Tag: IMF

The “deadly embrance” between housing, house prices, and bank mortgages

An interesting IMF working paper “Mitigating the Deadly Embrace in Financial Cycles: Countercyclical Buffers and Loan-to-Value Limits” examines the limitations of Basel III in the home loan market, and makes the point that the risk-weighted focus, even with enhancement, does not cut the mustard especially in a rising or falling property market. Indeed, there is a “deadly embrance” between housing, house prices, and bank mortgages which naturally leads to housing boom and bust cycles, which can be very costly for the economy and difficult for central banks to manage. They find that macroprudential measures may assist, but even then the deadly embrace remains.

The financial history of the last eight centuries is replete with devastating financial crises, mostly emanating from large increases in financial leverage.  The latest example, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09, saw the unwinding of a calamitous run-up in leverage by banks and households associated with the housing market. As a result, the financial supervision community has acknowledged that microprudential regulations alone are insufficient to avoid a financial crisis. They need to be accompanied by appropriate macroprudential policies to avoid the build-up of systemic risk and to weaken the effects of asset price inflation on financial intermediation and the buildup of excessive leverage in the economy.

The Basel III regulations adopted in 2010 recognize for the first time the need to include a macroprudential overlay to the traditional microprudential regulations. Beyond the requirements for capital buffers, and leverage and liquidity ratios, Basel III regulations include CCBs between 0.0 and 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets that raise capital requirements during an upswing of the business cycle and reduce them during a downturn. The rationale is to counteract procyclical-lending behavior, and hence to restrain a buildup of systemic risk that might end in a financial crisis. Basel III regulations are silent, however, about the implementation of CCBs and their cost to the economy, leaving it to the supervisory authorities to make a judgment about the appropriate timing for increasing or lowering such buffers, based on a credit-to-GDP gap measure. This measure, however, does not distinguish between good versus bad credit expansions and is irrelevant for countries with significant dollar lending, where exchange rate fluctuations can severely distort the credit-to-GDP gap measure.

One of the limitations of Basel III regulations is that they do not focus on specific, leverage-driven markets, like the housing market, that are most susceptible to an excessive build-up of systemic risk. Many of the recent financial crises have been associated with housing bubbles fueled by over-leveraged households. With hindsight, it is unlikely that CCBs alone would have been able to avoid the Global Financial Crisis, for example.

For this reason, financial supervision authorities and the IMF have looked at additional macroprudential policies. For the housing market, three additional types of macroprudential regulations have been implemented: 1) sectoral capital surcharges through higher risk weights or loss-given-default (LGD) ratios;3 2) LTV limits; and 3) caps on debt-service to income ratios (DSTI), or loan to income ratios (LTI). Use of such macroprudential regulations has mushroomed over the last few years in both advanced economies and emerging markets. At end-2014, 23 countries used sectoral capital surcharges for the housing market, and 25 countries used LTV limits. An additional 15 countries had explicit caps on DSTI or LTI caps. The experience so far has been mixed.in a sample of 119 countries over the 2000-13 period find that, while macroprudential policies can help manage financial cycles, they work less well in busts than in booms. This result is intuitive in that macroprudential regulations are generally procyclical and can therefore be counterproductive during a bust when bank credit should expand to offset the economic downturn.

Macroprudential regulations are often directed at restraining bank credit, especially to the housing market. They do not, however, take into account the tradeoffs between mitigating the risks of a financial crisis on the one side and the cost of lower financial intermediation on the other. In addition, given that these measures are generally procyclical, they can accentuate the credit crunch during busts. More generally, an analytical foundation for analyzing these tradeoffs has been lacking. MAPMOD has been designed to help fill this analytical gap and to provide insights for the design of less procyclical macroprudential regulations.

The MAPMOD Mark II model in this paper includes an explicit housing market, in which house prices are strongly correlated with banks’ credit supply. This corresponds to the experience prior and during the Global Financial Crisis. This deadly embrace between bank mortgages, household balance sheets, and house prices can be the source of financial cycles. A corollary is that the housing market is only partially constrained by LTV limits as the additional availability of credit itself boosts house prices, and thus raises LTV limits.

The starting point of the MAPMOD framework is the factual observation that, in contrast to the loanable funds model, banks do not wait for additional deposits before increasing their lending. Instead, they determine their lending to the economy based on their expectations of future profits, conditional on the economic outlook and their regulatory capital. They then fund their lending portfolio out of their existing deposit base, or by resorting to wholesale funding and debt instruments. Banks actively seek new opportunities for profitable lending independently of the size or growth of their deposit base—unless constrained by specific regulations.

In MAPMOD, Mark II, we extend the original model by introducing an explicit housing market. We use the modular features of the model to analyze partial equilibrium simulations for banks, households, and the housing market, before turning to general equilibrium results. This incremental approach sheds light on the intuition behind the model and simulation results.

The housing market is characterized by liquidity-constrained households that require financing to buy houses. A house is an asset that provides a stream of housing services to households. The value of a house to each household is the net present value of the future stream of housing services that it provides plus any capital gain/loss associated with future changes in house prices. We define the fundamental house price households are willing to pay to buy a house the price that is consistent with the expected income/productivity increases in the economy. If prices go above the fundamental house price reflecting excessive leverage, we refer to this as an inflated house price. The supply of houses for sale in the market is assumed to be fixed each period. House prices are determined by matching buyers and sellers in a recursive equilibrium with expected house prices taken as given. We abstract from many real-world complications such as neighborhood externalities, geographical location, square footage or other forms of heterogeneity.

Bank financing plays a critical role in the determination of house prices in the model. If banks provide a larger amount of mortgages on an expectation of higher household income in the future, demand for housing will go up, thus inflating house prices. Conversely, if banks reduce their loan exposure to the housing market, demand for houses in the economy will be reduced, leading to a slump in house prices. House prices therefore move with the credit cycle in MAPMOD, Mark II, just as in the real world.

Nonperforming loans and foreclosures in the housing market occur when households are faced with an idiosyncratic, or economy-wide, shock that affects their current LTV or LTI characteristics. Banks will seek to reduce the likelihood of losses by requiring a sufficiently high LTV ratio to cover the cost of foreclosure. But they will not be able to diversify away the systemic risk of a general fall in house prices in the economy. Securitization of mortgages in MAPMOD is not allowed. And even if banks were able to securitize mortgages, other agents in the economy would need to carry the systemic risk of a sharp fall in house prices. At the economy-wide level, the systemic risk associated with the housing market is therefore not diversifiable. The evidence from the Global Financial Crisis on securitization and credit default swaps confirms that this is the case, regardless of who holds mortgage-backed securities.

