$40.1 Billion (43.0 per cent) Interest-only Loans Written In 4Q 2014

APRA released their quarterly Property Exposure data to December 2014 today. We see continued strong growth in interest only loans. From DFA research we know these are mostly investment loans, despite the fact that APRA does not split out loan characteristics by investment and owner occupation. We think they should.

At a portfolio level, as at 31 December 2014, the total of residential term loans to households held by all ADIs was $1.28 trillion. This is an increase of $28.3 billion (2.3 per cent) on 30 September 2014 and an increase of $105.4 billion (9.0 per cent) on 31 December 2013. Owner-occupied loans accounted for 65.7 per cent of residential term loans to households. Owner-occupied loans were $840 billion, an increase of $14.8 billion (1.8 per cent) on 30 September 2014 and $57.6 billion (7.4 per cent) on 31 December 2013. Investment loans accounted for 34.3 per cent of residential term loans. Investment loans were $438.9 billion, an increase of $13.6 billion (3.2 per cent) on 30 September 2014 and $47.8 billion (12.2 per cent) on 31 December 2013.

Looking across the various types of ADI:

  • major banks held $1,037.3 billion of residential term loans, an increase of $23.0 billion (2.3 per cent) on 30 September 2014 and $83.7 billion (8.8 per cent) on 31 December 2013;
  • other domestic banks held $142.6 billion, an increase of $7.2 billion (5.3 per cent) on 30 September 2014 and $20.5 billion (16.8 per cent) on 31 December 2013;
  • foreign subsidiary banks held $54.3 billion, a decrease of $0.6 billion (1.1 per cent) on 30 September 2014 and an increase of $1.3 billion (2.5 per cent) on 31 December 2013;
  • building societies held $16.6 billion, an increase of $0.0 billion (0.1 per cent) on 30 September 2014 and a decrease of $0.1 billion (0.6 per cent) on 31 December 2013; and
  • credit unions held $27.9 billion, a decrease of $1.3 billion (4.5 per cent) on 30 September 2014 and an increase of $0.0 billion (0.1 per cent) on 31 December 2013.

Note that the higher growth of other domestic banks and lower growth of building societies and credit unions is in part due to the conversion of eight credit unions and one building society to banks.

ADIs with greater than $1 billion of residential term loans held 98.4 per cent of all residential term loans as at 31 December 2014. These ADIs reported 5.2 million loans totalling $1.26 trillion. The average loan size was approximately $241,000, compared to $234,000 as at 31 December 2013; $463.8 billion (36.9 per cent) were interest-only loans; and $31.5 billion (2.5 per cent) were low-documentation loans.

APRA-ADILoanPortfolioDec2014ADIs with greater than $1 billion of residential term loans approved $93.2 billion of new loans in the quarter ending 31 December 2014. This is an increase of $7.8 billion (9.2 per cent) on the quarter ending 30 September 2014 and $9.1 billion (10.8 per cent) on the quarter ending 31 December 2013. $58.4 billion (62.7 per cent) were for owner-occupied loans, an increase of $4.9 billion (9.2 per cent) from the quarter ending 30 September 2014; $34.8 billion (37.3 per cent) were for investment loans, an increase of $2.9 billion (9.1 per cent) from the quarter ending 30 September 2014;

Brokers accounted for 44.7% of loans by value, a record, since 2008. They reached an all time high of 46.7% prior to the GFC. However, if you take loan size into account, brokers continue to have a field day at the moment, thanks to high volumes and high commissions.

APRA-ADILoanNewDec2014$10.6 billion (11.4 per cent) had a loan-to-valuation ratio greater than or equal to 90 per cent; and $0.6 billion (0.7 per cent) were low-documentation loans.

APRA-ADILoanNewLVRDec2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

How Does High-Frequency Trading Impact Market Efficiency?

The Bank of England just published a research paper examining how High-Frequency Trading impacts Market Efficiency. High-frequency trading (HFT), where automated computer traders interact at lightning-fast speed with electronic trading platforms, has become an important feature of many modern financial markets. The rapid growth, and increased prominence, of these ultrafast traders have given rise to concerns regarding their impact on market quality and market stability. These concerns have been fuelled by instances of severe and short-lived market crashes such as the 6 May 2010 ‘Flash Crash’ in the US markets. One concern about HFT is that owing to the high rate at which HFT firms submit orders and execute trades, the algorithms they use could interact with each other in unpredictable ways and, in particular, in ways that could momentarily cause price pressure and price dislocations in financial markets.

Interactions among high-frequency traders Evangelos Benos, James Brugler, Erik Hjalmarsson and Filip Zikes

Using a unique data set on the transactions of individual high-frequency traders (HFTs), we examine the interactions between different HFTs and the impact of such interactions on price discovery. Our main results show that for trading in a given stock, HFT firm order flows are positively correlated at high-frequencies. In contrast, when performing the same analysis on our control sample of investment banks, we find that their order flows are negatively correlated. Put differently, aggressive (market-“taking”) volume by an HFT will tend to lead to more aggressive volume, in the same direction of trade, by other HFTs over the next few minutes. For banks the opposite holds, and a bank’s aggressive volume will tend to lead to aggressive volume in the opposite direction by other banks. As far as activity across different stocks is concerned, HFTs also tend to trade in the same direction across different stocks to a significantly larger extent than banks.

