Share prices in Asia have risen after Japan’s central bank promised to help protect markets from the impact of the coronavirus.
It comes after data showed Chinese factory activity fell in February at the fastest rate on record.
On Friday the US Federal Reserve made a similar pledge to stop more big falls on the world’s financial markets.
Last week concerns about the outbreak wiped more than $5 trillion from global stocks.
In a rare emergency statement, Bank of Japan (BOJ) Governor Haruhiko Kuroda said the central bank would take necessary steps to stabilise financial markets: “Overseas and domestic financial markets continue to make unstable movements due to heightening uncertainty over the impact on the economy from the spread of the coronavirus.”
“The BOJ will monitor developments carefully, and strive to stabilise markets and offer sufficient liquidity via market operations and asset purchases,” he added.
The language used in the statement suggested the central bank is ready to make full use of its existing tools to inject funds into the market, before considering what other steps it may take.
It follows a similar unscheduled announcement by the chairman of the US Federal Reserve. On Friday Jerome Powell said the central bank is watching developments closely for risks to the US economy and promised to take action if necessary.
Data released on Saturday showed that China’s official Purchasing Managers’ Index contracted in February at the fastest rate on record. The fall, which was even worse than slump seen during the 2008 global financial crisis, highlights the outbreak’s huge impact on the world’s second-largest economy.
Over the weekend senior officials in President Donald Trump’s administration also tried to soothe concerns about the risk of recession, highlighting the US economy’s underlying strength.
US Vice President Mike Pence, who is leading the administration’s response to the coronavirus, said that the stock market “will come back”, adding that “the fundamentals of this economy are strong”.
Members commenced their discussion of the global economy by noting the International Monetary
Fund’s forecast for global growth to pick up in 2020 and 2021. The easing in trade tensions
between
the United States and China, and ongoing stimulus delivered by central banks, had supported a
modest
improvement in the growth outlook for a number of economies. Global manufacturing and trade
indicators,
notably export orders, had continued to show signs of stabilising in late 2019. Inflation had
remained
low and below most central banks’ targets. Members also discussed the coronavirus outbreak,
which
was a new source of uncertainty regarding the global outlook.
In China, a range of activity indicators had picked up in the December quarter, which suggested
that
targeted fiscal and monetary easing had been working to stabilise economic conditions. In east
Asia, the
growth outlook had been supported by signs of a turnaround in the global electronics cycle and
more
stimulatory fiscal and monetary policies in some economies in the region. On the other hand, the
outlook
for output growth in India had been revised lower given the broad-based slowing in economic
activity
there.
In major advanced economies, indicators for manufacturing and services activity had ticked up
slightly
and tight labour markets had supported growth in consumption. In the United States, lower
interest rates
had supported a pick-up in residential investment. Business investment intentions had
stabilised.
Japanese economic activity had slowed as expected following the increase in the consumption tax
in
October 2019, but the fiscal stimulus that had been announced was expected to support growth. In
the
euro area, survey indicators of conditions in the manufacturing sector appeared to have bottomed
out,
but investment had remained weak.
The progress in addressing the US–China trade and technology disputes had alleviated an
important downside risk to global growth. However, given the nature of the ‘phase one’
deal and the potential for tensions to re-escalate, this risk had not been eliminated.
Members discussed the coronavirus outbreak, noting that it was a new source of uncertainty for
the
global economy. With the situation still evolving, members observed that it was too early to
determine
the extent to which growth in China would be affected or the nature of the international
spillovers. It
was noted that previous outbreaks of new viruses had had significant but short-lived negative
effects on
economic growth in the economies at the centre of the outbreak. Members observed that it was
difficult
to know how representative these earlier episodes could be. China now accounted for a much
larger share
of the global economy and was more closely integrated, including with Australia, than in 2003 at
the
time of the SARS outbreak. The economic effects would depend crucially on the persistence of the
outbreak and measures taken to contain its spread.
Some commodity prices, notably for industrial metals, iron ore and oil, had fallen on concerns
that the
coronavirus outbreak would disrupt production in China and reduce Chinese commodity demand in
the near
term. By contrast, rural prices had been little changed.
Domestic Economic Conditions
The Australian economy had grown modestly in the September quarter. While growth in public demand
and
exports had been relatively strong, growth in household spending and investment had remained
weak. The
output of the farm sector had also subtracted from growth over the preceding year, reflecting
the
effects of ongoing drought conditions. Members noted that the recent bushfires had devastated
some
regional communities and that this was expected to have reduced GDP growth over the December and
March
quarters. The effects of the coronavirus outbreak were also expected to subtract from growth in
exports
over the first half of 2020.