This paper presented a new version of MAPMOD (Mark II) to study the effectiveness of macroprudential regulations. We extend the original MAPMOD by explicitly modeling the housing market. We show how lending to the housing market, house prices, and household demand for housing are intertwined in the model in a what we call a deadly embrace. Without macroprudential policies, this naturally leads to housing boom and bust cycles. Moreover, leverage-driven cycles have historically been very costly for the economy, as shown most recently by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09.

Macroprudential policies have a key role to play to limit this deadly embrace. The use of LTV limits for mortgages in this regard is ineffective, as these limits are highly procyclical, and hold back the recovery in a bust. LTV limits that are based on a moving average of historical house prices can considerably reduce their procyclicality. We considered a 5 year moving average, but the length of the moving average used should probably vary based on the specific circumstances of each housing market.

CCBs may not be an effective regulatory tool against credit cycles that affect the housing market in particular, as banks may respond to higher/lower regulatory capital buffers by reducing/increasing lending to other sectors of the economy.

A combination of LTV limits based on a moving average and CCBs may effectively loosen the deadly embrace. This is because such LTV limits would attenuate the housing market credit cycle, while CCBs would moderate the overall credit cycle. Other macroprudential policies, like DSTI and LTI caps, may also be useful in this respect, depending on the specifics of the financial landscape in each country. It is, however, important to recognize that all these macroprudential policies come at a cost of dampening both good and bad credit cycles. The cost of reduced financial intermediation should be taken into account when designing macroprudential policies.

Note: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

 

From Global Savings Glut to Financing Infrastructure

A new IMF working paper investigates the emerging global landscape for public-private co-investments in infrastructure. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other so-called “infrastructure investment platforms” are an attempt to tap into the pool of both public and private long-term savings in order to channel the latter into much needed infrastructure projects. This paper puts these new initiatives into perspective by critically reviewing the literature and experience with public private partnerships in infrastructure. It concludes by identifying the main challenges policymakers and other actors will need to confront going forward and to turn infrastructure into an asset class of its own.

Institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds, and other investors such as sovereign wealth funds hold around $100 trillion in assets under management. One gets a clearer grasp of the enormous size of this global wealth by comparing it to US nominal GDP $18 trillion in 2015.
Global-AssetsAgainst this backdrop of a largely untapped pool of global savings, estimates suggest that the world needs to increase its investment in infrastructure by nearly 60 percent until 2030. There is a huge infrastructure investment gap in a large number of countries. The average infrastructure investment gap amounts to between $1 to 1.5 trillion per year. Infrastructure investment needs are mostly earmarked for upgrading depreciating brownfield infrastructure projects in the EU and in the US and for greenfield investments in low-income and emerging markets. The future growth in the demand for infrastructure will come increasingly from emerging economies.
There is growing recognition globally that development banks can play an important role in facilitating the preparation and financing of infrastructure projects by private long-term investors. A number of infrastructure platform initiatives have been launched very recently, most of them still at a prototype development stage. We discuss four different models that are currently at various stages of development. These platforms are all different attempts to tap into the vast pool of global long-term savings by better meeting long-term investor needs to attract them to infrastructure assets and by relaxing operating and governance constraints traditional development banks have been facing.
A first obvious lesson from an analysis of these platforms, is that the ability of development banks to leverage public money –committed capital from government contributions—by attracting private investors as co-investors in infrastructure projects is increasing the efficiency of development banks around the world. It is not just the fact that development banks are able to invest in larger-scale infrastructure projects and thus obtain a greater bang for the public buck, but also that these private investors together with development banks can achieve more efficient PPP concession contracts. Development banks are not just lead investors providing some loss absorbing capital to private investors. They also give access to their expertise and unique human capital to private investors, who would otherwise not have the capabilities to do the highly technical, time-consuming, due diligence to identify and prepare infrastructure projects. In addition, they offer a valuable taming influence on opportunistic government administrations that might be tempted to hold up a private PPP concession operator. Private investors in turn keep development banks in check and ensure that infrastructure projects are economically sound and not principally politically motivated. No wonder that this platform model is increasingly being embraced by development banks around the world.
The paper has documented that new platforms of investments have emerged. Notwithstanding, they are confronted with serious structural limitations. These platforms will certainly help on two important fronts namely on financing and origination of infrastructure projects, which this paper has focused on. Formally integrating these dimensions in models of PPP are important avenues for academic research.
Besides financing and origination, there are other important challenges to complete the broader task that lie ahead, such as in making infrastructure investment an asset class of its own. Two important directions are needed to further the agenda. First, the lack of standardization of underlying infrastructure projects is an important impediment to the scaling up of investment into infrastructure-based assets. Large physical infrastructure projects are indeed complex and can differ widely from one country to the next. In that respect, making use of securitization techniques such as collateralized bond obligations (or CBOs) or collateralized loan obligations (or CLOs) allow for better price discovery which will enhance the efficiency of the market and allow a more effective pooling of risk. It would also allow to “bulk up” the bond offering by addressing the problem of insufficient large sized bond issues. Overall, securitization will provide many advantages such as diversification for investors, lower cost of capital by allowing senior tranches to be issued with higher credit ratings, as well as higher liquidity. At the same time, securitization also creates debt instruments of variable credit risks to match the different risk appetites of investors. Second, there are important complementarities between actors participating in the “value chain” created by platforms including host countries, financial investors, guarantors and financial intermediaries. For all these reasons, the EIB has recently launched a renewable energy platform for institutional investors (REPIN) to offer repackaged renewable energy assets in standardized, liquid forms to institutional investors15. Although interest from institutional investors has been limited so far, the new carbon footprint disclosures and regulations of institutional investors that are expected be implemented after the Paris COP 21 climate summit, could nudge more pension and sovereign wealth funds to take on these securities.
Finally, host countries may put forth viable long term infrastructure projects but without the provision of guarantees to address construction, demand, exchange rate risks or without the securitization of underlying assets by financial intermediaries, those projects will not be funded, thus leaving everyone worse off. There is obviously also a need for enhanced coordination and cooperation across the various platforms in existence and for the creation of a global infrastructure investment platform. Part of the coordination should lead to risks being assumed by those best placed to hold them. Governments are the natural holders of political, regulatory and governance risks. The private sector for obvious incentive reasons should take on most of the construction risk, and demand risk should probably be shared, depending on the sector and type of project.
Note: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate.The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,or IMF management.