We find that HFT order flow is more correlated over time than that of the investment banks, both within and across stocks. This means that HFT firms tend more than their peer investment banks to buy or sell aggressively the same stock at the same time. Also, a typical HFT firm tends to simultaneously aggressively buy and sell multiple stocks at the same time to a larger extent than a typical investment bank. What does that mean for market quality? A key element of a well-functioning market is price efficiency; this characterises the extent to which asset prices reflect fundamental values. Dislocations of market prices are clear violations of price efficiency as they happen in the absence of any news about fundamental values.

Given the apparent tendency to commonality in trading activity and trading direction among HFTs, we further examine whether periods of high HFT correlation are associated with price impacts that are subsequently reversed. Such reversals might be interpreted as evidence of high trade correlations leading to short-term price dislocations and excess volatility. However, we find that instances of correlated trading among HFTs are associated with a permanent price impact, whereas instances of correlated bank trad- ing are, in fact, associated with future price reversals. We view this as evidence that the commonality of order flows in the cross-section of HFTs is the result of HFTs’ trades being informed, and as such have the same sign at approximately the same time. In other words, HFTs appear to be collectively buying and selling at the “right” time. The results are also in agreement with the conclusions of Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2014), who find evidence of commonality among the trading strategies of algorithmic trades in the foreign exchange market, but who also find no evidence that such commonality appears to be creating price pressures and excess volatility that would be detrimental to market quality.

A final caveat is in order. The time period we examine is one of relative calm in the UK equity market. This means that additional research on the behaviour of HFTs, particularly during times of severe stress in equity and other markets, would be necessary in order to fully understand their role and impact on price efficiency.

DFA’s perspective is a little different. The underlying assumption in the paper is that more transactions gives greater market efficiency, and therefore HFT is fine. We are not so sure, as first the market efficiency assumption should be questioned, second it appears those without HFT loose out, so are second class market participants – those with more money to invest in market systems can make differentially more profit. This actually undermines the concept of a fair and open market. We think HFC needs to be better controlled to avoid an HFC arms race in search of ever swifter transaction times. To an extent therefore, the paper missed the point.

 

How Does Macroprudential Impact Foreign Banks?

The Bank of England just released a paper which examines whether cross-border spillovers of macroprudential regulation depend on the organisational structure of banks’ foreign affiliates. On a tight leash: does bank organisational structure matter for macroprudential spillovers?  Piotr Danisewicz, Dennis Reinhardt and Rhiannon Sowerbutts.

Do multinational banks’ branches reduce their lending in foreign markets more than subsidiaries in response to changes in the regulatory environment in their domestic markets? And if so, how strong is this effect and how long does it last?

Studies show that multinational banks transmit negative shocks to their parent banks’ balance sheets – including changes in regulation – across national borders. In this paper we examine if the magnitude of the spillover effects depends on the organisation structure of banks’ foreign affiliates. We exploit cross-country cross-time variation in the implementation of macroprudential regulation to test if lending in the UK of foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries respond differently to a tightening of capital requirements, lending standards or reserve requirements in foreign banks’ home countries.

Focusing on differences in lending responses of branches and subsidiaries which belong to the banking group allows us to control for all factors which might affect parent banks’ decisions regarding their foreign affiliates’ lending. Our results show that whether foreign branches or subsidiaries react differently to changes in regulation in their home countries depends on the type of regulation and the type of lending.

Multinational banks’ branches respond to tighter capital requirements in their home countries by contracting their lending more than subsidiaries. On average, branch interbank lending growth in the UK grows by 6.3 percentage point slower relative to subsidiaries following a tightening of capital requirements in the bank’s home country. This is in line with our hypothesis which predicts that branch lending will be affected due to higher degree of control which parent banks have over its foreign branches. But this heterogeneity in response to capital requirements is only observed in case of lending to other banks. We find that the response of lending to non-bank borrowers to a tightening in capital requirements does not depend on the organisational forms of foreign banks’ UK affiliates. Turning to the impact of a tightening in lending standards or reserve requirements, we find that there are no differential effects on interbank and non-bank lending.

Additional analysis suggests that the stronger contraction in the provision of interbank loans exhibited by branches is only contemporaneous – ie the differential effect fades out after one quarter. Our research provides some evidence that a branch structure is more likely than a subsidiary structure to transmit a tightening in capital requirements affecting the parent institution in the home country. However, the effects we find are short-lived which means that the potential negative effects associated with a higher number of foreign branches we find in this study may not necessarily outweigh any benefits.

Mortgage Securitisation On The Rise

The ABS today released the data for Australian Securitisers to December 2014. We see two interesting points, first the value of mortgages being securitised has risen (up 4.8%), and second, a greater share are being purchased by Australian investors (all but 7.2%). We discussed recently the rise on securitisation, and the implications. We know the securitised mortgage pools have been securitised by both the banking sector, and non-banking sector. Investors who buy mortgage back securitised paper are of course leveraged into housing at a second order level.

At 31 December 2014, total assets of Australian securitisers were $136.5b, up $4.8b (3.6%) on 30 September 2014.

SecuritisersAssetsDec2014During the December quarter 2014, the rise in total assets was due to an increase in residential mortgage assets (up $5.2b, 4.9%) and cash and deposits (up $0.3b, 7.1%). This was partially offset by decreases in other loans (down $0.6b, 3.9%).

