Banking On The Future – The Property Imperative Weekly 29 Sept 2018

Welcome to the Property Imperative weekly to 29th September 2018, our digest of the latest finance and property news with a distinctively Australian flavour.

Another mega week, with the Royal Commission interim report out, the FED lifting rates, APRA releasing their banking stress tests, more class actions launched and Banks lifting their provisions to cover the costs of remediation, so let’s get stuck in…

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The Royal Commission Interim Report came out on Friday and turned the spotlight on the Greed driving Financial Services to sell at all costs, take fees from dead people, and reward anti-customer behaviour.  The report also called into question the role of the regulators, saying they were weak, and did not do their job. In fact, it’s not the lack of appropriate law, but it is noncompliance, without consequence which is the issue. They also raised the question of the STRUCTURE of industry. We discussed this in an ABC Radio National Programme, alongside Journalist Adele Ferguson and Ex. ACCC boss Graeme Samuel, and also in our show “Inside The Royal Commission Interim Report”.

The Royal Commission has touched on the critical issues which need to be considered. But now we have to take the thinking further.  In terms of structure, we should be thinking about how to break up the financial services sector into smaller more manageable entities that are not too big to fail. We should separate insurance from wealth management from core banking, and separate advice from product selling and manufacturing. There is a clear opportunity to implement Glass Steagall, which separates risky speculative activity from core meat and potatoes banking services we need. There is a big job to be done in terms of cultural change, within the organisations, as they shift to customer centricity – building their businesses around their customers. This requires different thinking from the top. Also Regulators have clearly not been effective because they were too close and too captured. This must be addressed.  The industry has played them, being prepared to pay small penalties if they get caught as just a cost of doing business. No real consequences.

Poor culture is rife across the industry and regulators.  For example, LF Economics Lyndsay David tried under a FOI request to get APRA to release details of its targeted reviews into the mortgage sector from 2016. Specifically whether Treasury were aware of the results. They were not.

The review was never intended to made public but was revealed during the Hayne Royal Commission. It found that at Westpac only one in 10 of banks’ lending controls were operating effectively.   In fact, APRA had ordered these “targeted review” in October 2016 and were conducted by PWC for WBC and CBA.  On 12 October 2016, APRA issued a letter to the Bank and 4 other large banks requesting that they undertake a Review into the risks of potential misrepresentation of mortgage borrower financial information used in loan serviceability assessments. In its letter, APRA referenced assertions made by commentators that “fraud and manipulation of ADI residential mortgage origination practices are relatively commonplace”.   Frankly the fact that these were buried, and the APRA still refuses to release they tells us more about APRA than anything else. After all we know mortgage fraud was widespread.

In this light, the APRA stress tests results, is on the same theme, high level, and vague, compared with the bank by bank data the FED releases, it’s VERY high level!  In APRA’s view, the results of the 2017 exercise provide a degree of reassurance: ADIs remained above regulatory minimum levels in what was a very severe stress scenario.  John Adams and I discussed this recently in our post “The Great Airbrush Scandal”  APRA is not convincing.

ASIC revealed this week that it has identified serious, unacceptable delays in the time taken to identify, report and correct significant breaches of the law among Australia’s most important financial institutions. It can they say take over 4.5 years to identify that a breach incident has occurred! ASIC chair said “Many of the delays in breach reporting and compensating consumers were due to the financial institutions’ inadequate systems, procedures and governance processes, as well as a lack of a consumer orientated culture of escalation”.

So now there is a growing sense of panic as according to the Australian, for example, from APRA who says a horde of Australia’s biggest ­financial institutions and super­annuation funds have been forced by the prudential regulator to ram through an in-depth review of their culture and governance before the royal commission ends next year.  After copping heavy criticism over the course of Kenneth Hayne’s royal commission over a lack of enforcement in the financial sector, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority has demanded Westpac, ANZ and National Australia Bank mimic the landmark cultural investigation of Commonwealth Bank the regulator launched late last year. Along with the major banks, some of the nation’s biggest union and employer-backed super funds — such as the $40 billion Hostplus, $35bn fund Cbus and $50bn REST super fund — have also been asked by APRA to review their culture.

And from the industry, for example the AFR reported that Westpac hauled each of its 40,000 bankers into urgent briefings by chief executive Brian Hartzer this week, before the Royal Commission Report came out, who warned them to bring forward customer problems.

Westpac also announced that Cash earnings in Full Year 2018 will be reduced by an estimated $235 million following continued work on addressing customer issues and from provisions related to recent litigation.  This included increased provisions for customer refunds associated with certain advice fees charged by the Group’s salaried financial planners due to more detailed analysis going back to 2008. These include where advice services were not provided, as well as where we have not been able to sufficiently verify that advice services were provided; Increased provisions for refunds to customers who may have received inadequate financial advice from Westpac planners;   Additional provisions to resolve legacy issues as part of the Group’s detailed product reviews;    Provisions for costs of implementing the three remediation processes above; and Estimated provisions for recent litigation, including costs and penalties associated with the already disclosed responsible lending and BBSW cases. Costs associated with responding to the Royal Commission are not included in these amounts.

Across the industry more than $1 billion has been put aside, so far and more to come. And guess who will ultimately pick up the tab for these expenses – yes we the customers will pay!

Another class action was announced this week as Law firm Slater and Gordon said it had filed class action proceedings in the Federal Court against National Australia Bank and MLC on behalf of customers sold worthless credit card insurance. Most were existing NAB customers and the bank should have known the insurance was likely to be of little or no benefit to them. Despite knowing this, NAB have continued to push the insurance widely, reaping millions in premiums while doing so. most people were sold the insurance over the phone and were not given a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms and conditions of the policy.

We continued to debate the trajectory of home price falls, as Media Watch discussed the 60 Minutes segment we were featured in. Once again somewhat myopic views were expressed by host Paul Barry, as we discussed on our recent post. You can also watch the 60 Minutes segment on YouTube which covers my views more comprehensively.  Prices are set to fall further. Period.