IMF Highlights Risks In NZ Economy

On February 5, 2016, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with New Zealand. In the report, they examine a number of issues, including high house prices in Auckland, trade exposures, low GDP per capita and chronic low household savings.  “From the 2000s, New Zealand has lagged behind top OECD countries in output per worker by 20–25 percent. This gap can be explained by both substantial productivity gaps and lower levels of capital. While the latter may be partly influenced by the low savings rate (and higher interest rates), the productivity gap is striking, particularly when taking into account New Zealand’s sound institutional and policy settings: New Zealand’s per capita should be 20 percent above the OECD average based on structural policy settings, not 20 percent below”.

NZ-GDPThe economy’s strong growth after the global financial crisis has been supported by rising terms of trade and reconstruction activity after the 2010–11 Canterbury earthquakes, as well as high net immigration. Growth peaked at 3.5 percent year-on-year (y/y) in Q4 2014, bringing output slightly above potential. However, the tailwinds have recently waned. In 2014, dairy prices began to fall from historic highs, leading to a sharp drop in income growth after the positive effect of declining oil prices had worn off, and investment activity related to the Canterbury rebuild has reached a plateau. As a result, output growth is estimated to have slowed to 2.3 percent in 2015, despite resilient consumption. Meanwhile, unemployment has been edging up reaching 6 percent in Q3 2015. Due largely to the decline in oil prices, inflation has dropped to 0.3 percent (y/y) in Q3 2015. House price inflation in Auckland has remained high, driven fundamentally by supply shortages.

The exchange rate depreciation has cushioned some of the impact of the decline in dairy prices. The bilateral exchange rate against the U.S. dollar has depreciated as dairy prices fell and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) eased monetary policy. The depreciation has mitigated the impact of the international dairy price decline on farmers’ incomes, and supported exports of travel and education services.

With growth below potential, measures of core inflation around the lower half of the target band, and a still strong exchange rate, monetary policy has been eased since June and the Reserve Bank stands ready to reduce rates further if warranted.

To manage risks arising from house price inflation in Auckland, macroprudential measures were introduced in 2013, leading to a temporary slowdown in price hike. A package of additional macroprudential regulations and tax measures was announced in May 2015, but having become fully effective only in November. The banking sector has increased capital and liquidity buffers, but reliance on offshore funding and a large share of mortgage lending remain sources of vulnerability.

Fiscal policy is also supportive of the economy in the short term, while consolidation is projected to resume in the medium-term. Automatic stabilizers have been allowed to work and public investment is being increased. Net debt is projected to decline further to around 5 percent of GDP in the medium term.

With chronically low national saving, New Zealand’s economy is dependent on borrowing from abroad. Its persistently negative savings-investment balance has led to the accumulation of a large net negative international investment position (IIP) which reached65 percent of GDP in 2014.

The short-term outlook is challenging with both external and domestic risks, the latter arising from rapid house price inflation in Auckland. However, New Zealand’s flexible economy is resilient, and medium-term prospects remain positive. New Zealand’s main exports—agricultural consumer products and tourism—should benefit from the ongoing shift to a more consumption-oriented growth model in China. Consumer demand in other Asian countries is also expected to grow. Overall, output growth is projected to recover to its estimated potential rate of 2.5 percent. With measures of core inflation around the lower end of the target range and expectations consistent with the band’s midpoint, inflation is forecast to rise to within the RBNZ’s target range of 1–3 percent in 2016.

Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors welcomed that New Zealand’s economy continues to perform well despite the slowdown imposed by the fall in dairy prices, plateaued investment associated with the Canterbury rebuild, and slower growth in trading partners. Directors agreed that New Zealand’s sound and flexible policy frameworks, including the important buffer provided by the flexible exchange rate, position the country well to weather the recent slowdown. Medium-term prospects remain positive, and Directors were encouraged by the authorities’ alertness to the downside risks and challenges arising from real estate market pressures, a persistently low savings rate, and relatively low productivity.

Directors considered the current accommodative monetary stance to be appropriate and agreed that, if needed, the authorities should stand ready for further easing given low inflationary pressures and below potential output. With regard to fiscal policy, they agreed that the planned easing this year and next, including through an acceleration of public investment in infrastructure, combined with a resumption of gradual fiscal consolidation thereafter, is appropriate. These measures should support the economy in the short term and bolster the public sector balance sheet in the longer term.

Directors noted that the banking system is resilient and well-supervised. They commended the proactive prudential and tax measures being taken to address the risks stemming from the housing market. Noting that the underlying cause of the housing market boom in Auckland is a supply/demand mismatch, they encouraged the authorities to be ready to use additional prudential measures and consider steps to reduce the tax advantage of housing over other forms of investments, while continuing to address supply-side bottlenecks.

Directors agreed that raising national and in particular private saving is critical to reducing external vulnerabilities from the still heavy reliance on offshore funding. They noted that higher saving may also reduce capital costs by lowering the risk premium and thereby support productive investment and long-term growth. They encouraged the authorities to consider comprehensive policy measures to boost long-term financial savings, including through reform of retirement income policies, as this could also help deepen New Zealand’s capital markets and broaden options for retirement planning.

Directors observed that, notwithstanding high living standards, New Zealand incomes lag those of other advanced economies, due to relatively low capital intensity and productivity. Acknowledging that the economy’s small size and distance from markets likely limit gains from trade, they encouraged the authorities to build on the country’s business-friendly environment to take steps to boost competition in key service sectors, leverage ICT more intensively, and address key infrastructure bottlenecks. They welcomed the focus of the government’s Business Growth Agenda on these issues.

Commodity Price Shocks and Financial Sector Fragility

A newly released IMF working paper investigates the impact of commodity price shocks on financial sector fragility.

Using a large sample of 71 commodity exporters among emerging and developing economies, it shows that negative shocks to commodity prices tend to weaken the financial sector, with larger shocks having more pronounced impacts. More specifically, negative commodity price shocks are associated with higher non-performing loans, bank costs and banking crises, while they reduce bank profits, liquidity, and provisions to nonperforming loans. These adverse effects tend to occur in countries with poor quality of governance, weak fiscal space, as well as those that do not have a sovereign wealth fund, do not implement macro-prudential policies and do not have a diversified export base.

The recent decline in commodity prices, especially for oil, has revived once again interest in their economic impact. Most commodities prices have declined by about 50 percent between mid-2014 and mid-2015, leading to significant losses in export earnings for commodity exporters. While commodity markets may be undergoing a transition to an era of low prices, such a sharp decline is not unprecedented.