Residential and non-residential mortgage assets, which accounted for 83.0% of total assets, were $113.3b at 31 December 2014, an increase of $5.2b (4.8%) during the quarter.

At 31 December 2014, total liabilities of Australian securitisers were $136.5b, up $4.8b (3.6%) on 30 September 2014. The rise in total liabilities was due to the increase in long term asset backed securities issued in Australia (up $4.3b, 4.3%) and loans and placements (up $3.0b, 18.4%). This was partially offset by a decrease in short term asset backed securities issued in Australia (down $1.5b, 33.0%) and asset backed securities issued overseas (down $1.1b, 10.4%).

SecuritiserLiabilitiesDec2014At 31 December 2014, asset backed securities issued overseas as a proportion of total liabilities decreased to 7.2%, down 1.1% on the September quarter 2014 percentage of 8.3%. Asset backed securities issued in Australia as a proportion of total liabilities decreased to 77.5%, down 0.7% on the September quarter 2014 percentage of 78.2%.

Note the ABS says revisions have been made to the original series as a result of improved reporting of survey data. These revisions have impacted the assets and liabilities reported as at 30 September 2014 and 30 June 2014.

RBA Outsources Macroprudential to APRA

In the Monetary Policy Meeting of the Reserve Bank Board minutes, released today, there is significant emphasis on the role of APRA to regulate the housing market. The economic data suggested continued easing in momentum, and the rate reduction was line ball, between cutting straight away or leaving it a month. Nothing about future intentions.

Financial Markets

Members commenced their discussion of financial markets with the observation that central bank policy actions, along with developments in Greece, had been the main focus of markets over the past two months.

Members were briefed about the announcement by the European Central Bank (ECB) of a large sovereign bond purchase program in January, following its assessment that its existing measures would not be sufficient to prevent inflation from remaining well below 2 per cent for a prolonged period. Starting in March, the ECB plans to purchase €60 billion of securities each month, well above the current rate of purchases of private securities; sovereign bonds would be bought in proportion to member countries’ contributions to the ECB’s capital. Debt purchases would continue until there was a sustained increase in inflation, but they would end no earlier than September 2016. This would increase the size of the ECB’s balance sheet past its 2012 peak of €3.1 trillion. While less than the US Federal Reserve’s maximum purchases of US$85 billion a month, on an annualised basis the ECB’s purchases would be equivalent to around 7½ per cent of the euro area’s annual GDP, compared with 6 per cent of US GDP for purchases by the Federal Reserve (and 16 per cent of Japanese GDP for purchases by the Bank of Japan).

Members noted that the Federal Reserve continued to indicate that it expected to start increasing its policy rate around the middle of this year, but financial markets had pushed back expectations for the first rate rise in the United States to around the end of the year. A number of central banks had eased policy in recent months in response to the effect of lower oil prices, including the Reserve Bank of India and the Bank of Canada. Markets had also pushed back expectations for policy tightening by a number of other central banks. In contrast, the central banks of Russia and Brazil had increased their policy rates.

The Swiss National Bank (SNB) abandoned its exchange rate ceiling against the euro, which had been in place since September 2011, and lowered the rate on bank deposits at the SNB by 50 basis points to −0.75 per cent. The SNB’s announcement noted that divergences between the monetary policies of the major currency areas had increased significantly. The move surprised markets, resulting in considerable market volatility and the bankruptcy of several foreign exchange brokers.

Members noted that sovereign bond yields in the major markets had fallen significantly since the December meeting. The falls had occurred across the yield curve but were particularly pronounced at longer maturities, with yields on 10-year bonds in the United States falling back to around 1.6 per cent and those in Germany and Japan reaching historic lows of 30 and 20 basis points, respectively. At these levels there was very little, if any, compensation for term risk. For maturities up to five years, yields on bonds issued by Japan, Germany and most of the core euro area economies, as well as Sweden and Switzerland, had fallen below zero. Yields on Australian government bonds had mostly tracked global developments and had also fallen considerably, with the 10-year yield declining to a historical low below 2½ per cent.

The declines in global bond yields reflected a number of factors but the extent of the decline in yields was difficult to explain. The large bond purchases by major central banks had clearly contributed but so too had a reduction in bond supply, reflecting a narrowing of fiscal deficits in a number of countries. Concerns about the global growth outlook and the risk of sustained low inflation following falls in the oil price had also played a role.

Members noted that the Greek authorities had indicated that they planned to restructure the country’s debt, most of which was owed to official sector institutions. Greece had nonetheless also indicated a desire to remain part of the euro area. The current European assistance program expired at the end of February and markets had been closed to Greece since the recent election. Members also noted that the critical issue in the near term was not so much the obligations of the Greek Government but rather the funding of Greek banks. To date, there had been minimal spillover from developments in Greece to other markets.

There had been sizeable movements in exchange rates since the December meeting, reflecting the increasingly divergent paths of monetary policy among the major advanced economies. Most notably, the Swiss franc had appreciated by around 15 per cent against the euro since mid January. While the US dollar had depreciated against the Swiss franc, it had also appreciated further against most other currencies since the December meeting (including by around 10 per cent against the euro). The renminbi had been little changed against the US dollar over much of 2014, but had depreciated somewhat since the December meeting.

