversation.

When we talk about rental housing in Australia, we often make comparisons with renting overseas. Faced with insecure tenancies and unaffordable home ownership, we sometimes try to envisage European-style tenancies being imported here.

And, over the past year, there has been a surge of enthusiasm for developing a sector of large-scale institutional landlords, modelled on the UK’s build-to-rent sector or “multi-family” housing in the US.

Our review of the private rental sectors of ten countries in Australasia, Europe and North America identified innovations in rental housing policies and markets Australia might try to emulate – and avoid. International comparisons also give a different perspective on aspects of Australia’s own rental housing institutions that might otherwise be taken for granted.

Not everyone in Europe rents

In nine of the ten countries we reviewed, private rental is the second-largest tenure after owner-occupation. Only in Germany do more households rent privately than own their housing. Most of the European countries we reviewed have higher rates of home ownership than Australia.

In most of the European and North American countries in our study, single people and lower-income households and apartments are heavily represented in the private rental sector. Higher-income households, families with kids, and detached houses are represented much more in owner-occupation. It’s less uneven in Australia: more houses, kids and higher-income households are in private rental.

Two key potential implications follow from this.

First, it suggests a high degree of integration between the Australian private rental and owner-occupier sectors, and that policy settings and market conditions applying to one will be transmitted readily to the other.

So, policies that give preferential treatment to owner-occupied housing will also induce purchase of housing for rental, and rental housing investor activity will directly affect prices and accessibility in the owner-occupied sector.

It also heightens the prospect of investment in both sectors falling simultaneously, with little established institutional capacity for countercyclical investment that makes necessary increases in ongoing supply.

A second implication relates to equality. Australian households of similar composition and similar incomes differ in their housing tenure – and, considering the traditional value placed on owner-occupation, this may not be by choice.

This suggests housing tenure may figure strongly in the subjective experience of inequality. It raises the question of whether housing is a primary driver of inequality, and not the outcome of difference or inequality in other aspects of life.

The rise of large corporate landlords

In almost all of the countries we reviewed, the ownership of private rental housing is dominated by individuals with relatively small holdings. Only in Sweden are housing companies the dominant type of landlord.

However, most countries also have a sector of large corporate landlords. In some countries, these landlords are very large. For example, America’s five largest corporate landlords own about 420,000 properties in total. Germany’s largest landlord, Vonovia, has more than 330,000 properties alone.

These landlords’ origins vary. Germany’s arose from massive sell-offs of municipal housing and industry-related housing in the early 2000s.

In the US, multi-family (apartment) landlords have been around for decades. And in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, they have been joined by a new sector of single-family (detached house) landlords that have rapidly acquired large portfolios from bulk purchases of foreclosed, formerly owner-occupied homes.

In these countries and elsewhere, the rise of largest corporate landlords has been controversial. Germany’s have a poor record of relations with tenants – to the extent of being the subject of popular protests in the 2000s – and their practice of characterising repairs as improvements to justify rent increases.

American housing advocates have voiced concern about “the rise of the corporate landlord” – especially in the single-family sector, where there’s some evidence that they more readily terminate tenancies.

These landlords also don’t build much housing. They are most active in renovating (for higher rents), merging with one another, and – especially in the US – developing innovative financial instruments such as “rental-backed securities”.

“Institutional landlords” are now a standing item on the Australian housing policy agenda. Considering the activities of large corporate landlords internationally, we should get specific about the sort of institutional landlords we really want, how we will get them, and how we will ensure they deliver desired housing outcomes.

Policymakers and housing advocates have, for years, looked to the community housing sector as the prime candidate for this role. They envisage its transformation into an affordable housing industry that works across the sector toward a wide range of policy outcomes in housing supply, affordability, security, social housing renewal and community development.

With interest in the prospect of build-to-rent and multifamily housing rising in the property development and finance sectors, there is a risk that affordable housing policy may be colonised by for-profit interests.

The development of a for-profit large corporate landlord sector may be desirable for greater professionalisation and efficiencies in the management of tenancies and properties. However, this should not come at the expense of a mission-oriented affordable housing industry that makes a distinctive contribution to housing outcomes.