IMF-Working-Resources-1Adverse commodity price shocks can also contribute to financial fragility through various channels. First, a decline in commodity prices in commodity-dependent countries results in reduced export income, which could adversely impact economic activity and agents’ (including governments) ability to meet their debt obligations, thereby potentially weakening banks’ balance sheets. Second, a surge in bank withdrawals following a drop in commodity prices may significantly reduce banks’ liquidity and potentially lead to a liquidity mismatch.

If large enough, commodity price shocks can also adversely affect bank balance sheets by weighing on international reserves and increasing the risk of currency mismatches. Third, a decline in commodity prices can reduce commodity exporters’ fiscal performance (by lowering revenue), which in turn may push government to adjust their budgets to accommodate revenue shortfalls. Often this can happen in a disorderly manner through the accumulation of payment arrears to suppliers and contractors, who in turn are unable to adequately service their bank loans.

Macro-prudential policies are gaining attention internationally as a useful tool to address system-wide risks in the financial sector. Macro-prudential policies act as an important factor for the stability of the financial sector. Macro-prudential instruments cover policies related to borrowers, loans, banks’ assets or liabilities, foreign currency credit, reserve requirements and policies that encourage counter-cyclical buffers (capital, dynamic provisioning and profits distribution restrictions). They may act as a tool to monitor the financial sector, therefore reducing the risk-taking and allowing the government to intervene on time.

The results show that negative commodity price shocks increase NPLs and bank costs, and decrease bank profits only in countries without macro-prudential policies. In contrast, countries with macro-prudential instruments are better able to cope with the detrimental impacts of adverse commodity price shocks. The implementation of macroprudential policy does not matter when it comes to provisions to NPLs as commodity price slumps lower provisions to NPLs in countries with or without macro-prudential policy.

Adverse commodity price shocks tend to lead to financial problems in non-diversified economies. The results also highlight that the detrimental effects of commodity price shocks are more common in countries with a low diversification of their export base. A lack of diversification may increase exposure to adverse external shocks and vulnerability to macroeconomic instability. While a diversified export base may allow countries to better handle declines in commodity related revenues with alternative sources.

In terms of policy implications, the findings underscore the necessity of adopting policies to increase the resilience of resource rich-countries. First, developing countries should promote sound economic policies and good governance that will ensure the effective use of natural resource windfalls and build fiscal buffers, including through sovereign wealth funds or similar arrangement. The presence of a sovereign wealth fund can effectively mitigate the impact of commodity price shocks and stabilize the economy. More generally, sound fiscal policy, characterized by low debt levels is an important buffer against exogenous shocks. Second, countries should implement macro-prudential policies in order to limit or mitigate systemic risk. Finally, countries should diversify their production and exports base in order to have more alternative sources of revenues allowing them to deal with the volatility of commodity exports related revenues.

Note: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the authors and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Will Virtual Currencies Go Main Stream?

Virtual currencies (VCs) and especially their underlying technologies are a potentially important advance for the financial sector that could increase efficiency and financial inclusion, but can also serve as vehicles for money laundering, terrorism financing, and tax evasion. Achieving a balanced regulatory framework that guards against risks without suffocating innovation is a challenge that will require extensive international cooperation, says a new IMF staff paper, “Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations,” released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the World Economic Forum.

The report provides an overview of virtual currencies, how they work and how they fit into monetary systems, both domestically and internationally. It discusses the potential implications of the technological advances underlying virtual currencies, such as the distributed ledger system, before examining the regulatory and policy challenges posed by VCs, in the areas of consumer protection, financial integrity (money laundering and terrorism financing), taxation, financial stability, exchange and capital controls and monetary policy. The paper also sets out principles for the design of regulatory frameworks for VCs at both the domestic and international levels.

As digital representations of value, VCs fall within the broader category of digital currencies (Figure 1). However, they differ from other digital currencies, such as e-money, which is a digital payment mechanism for (and denominated in) fiat currency. VCs, on the other hand, are not denominated in fiat currency and have their own unit of account.

Virtual-CurrenciesHigh price volatility of VCs limits their ability to serve as a reliable store of value. VCs are not liabilities of a state, and most VCs are not liabilities of private entities either. Their prices have been highly unstable (see Figure 2), with volatility that is typically much higher than for national currency pairs. Both prices and volatility appear to be unrelated to economic or financial factors, making them hard to hedge or forecast.

Bitcoin

Computing technology has made possible decentralized settlement systems built on distributed ledgers distributed across individual nodes in the payment system. Centralized systems have a master ledger keeping track of transactions maintained by a trusted central counterparty. In a distributed ledger system, multiple copies of the central ledger are maintained across the financial system network by a large number of individual private entities. The network’s distributed ledgers—and hence individual transactions—are validated by using technologies derived from computing and cryptography, most often derived from the so-called blockchain technology. These technologies allow a consensus to be achieved across members of the network regarding the validity of the ledger. This distributed ledger concept underpins decentralized VCs—for example the blockchain technology behind Bitcoin. The distributed ledger provides a complete history of transactions associated with the use of particular units of a decentralized VC. They provide a secure permanent record that cannot be manipulated by a single entity and do not require a central registry.

Blockchain

A key conclusion of the paper is that the distributed ledger concept has the potential to change finance by reducing costs and allowing for deeper financial inclusion in the longer run. This could be especially important for remittances, where transaction costs can be high, around 8 percent. Distributed ledgers can also shorten the time required to settle securities transactions, which currently take up to three days, as well as lower counterparty and settlement risks.

“Virtual currencies and their underlying technologies can provide faster and cheaper financial services, and can become a powerful tool for deepening financial inclusion in the developing world,” said IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, who presented the report at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, during the panel Transformation of Finance. “The challenge will be how to reap all these benefits and at the same time prevent illegal uses, such as money laundering, terror financing, fraud, and even circumvention of capital controls.”

Note: Staff Discussion Notes (SDNs) showcase policy-related analysis and research being developed by IMF staff members and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in Staff Discussion Notes are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

IMF Lowers Growth Projections – Again

The latest World Economic Outlook, just released, contains a lower growth projection of 3.4 percent in 2016 and 3.6 percent in 2017 and so raising actual and potential output through a mix of demand support and structural reforms is even more urgent.