The Australian dollar had depreciated by around 9 per cent against the US dollar since the December meeting. On a trade-weighted basis, the Australian dollar was around 4 per cent below its early 2014 levels, notwithstanding significant falls in commodity prices over the intervening period. The depreciation of the Australian dollar against the US dollar and renminbi had been partly offset by its appreciation against the yen and euro.

Equity prices in advanced economies had been broadly unchanged since early December, notwithstanding a strong rally in European share prices following the announcement of the expansion of the ECB asset purchase program. Global equity prices had risen moderately over 2014, led by an 11 per cent increase in US equity prices, while Chinese equities had significantly outperformed other emerging markets since mid 2014.

In Australia, equity prices recorded a smaller rise over 2014 than that recorded in most global markets, primarily reflecting the decline in equity prices of resource companies. Equity prices had increased by 4 per cent since the start of 2015 even though prices of resource companies had fallen further.

Members noted that Australian lending rates on the outstanding stock of housing and business loans had continued to edge down since the December meeting. At the time of the December meeting, financial market pricing had suggested some chance of an easing in policy during 2015. This expectation strengthened somewhat during January, and by the time of the February meeting pricing reflected a two-thirds probability of a 25 basis point reduction in the cash rate at that meeting, with the cash rate expected to be 2 per cent by the end of the year.

International Economic Conditions

Members noted that growth of Australia’s major trading partners had been around its long-run average in 2014 and that early indications suggested this pace had continued into 2015. Prices of a range of commodities, notably oil and iron ore, had fallen further in recent months, reflecting a combination of both lower growth in global demand for commodities and, more importantly, significant increases in supply. Members also noted that the lower oil prices, if sustained, would be positive for the growth of Australia’s trading partners, which are net importers of energy, and would continue to put downward pressure on global prices of goods and services. Very accommodative global financial conditions were also expected to support global growth in 2015. These positive effects on trading partner growth, however, were expected to be largely offset in 2015 by a gradual decline in the pace of growth in China.

In China, economic growth had eased a little but was close to the authorities’ target for 2014. Growth of household consumption had held up over 2014, while growth of investment and industrial production – which contribute significantly to the demand for commodities – had trended lower over the past year or so. Conditions in the residential property market had remained weak, and measures introduced to support the market appear to have had only a modest effect so far.

In Japan, economic activity had been weaker than expected since the increase in the consumption tax in April 2014, but growth appeared to have resumed in the December quarter and the labour market remained tight. However, inflation had declined in recent months and remained well below the Bank of Japan’s target. The pace of growth had slowed a little in the rest of east Asia over 2014; as the region as a whole is a net importer of oil, activity was likely to have been supported by the decline in oil prices.

Members observed that the US economy had continued to strengthen, resulting in output growing at an above-trend pace over the second half of 2014. Employment growth had picked up further and the unemployment rate had continued to decline. Ongoing strength in the labour market and lower gasoline prices had contributed to a sharp rise in consumer sentiment. On the other hand, growth in the euro area remained modest. Inflation had remained well below the ECB’s target and inflation expectations had declined further, prompting the ECB to implement additional stimulus measures.

Domestic Economic Conditions

Members noted that the data released since the December meeting suggested that the domestic economy had continued to grow at a below-trend pace over the second half of 2014. Resource exports appeared to have continued growing in the December quarter and growth was expected to remain strong, particularly as liquefied natural gas (LNG) production came on line over the next year or so. The lower exchange rate was expected to support growth of exports, particularly service exports such as education and tourism.

Activity and prices in the housing market had continued to be bolstered by the low level of lending rates and strong population growth. A range of indicators, including residential building approvals, suggested further growth of dwelling investment in the near term. Housing price inflation had moderated from the rapid rates seen in late 2013, but remained high and in Sydney and Melbourne had been well above the growth rate of household income. Growth of owner-occupier housing credit had remained around 6 per cent in year-ended terms, while investor credit had continued to grow at a noticeably faster rate.

Members were briefed on the main regulatory actions taken recently to address housing risks in the domestic economy. In particular, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) had announced several policy measures in early December to reinforce sound residential mortgage lending practices. These policies included clarification of prudential expectations on what constituted acceptable growth in housing lending to investors and the possible steps that would be considered if APRA’s expectations were not met, such as increased capital requirements.

Turning to the business sector, members noted that mining investment had continued to decline in the second half of 2014, and larger declines were expected over 2015 as existing projects were completed and very few new projects were likely to proceed. Non-mining business investment had remained subdued and recent data pointed to this continuing into the first half of 2015. Growth in public demand was expected to be subdued over the next year or so.

Members observed that household consumption growth had picked up since its lows in early 2013, supported by low interest rates and rising housing wealth. However, consumption growth had remained below average. The recent decline in fuel prices was expected to provide some offset for overall household incomes from weak growth in labour incomes.

Members noted that the most recent data on the labour market had been a little more positive than early in 2014. However, while employment growth had strengthened somewhat over the past year, the unemployment rate had increased further over 2014 and average hours worked had remained below the levels of a few years ago. Leading indicators of labour demand had changed little in recent months and pointed to only modest employment growth in the months ahead.