Realestate.com.au says that according to a survey of property experts and economists further falls in housing prices across Australia’s cities are expected.  They suggest an 8.2% fall in house prices in Sydney, a 8.1% fall in Melbourne and a 7% fall in Brisbane. In fact all centres are expected to see a fall.  Finder.com.au insights manager Graham Cooke was quoted as saying that the cooling market conditions made it harder for existing homeowners to build up equity. But they could be good news for first-home buyers with a deposit in hand. “If you’re thinking of getting into the market over the next few years, hold out until prices have dropped further and use this time to save for your upfront costs,” he said. “Right now, there’s no need to jump on the first suitable property you see. Waiting a few years could potentially save you thousands of dollars.”

Damien Boey at Credit Suisse said this week that by the start of 2020, Sydney house prices could have dropped by 15-20% from their 2017 peak. The market is heavily oversupplied, even before we consider the risk of higher insolvency activity and foreclosure sales. He argues that demand is the problem – not credit supply. We could ease lending standards from here, and still not cause housing demand to bounce back. Investors cannot sustain capital growth by themselves. They need a “greater fool” to on sell their houses too. But foreign demand is weak, and first home buyers are priced out of the market. Specifically, Chinese demand for property is weak, as evidenced by low levels of outward direct investment, and the failure of the AUD to rise in response to CNH weakness. Promised relaxation of capital controls has not eventuated, and CNY devaluation pressure has had a negative impact on credit conditions, as well as the ability of Chinese residents to export capital abroad. Finally, dwelling completions are still rising in response to high levels of building approvals from more than a year ago – the building lead time has lengthened significantly. As for the RBA, any rate cuts from here are unlikely to be passed on in full to end borrowers, given counterparty credit risk concerns in the interbank market.

UBS Global Housing Bubble Index came out and showed that Sydney had slipped from 4th to 11th in a year. They noted that Prices peaked last summer and have slid moderately as tighter lending conditions reduced affordability. Particularly since the land tax surcharge more than doubled and a vacancy fee was introduced, the high end of the market has suffered most. The vacancy rate on the rental market has also climbed. Nevertheless, inflation-adjusted prices are still 50% higher than five years ago, while rents and incomes have grown at only single-digit rates.

Corelogic reported further prices falls this week in Sydney, down 0.57%, Melbourne down 0.79%, Adelaide, down 0.15%, Perth down 0.73%, while Brisbane rose a little up 0.06%.  Melbourne looks to be the weakest centre currently, and we continue to expect to see further falls.

CoreLogic says that last week 2,404 homes went to auction across the combined capital cities, returning a final auction clearance rate of 52.4 per cent, slightly higher than the 51.8 per cent the previous week which was the lowest seen since Dec-12. Over the same week last year, 2,782 homes went to auction and a clearance rate of 66.2 per cent was recorded.

Melbourne’s final clearance rate was recorded at 53.8 per cent across 1,161 auctions last week, compared to 54.1 per cent across a lower 988 auctions over the previous week. This time last year a higher 1,361 homes were taken to auction across the city and a much stronger clearance rate was recorded (70.6 per cent).

Sydney’s final auction clearance rate came in at 51.1 per cent across 851 auctions last week, up from 48.6 per cent across 669 auctions over the previous week. Over the same week last year, 1,033 Sydney homes went to auction returning a final clearance rate of 65.9 per cent.

Across the smaller auction markets, clearance rates improved across Adelaide and Tasmania, while Brisbane, Canberra and Perth saw clearance rates fall week-on-week.

Of the non-capital city auction markets, the Geelong region was the best performing in terms of clearance rate (61.1 per cent), followed by the Hunter region where 58.8 per cent of homes sold.

The combined capital cities are expecting 65 per cent fewer homes taken to market this week, with half the nation host to an upcoming public holiday, combined with both the NRL and AFL grand finals being held over the weekend, it looks to be a quiet week for the auction markets.

There are 846 capital city auctions currently being tracked by CoreLogic this week, down from the 2,404 held last week and lower than the 969 auctions held over the same week last year.

Finally, the latest RBA and APRA lending statistics, plus the June quarter household ratios, shows that credit growth is still too strong, with the 12-month growth by category shows that owner occupied lending is still growing at 7.5% annualised, while investment home loans have fallen to 1.5% on an annual basis. Overall housing lending is growing at 5.4% (compared with APRA growth of 4.5% over the same period, so the non-banks are clearly taking up some of the slack). Still above wages and inflation. Household debt continues to rise.

The non-bank sector (derived from subtracting the ADI credit from the RBA data) shows a significant rise up 5% last month in terms of owner occupied loans. APRA needs to look at the non-banks. And quickly. This was confirmed looking at the rising household debt to income ratios, where in short the debt to income is up again to 190.5, the ratio of interest payments to income is up, meaning that households are paying more of their income to service their debts, and the ratio of debt to home values are falling. All three are warnings.  The policy settings are not right. You can watch our show “What Does The Latest Data Tell Us?  But for now it is worth highlighting that despite all the grizzles from the property spruikers, mortgage lending is STILL growing…. and faster than inflation. We have not tamed the debt beast so far, despite failing home prices.  No justification to ease lending standards – none.

So to a quick look at the markets. The ASX 200 Financial Sector Index was up 1.20% on Friday to close at 6,127 – in a relief rally that the Royal Commission report was not worse (and the prospect of less regulation was mooted). We think this will reverse as the full implications of the report are digested, but of course the market profits from volatility.  CBA, the biggest owner occupied mortgage lender was up 1.9% to close at 71.41, despite some analysts now suggesting a fair price closer to 65.00.  Both are a long way from the 81.00 it reached in January. It will not return there anytime soon.

Westpac rose 1.16% to close at 27.93, still well off its November 2017 highs of 33.50, National Australia Bank rose 1.76% to 27.81 and ANZ closed at 28.10 up 1.4%.  AMP, who has already been hit hard by the Royal Commission rose 1.59% to 3.19, still way down on its March highs before the revelations came out.  Macquarie Group fell 1.34% and ended at 126.04. Suncorp ended at 14.46, up 0.84% and Bendigo Adelaide Bank rose 1.22% to 10.75. The Aussie ended up a little to 72.22, 0.19% higher on Friday, but with still more falls expected ahead, we think it could test 71.00 quite soon.