Recent Developments

In 2015, global economic activity remained subdued. Growth in emerging market and developing economies—while still accounting for over 70 percent of global growth—declined for the fifth consecutive year, while a modest recovery continued in advanced economies. Three key transitions continue to influence the global outlook: (1) the gradual slowdown and rebalancing of economic activity in China away from investment and manufacturing toward consumption and services, (2) lower prices for energy and other commodities, and (3) a gradual tightening in monetary policy in the United States in the context of a resilient U.S. recovery as several other major advanced economy central banks continue to ease monetary policy.

Overall growth in China is evolving broadly as envisaged, but with a faster-than-expected slowdown in imports and exports, in part reflecting weaker investment and manufacturing activity. These developments, together with market concerns about the future performance of the Chinese economy, are having spillovers to other economies through trade channels and weaker commodity prices, as well as through diminishing confidence and increasing volatility in financial markets. Manufacturing activity and trade remain weak globally, reflecting not only developments in China, but also subdued global demand and investment more broadly—notably a decline in investment in extractive industries. In addition, the dramatic decline in imports in a number of emerging market and developing economies in economic distress is also weighing heavily on global trade.

Oil prices have declined markedly since September 2015, reflecting expectations of sustained increases in production by Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members amid continued global oil production in excess of oil consumption.1 Futures markets are currently suggesting only modest increases in prices in 2016 and 2017. Prices of other commodities, especially metals, have fallen as well.

Lower oil prices strain the fiscal positions of fuel exporters and weigh on their growth prospects, while supporting household demand and lowering business energy costs in importers, especially in advanced economies, where price declines are fully passed on to end users. Though a decline in oil prices driven by higher oil supply should support global demand given a higher propensity to spend in oil importers relative to oil exporters, in current circumstances several factors have dampened the positive impact of lower oil prices. First and foremost, financial strains in many oil exporters reduce their ability to smooth the shock, entailing a sizable reduction in their domestic demand. The oil price decline has had a notable impact on investment in oil and gas extraction, also subtracting from global aggregate demand. Finally, the pickup in consumption in oil importers has so far been somewhat weaker than evidence from past episodes of oil price declines would have suggested, possibly reflecting continued deleveraging in some of these economies. Limited pass-through of price declines to consumers may also have been a factor in several emerging market and developing economies.

Monetary easing in the euro area and Japan is proceeding broadly as previously envisaged, while in December 2015 the U.S. Federal Reserve lifted the federal funds rate from the zero lower bound. Overall, financial conditions within advanced economies remain very accommodative. Prospects of a gradual increase in policy interest rates in the United States as well as bouts of financial volatility amid concerns about emerging market growth prospects have contributed to tighter external financial conditions, declining capital flows, and further currency depreciations in many emerging market economies.

Headline inflation has broadly moved sideways in most countries, but with renewed declines in commodity prices and weakness in global manufacturing weighing on traded goods’ prices it is likely to soften again. Core inflation rates remain well below inflation objectives in advanced economies. Mixed inflation developments in emerging market economies reflect the conflicting implications of weak domestic demand and lower commodity prices versus marked currency depreciations over the past year.

The Updated Forecast

Global growth is projected at 3.4 percent in 2016 and 3.6 percent in 2017.

Advanced Economies

Growth in advanced economies is projected to rise by 0.2 percentage point in 2016 to 2.1 percent, and hold steady in 2017. Overall activity remains resilient in the United States, supported by still-easy financial conditions and strengthening housing and labor markets, but with dollar strength weighing on manufacturing activity and lower oil prices curtailing investment in mining structures and equipment. In the euro area, stronger private consumption supported by lower oil prices and easy financial conditions is outweighing a weakening in net exports. Growth in Japan is also expected to firm in 2016, on the back of fiscal support, lower oil prices, accommodative financial conditions, and rising incomes.

Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Growth in emerging market and developing economies is projected to increase from 4 percent in 2015—the lowest since the 2008–09 financial crisis—to 4.3 and 4.7 percent in 2016 and 2017, respectively.

  • Growth in China is expected to slow to 6.3 percent in 2016 and 6.0 percent in 2017, primarily reflecting weaker investment growth as the economy continues to rebalance. India and the rest of emerging Asia are generally projected to continue growing at a robust pace, although with some countries facing strong headwinds from China’s economic rebalancing and global manufacturing weakness.
  • Aggregate GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean is now projected to contract in 2016 as well, albeit at a smaller rate than in 2015, despite positive growth in most countries in the region. This reflects the recession in Brazil and other countries in economic distress.
  • Higher growth is projected for the Middle East, but lower oil prices, and in some cases geopolitical tensions and domestic strife, continue to weigh on the outlook.
  • Emerging Europe is projected to continue growing at a broadly steady pace, albeit with some slowing in 2016. Russia, which continues to adjust to low oil prices and Western sanctions, is expected to remain in recession in 2016. Other economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States are caught in the slipstream of Russia’s recession and geopolitical tensions, and in some cases affected by domestic structural weaknesses and low oil prices; they are projected to expand only modestly in 2016 but gather speed in 2017.
  • Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa will see a gradual pickup in growth, but with lower commodity prices, to rates that are lower than those seen over the past decade. This mainly reflects the continued adjustment to lower commodity prices and higher borrowing costs, which are weighing heavily on some of the region’s largest economies (Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa) as well as a number of smaller commodity exporters.

Forecast Revisions

Overall, forecasts for global growth have been revised downward by 0.2 percentage point for both 2016 and 2017. These revisions reflect to a substantial degree, but not exclusively, a weaker pickup in emerging economies than was forecast in October. In terms of the country composition, the revisions are largely accounted for by Brazil, where the recession caused by political uncertainty amid continued fallout from the Petrobras investigation is proving to be deeper and more protracted than previously expected; the Middle East, where prospects are hurt by lower oil prices; and the United States, where growth momentum is now expected to hold steady rather than gather further steam. Prospects for global trade growth have also been marked down by more than ½ percentage point for 2016 and 2017, reflecting developments in China as well as distressed economies.

Risks to the Forecast

Unless the key transitions in the world economy are successfully navigated, global growth could be derailed. Downside risks, which are particularly prominent for emerging market and developing economies, include the following:

  • A sharper-than-expected slowdown along China’s needed transition to more balanced growth, with more international spillovers through trade, commodity prices, and confidence, with attendant effects on global financial markets and currency valuations.
  • Adverse corporate balance sheet effects and funding challenges related to potential further dollar appreciation and tighter global financing conditions as the United States exits from extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy.
  • A sudden rise in global risk aversion, regardless of the trigger, leading to sharp further depreciations and possible financial strains in vulnerable emerging market economies. Indeed, in an environment of higher risk aversion and market volatility, even idiosyncratic shocks in a relatively large emerging market or developing economy could generate broader contagion effects.
  • An escalation of ongoing geopolitical tensions in a number of regions affecting confidence and disrupting global trade, financial, and tourism flows.