Overall, economic growth was expected to be weaker in the near term than had been forecast three
months
earlier, partly because of the effects of the bushfires and the coronavirus outbreak. However,
GDP
growth was still expected to pick up over the forecast period, supported by accommodative
monetary
policy, a pick-up in mining investment, and recoveries in dwelling investment and consumption.
The
recovery from the bushfires was expected to add to growth in the second half of 2020. The
central
forecast for growth remained unchanged since November, at 2¾ per cent over 2020
and
around 3 per cent over 2021.
An increase in mining investment was expected in the near term and a turnaround in dwelling
investment
was likely to have occurred by the end of 2019. However, the recovery in consumption was less
certain
and more consequential for overall demand. There was also uncertainty around estimates of the
effects of
the bushfires and the coronavirus outbreak: it was difficult to assess potential indirect
effects on
activity from these events and relevant data were yet to be published.
Household consumption had been lower than expected in the September quarter despite strong growth
in
household disposable income, supported by the receipt of tax offset payments and lower interest
payments
following the recent reductions in the cash rate. Information from the ABS retail sales release
and the
Bank’s liaison program had suggested that retail sales volumes were likely to have grown
only
modestly in the December quarter; although nominal retail sales had increased strongly in the
month of
November, much of this increase was likely to have been purchases brought forward to take
advantage of
‘Black Friday’ sales. Measures of consumer sentiment had declined over recent
months, but
consumers’ views on their personal financial situation, which historically have had a
stronger link
to consumption, had been little changed.
Members noted that a number of factors had contributed to the slowdown in consumption growth
since
mid 2018. The downturn in the housing market had reduced households’ wealth, and the
extended
period of weak growth in household income had probably lowered expectations of future income
growth.
Members observed that the prolonged period of slow growth in income was expected to continue to
weigh on
consumption over coming quarters. Furthermore, recent data had suggested that households were
directing
more income to saving and reducing their debt.
Looking ahead, the Bank’s forecast was for growth in consumption to increase gradually,
sustained
by moderate growth in household disposable income and the recovery in the housing market. Growth
in
housing prices had picked up in most capital cities and parts of regional Australia over recent
months.
Prices had increased very strongly in Sydney and Melbourne in recent months. Higher housing
prices and
the associated increase in housing turnover were expected to support consumption and dwelling
investment.
Dwelling investment had continued to decline in the September quarter, however, and was expected
to
decline further in the near term. Nonetheless, leading indicators were consistent with the
forecast of a
trough in dwelling investment towards the end of 2020, followed by a recovery through 2021.
Private
residential building approvals had increased in the December quarter. Contacts in the Bank’s
business liaison program had reported an increase in sales of new homes and greenfield land in
recent
months.
Business investment declined in the September quarter, with both mining and non-mining investment
weaker than expected as at November. Mining investment had been considerably lower
because
work on new liquefied natural gas plants had continued to wind down. Information from business
liaison
contacts and the recent ABS capital expenditure survey continued to support the view that mining
investment was passing through a trough. Non-mining investment was expected to be subdued in the
near
term, but then to increase modestly, consistent with the expected pick-up in domestic activity.
Public
investment had been stronger than expected in the September quarter and information from
government
budgets had suggested public spending would continue to support growth in the near term,
including
through funding of initiatives for bushfire recovery and drought relief.
The unemployment rate had declined slightly to 5.1 per cent in December. Employment
growth
had moderated in the December quarter, but had remained at 2.1 per cent over the year.
All the
growth in the quarter had been in part-time employment. The Bank’s forecast of employment
growth
had been revised downwards for the first half of 2020, reflecting the overall signal from
leading
indicators and the downward revision to forecast GDP growth in the near term. The unemployment
rate was
expected to remain in the 5–5¼ per cent range for some time before
declining to
around 4¾ per cent in 2021, as GDP and employment growth picked up.
Members noted that the inflation data for the December quarter had been in line with
expectations.
Headline CPI inflation had been 0.6 per cent in the quarter and 1.8 per cent
over
2019. Trimmed mean inflation had been 0.4 per cent in the quarter and 1.6 per cent
over 2019. Housing inflation had continued to be a significant drag on overall inflation,
with little
change in rents both in the quarter and over the year. New dwelling prices had risen in the
December
quarter following earlier declines because smaller discounts had been offered by developers.