In the US markets, the Dow Jones Industrial ended at 26,458, up 0.07%, but off its recent highs, the NASDAQ  ended up 0.05% to 8,046, while the S&P 500 was flat at 2,913.  The Volatility index was lower, at 12.12, down 2.34%. The bulls are, in the short term at least, firmly in control.

Gold was up 0.74% to 1,196, but still in lower regions than last year, reacting to the strength of the US Dollar.  Oil was higher again, up 1.41% to 73.53.  In fact, until sizable supply is offered up by OPEC some are suggesting we could see prices above the $100 per barrel market, but $100 seems an overreach on the current charts.

On the currencies, the Yuan USD was up 0.31% to 14.56, as China continues to manage the rate lower.  Of course the trade wars are in full play.

President Trump has announced a 10% tariff on $200 billion in Chinese imports. That tariff is currently 10%, but at the end of 2018, that’s expected to rise to 25%. This is the third round of tariffs, and it’s the largest round of tariffs. Back in July, we had $34 billion worth of Chinese goods tariffed. Then, in August, we had a follow-on of $16 billion in tariffs. So, this is really a huge jump up of $200 billion. This is affecting all kinds of goods. The U.S. brings in a little over $500 billion worth of goods from China. The $250 billion so far this year is roughly half, but Trump has said that if China were to take retaliatory action on these tariffs, which they have, in fact, then he’s going to put in place another $267 billion worth of imports. For all intents and purposes, that would put a tariff in place on 100% of U.S.-China trade.

China also announced some tariffs on $60 billion worth of goods that also went into effect on September 24th. This is in addition to, China had also had previously announced tariffs of $50 billion. The total U.S.-China trade is about $130 billion dollars of imports of United States goods into China. This second round of Chinese tariffs is going to now cover $110 billion dollars of the $130 billion of U.S.-China trade — again, almost 100% of the entire trading relationship.

So, this is pretty significant in that almost all the cards have been played here. If all the threats and allegations with regard to tariffs are followed through upon, all of U.S.-China trade is set to be under some kind of tariff barrier in 2018. This will be a big deal.

The 10 Year Bond rate was up 0.29% to 3.065 after the Fed rate hike this week.  The Fed moved as expected, and continues to highlight more upward movements in the months ahead – in fact their language is arguably more bullish now.  The target range for the federal funds rate is now 2 to 2-1/4 percent. In their projection release, they see GDP sliding from 2019…. while inflation is expected to rise. The 3-month rate was up 0.35% on Friday to 2.207., still signalling a recession risk down the track. We discussed the impact of the US Rated move in our show “The FED Lifts, More Ahead And What Are The Consequences?

We think the US corporate bond market is the key here, and we discussed this in our video Is A [US] Corporate Meltdown On The Cards?

Finally, turning to Crypto, Bitcoin ended down 1.43% to 6,617. Little signs of new directions here in the short term.

So in summary a week dominated by the Royal Commission locally, against a back cloth of higher international interest rates, and risks.  We are, as they say, set for interesting times ahead.

JP Morgan To launch ASX OTC Clearing Agency For AUD/NZD Denominated OTC Derivatives.

From Investor Daily.

After successfully clearing a trade for one of its underlying clients, JP Morgan will be the first to launch the service for the Australian dollar.

The ASX operates the largest listed interest rate derivatives market in Asia with an annual turnover of $53 trillion and has a fully developed OTC Clearing service.

ASX executive general manager derivatives and OTC markets Helen Lofthouse said ASX had invested in a capital efficient clearing infrastructure and JP Morgan’s access demonstrated its commitment to clients.

“It also shows ASX’s determination to develop services valued by the market, which includes local clearing that’s open throughout the Australian and New Zealand time zone,” she said.

The launch underscores JP Morgan’s commitment to clearing, said Head of Asia clearing David Martin.

“This investment underlines our commitment to the Australian and New Zealand marketplace, and the Asian marketplace in general,” said Mr Martin.

Mr Martin said that the OTC derivatives clearing market was continually changing and JP Morgan needed to offer greater choices.

“Clients need a clearing broker whose business model continues to evolve and a product offering that continues to expand,” he said.

Mr Martin said that, globally, JP Morgan was broadening products for their clients and wanted to provide the local market support for investors.

“JP Morgan’s approach also allows our clients to use the depth of our local markets franchise and our ability to make markets at the ASX,” he said.

Futures & Options and OTC Clearing manager at JP Morgan David Stinson said that by using the ASX services, it allowed them to extend benefits to more clients.

“By supporting the cross-margining facility that ASX offers across its cleared interest rate derivatives, we are extending this benefit to buy-side clients and allowing them to access funding and margin efficiencies,” he said.

Fed Hikes As Expected – More To Come…

The Fed moved as expected, and continues to highlight more upward movements in the months ahead – in fact their language is arguably more bullish now.  The target range for the federal funds rate is now 2 to 2-1/4 percent.

In their projection release, they see GDP sliding from 2019….

… while inflation is expected to rise:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising at a strong rate. Job gains have been strong, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has stayed low. Household spending and business fixed investment have grown strongly. On a 12-month basis, both overall inflation and inflation for items other than food and energy remain near 2 percent. Indicators of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that further gradual increases in the target range for the federal funds rate will be consistent with sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective over the medium term. Risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced.

In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 2 to 2-1/4 percent.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Jerome H. Powell, Chairman; John C. Williams, Vice Chairman; Thomas I. Barkin; Raphael W. Bostic; Lael Brainard; Richard H. Clarida; Esther L. George; Loretta J. Mester; and Randal K. Quarles.

RBA Confirms Banks Create Money

There was an interesting speech from RBA Assistant Governor (Financial Markets) Christopher Kent entitled “Money – Born of Credit“.

The first fascinating point was his confirmation that loans create deposits (rather than deposits creating loans, which was the traditional view of how banks worked).  This is a critical pivot, because it means banks can create ever more loans, provided borrowers are prepared to borrow.  This is something I have discussed many times, and recently with Steve Keen on the DFA YouTube Channel. It has profound implications for monetary policy.

Control of credit in this model becomes critical.

