The Coalition government has expanded the inquiry into the financial services sector and the Royal Commission implementation. From InvestorDaily
Treasurer
Josh Frydenberg has asked the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Economics to inquire into progress made by financial
institutions in implementing the recommendations of the Hayne Royal
Commission.
Ten recommendations were made by Commissioner Hayne
in his final report directed towards the industry with the inquiry
expected to learn how that implementation is progressing.
Commissioner
Hayne made a total of 76 recommendations but made it clear that primary
responsibility for misconduct in the financial sector lies with the
institutions concerned and their boards and senior management.
The
remit of the inquiry has also been expanded to include other major
relevant financial institutions and leading financial services
associations.
The inquiry will complement the continuation of the broader inquiry into the four major banks which was announced in 2016.
The
inquiry will provide further transparency to the public on the work the
institutions are doing in implementing the Royal Commission
recommendations.
The government hopes that in doing so it will contribute to restoring community trust in the sector.
NAB late on Friday 26 July 2019 begun contacting approximately 13,000 customers to advise that some personal information provided when their account set up was uploaded, without authorisation, to the servers of two data service companies.
NAB’s security teams have
contacted the companies, who advise that all information provided to them is
deleted within two hours.
NAB Chief Data Officer,
Glenda Crisp, said the compromised data included customer name, date of birth,
contact details and in some cases, a government-issued identification number,
such as a driver’s licence number.
“We take the privacy and the
protection of customer information extremely seriously and I sincerely
apologise to affected customers. We take full responsibility,” she said.
“The issue was human error
and in breach of NAB’s data security policies.”
Ms Crisp said it was not a
cyber-security issue. No NAB log-in details or passwords have been compromised
– and NAB’s systems remain secure.
“Our number one priority is
to support our customers. We are moving quickly to proactively contact every
person affected.”
NAB is calling, emailing or
writing to each impacted customer individually. A dedicated, specialist support
team is in place, available to them 24/7.
If government identification
documents need to be reissued, NAB will cover the cost.
NAB will also cover the cost
of independent, enhanced fraud detection identification services for affected
customers.
Importantly there is no
evidence to indicate that any of the information has been copied or further
disclosed.
NAB is advising impacted
customers that they do not need to take any action with their account.
“We have reviewed these
customers’ accounts, over and above our rigorous normal checks, and have not
identified any unusual activity. We will continue to monitor 24/7 to
protect our customers’ accounts,” Ms Crisp said.
NAB has also notified and is
working with industry regulators, including the Office of the Australian
Information Commissioner.
Ms Crisp said: “We take full
responsibility. We can assure you that we understand how this happened and we
are making changes to ensure this does not happen again.”
ASIC has commenced proceedings in the Federal Court against ANZ over allegations relating to charging of fees for periodical payments. Via InvestorDaily.
ASIC
advised ANZ earlier in the day that it would commence proceedings in
relation to the charging of fees for periodical payments in certain
circumstances prior to February 2016.
The commission is alleging that ANZ was not entitled to charge certain fees under the bank’s contracts with its customers.
These fees were the subject of a class action which were settled out of court for $1.5 million, pending court approval.
ASIC
said that ANZ’s contract terms and conditions defined a periodical
payment as a debit from an ANZ account which the customer instructed ANZ
to make to the account of another person or business.
The
definition of the payment excluded payments between two accounts in the
name of the same or business, but ASIC alleges that between 2003 and
2016 ANZ charged fees for payments between same name accounts.
Transaction
fees were charged when a periodical payment was successful and
non-payment fees were charged when the payment was not.
For
businesses these transaction fees were between $1.70 and $4 and
non-payment fees were between $35 and $45 while for individuals they
were $4 and between $6 and $45 respectively.
These fees were
charged on at least 1.3 million occasions alleges ASIC and the
commission contends that the bank first became aware of the risk in July
2011.
Despite this ASIC will say in court that ANZ did not
provide written notification of the issue’s existence until 2014, did
not commence notifying customers until September 2015 and did not change
its terms and conditions until February 2016.
