Tag: APRA

Within the APRA speech we discussed earlier, there was an important little paragraph, which warrants separate coverage. It concerns the emergence of “hybrid” instruments, which banks have been offering, with a fixed return higher than deposit interest rates – returns which in the current low interest rate environment many will find attractive. However APRA makes the point, they should not be considered as higher yield alternatives to deposits as they are intrinsically less safe. Should a bank find they fall below certain capital ratios, the hybrid becomes the first line of defence, and will not pay out. These risks need to be understood.

Searching for new capital when a business is distressed, and time is of the essence, is ideally to be avoided. And we want to minimise the risk that the taxpayer has to come to the rescue. With that in mind, the post-crisis regulatory framework has built mechanisms that trigger automatic corrective action to help restore a firm’s capital when it has been diminished. There is a lot of discussion and debate on the merits of so-called bail-inable instruments and bail-in powers, including in response to the FSI’s third recommendation that APRA implement a framework for recapitalisation capacity sufficient to facilitate the orderly resolution of an Australian ADI and minimise taxpayer support. But the idea of bail-in is not something completely new: certain recapitalisation mechanisms already exist in the Australian framework. Examples include:

• the use of the capital conservation buffer, which imposes increasing limitations on a ADI’s ability to make discretionary distributions to capital providers and employees as the ADI approaches its minimum regulatory requirements;
• the trigger that exists in Additional Tier 1 instruments (often referred to as ‘hybrids’) that provide for the instrument to be written off, or converted to equity,
  in the event that an ADI’s capital ratio falls below 5.125 per cent; and
• the point of non-viability trigger in both Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments, which provides for the instruments to be written off or converted to equity in the event that APRA considers that the ADI would become non-viable without such action (or some other form of support).

These latter two recapitalisation mechanisms, in particular, are designed to provide some ‘breathing space’ to allow for orderly resolution. They are not designed to deliver resurrection, but more modestly to provide scope for an ADI’s services to customers to continue while new owners and managers are being put in place. Strengthening this by increasing loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity further, as recommended by the FSI, remains a work in progress and likely to take some time to complete. We are, as I have said elsewhere, hastening slowly in response to that recommendation given the importance of getting the policy settings right.

However, the new mechanisms that have already been instituted within existing capital instruments are a very important part of the new regulatory framework. Viewing these capital instruments as simply higher-yielding substitutes for vanilla fixed-interest investments, let alone deposits, is something to be counselled against, since from APRA’s perspective holders of these instruments are providing the important first lines of defence that we can call into action, in some instances even ahead of shareholders, to aid an orderly resolution.

In a speech by APRA Chairman Wayne Byres, “Finding success in failure” delivered in Sydney today at the Actuaries Institute conference, ‘Banking on Capital’, he discusses capital standards for authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADI’s) and why a sole reliance on capital to deliver financial stability is an unwise strategy:

• ‘When we judge a bank’s capital to be high or low, or something in the middle, we are making a judgement that takes into account a range of issues that impact on bank risk profiles: funding and liquidity, asset quality, governance, risk management and risk culture, to name a few, all come into the equation in some way or another.’
• ‘To attempt to provide the community with an iron clad guarantee that nothing can go awry would require severe limitation on the risk-taking ability of the banking system, and prevent it from fulfilling the vital and productive roles that it plays in intermediating between borrowers and lenders and facilitating the smooth functioning of payments throughout the economy. Put simply, a zero failure regime is not desirable.’
• ‘If we accept that failures, while hopefully still reasonably rare, are nevertheless inevitable, then preparation to minimise their impact is an essential investment.’
• ‘Planning and investing to facilitate their own demise is something that financial firms inevitably struggle to do, so APRA will be reinforcing its expectations in relation to ADI’s [Financial Claims Scheme (FCS)] testing programs in the near future, with a view to ensuring there is genuine readiness to activate the FCS if it is ever needed.’