The second is that he then tries to explain why inter bank lending rates remain elevated for Australian banks. I think he is less successful here, because the obvious missing link in the risk premium which is now in place (given the litany of issues raised by the Royal Commission, regulatory pressure, and potential class actions).

Our banks are having to pay more for their funding because of their recent track record, and this is not going to flip back anytime soon, in my view.

Here is the speech which is worth reading.

 

Most of us would put cold hard cash at the top of our list when we think of money. Others would include funds they have on deposit at a bank. Some might contemplate broader measures of their wealth. Historians would be tempted to tell us about the role of precious metals, coins, salt, shells and even rum when the topic of money is raised. When thinking about the role that money plays in an economy, economics teachers and academics might educate us about money multipliers, the velocity of money and money demand and supply functions. Keen students of episodes of high inflation would discuss Milton Friedman and the notion that inflation is ‘always and everywhere’ a monetary phenomenon. Given this, concerned citizens might be worried about what they see as the ability of private banks to create money via the extension of credit, seemingly at will.

While there are many interesting aspects of money, today I want to focus on the questions of how money is created and how money relates to lending or credit. Along the way, I’ll also review what’s been happening to both money and credit in Australia over recent decades. The process of money creation is often subject to a degree of confusion, in part because the explanation draws upon a combination of disciplines – accounting, banking and economics.

What Is Money?

It is relatively standard practice to define money according to its ability to do each of the following three things:

  • money can be used for transactions – it facilitates the exchange of goods, services or assets thereby avoiding the substantial costs associated with barter
  • money is a store of value – it’s worth does not fluctuate wildly, nor does it degrade rapidly over time, and
  • money acts as a commonly accepted unit of account – it provides a convenient means of comparing the value of a range of different goods, services or assets.

Banknotes and coins – otherwise known as currency – satisfy each of these functions. Currency long ago pushed aside other physical forms of money.

Currently, there is around $75 billion of currency in circulation in Australia (outside of the banking system). However, despite its usefulness, currency represents only a small share of money in modern economies.

Most money consists of deposits in banks, building societies and credit unions (simply referred to here as banks). Just as I can pay for my morning coffee using currency, I can also transfer funds in my bank deposit to the café’s account. In either case, the café owner receives a liquid store of value which they are confident will be accepted by others.

Not all bank deposits are equally liquid – for instance, it can take some time to gain access to funds in a term deposit. For this reason, it is common to construct a range of different ‘monetary aggregates’, from the more liquid narrower forms money – such as M1, which includes currency and current deposits at banks – to ‘broad money’, which also captures less liquid deposits and other financial products that share the characteristics of money discussed earlier (Table 1; Graph 1); for example, broad money includes certificates of deposit or short-term debt securities. For convenience, in what follows I’m going to focus on broad money.

Table 1: Monetary Aggregates
Measure Description(a)
Currency Notes and coins held by the private non-bank sector
Money base Currency + banks’ holdings of notes and coins + deposits of banks with the Reserve Bank + other Reserve Bank liabilities to the private non-bank sector
M1 Currency + current (cheque) deposits of the private non-bank sector at banks
M3 M1 + all other deposits of the private sector at banks (including certificates of deposit) except deposits of authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) + all deposits of the private non-ADI sector at credit unions and building societies (CUBS)
Broad money M3 + other deposit-like borrowings of all financial intermediaries (AFIs) from the non-AFI private sector (such as short-term debt securities)
(a) These descriptions abstract from some detail. See the Financial Aggregates release for more information.
Graph 1
Graph 1: Composition of Broad Money in Australia

 

Broad money represents a relatively liquid form of wealth held by Australian households and businesses. It includes currency, deposits and deposit-like products.[1] Unlike ancient forms of physical money – think shells or gold found in the natural environment – these are liabilities issued by authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) and other financial intermediaries.[2] Broad money in Australia is currently around $2 trillion or 115 per cent of the value of annual economic output as measured by nominal GDP; most of that is in the form of banking deposits. Over the past decade, the share of broad money represented by term and other bank deposits has increased in importance at the expense of holdings of current deposits and other borrowings from the private sector.

How Is Money ‘Created’?

Australia’s banknotes are produced by the Reserve Bank of Australia and account for most (about 95 per cent) of the value of Australian currency. The rest is accounted for by coins produced by the Royal Australian Mint.

Banks purchase banknotes from the Reserve Bank as required to meet demand from their customers and, in turn, the Reserve Bank ensures that it has sufficient banknotes on hand to meet that demand. Previous research by the Reserve Bank points to a number of drivers of demand for banknotes. The most important is the size of the economy.[3] This is consistent with people holding some fraction of their income in this most liquid form of money in order to undertake transactions.[4] Some share of demand is also accounted for by the desire for a liquid store of wealth. The value of banknotes in circulation as a share of nominal GDP has actually increased over recent years (to around 4 per cent), which suggests that this source of demand has grown strongly. This increase has been observed in a range of countries and is consistent with the low level of interest rates, which has reduced the opportunity cost of holding money (compared with holding interest-bearing deposits).

When customers withdraw currency from an ATM or a bank branch, the value of their deposit holdings declines and the value of their currency holdings increases. The stock of broad money, however, is unchanged.

As I mentioned earlier, the vast bulk of broad money consists of bank deposits. These banking liabilities are created when an Australian household or business has funds credited to their deposit account at an Australian bank. One way this can occur, for example, is when a business deposits currency it has earned with its bank. Again, such transactions add to deposits but do not create money because the bank customer is simply exchanging one type of money (currency) for another (a deposit).

Money can be created, however, when financial intermediaries make loans. Accordingly, the concepts of money and credit are closely linked in a modern economy, albeit not one for one. When a bank extends a loan, it makes money available to the borrower, for example, to buy a car, a house or equipment for a business. The bank may credit the deposit account of the borrower, who withdraws the funds to make their purchase. Alternatively, the bank may directly credit the deposit account of the seller on behalf of the borrower. In either case, the loaned funds will tend to find their way into a deposit somewhere in the banking system. This process adds to the supply of money.