ANZ first reported
the matter to ASIC in February 2014 and in September 2018 the bank
contacted ASIC advising that information previously provided was
incomplete.
As a result, ASIC commenced an investigation in October 2018 which has since concluded leading to the court case.
ASIC
is alleging a breach of both the Corporations Act and the ASIC Act for
the bank’s failure to ensure that financial services are provided
efficiently honestly and fairly and for engaging in misleading or
deceptive conduct.
It alleges this was because the bank continued
to charge the fees even when it became aware that the fees were
potentially unlawful and highly unlikely that it could remediate all
affected customers.
The ASIC act contraventions attract a maximum penalty of between $1.7 million and $2.1 million per contravention.
Background
ANZ
has already begun to pay out customers that were affected by this issue
after settling out of court a class action brought about by Maurice
Blackburn.
The class action launched by Maurice Blackburn in 2010
was against various fees charged by banks but ultimately was lost by
the law firm in 2016.
However, ANZ was ordered in one part of the Federal Court trial to repay customer’s fees in relation to periodical payments.
The
types of fees were on the smaller side and paid by customers when a
pre-arrange payment between its own accounts was not made due to
insufficient funds or for automated transactions between accounts.
The
bank stopped charging the fees in February 2016 and ANZ confirmed it
had set aside $50 million in customer remediation payments for this
matter of which more than $28 million has already been paid to customers
impacted.
RBA Governor Philip Lowe spoke today, and there were some important points.
First, expect rates to be lower for longer. ” It is highly unlikely that we will be contemplating higher interest rates until we are confident that inflation will return to around the midpoint of the target range”.
Second, the RBA has more capacity to cut if required (we think they will).
Third, moving the 2-3% inflation target band is not something they would want (the Treasurer is currently reviewing the RBA’s mandate and target!). They do not want to “shift the goalposts”!
Here is the speech:
I would like to start by winding the clock back, not by three years, but instead by 40 years. It was 40 years ago that I started studying economics in high school in Wagga Wagga. I sat the 3 unit economics exam for the Higher School Certificate (HSC) in 1979. At that time, the standard exam question was in two parts: why did Australia have both high inflation and high unemployment and what should policy do about it? I recall writing numerous essays on this troubling topic.
I also recall learning about the Misery Index. For those of you whose memories don’t go back
that far, this index is the sum of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. Few people talk about
this index these days, but I thought it would be useful to show it to you as background (Graph 1).
As you can see, things were pretty miserable in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, though, at least according
to this metric, they are not too bad. The Misery Index is now as low as it has been since the late
1960s. Today, we are living in a world of low and stable inflation and low unemployment. It is useful to
remind ourselves of this sometimes.
So this means that today’s HSC students are likely to be writing about why inflation is so low
at the same time that unemployment is also low. I hope that they are also being asked to write about how
public policy should respond to low inflation and its close cousins of slow growth in nominal wages and
household incomes.
These are important issues to be thinking about. Given this, I would like to use this opportunity to
address two related questions that I am asked frequently.
The first of these is why is inflation so low globally and in Australia?
And the second is, is inflation targeting still appropriate in this low inflation world?
I will then draw on my answers to make some remarks about monetary policy here in Australia.
1. Why is Inflation so Low?
It is useful to start off with a couple of graphs.
The first is the average rate of inflation globally (Graph 2). The picture is pretty clear. Global
inflation declined over the three decades to the early 2000s and has been low and stable for some
time.
Low inflation has become the norm in most economies. This is evident in this next graph, which shows
the share of advanced economies with a core inflation rate below 2 per cent and below
1 per cent (Graph 3). Currently, three-quarters of advanced economies have an inflation
rate below 2 per cent, and one-third have an inflation rate below 1 per cent.
The obvious question is why this has happened?
There is no single answer. But there are three factors that, together, help explain what has happened.
These are: the credibility of the current monetary frameworks; the continuing existence of spare
capacity in parts of the global economy; and structural factors related to technology and
globalisation.
I will say a few words about each of these.