APRA, along with our colleagues amongst the Council of Financial Regulators, has spent a great deal of time in recent years looking in a fairly hard-nosed way at how well Australia stacks up against these preconditions. The conclusion was somewhat mixed: there are no glaring deficiencies, but a number of areas for improvement.

• The importance of active supervision, and a willingness to intervene where appropriate, were some of the hard lessons that APRA took to heart following the HIH episode. Justice Owen found APRA under-resourced to identify problems, and slow to respond to them once found. These were fair conclusions, and APRA worked hard under my predecessor to build both its capacity and conviction. Fifteen years on from HIH, efforts to further improve our supervision – to identify risks early and respond promptly – remain at the forefront of our latest strategic plan, and I expect they will always feature prominently in APRA’s priorities.
• When it comes to powers to intervene, the FSI’s Final Report noted there are some gaps and deficiencies in the Australian statutory framework for crisis management and resolution when compared with international standards.⁶ This includes the need for such things as broader investigation powers; strengthened directions powers; improved group resolution powers; enhanced powers to deal with branches of foreign banks; and more robust immunities to statutory and judicial managers. In his speech last week, the Treasurer noted the Government’s intention to make improvements in this area, which we see as a very valuable (and low cost) investment in the stability in the financial system.
• Crisis planning is critical. Last year at this event I spoke about our plans for recovery and resolution planning. During the past year, I’m pleased to say larger ADIs have submitted new plans based on updated guidance issued by APRA, and we are now reviewing and benchmarking the plans in order to highlight areas of better practice that will further increase the credibility of plans in subsequent iterations.⁷ On resolution planning, more detailed work is also underway with specific firms to consider the planning required to ensure that APRA is able to use our resolution powers when needed. Our focus here is on the assessment of critical functions, intra-group dependencies such as critical shared services, and the identification of potential barriers to resolvability.
• No matter how good the plan, however, stabilising and restructuring a financial firm that is no longer viable in its current form is rarely going to be a quick and easy exercise. So it is important that, while a resolution plan is being implemented, the firm’s critical functions can be maintained so as to reduce potential losses and minimise the disruption to the broader financial system. Key to doing this is that the firm has the financial resources to allow it to continue to operate while its business is reorganised.

APRA has issued an update on Australian Bank capital ratios. They show that banks in Australia have lifted their capital base in the past year, (e.g. CET1 from 11.7% to 13.5% on an international comparison basis  at December 2015), but APRA also underscores the fact that even higher capital ratios will be required to meet tighter rules, and to ensure that local banks do not slip down the international ranking, so as to maintain their ratios as “unquestionably strong”. This is because regulators are driving ratios higher in many countries.

Higher capital costs of course, and in in the normal course of business, will lead to more expensive loans and lower returns to shareholders. We think dividends will be under pressure in the next couple of years.

It is also worth saying that APRA is disclosing aggregate data, so variations across individual banks will be masked. This makes an interesting comparison to data from the FED where the results of capital stress tests are reported at an institution level. We think APRA should report capital ratios by individual institution, but of course they won’t.

In July 2015, APRA published the Information Paper International capital comparison study (2015 study) as an important first step in addressing the Financial System Inquiry (FSI) recommendation to set capital standards such that Australian authorised deposit-taking institution (ADI) capital ratios are ‘unquestionably strong’.

In its final report, the FSI suggested that for banks to be regarded as unquestionably strong they should have capital ratios that position them in the top quartile of internationally-active banks. APRA’s 2015 study, which adjusted for differences in measurement methodology across jurisdictions and uses a number of different measures of capital strength, found that the Australian major banks were well-capitalised, but not in the top quartile of international peers.