Bringing it home

Looking at the policy settings in the ten countries, we found some surprising results and strange bedfellows.

For example, Germany – which has had a remarkably long period of stable house prices – has negative gearing provisions and tax exemptions for capital gains, much like Australia. But, in Australia, these policies are blamed for driving speculation and booming prices.

And while the UK taxes landlords more heavily than most other countries, it has the fastest-growing private rental sector of the countries we reviewed.

However, these challenging findings should not be taken to diminish the explanatory power or effectiveness of these settings in each country’s housing policy. Rather, they show the necessity of considering taxation and other policy settings in interaction with each other and in wider systemic contexts.

So, for example, Germany’s conservative housing finance practices, and regulation of rents, may mean the speculative potential of negative gearing and tax-free capital gains isn’t activated there.

Strategy in Australia for its private rental sector should join consideration of finance, taxation, supply and demand-side subsidies and regulation with the objective of making private rental housing outcomes competitive with other sectors.

Author: Chris Martin, Research Fellow, City Housing, UNSW

Irresponsible Mortgage Lending A Significant Risk For Seniors

From NestEgg.com.au

Surging property prices in Australia’s capital cities can be attributed to irresponsible lending, but it’s not just young buyers suffering the consequences, a consumer organisation has said.

In its submission to the royal commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Finance sector, the not-for-profit consumer organisation, the Consumer Action Law Centre (CALC) said the number of Aussie households facing mortgage stress has “soared” nearly 20 per cent in the last six months, and argued that lenders are to blame.

Referencing Digital Finance Analytics’ prediction that homes facing mortgage stress will top 1 million by 2019, CALC said older Australians are at particular risk.

The organisation explained: “Irresponsible mortgage lending can have severe consequences, including the loss of the security of a home.

“Consumer Action’s experience is that older people are at significant risk, particularly where they agree to mortgage or refinance their home for the benefit of third parties. This can be family members or someone who holds their trust.”

Continuing, CALC said a “common situation” features adult children persuading an older relative to enter into a loan contract as the borrower, assuring them that they will execute all the repayments.

“[However] the lack of appropriate inquiries into the suitability of a loan only comes to light when the adult child defaults on loan repayments and the bank commences proceedings for possession of the loan in order to discharge the debt,” CALC said.

The centre referred to a Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) case study in which retiree and pensioner, Anne, entered into a loan contract with her son Brian. The repayments were to be made out of Brian’s salary and Anne’s pension. The loan was requested in order to extend her home so that Brian could live with her.

Following loan approval, the lender provided more advances under the loan contract. The advances were used to pay off Brian’s credit debt and buy a car.

When Brian left his job to travel, Anne could no longer afford the repayments and the lender said it would repossess her home.

“Anne lodged a dispute with FOS. After considering the dispute, FOS concluded that Anne was appropriately a co-debtor in the original loan contract, as she had received a direct benefit from the loan (the extension to her home and therefore an increase in its value),” CALC said.

“However, FOS considered that she was not liable for the further advances as she did not directly benefit from the application of the funds. Even though the repayment of Brian’s credit card debts may have provided more towards the household income, FOS concluded that this was not a direct benefit to Anne.

“Neither was the purchase of a car for Brian, as there was no information to show that Anne used the car or relied on Brian to transport her.”

CALC also expressed concern that the Household Expenditure Measure (HEM) is not a robust enough living expense test.

Noting that the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority shares their concern, the centre said the reliance on the HEM test raises concerns about the robustness of the actual measure.

“APRA states that it has concerns about whether these benchmarks provide realistic assessments of a borrower’s living expenses.

“In the same vein, ASIC has issued proceedings against Westpac in the Federal Court for failing to properly assess whether borrowers could meet repayment obligations, due to the use of benchmarks rather than the actual expenses declared by borrowers.”

CALC warned that over-indebtedness has ramifications for the economy but also for individuals and families.

Highlighting the link between high levels of debt and lower standards of living, CALC said it can have significant long-term effects as well, with the capacity to damage housing, health, education and retirement prospects