Consumer price inflation had declined in year-ended terms, partly as a result of a large fall in fuel prices in the December quarter and the effect of the repeal of the carbon price on utility prices in the September quarter. Various measures of underlying inflation, which largely abstract from these and other temporary factors, had declined in year-ended terms to around 2¼ per cent. Non-tradables inflation (excluding utility prices) had declined further in year-ended terms to relatively low levels, consistent with subdued domestic cost pressures. Prices of tradable items (excluding volatile items and tobacco) were little changed in the December quarter, but were expected to face upward pressure over time from the pass-through of the depreciation of the Australian dollar since early 2013.

Turning their discussion to the economic outlook, members noted that staff forecasts for output, which were conditioned on an assumption of no change in the cash rate, had been revised lower in the near term. Recent data indicated that the expected pick-up in consumption and non-mining business investment was likely to occur later than had been previously anticipated, while the pick-up in LNG exports over coming quarters was now likely to be less rapid. At the same time, it was anticipated that the net effect of commodity price changes and the exchange rate depreciation over the past three months would provide a positive impetus to domestic growth over the next year or so. Overall, the underlying forces driving growth remained much as they had been for some time and GDP growth was still expected to pick up gradually to an above-trend pace in the latter part of the forecast period.

The revisions to GDP growth implied that the unemployment rate would peak at a higher rate and later than had been previously forecast, before declining gradually. The inflation forecast had also been revised lower, reflecting the softer outlook for labour and product markets as well as the recent fall in oil prices. Headline inflation was expected to remain low for a time, before picking up at the end of the forecast period. Underlying inflation was expected to remain well contained and consistent with the target throughout the forecast period.

Members discussed a number of uncertainties around the forecasts. They noted that developments in commodity markets, particularly the price of oil, would affect future global growth and inflation outcomes. One area of uncertainty continued to be the outlook for the Chinese property market and its implications for Chinese demand for commodities. Members also noted that developments in commodity markets were likely to be affected by supply factors; for instance, the response of ‘unconventional’ oil producers in North America to lower oil prices.

As usual, the path of the exchange rate remained a key area of uncertainty. Members noted that the exchange rate had remained above most estimates of its fundamental value, given the decline in commodity prices over the past year, and that future exchange rate movements would be affected by market expectations for monetary policy, both domestically and abroad. They noted that, all else being equal, a sustained further depreciation would, if it occurred, stimulate growth in the domestic economy and put some temporary upward pressure on inflation.

Members noted that there was considerable uncertainty around the timing and extent of the expected increase in household consumption growth and non-mining business investment. Although fundamental factors such as low interest rates and strong population growth remained in place, they had not been sufficient to see a significant pick-up in the growth of these variables or a decline in the degree of spare capacity in the labour market. In addition, recent data suggested that the expected improvement in economic conditions would occur later than had been previously expected. Members commented that a strengthening in non-mining investment was a necessary element for growth to pick up to an above-trend pace, and noted the importance of confidence in underpinning such an outcome. Indeed, an improvement in the appetite for businesses to take on risk had the potential, should it occur, to lead to much stronger growth in non-mining business investment than currently forecast.

Considerations for Monetary Policy

In assessing the appropriate stance for monetary policy in Australia, members noted that the outlook for global economic growth was little changed, with Australia’s major trading partners still forecast to grow by around the pace of recent years in 2015. Commodity prices, particularly those for iron ore and oil, had declined over the past year largely in response to expansions in global supply, though members judged that demand-side factors, such as the weakness in Chinese property markets, had also played some role. Conditions in global financial markets had remained very accommodative.

Domestically, over recent months there had been fewer indications of a near-term strengthening in growth than previous forecasts would have implied. This included survey measures of household and business confidence, which remained around or even a bit below average. As a result, the revised staff forecasts – which were based on an unchanged cash rate – suggested that GDP growth would remain below trend over the course of this year, before gradually picking up to an above-trend pace in 2016, somewhat later than had been previously expected. The unemployment rate was therefore expected to peak a little higher (and later) than in the previous forecast. The net effect of declining commodity prices and the depreciation of the exchange rate was expected to boost growth over the forecast period. Nonetheless, the higher degree of spare capacity now in prospect and lower oil prices had led to a lowering of the forecast for inflation, offset somewhat by the effects of the recent exchange rate depreciation. The restrained pace of wage increases over the past year or so and accompanying growth in productivity, which had dampened growth in unit labour costs, suggested that low rates of inflation were likely to be sustained. In other respects, the forces underpinning the outlook for domestic activity and inflation were much as they had been for some time.

Members noted the current accommodative setting of monetary policy, which had been providing support to domestic demand. They noted that the Australian dollar had depreciated noticeably against a rising US dollar over recent months, although less so against a basket of currencies, and that it remained above most estimates of its fundamental value, particularly given the significant declines in key commodity prices. Members agreed that a lower exchange rate was likely to be needed to achieve balanced growth in the economy.

Given the large increases in housing prices in some cities and ongoing strength in lending to investors in housing assets, members also agreed that developments in the housing market would bear careful monitoring. They noted that it would be important to assess the effects of the measures designed to reinforce sound residential mortgage lending practices announced by APRA in December.