First, the credibility of the monetary frameworks. One of the responses to the high inflation rates of
the 1970s and 1980s was to put in place monetary frameworks with a strong focus on inflation control. In
some countries, this took the form of rewriting the law to require the central bank to focus on just one
thing: inflation. Many countries also adopted an inflation target, with monetary policy decisions being
explained primarily in terms of inflation.
This increased focus on inflation has helped cement low inflation norms in our economies. Many people
understand that if inflation were to pick up too much, the central bank would respond to make sure the
pick-up was only temporary. This means that workers and firms can make their decisions on the basis that
the rate of overall inflation will not be too different from the target rate. This has made the system
less inflation prone than it once was.
The second explanation for low inflation is the continuing existence of spare capacity in parts of the
global economy.
The existence of spare capacity was an important factor explaining low inflation in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis. And today, it remains a factor in some countries, including here in
Australia. But, on the surface, it is a less convincing explanation for low inflation in countries where
unemployment rates are now at multi-decade lows. Based on conventional measures of capacity utilisation,
these economies are operating close to their sustainable limits. One explanation for continuing low
inflation in this environment is that the current rate of aggregate demand growth is simply not fast
enough to put meaningful pressure on capacity. If so, stronger demand growth would be expected to see
inflation pick up. Another possibility is that the unemployment rate, by itself, no longer provides a
good guide to spare capacity, partly due to the flexibility of labour supply. I will come back to this
idea in the discussion of inflation outcomes in Australia.
The third explanation is that globalisation and advances in technology have changed pricing dynamics.
There are two main channels through which this appears to be happening. The first is by lowering the
cost of production of many goods. And the second is by making markets more contestable and increasing
competition. The main effect of these changes should be on the level of prices, rather than
on the ongoing rate of inflation. But this level effect is playing out over many years, so it appears as
persistently low inflation.
It is widely accepted that the entry into the global trading system of hundreds of millions of people
with access to modern technology put downward pressure on the prices of manufactured goods. Reflecting
this, goods prices in the advanced economies have barely increased over the past couple of decades
(Graph 4). But the effects of globalisation and technology extend beyond this and into almost every
corner of the economy, including the services sector.
In today’s globalised world, there are fewer and fewer services that can be thought of as truly
non-traded. Many services can now be delivered by somebody in another country. Examples include: the
preparation of architectural drawings, document design and publishing, customer service roles and these
days many people in professional services work with team members located in other countries. In
addition, many tasks, such as accounting and payroll, are being automated. All this has been made
possible by technology and by globalisation.
The new global technology platforms have also revolutionised services such as retail, media and
entertainment, and transformed how we communicate and search for information and compare prices.
These changes are having a material effect on pricing, with services price inflation lower than it once
was. Many firms know that if they don’t keep their prices down, another firm somewhere in the
world might undercut them. And many workers are concerned that if the cost of employing them is too
high, relative to their productivity, their employer might look overseas or consider automation. And,
more broadly, better price discovery keeps the competitive pressure on firms. The end result is a
pervasive feeling of more competition. And more competition normally means lower prices.[1]
So these are the three important factors that are contributing to low inflation. None of them by
themselves is sufficient to explain what is happening, but together they are having a powerful effect.
The current high inflation rates in Argentina and Turkey remind us that globalisation and technology, by
themselves, do not drive low inflation. The monetary framework clearly matters too. Weaknesses in that
framework still result in high inflation.
2. Is Inflation Targeting Still Appropriate?
This brings me to my second question: is inflation targeting still the appropriate monetary framework
for most countries?
It is understandable that people are asking this question. Given the factors that I have just discussed, some commentators have argued that central banks will find it increasingly difficult to achieve their inflation targets. Some then go on to argue that central banks should just accept this, not fight it; perhaps they should shift the goal posts, or even adopt another monetary framework. A related argument is that the very low interest rates that have accompanied the pursuit of inflation targets are pushing up asset prices in an unsustainable way and sowing the seeds for damaging problems in the future.
You might, or might not, agree with these perspectives. Either way, it is reasonable to ask if we are
on the right track: is inflation targeting still appropriate?