If I stopped here, you might be left with the impression that the process of lending allows the banking system to create endless quantities of money at no cost. However, the process of money creation is constrained in numerous ways and depends on the behaviour of borrowers, banks and regulators, as well as the stance of monetary policy.

In the first instance, the process of money creation requires a willing borrower. That demand will depend, among other things, on prevailing interest rates as well as broader economic conditions. Other things equal, lower interest rates or stronger overall economic conditions will tend to support the demand for credit, and vice versa.

The bank then has to be willing and able to issue the loan:

  • It has to satisfy itself that the borrower can service the loan.
  • The bank must maintain a sufficient share of its assets in liquid form to meet any drawdowns relating to the new loan, as well as meeting any withdrawals from existing depositors.[5] Otherwise, the bank runs the risk of failing to meet its obligations when they fall due.
  • The bank’s loans and other assets need to be backed by adequate capital. Capital is needed to absorb unexpected losses arising from defaults or other sources of variation in the value of assets.
  • The interest rates charged on loans must cover expected losses on the loan portfolio, as well as the costs of deposits and other sources of funding. Revenues from loans and other assets will also have to cover the operating costs of the bank, while allowing it to earn a profit so that shareholders can earn a reasonable return on the bank’s capital.

All of these considerations imply that money creation occurs at some cost, which serves to constrain the extent of lending. These constraints are reinforced by regulatory requirements for liquidity, capital adequacy and lending standards set by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Other things equal, anything that reduces the willingness or ability of banks to make loans can be expected to result in lower growth of (system-wide) money.

It’s also worth emphasising that the process of money creation is not the result of the actions of any single bank – rather, the banking system as a whole acts to create money. A single bank may make loans by drawing on its liquid assets, yet not receive the corresponding deposits created in return. Before extending further loans, that bank would need to raise funds in other ways – for example, by issuing debt or equity securities or by waiting for its deposits and liquid assets to rise via other means.[6]

Graph 2 illustrates how the process of money creation can work. It shows an example of an increase in loans of $100 billion. However, the increase in loans in this case leads to an increase in deposits of $60 billion; in other words, the changes are not one for one. This is because there are other sources of funding besides deposits – and indeed, loans are not the only assets held by banks. In the example shown, other funding comes from issuance of debt and equity. The shares from different sources are in line with the actual funding behaviour of the banking system over recent years (Graph 3).

Graph 2
Graph 2: Stylised Banking Sector Deposit Growth
Graph 3
Graph 3: Funding Composition of Banks in Australia

 

In summary, changes in the stock of broad money are the result of a myriad of decisions, including those of banks, their borrowers, creditors and shareholders. And these decisions take place within the framework of a range of regulatory and institutional arrangements. It is worth noting that the Reserve Bank does not target a particular level or growth rate of money (although it has done so under a previous monetary policy regime).[7] Instead, the Reserve Bank has some influence on the money stock via the effect of its interest rate target for the overnight cash rate on other interest rates in the economy. These in turn affect the cost of borrowing and economic conditions more generally. Ultimately, borrowing and lending decisions – and thus the creation of money – are constrained by the need for prudent banking behaviour, the budget constraints of borrowers and the profitability of lenders.

One final word on the creation of money is that as fun as it is to teach students about traditional money multipliers, I don’t find them to be a very helpful way of thinking about the process. In Australia, simple regulatory regimes – which had earlier required banks to hold a minimum share of their deposits as reserves with the Reserve Bank – have been replaced with modern prudential regulation and market discipline. Again, the demand for and supply of credit is the real driver of money. That point can be reinforced by examining the behaviour of credit and money over time.

What Has Money Been Doing and Why?

Given that money is used for transactional purposes and as a store of value, it makes sense that most of the time it would at least keep pace with growth in the value of nominal spending. Indeed, in Australia it has grown faster than that over the past 40 years, roughly doubling as a share of nominal GDP (Graph 4).

Growth of credit has been stronger still, roughly tripling as a share of nominal GDP, from under 50 per cent in the early 1980s to over 150 per cent currently. A closer look at the banks’ balance sheets shows how these changes have occurred.

Graph 4
Graph 4: Credit and Broad Money – Share of Nominal GDP

 

In 1980, Australian banks held more than 80 per cent of their liabilities as deposits (worth around $47 billion at the time) (Graph 5). This deposit base was more than sufficient to fund loans of about 60 per cent of assets (worth $34 billion). The majority of the remaining assets were held in the form of securities (mostly government bonds).[8]

Graph 5
Graph 5: Banks’ Assets and Liabilities – 1980

 

As banks grew through the next four decades or so, there was a marked change in the composition of their balance sheets. These changes reflected choices by both banks and the private sector and were strongly influenced by the deregulation of the financial system. In particular, constraints on banks’ business activities were progressively removed in the 1970s and early 1980s (for example, the interest rates they could charge and pay, their product offerings, lending volumes and their asset holdings). This was associated with significant changes in banks’ abilities to attract and use different funding sources to support balance sheet growth.[9] By the early 1990s, Australians’ demand for credit from banks became larger than the sum of all of their deposits.

Following a period of slower growth around the early 1990s recession, credit growth picked up again and continued to grow much more quickly than money. To enable this, a greater proportion of bank funding during this period was drawn from sources other than deposits. Much of it owed to an increase in the issuance of debt securities, which was supported, in part, by a strong appetite from non-residents for Australian bank debt.

These trends continued until the global financial crisis. Following the crisis, credit growth fell for a while (reflecting a decline in both the supply of and demand for credit). At the same time, the stock of (broad) money increased noticeably, rising by around $1.1 trillion dollars, from around 80 per cent of GDP in 2007 to around 115 per cent in 2018. This strong growth reflected a sharp increase in the share of funding sourced from deposits at the expense of short-term debt securities, consistent with banks seeking more stable funding. Meanwhile, households and businesses increased the share of their assets held in the form of deposits.

While loans have grown dramatically in nominal terms, to around $2.6 trillion today, the share of loans on banks’ balance sheets is the same as it was in 1980 (Graph 6).[10] In contrast, and notwithstanding the increase in deposits since the global financial crisis, the share of deposits has declined over the past 40 years from above 80 per cent to around 50 per cent of banks’ balance sheets.[11] Currently, a sizeable share of banks’ liabilities is in the form of bonds on issue – a source of funding that was less important in 1980.[12] Banks also have a much larger share of ‘other liabilities’ (such as those to non-residents and related parties, which are not included in domestic monetary aggregates).