On the basis of their assessment of current conditions and taking into account the revised forecasts, the Board judged that a further reduction in the cash rate would be appropriate to provide additional support to demand, while inflation outcomes were expected to remain consistent with the 2 to 3 per cent target. In deciding the timing of such a change, members assessed arguments for acting at this meeting or at the following meeting. On balance, they judged that moving at this meeting, which offered the opportunity of early additional communication in the forthcoming Statement on Monetary Policy, was the preferred course.

The Decision

The Board decided to lower the cash rate by 25 basis points to 2.25 per cent, effective 4 February 2015.

Risky Lending In A Low Interest Rate Competitive Environment

Regulators have been concerned about the quality of lending, and have been increasing their supervision, conscious of the potential impact on financial stability. However, a paper from the Bank for International Settlements  – Bank Competition and Credit Booms highlight that especially when interest rates are low, and competition intense, banks will naturally and logically drop underwriting standards. This observation is highly relevant to the Australian context, where competition for home loans in particular is leading to heavy discounting from already low rates, and potential lax underwriting. It suggests that lowering rates further will exacerbate the effect.

Greater bank competition and a lower risk-free rate raise the screening costs of lending, which can result in sharp increases in credit supply and deteriorations in average loan quality, which are inefficient for banks. Banks’ incentives to make risky loans can vary despite unchanged capital structure, thus highlighting the role of a risk-taking mechanism. This approach helps explain the existing mixed empirical results on the relationship between bank competition and financial stability. The model can be used to define a neutral interest rate in the context of financial cycles.

There is a growing recognition that the relationship between finance and growth may be unstable in practice. Past financial crises serve as painful reminders that increasing financial access by too much too fast is subject to diminishing returns at best, and can even lead to severe output losses when the financial sector is in disarray. Despite ample evidence for this perverse nonlinearity, there is less understanding about the exact mechanism by which excessive finance that is harmful for stability can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. Similarly, the role of policy in navigating the trade-o between growth and financial stability, unlike that between growth and inflation, remains a relatively uncharted territory.

This paper proposes a simple model of bank lending decision, where a`credit boom’ could emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon. Two key forces interact to determine the equilibrium. First, banks have an incentive to screen out bad clients by restricting the amount of lending per contract, as riskier firms are known to seek larger loans despite a lower chance of success. Such screening entails costs to both banks and good firms, given that credits are being rationed to meet incentive compatibility conditions. This feature is essentially classic credit rationing.

The second force comes into play when banks enjoy some monopolistic power over their loan market, but can attempt to poach clients from another bank by offering cheaper loan contracts. Lowering prices of loans raises the screening costs, because it necessitates even greater credit rationing if banks were to screen out risky fi rms. When the degree of bank competition for borrowers is suciently intense, it becomes optimal for banks to stop screening and rush to dominate the market by off ering contracts with larger loans to all firms. This new pooling equilibrium is characterised by a low lending interest rate (relative to the average productivity of underlying projects), a larger loan size, and a higher probability of loan defaults.

A lower risk-free rate increases the banks’ incentives to lend by lowering the opportunity cost of funds. But how the credit market equilibrium responds to changes in the risk-free rate also depends on the market structure in which banks operate. In particular, when a bank can gain more market share for a given cut in lending rate, the degree of competiton tends to be higher in equilibrium for any level of risk-free rate. Credit booms are therefore more likely to occur when banks compete more aggressively and/or the risk-free rate is low. In this context, the notion of `fi nancial stability neutral’ monetary policy can be given an explicit de nition, namely that which will prevent a pooling equilibrium from occuring. At the same time, the presence of intense bank competition can limit the effectiveness of monetary policy in containing a credit boom and achieving the financial stability objective.

Why A Larger Finance Sector Is Killing The Economy

The Bank for International Settlements released a paper “Why does financial sector growth crowd out real economic growth?” The paper suggests that rather than encouraging a bigger banking sector, we should be careful because a larger finance sector actually kills growth in the real economy. That is an important insight, given that in Australia, the ratio of bank assets to GDP is higher than its ever been, and growing, at a time when economic growth in anemic.

GDP-to-Bank-Assets-Sept-2014Other countries have significantly higher ratios. The mythology that a bigger banking sector is good for Australia should be questioned. At a time when banks are growing in Australia, thanks to high house prices and lending, inflating their size, we should be looking hard at these findings, because if true, we are on the wrong track.

The purpose of this paper is to examine why financial sector growth harms real growth. We begin by constructing a model in which financial and real growth interact, and then turn to empirical evidence. In our model, we first show how an exogenous increase in financial sector growth can reduce total factor productivity growth. This is a consequence of the fact that financial sector growth benefits disproportionately high collateral/low productivity projects. This mechanism reflects the fact that periods of high financial sector growth often coincide with the strong development in sectors like construction,  where returns on projects are relatively easy to pledge as collateral but productivity (growth) is relatively low.

Next, we introduce skilled workers who can be hired either by financiers to improve their ability to lend, increasing financial sector growth, or by entrepreneurs to improve their returns (albeit at the cost of lower pledgeability). We then show that when skilled workers work in one sector it generates a negative externality on the other sector. The externality works as follows: financiers who hire skilled workers can lend more to entrepreneurs than those who do not. With more abundant and cheaper funding, entrepreneurs have an incentive to invest in projects with higher pledgeability but lower productivity, reducing their demand for skilled labour. Conversely, entrepreneurs who hire skilled workers invest in high return/low pledgeability projects. As a result, financiers have no incentive to hire skilled workers because the benefit in terms of increased ability to lend is limited since entrepreneurs’ projects feature low pledgeability. This negative externality can lead to multiple equilibria. In the equilibrium where financiers employ the skilled workers, so that the financial sector grows more rapidly, total factor productivity growth is lower than it would be had agents coordinated on the equilibrium where entrepreneurs attract the skilled labour. Looking at welfare, we are able to show that, relative to the social optimum, financial booms in which skilled labour work for the financial sector, are sub-optimalwhen the bargaining power of financiers is sufficiently large.