Before I address this question, I would like to push back against the idea that central banks simply
can’t achieve their inflation targets. As we all know, some central banks have struggled to
achieve their targets over a long period of time; Japan and the euro area are the obvious examples. But
this is not a universal experience. Over recent times, inflation has been around target in Canada,
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. So the experience is mixed (Graph 5).
There is no single factor that explains this mixed experience. But countries that are operating nearer
to full capacity are more likely to have inflation close to target. It also appears that if you have an
extended period of very low inflation – as did Japan and the euro area – it is harder to
get back to target as a deflationary mindset takes hold. It is also possible that demographics may be
playing a role, although the evidence here is mixed.
Overall, these varying experiences do not support the idea that it has become impossible for central
banks to achieve their targets.
Here in Australia, some have argued that a lower inflation target would be a good idea given the
ongoing low rates of inflation; that we should adjust our formulation of 2–3 per cent,
on average, over time. Lowering the target might have the short-run advantage of allowing us to say we
have achieved our goal, but shifting the goalposts hardly seems a good way to build long-term
credibility. Shifting the goal posts could also entrench a low inflation mindset.
More broadly, over recent years the international debate has gone in the other direction: that is, to
argue for a higher, not lower, inflation target. The argument is that a higher rate of inflation
– and thus a higher average level of interest rates – would promote economic welfare by
providing more room to lower interest rates, without running up against the lower bound. This greater
flexibility for monetary policy could stabilise the economy when it was hit with a negative shock. To be
clear, I am not arguing for a higher inflation target, but rather acknowledging there are arguments in
both directions.
This brings me back to the question: is inflation targeting still appropriate?
The short answer is yes, but it is important to be clear what this means in practice.
Inflation targeting can mean different things to different people. It comes in different shapes and
sizes. Some versions require a central bank to focus on inflation alone and set monetary policy so that
the forecast rate of inflation is equal to the target. But inflation targeting does not need to be rigid
like this.
In my view, an inflation targeting regime should consist of the following four elements.
The inflation target should establish a clear and credible medium-term nominal anchor for the
economy.
A high degree of uncertainty about future inflation hurts both investment and jobs. The economy works
best if there is a degree of predictability. Most people can cope with some variation in the inflation
rate from year to year. But dealing with uncertainty about what inflation is likely to average over the
medium term is more difficult. Inflation targeting plays an important role in reducing that uncertainty
by providing a strong nominal anchor.
The inflation target should be nested within the broader objective of welfare maximisation.
It is worth remembering that inflation control is not the ultimate objective. Rather, it is a means to
an end. And that end is the welfare of the society that we serve. I sometimes feel that as some central
banks sought to establish their credentials as inflation fighters they over-emphasised the importance of
short-run inflation outcomes. And this has been difficult to walk back from. Some central banks have
been concerned that if they gave weight to other considerations, the community might doubt their
commitment to inflation control. So, it became all about inflation.
But central banks have a broader task than just controlling inflation in a narrow range. They play an
important role in preserving macroeconomic stability and thus the steady creation of jobs. Also, their
decisions affect borrowing and asset prices and thus financial stability too. Central banks have to
determine how to balance these considerations when making monetary policy decisions. This means it makes
sense for inflation targeting to be embedded within the broader objective of maximising the welfare of
society.
The inflation target should have a degree of flexibility.
This is not to say that the target itself should be flexible; this would diminish its usefulness in
providing a medium-term anchor. Rather, some variation in inflation from year to year is acceptable and
indeed unavoidable. How much variation is too much is difficult to know, but the variation should not be
so large that it generates doubt about the commitment of the central bank to achieving the target over
time.
The inflation target needs to be accompanied by a high level of accountability and transparency.
If the inflation target is operated flexibly and is nested within the broader objective of welfare
maximisation, the central bank has a degree of discretion. It is important that when exercising this
discretion, the central bank is transparent. Problems can arise if the community doesn’t
understand the central bank’s actions, or if they see it as acting unpredictably or
inconsistently with its mandate. This means you should expect us to explain what we are doing, why we
are doing it and how we are balancing the various trade-offs.
So these are the four elements that I see as important to an effective inflation-targeting regime.