Graph 6
Graph 6: Banks’ Assets and Liabilities – 2018

 

Looking back, it is clear that there have been many instances of sustained gaps between the growth of deposits – and broad money more generally – and the growth of credit (Graph 7). While broad money growth outpaced credit growth for most of the period since the financial crisis, this was not the experience of the two decades or more prior to the crisis, when credit typically outpaced broad money.

Graph 7
Graph 7: Credit and Broad Money Growth

 

This long history suggests that we should not be concerned about a so called deposit ‘funding gap’. Some commentators have suggested that the recent decline in the growth rate of money has left banks with insufficient deposit funding to support credit growth. According to this hypothesis, banks have been forced to seek other forms of funding, including from short-term money markets, which, so the argument goes, can help to explain the notable rise in rates in those markets in recent months.[13]

What are we to make of this hypothesis? First, such a gap between the growth of deposits and credit has been commonplace over recent decades – and conditions in short-term money markets were benign through much of those earlier episodes. Second, loans are not the only assets on banks’ balance sheets; indeed, in recent quarters, growth in these other assets has been particularly slow – slower than both credit and deposits (Graph 8). So deposit growth has more than matched the growth in total assets.

Graph 8
Graph 8: Loan, Deposit and Balance Sheet Growth

 

Third, if some banks really did have insufficient deposit funding, we would expect to see them competing more vigorously for deposits by raising interest rates on those products. But retail deposit rates have been flat to down over the past year (Graph 9).

Graph 9
Graph 9: Major Banks’ Retail Deposit Rates

 

In short, there is little evidence that there is any relationship between the slowing of deposit growth and recent funding pressures in short-term money markets. More generally, given my earlier discussion about the extension of credit leading to the creation of banking system deposits, worrying about slower deposit growth impinging on the banking system’s ability to generate credit is putting the cart before the horse.

What Can Money or Credit Tell Us about Broader Economic Developments?

Given this discussion, it is worth asking whether the behaviour of money can tell us anything useful about broader economic developments and, if so, is it more or less useful than the behaviour of credit?

I’m going to address these questions in a very narrow way by examining whether the growth of broad money or credit provides any useful statistical information about the growth of nominal GDP. Because data for money and credit are available about five weeks ahead of the quarterly GDP release, we can examine whether growth in the current quarter of these series provides any additional information about the likely outcome for nominal GDP this quarter. This exercise is intended to merely determine whether money or credit are useful indicators of GDP. It is not intended to demonstrate whether a causal link exists between money or credit and GDP. (Indeed it is possible that the direction of causation runs in either or both, directions.)

I start with a simple model of quarterly nominal GDP growth as a function of recent lags of nominal GDP growth (Model 1 in Table 2). The model is estimated over the inflation-targeting period. This simple model is not particularly useful; lags of nominal GDP growth explain only about 8 per cent of the variation in the current growth of nominal GDP. But it gives us a useful baseline for comparison.

Table 2: Simple Models of Nominal GDP Growth(a) March quarter 1993 – June quarter 2018
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 1.14** 0.85** 0.88** 0.70**
GDP growth(b) 0.21 0.04 −0.06 −0.08
Broad money growth(c) 0.26* 0.16
Credit growth(c) 0.31** 0.25**
R-squared 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.22
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.10
(a) Quarterly data; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5 per cent level; * indicates statistical significance at the 10 per cent level
(b) Coefficient presented is the sum of the coefficients on the past four lags of quarterly nominal GDP growth; statistical significance is based on a joint significance test for these coefficients
(c) Coefficients presented are the sum of the coefficients on the current and past four lags of quarterly broad money or credit growth; statistical significance is based on joint significance tests for these coefficients
Sources: ABS, RBA

Adding current and past lags of money growth to the baseline model doesn’t improve its performance much; the sum of the coefficients on the money terms are statistically significant, but only at a 10 per cent level (Model 2). Similarly, adding current and past lags of credit growth improves the model’s explanatory power only slightly; however, the sum of coefficients on the credit terms are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level (Model 3). Interestingly, if both money and credit terms are included at the same time, only credit growth is statistically significant (Model 4). This suggests that credit growth is a marginally more useful statistical indicator of the growth of economic activity than money growth; again, I should stress that the contribution of the credit variable to the model in terms of its additional explanatory power is very modest.[14]

Conclusion

Currency in circulation has increased as a share of nominal GDP – indeed it’s as high as it’s been in many decades. But the increase in money, which includes bank deposits, has been even greater over the same period. That increase has been driven by the extension of credit, which depends on the decisions of borrowers and lenders. Banks have been able to fund that additional credit via growth in other sources of funding, including debt securities and equity. The recognition that deposits are created by the banking system via the extension of credit suggests that we should not be concerned about the banking system facing a deposit funding gap. Moreover, it is consistent with simple empirical analysis that suggests that credit is a marginally more useful indicator of the near-term growth in the value of economic activity than money.

Lehman Brothers 10 Years On – What Does It Mean To Australia?

I discuss the fallout from the collapse of Lehman Brothers a decade later with Robbie Barwick from the CEC, with a focus on Australia.

Did we dodge the GFC, and what are the implications households and banks here today?

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Euribor Deadline Uncertainty for SF, Covered Bonds, Banks

The approaching deadline for Euribor to become compliant with the EU Benchmark Regulation (BMR) is creating significant uncertainty for the euro-denominated floating rate assets and liabilities of structured finance transactions, covered bonds and banks, Fitch Rating says. If Euribor does not become compliant, the benchmark could no longer be used as a reference rate for new contracts from the start of 2020 and could only be used for legacy contracts with regulatory approval.

The Belgian Financial Services and Markets Authority is not expected to assess whether Euribor, which is in the process of being reformed, will become BMR compliant until late 2019. Euribor’s planned hybrid calculation method is being put in place with the aim of meeting the BMR requirements, but it is not yet clear if the change will result in compliance.