In particular, APRA’s 2015 study found that, based on the major banks’ capital adequacy ratios at 30 June 2014, a 70 basis point (bp) increase in capital ratios would be required to position the major banks’ Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio at the international 75th percentile (i.e. the bottom of the top quartile) and that they would likely need to increase their capital adequacy ratios by a larger amount to be comfortably positioned in the top quartile over the medium to long term.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) recently published an updated quantitative impact study (QIS)¹ including the capital ratios of internationally active banks as of 30 June 2015. Based on the same methodology used in APRA’s 2015 study and using the latest Basel QIS, APRA has recently reviewed the major banks’ relative position to their international peers. To incorporate the capital raisings undertaken by the major banks, particularly during the second half of 2015, this update is based on their capital ratios as at December 2015.

As detailed in APRA’s 2015 study, the major banks’ weighted average comparison CET1 ratio was estimated as 11.7 per cent as at June 2014. Chart 1 shows that by December 2015, this ratio had increased by 180 bps to 13.5 per cent. This increase was the result of a range of factors, but the largest single driver was the substantial capital raisings by the major banks in the latter part of 2015. The differential between the CET1 ratio under APRA’s requirements and the international comparison ratio also increased: in broad terms, the differential as at December 2015 was 350 basis points.

On a relative basis, the strengthening of the major banks’ CET1 ratios placed them, on average, at approximately 40 bps above the June 2015 Basel QIS 75th percentile of 13.1 per cent for Group 1 banks.² The improvement in the relative position of the major banks in Chart 1 is likely to be somewhat overstated by the timing differences between the international (June 2015) and Australian (December 2015) data. On average, the 75th percentile CET1 ratio in the Basel QIS has tended to increase by approximately 25-35 basis points each half year, suggesting the 75th percentile would be somewhat higher had December 2015 QIS data been available to APRA. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this timing difference, the relative positioning of the Australian major banks’ CET1 ratios now seems broadly in line with the benchmark suggested by the FSI.

Chart 1: CET1 ratios of Basel QIS and major banks³

^{Source: APRA data}

Furthermore, since the 2015 study the relative position of the major banks’ other weighted average comparison capital ratios have improved compared to the distribution of Basel QIS Group 1 banks.⁴ As shown in Chart 2, the major banks’:

• comparison Tier 1 ratio of 14.8 per cent is positioned in the top quartile as compared to the third quartile as at June 2014; and
• comparison Total capital ratio of 16 per cent is positioned at the bottom of the top quartile as compared to the median of the distribution as at June 2014.

The relative position of the major banks’ Tier 1 Leverage ratio of 5.4 per cent has also increased to a level above the median (but still below the top quartile) of the distribution of Basel QIS Group 1 banks. This compares to the banks’ position below the median in the 2015 study.

Chart 2: Capital adequacy ratios of Basel QIS (June 2015) and major banks (Dec 2015)

^{Source: APRA data}

As noted above the major banks have undertaken significant capital raisings since the 2015 study, which has significantly improved their capital adequacy positon relative to international peers. That said, the trend of international peer banks strengthening their capital ratios continues. Forthcoming international policy developments will also likely mean that Australian banks need to continue to improve their capital ratios in order to at least maintain, if not improve, their relative positioning. The final design and calibration of these reforms will not be decided until around the end of 2016, and it would be prudent for Australian ADIs to continue to plan for the likelihood of strengthened capital requirements in some areas.

As detailed in the 2015 study, APRA’s analysis on the relative positioning of major bank capital ratios is intended to inform, but not determine, its approach for setting capital adequacy requirements. Recent regulatory actions (such as that applying to mortgage risk weights announced in July 2015), and the resulting improvement in the major banks’ international capital comparison, provide the necessary time for APRA to consider the full range of factors that are relevant to satisfy the FSI’s unquestionably strong recommendation. Critically this includes assessing the impact of the Basel Committee reforms as they are finalised and considering how other measures of resilience, such as liquidity, funding, asset quality, and recovery and resolution planning can assist in achieving the FSI’s objective.

APRA intends to provide further insight to these broader considerations once the Basel Committee has completed its deliberations on the international framework around the end of 2016.