We have all four elements in Australia. Our commitment to deliver an average inflation rate over time
of 2 point something provides a strong nominal anchor. We have always viewed the inflation target
in the wider context, reflecting the broad mandate for the RBA set out in the Reserve Bank Act
1959. That Act was passed 60 years ago and has stood the test of time. The RBA was also one
of the earliest advocates of flexible inflation targeting – this is evident in our use of the
words, ‘on average, over time’ when describing our target. We also place a heavy emphasis
on explaining our decisions and their rationale to the community.
Our overall assessment is that Australia’s monetary policy framework has served the country well
over the past three decades. The flexibility that has always been part of our regime has helped underpin
a strong and stable economy and has helped Australia deal with some very large economic shocks. We are
not inflation nutters. Rather, we are seeking to deliver low and stable inflation in a way that
maximises the welfare of our society.
Over the nearly 30 years we have had the inflation target, inflation has averaged
2.4 per cent, very close to the midpoint. It has, however, been below this average over recent
years and I will talk about this in a few moments.
Before I do so, it is important to note that we periodically review
the formulation of the current target and examine alternative monetary
frameworks, including at our annual conference last
year.[2] We are also monitoring closely the discussions that are
taking place in the academic community and in other central banks. In my view, the evidence does not
support the idea that a change to our inflation target would deliver better economic outcomes than
achieved by our current flexible inflation target. Some alternative frameworks would also be more
difficult to implement and/or be harder to explain to the community. But it is important that we
regularly examine the arguments.
Australian Monetary Policy
I would now like to discuss recent inflation outcomes and monetary policy in Australia.
Like other countries, Australia has had low inflation over recent years. Over the past four years,
headline inflation has mostly been below 2 per cent, although it has been slightly above that
mark on a couple of occasions (Graph 6). In underlying terms, inflation has been below the band for
three years.
Given this history, it is reasonable to ask why this happened and how the Reserve Bank Board has
thought about it.
I will first focus on the period from late 2016 to late 2018. Through most of this period, gradual
progress was being made in returning inflation to target and the unemployment rate was moving lower.
Inflation was on a gentle upswing and the unemployment rate was coming down more quickly that we had
expected. Reflecting this, in August 2017 the two-year ahead inflation forecast was
2½ per cent. Since then it has been lower than this, at
2–2¼ per cent.
Throughout this period, the Board discussed the case for seeking a faster and more assured return of
inflation to around the midpoint of the target range. It was natural to be discussing this because
having inflation around the midpoint of the target range allows more scope for surprises in either
direction.
As you know, in the end the Board did not adjust interest rates through this period. It judged that
seeking to achieve a faster return of inflation to the midpoint of the target range would have been
accompanied by more rapid growth in debt, at a time when household balance sheets were already very
extended. Our judgement was that, given the progress that was being made towards our goals, it was
appropriate to use the flexibility in our inflation target to pursue a course that was more likely to be
in the country’s long-term interest. We could have generated a bit more inflation, but we would
have had faster growth in household debt as well.
I acknowledge that others might see this trade-off differently. But given the unemployment rate was
coming down and inflation had lifted from its trough, we did not see a strong case for monetary
easing.
Towards the end of last year, that assessment began to shift. Inflation was turning out to be lower
than we had earlier expected and our forecasts for inflation were being marked down. There are a few
reasons for this, but the one I want to highlight today is the flexibility of labour supply, as this
links back to my earlier discussion of the reasons for low inflation globally.
When we prepared our forecasts in mid 2017, we did so on the basis that the share of the adult
population participating in the labour market (the participation rate) would remain steady over the next
couple of years (Graph 7). At the time, this was considered a reasonable forecast: while we
expected some increase in participation from an encouraged worker effect because of solid employment
growth, we thought this would be offset by the ageing of the population.
Since then, things have turned out quite differently. Employment growth has been much stronger than
expected and the participation rate has risen by 1½ percentage points, which is a large change
over a fairly short period. Put simply, the strong demand for labour has been met by more labour
supply.