Various sectors could be affected if BMR compliance is not reached. Most eurozone structured finance notes reference Euribor, as do a substantial amount of covered bonds issued for repo transactions and euro-denominated bank debt. In contrast, corporate and public sector entities in the eurozone issue floating rate bonds to a lesser extent.

Euribor is also a common reference rate for leveraged and SME loans and commercial mortgages throughout Europe. Most residential mortgages in Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are Euribor-based along with smaller proportions in other markets. Shifting to an alternative rate for contracts without long-term fall-back provisions could be particularly difficult given consumer protection laws.

If it does not become BMR compliant, the Belgian FSMA could allow Euribor to continue to be used in legacy contracts. It could also force bank panel participation for up to two years. This would allow some time for an alternative benchmark to be established and adopted by market participants. Work has begun on developing a term rate from a soon-to-be selected alternative euro risk-free rate to become a fall-back or possible replacement rate. But if the ECB’s new euro short-term rate (ESTER) is chosen as the favoured alternative, this two-year period could still be tight as much of the work is unlikely to progress before ESTER’s daily publication starts from 2H19.

If Euribor is deemed BMR compliant, a risk to investors and issuers is that a revised Euribor could have an absolute level or volatility that is different to the current rate. This could see disputes of contracts signed based on the pre-reform Euribor. Increased volatility or different absolute levels could also increase basis risk or prepayment rates, which could affect excess spread for structured finance and covered bonds.

Any potential future rating action for structured finance and covered bonds would depend on how seamlessly Euribor-based bonds, loans and hedges make the transition to either a revised and BMR-compliant Euribor or a fall-back reference rate. The following factors would have an impact on the rating analysis: contractual fall-back provisions, how technical and administrative challenges are addressed, other credit protection and the remaining weighted average lives after 2019 of assets and liabilities exposed to Euribor risks.

Bank and non-bank financial institutions may see non-traded interest rate risks increase if they are unable to re-price their variable-rate loans in line with changes to their funding. But we expect mainstream and specialist lenders should have some scope to pass on any short-term unexpected price adjustments. If replacement term structures do not come on-stream sufficiently quickly or lack liquidity, this could also increase traded market risks. While this could in theory affect capital adequacy requirements or stress-test results, it is likely to be immaterial.

Swaps and swap replacement provisions in structured finance and covered bonds could also be at risk from the tight timeframe for Eonia replacement. Eonia is used for valuations of Euribor-based swaps and will not become BMR-compliant.

Lehman Brothers 10 Years On

I was in London in 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed, 10 years ago. The sense at the time was that the financial system was teetering on the brink as stocks crashed, and liquidity dried up. Banks and other Financial Instructions just stopped trusting each other.  We perhaps escaped the worse possible outcomes, but looking back, in fact the financial system is even today still under pressure, and some would say we have not really learnt the hard lessons of the great recession as it’s called.

Dave Lafferty, who is Natixis Investment Managers chief market strategist penned an really interesting piece which discusses the lessons investors might have learned 10 years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, via InvestorDaily. I want to take you through his commentary and add my own points as we go though.

He starts by saying that It’s often said that you should never let a good crisis go to waste. As we approach the 10 year anniversary of the seminal event of the global financial crisis – the collapse of Lehman Brothers – investors may wonder if we’ve learned anything from past mistakes. Through the varying lenses of policymakers, investors and markets, the answer is decidedly mixed.

Without question, policymakers around the globe have made some headway, particularly in the area of bank vulnerability. While concentration risk among the major global banks has actually grown since the crisis, broadly speaking, leverage and trading risk are down while equity and capital ratios are up. Large bank failures remain a risk, particularly in the European periphery and emerging markets, but the gradual de-risking of banks should make the system less vulnerable to contagion in the next Lehman-like crisis.

Where policymakers have made less progress is on the monetary front. Other than the US Fed, the other major central banks remain in crisis mode today, unable to lift rates or unwind their massive quantitative easing programs. Balance sheets are bloated to the tune of $15 trillion with still close to $8 trillion in negative-yielding sovereign bonds, reducing the stimulative firepower of the major central banks to counteract the next recession or crisis. In the end, it may be fortunate that banks have ramped up their ability to absorb losses because central banks certainly have less power to prevent them.

Coming on the heels of the tech and telecom bust of 2000-2001, the plunge in risk assets during the GFC represented the second bear market in eight years for many investors. In addition to rethinking their equity expectations, Lehman’s collapse highlighted a new risk: that systemically important institutions might be too big, too interconnected, or too complex to save. Millennial investors coming of age in the 2000s may never look at equities the way the Baby Boomers did growing up in the bull market of the 1980s and ’90s. The common refrain in the wake of Lehman was that investors cared more about the “return of their capital, not the return on their capital”. While some scar tissue has built up, investors have been forever altered.

Ten years of Zero Interest Rate Policy and Negative Interest Rate Policy have pushed them grudgingly out the risk spectrum and back into equities, but there is little doubt investor risk tolerance has been fundamentally altered. Investors are more skittish and therefore more likely to bail when volatility rears its head again. “Buy and hold” has gone from a trusted maxim to a sad platitude that many investors can no longer embrace.

Finally, as investors have changed, so have the markets. Because the failure of Lehman was equal parts credit crisis and liquidity crisis, investors have come to demand both better protection and more liquidity in their investments. Wall Street, asset managers and global banks have been more than willing to develop new products and strategies promising to reduce volatility, manage downside exposure, or reduce correlation to falling markets. Assets in these products number in the trillions and include all manner of strategies that either use volatility as an input to reduce exposure or short volatility outright.

The common theme of these strategies, to one degree or another, is to reduce risk into falling markets, which may exacerbate the sell-off – as seen in February’s volatility tantrum. While we believe these strategies play an important role in tailoring appropriate client portfolios, it represents a modern-day tragedy of the commons whereby investors’ demands for better downside protection actually creates selling pressure and downside volatility when the crisis finally comes.

Historical analysis of any crisis is likely to be inconclusive and provide few solutions. There can only be so much learned from looking back when every new crisis is sewn from different seeds. All participants and policymakers can do is hope that the system is more flexible and therefore less fragile when the next crisis hits.