Commodity markets pose two-sided risks. On the downside, further declines in commodity prices would worsen the outlook for already-fragile commodity producers, and increasing yields on energy sector debt threaten a broader tightening of credit conditions. On the upside, the recent decline in oil prices may provide a stronger boost to demand in oil importers than currently envisaged, including through consumers’ possible perception that prices will remain lower for longer.

Policy Priorities

With the projected pickup in growth being once again weaker than previously expected and the balance of risks remaining tilted to the downside, raising actual and potential output through a mix of demand support and structural reforms is even more urgent.

In advanced economies, where inflation rates are still well below central banks’ targets, accommodative monetary policy remains essential. Where conditions allow, near-term fiscal policy should be more supportive of the recovery, especially through investments that would augment future productive capital. Fiscal consolidation, where warranted by fiscal imbalances, should be growth friendly and equitable. Efforts to raise potential output through structural reforms remain critical. Although the structural reform agenda should be country specific, common areas of focus should include strengthening labor market participation and trend employment, tackling legacy debt overhang, and reducing barriers to entry in product and services markets. In Europe, where the tide of refugees is presenting major challenges to the absorptive capacity of European Union labor markets and testing political systems, policy actions to support the integration of migrants into the labor force are critical to allay concerns about social exclusion and long-term fiscal costs, and unlock the potential long-term economic benefits of the refugee inflow.

In emerging market and developing economies, policy priorities are varied given the diversity in conditions. Policymakers need to manage vulnerabilities and rebuild resilience against potential shocks while lifting growth and ensuring continued convergence toward advanced economy income levels. Net importers of commodities are facing reduced inflation pressures and external vulnerabilities, but in some, currency depreciations accompanying reduced capital inflows could limit the scope for monetary policy easing to support demand. In a number of commodity exporters, reducing public expenditures while raising their efficiency, strengthening fiscal institutions, and increasing noncommodity revenues would facilitate the adjustment to lower fiscal revenues. In general, allowing for exchange rate flexibility will be an important means for cushioning the impact of adverse external shocks in emerging market and developing economies, especially commodity exporters, though the effects of exchange rate depreciations on private and public sector balance sheets and on domestic inflation rates need to be closely monitored. Policymakers in emerging market and developing economies need to press on with structural reforms to alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks, facilitate a dynamic and innovation-friendly business environment, and bolster human capital. Deepening local capital markets, improving fiscal revenue mobilization, and diversifying exports away from commodities are also ongoing challenges in many of these economies.

Macroprudential, Capital and LVR Controls

A newly released IMF working paper examines the impact of macroprudential controls, including lifting capital ratios, and reducing allowable loan to value (LVR) ratios. They find that first, monetary policy and macroprudential policies related to bank capital are likely to be transmitted through the same channels in the banking system as they both affect the cost of loans. So, they should be expected to reinforce each other. Second, capital buffers or liquidity ratios targeting specific sectoral exposures are likely to be effective in slowing down credit growth in the mortgage market. Third, macro-prudential instruments affecting the cost of capital or the liquidity position could usefully be complemented by instruments related to non-price dimensions of mortgage loans such as limits on LTVs. The evidence also suggests that tightening of LTVs is more effective in slowing down credit growth and house price  appreciation when monetary policy is too loose.

The design of a macro-prudential framework and its interaction with monetary policy has been at the forefront of the policy agenda since the global financial crisis. However, most advanced economies (AEs) have little experience using macroprudential policies, while there is, by contrast, more evidence about macro-prudential instruments aimed at moderating the volatility of capital flows in emerging markets. As a result, relatively little is known empirically about macroprudential instruments’ effectiveness in mitigating systemic risks in these countries, about their channels of transmission, and about how these instruments would interact with monetary policy.

Many countries publish bank lending surveys that provide very useful information on how banks modify the price and non-price terms of loans to the private sector, and on the drivers of these lending conditions. Some of the terms of loans (such as actual loan-to-value ratios (LTVs)) or some of the drivers of the lending standards (such as the cost of bank capital or the liquidity position of a bank) are directly related to macro-prudential instruments considered to be key in the policy toolkit of many jurisdictions. In this paper, we make use of the European Central Bank Lending Survey to develop a methodology and estimate empirically the likely effectiveness of some of these macro-prudential policies, their channel of transmissions and their interactions with monetary policy.

There is thus far little knowledge about how (policy driven) changes in the cost of bank capital (which could be the result of the implementation of a countercyclical capital buffer, of time contingent or sectoral risk weights, or more generally of bank specific changes in the capital adequacy ratio) or in the bank liquidity position would be transmitted to credit supply. Specifically, would such policy actions be transmitted through non-price factors (such as LTVs, collateral requirements, or maturity) or through price factors (such as price margins or fees)? There is also relatively little knowledge about whether limits on LTVs could significantly slow down house price appreciation and/or mortgage loan growth. Should measures affecting capitalization be complemented by non-price measures constraining lending standards? Can some of these macro-prudential policies be effective during housing booms when traditional monetary policy is typically too loose? Assessing such interactions and the transmission channel of macro-prudential instruments, with a specific focus on the real estate market, is important, as shocks to the real estate market have been a key source of systemic risk during the recent financial crisis.

The Euro-system Bank Lending Survey (BLS) contains information on overall changes in lending standards, or net tightening of lending standards and changes in lending standards related to non-price factors (LTVs, collateral requirements, maturity), price factors (such as margins) and factors contributing to the changes in lending standards, including balance sheet characteristics (such as capital and liquidity ratios) which can be mapped to specific macroprudential targets set by national regulators. However, identification of the impact of macro-prudential policies requires addressing specific challenges. The BLS does not require banks to specify the exact nature of the shocks that cause a change in lending standards or in the cost of capital, even though it provides information on perceptions of risks, economic activity, and competition pressures, and their contribution to the change. Hence, our approach is potentially subject to omitted variable bias, reverse causality and measurement bias (as expectations about house prices and credit growth may be mis-measured). Moreover, our observable variables (lending standard, and the contribution of balance sheet factors to lending standard) are not policy variables, which in our case are unobserved shocks affecting our observables. To address these issues, we develop methodologies relying upon instrumental variables and GMM estimators; our study also includes various control variables such as growth prospects, financial conditions, perception of risks and monetary policy cycle. Still, a potential advantage of our approach is that we would be able to capture the impact of the announcement of macro-prudential measures on lending standards, even before the actual implementation of the policy.