It is useful to consider the following thought experiment. Suppose the participation rate had still
risen materially, but by ¾ per cent, rather than 1½ per cent. All else
constant, this would have meant the unemployment rate today would have been well below
5 per cent.
This flexibility of labour supply is a positive development and has meant that strong employment growth
has not tested the economy’s supply capacity. More demand for workers has been met with more
labour supply. This has contributed to the subdued wage outcomes over recent times, which in turn has
contributed to the low inflation outcomes.
The more flexible supply side means that employment growth can be stronger without fears of
overheating. At the same time, the unemployment rate that would put upward pressure on inflation is also
lower than it once was.
As the evidence accumulated in support of these propositions, the outlook for monetary policy changed
and the Board lowered the cash rate in June and July. In making these decisions the Board also
recognised that the earlier concerns about the trajectory of household debt had lessened. The Board has
also paid attention to the shift in the outlook for monetary policy globally.
These two recent reductions in the cash rate will support demand in the Australian economy. So too will
recent tax cuts, higher commodity prices, some stabilisation in the housing market, ongoing investment
in infrastructure and a lift in resource sector investment. We also need to remember that the underlying
foundations of the Australian economy remain strong.
It remains to be seen if future growth in demand will be sufficient to put pressure on the
economy’s supply capacity and lift inflation in a reasonable timeframe. It is certainly possible
that this is the outcome. But if demand growth is not sufficient, the Board is prepared to provide
additional support by easing monetary policy further. However, as I have discussed on other occasions,
other arms of public policy could also play a role in this scenario.
Whether or not further monetary easing is needed, it is reasonable to expect an extended period of low
interest rates. On current projections, it will be some time before inflation is comfortably back within
the target range. The Board is strongly committed to making sure we get there and continuing to deliver
an average rate of inflation of between 2 and 3 per cent. It is highly unlikely that we will
be contemplating higher interest rates until we are confident that inflation will return to around the
midpoint of the target range.
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) has required several banks to tighten the intra-group funding arrangements for their Australian operations.
Following a review of funding agreements across the authorised deposit-taking (ADI) industry, APRA has notified Macquarie Bank Limited, Rabobank Australia Limited and HSBC Bank Australia Limited that the reporting of their intra-group funding as stable has been in breach of the prudential liquidity standard.
APRA’s review found these banks were improperly reporting the stability of the funding they received from other entities within the group. These banks had provisions in their funding agreements that would potentially allow the group funding to be withdrawn in a stress scenario, undermining the stability of the Australian bank.
APRA is requiring these banks to strengthen intra-group agreements to ensure term funding cannot be withdrawn in a financial stress scenario. APRA is also requiring these banks to restate their past funding and liquidity ratios where these had been reported incorrectly, to provide transparency to investors and the broader community. Supervisors are considering a range of further options, including the imposition of higher funding and liquidity requirements on these ADIs.
APRA Deputy Chair John Lonsdale said: “Macquarie Bank, Rabobank Australia and HSBC Australia are financially sound, with strong liquidity and funding positions in the current stable environment. However, to ensure they would be able to withstand a scenario of financial stress, group funding agreements for Australian banks must be watertight, so they can be relied on when they would be most needed.”
To assist ADIs in complying with the prudential regulations, APRA has published a new frequently asked question (question 17), available on the following page: Liquidity – frequently asked questions