On this score, we can only conclude that things have changed very little from the days of Lehman. While consumers are in no worse shape, corporate and sovereign debt levels have only risen since the crisis, sustained solely by artificially low interest rates. Banks have found some religion with respect to building equity capital, but much of the leverage has simply moved to the bond markets. Meanwhile, old fashioned value investors who were willing to catch the falling knife are few and far between, replaced by quants and algos who will sell (or go short) at the first sign of trouble. The Lehman collapse brought about many positive changes, but in the end, the global financial system appears no less brittle today than a decade ago.

My view is the it will be US corporate bonds which will be the point of failure as the FED lifts rates in the months ahead. So history may not repeat, but it may well rhyme!

Capital Markets 201 – Part 1

Welcome to the first in a new series of videos and posts in which we discuss the capital markets. It’s important to understand how these markets work because they are such a large element in the financial system, with bonds and other funding instruments, and the mix of derivatives together dominating the markets – and by the way, the risks in the system too. As you will know from our earlier posts, the total value of derivatives in the system globally dwarfs the value of the real economy.

You might like to know that I spent a number of years working in a major bank where I taught capital markets to their senior executives, because they had been subject to a major financial crash during which it became clear that the senior executives in the company had NO idea about how the markets really worked, and the inherent risks which they were taking. Some would say little has changed.

In this introduction I will discuss what we are going to explore in the series, over the weeks ahead.  I am not assuming any prior knowledge of the topic in these shows, so we will start out quite simply, but by the end of the series we will be touching on some really complex, yet interesting concepts.  So do come along for the ride. And I should explain that I called the series “Capital Markets 201” because this is going to be more, much more than a simple 101 overview.

So today, to start, I am going to outline the structure of the series and offer a definition of “Capital Markets”.

The capital markets are simply a market place where buyers and sellers engage in the trade of financial securities like bonds, stocks, and other instruments. This buying/selling may be undertaken by participants as diverse as banks, other financial institutions, companies, government entities and even individuals. The market may exist within a country, and internationally, with the bulk of the transactions relating to Australia for example, being off-shore.

These markets help to channel surplus funds from savers to institutions which then invest them, and many of these trades are in longer-term securities, though as we will see later sort-term funding and also a complex set of derivatives are also important in the sector.

Finally, capital market consists of primary markets and secondary markets. Primary markets deal with trade of new issues of stocks and bonds, and other securities, whereas secondary markets deals with the exchange of existing or previously-issued securities. Another important division in the capital market is made on the basis of the nature of security traded, i.e. stock market and bond market.

Finally, as well as trading in the underlying securities there are many flavours of derivative. A derivative is a contract between two parties which derives its value/price from an underlying asset. The most common types of derivatives are futures, options, forwards and swaps. Generally stocks, bonds, currency, commodities and interest rates form the underlying asset.

So to the structure of our series of programmes.

We are going to start in the next video with the concept of the time value of money. It’s essential to understand that capital markets are essentially all about manipulating cash flows. So we need to know about how to assess cash flows, and develop some basic language to describe them. We will also touch on concepts such as compound interest, current and future value, and internal rates of return.

Next we will look at the treasury operations in banks and other large corporations, and discuss the concept of disintermediation, where companies behave like banks in their own right. We will also meet archetypical “Belgium Dentists” and where they put their money.

After that, we will start looking at the individual instruments which make up the Capital Markets armoury. So we will look at bonds and other funding instruments, and how they work, and the different flavours which are out there. These instruments are the bedrock of the capital markets, so we will look at who might buy and sell such instruments.

Once we understand how bonds work, we can then start to explore the more complex derivatives areas of the capital markets.

We will look at futures and options contracts and how they work. This is a big area and we will look at both contracts relating to physical commodities like corn and pork bellies as well as financial contracts.

We will take a deep dive into interest rate and currency swaps and options, an area which I find really interesting.  And there are a number of other variants which we will also touch on.

Then towards the end of the series we will start looking at financial engineering, where these various products are put to work. I will look for example at securitisation (I was involved in some of the early transactions in the 1990’s).

And as we bring the series to a close we will look at the risks in the system, the way the markets are regulated, or not, and some of the gaps in reporting and disclosure.

So buckle up, and enjoy the ride.  And by the way, I will run a couple of live Q&A events as we progress through the series, and I will also try and answer questions as we go though, so do post any you may have.

Watch out for the next episode – The Time Value of Money – coming soon.

And by the way, if you value the content we produce please do consider joining our Patreon programme, where you can support our ability to continue to make great content. Here is the link, and it’s in the comments below.

IPOs must disclose royal commission exposure

ASIC has warned companies seeking to raise money through IPOs that they must tell investors how they are likely to be affected by the royal commission, via InvestorDaily.

 The corporate regulator released Report 589: ASIC regulation of corporate finance on Friday. The report covers ASIC’s regulation of fundraising activities, M&A and other corporate governance transactions throughout the first six months of 2018.

ASIC raised disclosure concerns with 19 per cent of the prospectuses filed in the period. The top concern was that the business model was not fully of adequately disclosed.

One of the ongoing concerns for ASIC this year when it comes to IPOs has been the disclosure of risks associated with the royal commission into misconduct in the banking, superannuation and financial services industry.

ASIC reveals in the report that during the first six months of 2018 it “closely examined and queried the adequacy of disclosure about the risks associated with a wealth management company’s vertical integration model”.

“If a financial services company raises funds through an IPO over the coming period, we consider that investors should be given candid information about how the business may be affected by the issues being raised in the royal commission,” said ASIC.

Depending on the business model, companies will be required to disclose relevant historical and current interactions with regulators – as well as specific regulatory risks the the business may encounter, said ASIC.

ASIC also warned against the practice of leaking information to the media about upcoming IPOs.

“We are concerned that references to investor education reports are made public through the media, often before the prospectus is lodged with ASIC,” said the regulator.

Statements about pre-commitment to an IPO by institutional investors or ‘cornerstone investors’ should also be “made with care”, warned ASIC.

“Retail investors may interpret a large pre-commitment by institutional investors as a sign the IPO is a good investment and decide to follow suit,” said the report.