Turning to the empirical results, we move beyond the aggregate results and examine industry-level data. Here we focus on manufacturing industries and find that industries that are in competition for resources with finance are particularly damaged by financial booms. Specifically, we find that manufacturing sectors that are either R&D-intensive or dependent on external finance suffer disproportionate reductions in productivity growth when finance booms. That is, we confirm the results in the model: by draining resources from the real economy, financial sector growth becomes a drag on real growth.

Their conclusions are important.

First, the growth of a country’s financial system is a drag on productivity growth. That is, higher growth in the financial sector reduces real growth. In other words, financial booms are not, in general, growth-enhancing, likely because the financial sector competes with the rest of the economy for resources. Second, using sectoral data, we examine the distributional nature of this effect and find that credit booms harm what we normally think of as the engines for growth – those that are more R&D intensive. This evidence, together with recent experience during the financial crisis, leads us to conclude that there is a pressing need to reassess the relationship of finance and real growth in modern economic systems.

 

Bendigo Bank Results Show Signs Of Home Loan Competition

Bendigo and Adelaide Bank (BEN), Australia’s fifth largest bank, today announced an after-tax statutory profit of $227.3 million for the six months ending 31 December 2014. The results were in line with the consensus expectations. Underlying cash earnings were $217.9 million, a 10.9 per cent increase on the prior half year result. Bad and doubtful debts expense was $30.1 million, down 29.5% on the prior corresponding period. NIM was maintained at 2.24%. Cash earnings per share were 48.1 cents, an increase of 3.4 per cent.

The interim fully franked dividend of 33 cents per share is up 2 cents on the 2014 interim dividend.

Basel III CET1 ratio increased by 12bps half on half to8.14% and an $292m additional Tier 1 capital issued in October. $600m RMBS was issued in December 2014. Total capital increased 80bps half on half to 12.19%.

Looking at the segmentals, Retail banking was up 14.2% from Jun 2014 ($128m to $146m), Third party banking was down 4.6% from Jun 2014 ($95.8m) to $91.4m, Wealth fell 37.5% from $19.5m to $12.0m and Rural rose 73.3% from $24.3m to $42.1m including the Rural Finance acquisition – in In July 2014, Bendigo finalised its $1.78 billion acquisition of Rural Finance Corp. from Victoria’s state government which has grown its agricultural lending. Overall, home lending grew at just 3.2% compared with system growth of 7.1%, whilst arrears were around 0.5%. There was strong competition through the broker originated channel.

BendigoHomeLendingDec2104They grew business lending by 19.7% compared with system of 7.4%. Business loan arrears were around 1.4%. Deposit growth was 1.5%, compared with system of 9.1%. Bendigo had an 8 basis point squeeze on lending margins thanks to competitive pressures and as a result they reduced term deposit pricing to help partly offset this so the net interest margin remained unchanged. Customer satisfaction remains higher than the majors, highlighting their unique position in the market.

The market reacted negatively to the results, because the growing business lending sector may imply higher loss rates, pressure on home lending margin and share, and reduced provisioning.

 

Is More Securitisation A Good Thing?

Prior to the 2007 Financial Crisis, securitisation was seen as a tool to support economic growth and financial stability by enabling issuers and investors to diversify and manage risk. By transforming a pool of illiquid assets into tradable securities, securitisation frees up bank capital, allowing banks to extend new credit to the real economy, and support the transmission of monetary policy. However, it has the capacity to amplify the flow of credit inside or outside the banking system, increase leverage, exacerbate misaligned incentives in the financial intermediation chain, and, thus, ultimately amplify systemic risk. It was right at the heart of the GFC. Now, Regulators and Bankers are looking for ways to resurrect securitisation, and there are signs of momentum beginning to grow in some markets.

In a recent speech, Dame Clara, External Member of the Financial Policy Committee, Bank of England, noted that whilst it is important to recognise that market-based finance can also present systemic risk, a more balanced financial system should emerge in the long-term. This should make both the real economy and banking system more resilient to economic shocks, as well as help central banks step back from “last resort” measures and allow private markets to operate more widely and efficiently. She also highlighted the important role of investment banks in helping this balance to be achieved. Firstly, by facilitating equity and bond issuance, and secondly by ensuring liquidity in the secondary market for those assets.

In the US and Europe, Securitisation issues fell from 2007 onwards, but are showing signs of recovery (chart shows billions of US dollars)

Global-Securitisation-2014In Australia, where momentum started in mid 1990’s, we saw a similar collapse post the GFC. But again, we are seeing the first signs of a lift in volumes, as the mortgage market has grown.