17. How should clauses which accelerate the repayment of funds owing
under funding programs or agreements (such as in the event of a
material adverse change) affect the treatment of the funding under APS
210 Attachment A paragraph 45 and APS 210 Attachment C paragraph 8?
APRA expects that a clause which allows a lender (or depositor) to accelerate repayment if the ADI is under financial stress but is still solvent and meeting its financial obligations under the program/agreement will be included in the LCR as funding that has its earliest possible contractual maturity date within the LCR horizon of 30 days. A run-off rate according to the requirements of APS 210 Attachment A paragraph 53 must then be applied. Similarly, APRA expects for NSFR purposes that the ADI will assume a residual maturity of less than six months, being the earliest date at which the funds under the funding agreement containing the relevant acceleration clause may be redeemed, and assign an ASF factor in accordance with the requirements of APS 210 Attachment C paragraph 15. The clauses that were of concern allow the lender (or depositor) to accelerate maturity, making funds owed under the funding agreement immediately due and payable (regardless of the maturity date) upon the borrowing ADI hitting a particular trigger or coming under (or potentially coming under) stress. Such clauses could allow the lender (or depositor) to withdraw funds when they are most needed by the borrowing ADI. Further, the funds might be withdrawn in priority to other creditors, including retail depositors. Examples of such clauses include, but are not limited to:
any material adverse change of the borrowing ADI which could affect the ability of the borrowing ADI to satisfy its obligations;
meeting a specified market-based or similar trigger (for example, hitting a credit default swap spread or equity price), regardless of the likelihood of meeting that trigger;
any representation or warranty made at issuance later becomes untrue or misleading either when made or repeated;
a downgrade in excess of 3 notches in the borrowing ADI’s long-term credit rating; and
any litigation or governmental investigation or proceeding pending or threatened against the borrowing ADI.
APRA appreciates the difficulty of precisely prescribing whether a clause will result in the funding being included within the 30-day horizon of the LCR. APRA expects ADIs to apply a robust process of challenge to such a determination. However, at a high level, a clause that potentially triggers early repayment where the ADI is still meeting its financial obligations under the facility, has not failed and continues to operate as an ADI should warrant careful scrutiny. If the ADI remains in doubt, it should send a query to APRA rather than risk a potential breach of the requirements in APS 210. In addition to consideration of the appropriate LCR and NSFR requirements in APS 210, if an ADI has a term or condition in a funding agreement with a related entity which is not typically contained in its external funding programs and agreements, the ADI should also consider the requirements of APS 222 paragraph 9.
NAB has updated its mortgage serviceability assessment policy, becoming the final big four bank to amend its policy in response to APRA’s new guidance. Via The Adviser.
It has lowered its interest rate floor to 5.5 per cent and increased its interest rate buffer to 2.5 per cent, effective for all new home loan applications from 5 August.
The revisions have come in response to the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s (APRA) changes to
its home lending guidance, in which it scrapped the 7 per cent interest
rate floor for mortgage assessments and increased the buffer rate to
2.5 per cent.
Commenting on the
changes, NAB’s chief customer officer, consumer banking, Mike Baird
said: “NAB welcomes the updated APRA guidelines on home lending
serviceability.
“We believe now is the
right time to change the approach to how the affordability rate floor is
determined, given the continuing low interest rate environment.”
He
added: “As a responsible lender, serviceability is assessed using a
number of factors and we consider all lending applications on a
case-by-case basis.”
NAB
has matched ANZ’s rate floor of 5.5 per cent, and has undercut CBA and
Westpac, who dropped their floor rates to 5.75 per cent.
However, as
it stands, Macquarie has the lowest floor rate (5.3 per cent), with
MyState on the opposite side of the spectrum, dropping its floor rate to
just 6.2 per cent.
All the aforementioned lenders have also increased their buffer rates to 2.5 per cent.
Other
lenders are expected to follow suit, including non-banks, with Resimac,
which, along with the rest of the non-bank sector is not formally bound
by APRA’s guidance, also confirming that it is reviewing its policy.
This is in response to the fact that in the financial sector, APRA has observed an over-emphasis on short-term financial performance and a lack of accountability when failures occur, especially among senior management.
In a discussion paper released today for consultation, APRA has proposed creating a new prudential standard to better align remuneration frameworks with the long-term interests of entities and their stakeholders, including customers and shareholders.
Draft prudential standard CPS 511 Remuneration introduces heightened requirements on entities’ remuneration and accountability arrangements in response to evidence that existing arrangements have been a factor driving poor consumer outcomes.
The proposed reforms address recommendations 5.1 to 5.3 from the Final Report of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, which were endorsed by the Government in February.
The package of measures is materially more prescriptive than APRA’s existing remuneration requirements and will place Australia in line with better international remuneration practice.