Inflationary pressures were expected to remain subdued. Underlying and headline inflation were
expected
to increase a little to around 2 per cent over the following couple of years as spare
capacity
in the economy declined. Wages growth was expected to be largely unchanged over the following
couple of
years because mild upward pressure on growth in the wage price index would likely be offset by
downward
pressure from the increase in the superannuation guarantee from mid 2021.
Members noted that the risks around the wage and price inflation forecasts were evenly balanced.
Wages
growth could pick up faster than expected if labour market conditions tightened by more than
expected.
The increase in the superannuation guarantee in 2021 was forecast to constrain wages growth for
some
wage earners, although the timing and extent of this was uncertain and broader measures of
earnings
growth could be expected to be boosted a little. Domestic inflationary pressures would depend on
a range
of factors, including how fast the economy recovered from the soft patch over the preceding
year, the
persistence of the effect of the drought on food prices, and developments in the housing market.
Financial Markets
Members noted that developments in global financial markets had reflected evolving perceptions of
key
risks.
Up until mid January, concerns over global downside risks had eased following stabilisation in a
range
of forward-looking indicators of growth, the passage of the ‘phase one’ US–China
trade deal and improved prospects for an orderly Brexit. In response, long-term government bond
yields
and equity prices had risen. The US dollar and Japanese yen had depreciated a little, while
the
Chinese renminbi had appreciated. There had also been renewed capital flows into emerging
markets.
However, since then these moves in financial markets had been partly reversed as market
participants
became concerned about the potential effect of the coronavirus on the prospects for global
economic
growth. In particular, government bond yields had declined noticeably to be back at very low
levels. In
Australia, the 10-year government bond yield had declined in line with movements abroad, to
below
1 per cent. Also, the US dollar and Japanese yen had appreciated, while the
Chinese
renminbi had depreciated. The Australian dollar had also depreciated to be around its lowest
level since
2009.
Overall, global financial conditions remained accommodative, in part because of ongoing stimulus
delivered by central banks. After some easing of monetary policies in 2019, central banks in the
major
advanced economies had indicated that their current policy settings were likely to remain
appropriate
for some time. Central banks in the United States, Europe and Japan had recently left policy
settings
unchanged, noting that some downside risks had receded for the time being. However, they had
also
signalled that they were prepared to ease policy further if necessary, and markets were
expecting some
further easing in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada in the year ahead. In China,
the
central bank had recently implemented targeted measures to support economic growth, including by
providing additional liquidity to the financial system.
Corporate financing conditions had generally remained favourable, including in Australia. Credit
spreads were at low levels and global equity prices had been higher over recent months,
notwithstanding
the volatility associated with the coronavirus outbreak. Members noted that equity market
valuations
were high relative to earnings in a number of economies, which could be explained partly by low
long-term bond yields keeping overall discount rates low relative to history.
Domestically, the reductions in the cash rate in 2019 had seen bank funding costs and lending
rates
reach historic lows. The major banks were estimated to be paying interest of 25 basis
points or
less on a little over one-quarter of their deposit funding. Around 60 basis points of the
75 basis point reduction in the cash rate since mid 2019 had been passed through to
standard
variable mortgage rates. However, the actual rates that households were paying on their
outstanding
variable-rate loans had declined by more than this, with the average rate declining by almost
70 basis points over the same period. This additional decline reflected strong competition
among
lenders for high-quality borrowers and households continuing to switch from (more expensive)
interest-only loans. If this were to continue, by around mid 2020 the average rate paid on
outstanding variable-rate mortgages would have declined by around 75 basis points since May
2019.
Households’ total mortgage payments increased in the December quarter, with a rise in
principal
and excess payments more than offsetting the decline in interest payments. Members discussed
whether
this increase reflected a change in behaviour by households and the potential for it to persist.
They
noted that some households were likely to be repaying their debts faster in response to low
growth of
their incomes and the earlier fall in housing prices. The process of balance sheet adjustment
had been
facilitated in part by the reductions in the cash rate as well as by the higher tax refunds for
low- and
middle-income earners, both of which had boosted disposable incomes.
Consistent with stronger conditions in some established housing markets, housing loan commitments
had
continued to rise. That had been driven largely by owner-occupiers, and growth in credit
extended to
owner-occupiers had increased to 5½ per cent on a six-months-ended annualised
basis in
December. Despite accommodative funding conditions for large businesses, growth in business debt
had
slowed over the six months to December.