Securitisation-Assets-Sept-2014But, is this a good thing? It certainly enables Banks to lend more. Changes to the capital rules will however mean these methods are less effective from a capital efficiency view point than prior to the GFC. In December 2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published “Revisions to the Securitisation Framework”. This framework, which will come into effect in January 2018, forms part of the Committee’s broader Basel III agenda to reform regulatory standards for banks in response to the global financial crisis and thus contributes to a more resilient banking sector. The new concept aims to make capital requirements more prudent and risk-sensitive, reduce mechanistic reliance of the industry on external credit ratings, and reduce cliff effects. In all the proposed approaches a risk-weight floor of 15 percent for any securitization tranche is suggested. Net, net however, securitisation will still be capital efficient.

The IMF recently released a discussion paper on Securitisation, the Road Ahead, where the role of securitisation was discussed, and some ideas laid out as to how to allow securitisation to be used, without the overlay of complex risks. They suggest that:

Placing private securitisation markets back on a firm and sustainable footing has never been more important. Financial risk-taking has resurfaced, but securitisation has yet to retake its instrumental role in rekindling credit flows and diversifying risks. Clearly, securitisation must be managed in a way that supports financial stability rather than posing risks to it. Many reforms have focused on mitigating these risks. They need to be complemented by further policy actions to secure a thriving financial ecosystem for securitisation.

Proposed reforms along the four-stage financial intermediation chain should be strengthened. First, the quality of underlying loan origination practices should be further beefed up to restore the appetite for securitisation. Second, securitisation intermediaries must be encouraged to develop structures that are transparent, straightforward to value, and primarily designed to finance the real economy. Legal ambiguities related to the rights and obligations of servicers, trustees, and investors should be avoided. Establishing the secure, transparent, and cost-effective transfer of claims on collateral will be paramount. Third, credit ratings can be put to better use. Standardised definitions of securitisation characteristics and full disclosure of the rating process would increase transparency and confidence. The practice of rating shopping should be disclosed and the removal of references to external ratings in regulations accelerated. Fourth, investors can be galvanised by ensuring consistent application of capital charges across asset classes and borders. It will be beneficial to avoid large step-changes in charges (the so-called “cliff effects”) between classes of securitised assets that do not differ much in underlying quality.

More granular application of industry standards for the classification of risk would preserve the benefits of those standards while mitigating due diligence problems encountered during the crisis. A single aggregate label for risk tends to act as a credit rating, encouraging investors to shirk on their due diligence. Changes in the rating can create forced buying and selling pressure independent of the variation in investor tolerances for risk. Proposals for a binary (high-low quality) aggregate classification system risk creating a fragmented market with significant pricing discontinuities. Instead, standardisation across individual risk factors (i.e., duration, prepayment risk, collateral fungibility, track record of credit performance, etc.) could mitigate these concerns.

Finally, securitisation markets would be strengthened by fostering a diversified nonbank institutional investor base with a long time horizon. In the case of Europe, for instance, the development of a suitable nonbank investor base will likely require the pan-European harmonization of loan-level reporting standards, documentation standards, insolvency regimes, and taxation treatment of securitisations. Regulatory, institutional, and product design obstacles will also need to be overcome to encourage greater sponsorship from European insurers and pension funds, both of which are underutilized potential sources of patient, long-term capital. These efforts could also contribute to the broader aim of diversifying the sources of financing for the European economy.

So regulators are trying to figure out the best mix of regulation and control to allow securitisation to become more main stream again. We agree significant changes would be required across the securitisation value chain, but are less convinced of the merits to allowing such financial engineering to be drive the market. It remains a complex and relatively opaque funding method, designed to leverage capital harder. The risk is however is that other more exotic alternatives are also being explored and as indicated earlier, more open securitisation mechanisms may be lower risk from a financial stability perspective than some others – the question is, is this sufficient reason to encourage a resurgence?

90% of additional Tier 1 instruments issued by banks globally in 4Q14 were for large Chinese banks

According to Fitch, nearly 90% of additional Tier 1 (AT1) instruments issued by banks globally in 4Q14 were issued by large Chinese banks. This resulted in Chinese banks, which were not present in the growing AT1 market before 4Q14 becoming the third-largest issuers of AT1 instruments behind UK and Swiss banks and accounting for around 20% of the USD131bn AT1 and other capital-trigger instruments.

Overall, banks issued around USD29bn in AT1 bonds in 4Q14, the second-strongest quarter after 2Q14. Fitch expects issuance volumes in 1H15 to remain dominated by Chinese banks which are likely to issue around USD50bn AT1 instruments in the short-term, mostly in local currency in their domestic market.

However, with the year-end results season under way and following tax status clarifications of AT1 instruments in several European countries, issuance from European banks will also likely remain solid, provided market conditions are conducive. This was evidenced by a EUR1.5bn issue by Netherlands-based Rabobank Group in January 2015.

Overall coupon omission and write-down/conversion risk in the AT1 market remained broadly stable in 4Q14. The write-down/conversion TDA (the issue size-weighted distance between the applicable common equity Tier 1 ratio of the issuer and the contractual write-down or conversion trigger) increased by a negligible 14bps to 679bps at end-4Q14, indicating marginally lower average write-down/conversion risk. In absolute terms, the write-down/conversion TDA widened to USD39.2bn at end-4Q14 from USD26.5bn at end-3Q14 largely as a result of the above-average size (in absolute terms) of the new Chinese issuers.