Among the key reforms, APRA is proposing:
To elevate the importance of managing non-financial risks, financial performance measures must not comprise more than 50 per cent of performance criteria for variable remuneration outcomes;
Minimum deferral periods for variable remuneration of up to seven years will be introduced for senior executives in larger, more complex entities. Boards will also have scope to recover remuneration for up to four years after it has vested; and
Boards must approve and actively oversee remuneration policies for all employees, and regularly confirm they are being applied in practice to ensure individual and collective accountability.
APRA Deputy Chair John Lonsdale said it was clear that existing remuneration arrangements in many entities were not incentivising the right behaviours.
“Remuneration and accountability frameworks play an important role in driving employee behaviour. Where policies are poorly designed, or not followed in practice, companies may incentivise conduct that is contrary to the long-term interests of the company and its customers.
“In the financial sector, APRA has observed an over-emphasis on short-term financial performance and a lack of accountability when failures occur, especially among senior management.
“This has contributed to a series of damaging incidents that have undermined trust in both individual institutions and the financial industry more broadly. Crucially from APRA’s perspective, these incidents have damaged not only institutions’ reputations, but also their financial positions,” Mr Lonsdale said.
Mr Lonsdale said CPS 511 would complement the Banking Executive Accountability Regime to lift industry standards of accountability and reduce the likelihood of misconduct.
“Limiting the influence of financial performance metrics in determining variable remuneration will encourage executives to put greater focus on non-financial risks, such as culture and governance. As our recent response to the industry self-assessments made clear, this remains a weak spot in many financial institutions.
“Introducing the minimum holding periods for variable remuneration ensures executives have ‘skin in the game’ for longer, and allows boards to adjust remuneration downwards if problems emerge over an extended horizon.
“APRA will not be determining how much employees get paid. Rather, we want to empower boards to more effectively incentivise behaviour that supports the long-term interests of their entities. By reducing the risk of misconduct, we hope to see better outcomes for customers and higher returns for shareholders in the long-term.
“We recognise that some aspects of this proposal are far-reaching and will require major changes to industry practices. APRA will listen closely to feedback from impacted stakeholders to determine if our proposed approach is correctly calibrated to achieve its intended outcomes,” he said.
A three month consultation period will close on 22 October. APRA intends to release the final prudential standard before the end of 2019, with a view to it taking effect in 2021 following appropriate transitional arrangements. Copies of the discussion paper and the draft Prudential Standard CPS 511 Remuneration are available on the APRA website at: Consultation on remuneration requirements for all APRA-regulated entities.
I discuss the recent APRA Capability Review with Business Man and Ex ANZ Director John Dahlsen.
We discuss the need to change APRA, and also look at the structure of banking more generally.
Former chief executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Ross McEwan has
been appointed to the role of group chief executive officer and
managing director.
Mr McEwan has been chief executive of the
Royal Bank of Scotland since 2013 and led the bank through significant
change and recovery.
Mr McEwan will start at NAB no later than
April 2020 when his obligations to RBS are wrapped up and will be
invited to join the board of NAB at that time.
NAB chairman-elect
Philip Chronican said NAB was pleased with its appointment of Mr McEwan
given his long-standing knowledge of the banking industry.
“Ross
McEwan is the ideal leader for NAB as we seek to transform our
operations and culture firmly around leading customer service,
experience and products,” Mr Chronican said.
“Ross brings a
compelling range of experience across finance, insurance and investment
with a track record of delivering important and practical improvements
for customers. RBS has been through many of the same challenges which
NAB now faces around culture, trust and reputation.”
Mr McEwan who was group executive of retail banking at CBA for five years said he looked forward to returning to Australia.
“It
is a privilege to return to Australia and lead NAB at a crucial time
for the bank, its customers, employees, shareholders and the broader
community.
“There are a number of areas where NAB can extend its
lead, such as business banking, agriculture and health, and other areas
where I believe we should consistently lead such as customer service. We
must also meet and exceed the expectations of our many stakeholders,”he
said.
The new appointment means Mr Chronican will now take over Dr Ken Henry’s role as chairman in mid-Novemeber.
The board will put other interim management arrangements suitable to APRA in place if required before Mr McEwan starts.