IMF-Macro-Modelling-Jan-2016Our main findings are the following. First, our estimates suggest that measures that increase the cost of bank capital are effective in slowing down credit growth and house price appreciation. Second, changes in LTV also impact credit growth and house price appreciation but their impact tends to be more moderate. Third, macro-prudential policies affecting the cost of capital are transmitted mainly through price margins, with very little impact on LTV ratios or other non-price characteristics of mortgage loans. The evidence also suggests that tightening of LTVs is more effective in slowing down credit growth and house price appreciation when monetary policy is too loose.

Note: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

IMF Head Warns of Slow Growth and Economic “Shocks” in 2016

International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde offered a bleak economic forecast for 2016 and beyond in a guest column published Wednesday in the German financial newspaper Handelsblatt.

The IMF head wrote that global economic growth next year would be “disappointing” and the outlook for the medium term had also deteriorated. Lagarde pointed to the continuing slowdown in China and the prospect of rising interest rates in the US as major factors leading to a continued slowdown in world growth rates and the potential for financial shocks.

Lagarde also noted the substantial decline in the growth of world trade, the ongoing fall in oil and other commodity prices, and the worsening economic and financial crisis in so-called “emerging market” and “developing” countries whose economies are heavily dependent on commodity exports and expanding trade.

“All of that means global growth will be disappointing and uneven in 2016,” Lagarde said. She warned, in particular, of “spillover effects” resulting from the decision of the US Federal Reserve Board earlier this month to begin raising its benchmark interest rate from near zero, the first Fed rate increase in over nine years.

Lagarde and the IMF had lobbied against the Fed move, warning that it could spark a panic outflow of capital from emerging market countries with high levels of dollar-denominated corporate debt such as Brazil, Turkey and South Africa.

In the Handelsblatt article, Lagarde said that she was concerned about the ability of such countries to absorb “shocks,” citing in particular an increase in financing costs for corporations that sold large volumes of dollar-denominated bonds during the emerging market and oil boom that followed the financial crisis of 2008. The rise in the dollar means the real cost of debt repayment for these companies, whose revenues are in sinking local currencies, increases.

Lagarde hinted that the crisis could spread more broadly across the financial system, suggesting that emerging market and energy sector companies defaulting on their payments could “infect” banks and state treasuries.

The Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures

An IMF Working Paper has been released “The Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures by the Systemic Four on Global Liquidity and Monetary Conditions“.  The paper examines the impact of unconventional monetary policy measures (UMPMs) implemented since 2008 in the United States, the United Kingdom, Euro area and Japan—the Systemic Four—on global monetary and liquidity conditions. Overall, the results show positive significant relationships. However, there are differences in the impact of the UMPMs of individual S4 countries on these conditions in other countries. UMPMs of the Bank of Japan have positive association with global liquidity but negative association with securities issuance. The quantitative easing (QE) of the Bank of England has the opposite association. Results for the quantitative easing measures of the United States Federal Reserve System (U.S. Fed) and the ECB UMPMs are more mixed. Of significant concern are the spill-over effects, which will continue to impact many economies, including those in developing countries as attempts are made to bring policy settings back to “more normal” settings.

In recent years, central banks in several systemically important countries have adopted unconventional monetary policy measures (UMPMs)—ranging from large scale purchases of public and private debt securities to direct lending to banks—designed to inter alia, repair the monetary transmission mechanism by ensuring depth and liquidity in financial markets and provide monetary accommodation at the zero lower bound of policy interest rates.  One distinguishing feature of UMPMs, which has also been referred to as quantitative easing (QE), is that the central bank actively uses its balance sheet to influence market prices and conditions beyond the use of a short-term or “policy” interest rate. As a result of these policies, the balance sheets of the central banks implementing the UMPM programs expanded significantly over the period 2008–14. This has led to large injections of money into the economy through increased reserves (which, by a “money multiplier,” increased broad money), as well as introduction of negative interest rates for some policy instruments in some advanced countries. With money and securities being imperfect substitutes, these programs resulted in portfolio rebalancing of assets of the United States, the United Kingdom, Euro area, and Japan—the Systemic Four (S4)— banks and corporations, which in turn increased asset prices. Investors responded by acquiring more risky assets outside the S4 that became relatively more attractive compared with S4 government bonds and securities: capital outflows from the S4 rebounded leading to increased inflows and issuance of new securities in emerging market economies (EMEs).

The overall effect of the S4 UMPMs on the rest of the world (RoW) liquidity and monetary conditions is not yet clear, as positive trade and capital spillovers may likely be accompanied by increased macro-financial vulnerabilities. While empirical studies find evidence of significant spillovers of monetary easing in the S4 on the RoW through trade and finance channels, research on the impact of the S4 UMPMs on the RoW banks’ balance sheets, liquidity, and money supply is still in an embryonic stage. Indeed, the substitution of cross-border banking flows with portfolio flows of non-banks does raise new concerns about financial vulnerabilities. The growing role of non-financial corporations (NFCs) as de facto “financial intermediaries” may reduce the effectiveness of macroprudential policies and limit the ability of policy makers to respond to future shocks.

Seen from a broader perspective, such UMPM programs might also lead to a loosening of fiscal discipline and shifts in the allocation of resources. In this context, the overall effect of the S4 UMPMs on the RoW is likely to be dependent on both the specific policy frameworks of affected countries and each UMPM program. Likewise, the affect of S4 UMPMs reversals on the RoW, i.e., monetary policy normalization, could also be varied. Against this background, this paper attempts to break new ground in empirically investigating UMPM spillovers on global liquidity and monetary conditions and financial sector balance sheets in other countries. In particular, we focus our analysis on spillovers from S4 monetary policy easing (conventional and QE/UMPMs) on the RoW’s monetary aggregates, banks’ balance sheets (NFC deposits), and NFC securities issuances. We also assess potential threats stemming from UMPMs unwinding to the RoW. To the best of our knowledge, this topic remains largely unexplored, which is a major gap in understanding of UMPM spillovers/leakages.

The paper focuses on specific QE programs and UMPMs implemented by the S4: (i) the large-scale assets purchase (LSAP) by the U.S. Fed, split by type of securities into purchases of U.S. treasuries, mortgage backed securities (MBS), and securities of government sponsored enterprises (GSE); (ii) the QE strategy implemented by the Bank of England (BoE); (iii) the assets purchase program of the Bank of Japan (BoJ); and (iv) the ECB’s government bond purchases (phases one and two), the ECB’s three-year long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), and the ECB’s securities market program (SMP).

We find positive and statistically significant relationships between UMPM implementation and global liquidity and monetary conditions in terms of global NFC deposit growth (including China), banks’ cross-border flows, and issuance of securities (particularly in foreign currency). We also find significant differences in the impact of the UMPMs implemented by individual S4 on broad money, NFC deposits, and securities issuance in EMEs. The BoJ’s asset purchases programs appear to have a positive impact on global liquidity and other countries’ monetary conditions, while they appear to have a negative association with issuance of securities. In contrast, the effects of the QE program implemented by the BoE have strong negative association with global liquidity, measured by broad money and NFC deposits and positive impact on issuance of NFC securities. Results for QE implemented by the U.S. Fed and ECB UMPMs are mixed.

The paper develops a new quarterly dataset covering the period Q1:2002–Q2:2014, leveraging monetary data reported by IMF member countries through the IMF’s standardized report forms (SRFs), which have the advantage of providing a consistent set of definitions based on the IMF’s Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual, and can be replicated over time and across countries using officially reported data. Core and non-core liabilities of banks are computed using detailed SRF data reported to the IMF on a confidential basis. Leveraging the IMF’s SRFs is our major advantage, relying on broad money as monetary aggregate, which is comparable across SRF reporting countries. In contrast, other studies have typically relied on countries’ self-reported monetary aggregates under more traditional classifications (e.g., M0, M2, etc.) subject to different national definitions, which make cross-country comparisons less meaningful.

The UMPMs implemented by the S4 and analyzed in this paper are negatively correlated with the nominal long term (LT) interest rates (Figure 1), confirming existing results of the empirical studies that show that UMPMs had significant impact on respective long-term government bond yields (LT interest rates).

Flows1This suggests that S4 UMPMs contributed to the compression of long-term interest rates in S4, which prompted a materialization of rebounded private capital outflows from these countries (Figure 2).Flows2Through a detailed descriptive and econometric analysis the results of this paper suggest that the impact on global liquidity, monetary conditions, and bank balance sheets from individual S4 UMPMs differ depending on the nature of each program, initial macro-economic conditions, and countries’ policy response. The U.S. QE programs might dominate in impact due to its size and the relevance of the U.S. dollar as a global transaction currency.

In addition, while we find a positive impact of S4 UMPMs on global liquidity and money growth, the differential nature of these programs can potentially have countervailing effects on each other and on global liquidity. For example, the U.S. Fed was concentrating on the asset side of the balance sheet to support the financial intermediary function, while the BoJ was targeting the liability side to provide a buffer against funding liquidity by increasing private banks’ excess reserves. The difference in policies explained in part by the differences in financial systems (market-based system in the United States versus bank-based system in Japan). Targeted assets purchases programs may have a potential positive impact on asset markets as they may prevent excessive swings in asset prices.

The S4 UMPM policies had a statistically significant impact on the EMEs’ banks money supply and funding liquidity though their impact on bank balance sheets, NFCs deposits, and NFC securities issuance. The portfolio rebalancing channel of QE/UMPM policies has led to the redistribution and increased issuance of EMEs’ debt and has increased the non-core liabilities in EME banking sectors.

The results also suggest that non-core liabilities of EME banks exhibit higher volatility than those of developed countries, making EMEs banking systems more vulnerable to the S4 monetary policy reversals and unwinding of the programs. At the same time, macroprudential regulation in EMEs may become less effective due to the increased significance of the non-banking sector as de facto “financial intermediary.”

Furthermore, UMPM programs have been accompanied by economic costs, since they seem to have led to the reallocation of resources on banks’ balance sheets and possibly contributed to loosening fiscal discipline in EMEs. Therefore, close monitoring of macro-financial vulnerabilities in EMEs and undertaking debt sustainability analysis on a frequent basis may be prudent to head-off policy mistakes and to maintain financial stability. Finally, as monetary policy begins to normalize in the S4, RoW liquidity and monetary conditions might get tighter. As the “taper tantrum” episode of 2013 showed, simply signaling a change in future monetary policy can create a wave of extreme volatility in the markets, influencing RoW exchange rates, flows and asset prices. This suggests the need for better communication among central banks and with the financial markets in addition to strengthening of the global financial safety net.

A full assessment of the effects of the UMPMs can be made only after a complete return to a normalized monetary policy. Nonetheless, at this point, our analysis can help shed light on the potential impact of the UMPMs on global monetary and liquidity conditions.

Note that IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Housing Price and Household Debt Interactions

A newly published IMF working paper looks at the relationship between house prices and household debt, in Sweden. The work is interesting because house prices have risen significantly, and household debt has risen substantially at a time when supply was limited. Australia is not the only country with these synonyms!

Sweden1The swings in house price growth have had wider amplitude than those of credit growth since the GFC. Whilst a loan-to-value ratio cap of 85 percent on all new mortgage loans was introduced in 2010 which may have affected lending growth, they still have tax relief on mortgage repayments.

Sweden-2The question the paper examines is the relationship between these higher prices and household debt levels. A common interpretation of the link between these markets is that mortgage lending drives housing prices up, motivating measures to curb credit. Yet, mortgage lending can also be driven by rising housing prices through the wealth
and collateral channels. Home ownership generally requires debt financing, especially as households usually acquire this major asset early in their life cycle. When house prices appreciate, households who own housing may perceive that their higher wealth allows for greater lifetime consumption, inducing households to borrow and spend more. At the same time, the higher value of housing assets expands the value of collateral against which borrowing is generally much cheaper than unsecured credit. Relaxing this collateral constraint thereby expands households’ borrowing capacity, which could be reflected in a combination of higher consumption and larger asset holdings. For households that do not yet own a house, higher prices increase the need to borrow but also relax collateral constraints.

The paper examines the interactions between housing prices and household debt using a three-equation model, finding that household borrowing impacts housing prices in the short-run, but the price of housing is the main driver of the secular trend in household debt over the long-run. Both housing prices and household debt are estimated to be moderately above their long-run equilibrium levels, but the adjustment toward equilibrium is not found to be rapid. Whereas low interest rates have contributed to the recent surge in housing prices, growth in incomes and financial assets play a larger role. Policy experiments suggest that a gradual phasing out of mortgage interest deductibility is likely to have a manageable effect on housing prices and household debt.

Note that IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.