Financial market pricing at the time of the meeting suggested that market participants expected a
further 25 basis point cut in the cash rate by mid 2020.
Before turning to the policy decision, members reviewed the policy and academic discussions
taking
place around the world regarding the operation of macroeconomic policy and monetary policy
frameworks in
an environment where interest rates are low because of structural factors. These discussions
focused on
a range of issues, including: the appropriate level and specification of inflation targets; the
cases
for and against more aggressive monetary policy easing when policy interest rates are near the
effective
lower bound; the role of forward guidance and strategies for lowering long-term interest rates
and their
potential side-effects; and the role of fiscal policy. Members also reviewed the international
discussions regarding possible changes in the monetary transmission mechanism at low interest
rates.
Considerations for Monetary Policy
In considering the policy decision, members observed that the outlook for the global economy
remained
reasonable, with signs that the slowdown in global growth was coming to an end. The progress in
addressing the US–China trade and technology disputes had reduced but not eliminated an
important
downside risk to global growth. The coronavirus outbreak was a new source of uncertainty. While
it was
too early to tell what the overall effect would be, the outbreak presented a material near-term
risk to
the economic outlook for China and for international trade flows, and thereby the Australian
economy.
Global financial conditions remained positive. This partly owed to ongoing stimulus delivered by
central banks, and financial market participants expected some further monetary easing in some
economies. Long-term government bond yields were back at very low levels, including in
Australia.
Borrowing rates for households and businesses were at historically low levels, and there was
strong
competition among lenders for borrowers of high credit quality. Conditions in some established
housing
markets had strengthened, and mortgage loan commitments had also picked up. The Australian
dollar had
depreciated to be around its lowest level since 2009.
The outlook for the Australian economy was for growth to improve, supported by a turnaround in
mining
investment and, further out, dwelling investment and consumption. In the short term, the effects
of the
bushfires were temporarily weighing on domestic growth, but the recovery was likely to reverse
the
negative effects on GDP by the end of the year. The forecast recovery in consumption growth
remained a
key uncertainty for the outlook. Consumption had been weak, as households had been gradually
adjusting
their spending to the protracted period of slow growth in incomes and to the fall in housing
prices.
Although housing prices had been rebounding nationally, it was too soon to see the response to
this in
household spending, and it was unclear for how long the period of balance sheet adjustment would
continue.
The unemployment rate had declined a little to 5.1 per cent and was expected to remain
around
this level for some time before declining further to a little below 5 per cent as
economic
growth picked up. Wages growth was expected to be largely unchanged over the following couple of
years.
Members agreed that a further gradual lift in wages growth would be a welcome development and
was needed
for inflation to be sustainably within the 2–3 per cent target range.
In the December quarter, CPI inflation had been broadly as expected at 1.8 per cent
over the
year. Inflationary pressures had remained subdued, held down by flat housing-related costs.
Inflation
was expected to increase gradually to 2 per cent over the following couple of years,
in
response to some tightening in labour market conditions.
Given this outlook, members considered how best to respond.
Members reviewed the case for a further reduction in the cash rate at the present meeting. This
case
rested largely on the only gradual progress towards the Bank’s inflation and unemployment
goals.
Lower interest rates could speed progress towards the Bank’s goals and make it more assured
in the
face of the current uncertainties. In considering this case, the Board took into account that
interest
rates had already been reduced to a low level and that there are long and variable lags in the
transmission of monetary policy. The Board also recognised that the incremental benefits of
further
interest rate reductions needed to be weighed against the risks associated with very low
interest rates.
Internationally, concerns had been raised about the effect of very low interest rates on
resource
allocation in the economy and their effect on the confidence of some people in the community,
notably
those reliant on savings to finance their consumption. A further reduction in interest rates
could also
encourage additional borrowing at a time when there was already a strong upswing in the housing
market.
The Board concluded that the cash rate should be held steady at this meeting. Members agreed that
it
was reasonable to expect that an extended period of low interest rates would be required in
Australia to
reach full employment and achieve the inflation target. The Board would continue to monitor
developments
carefully, including in the labour market, and remained prepared to ease monetary policy further
if
needed to support sustainable growth in the economy, full employment and the achievement of the
inflation target over time.
The Decision
The Board decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 0.75 per cent.
The normal line of argument has been that its central banks pumping liquidity into the financial markets which have led to falling real interest rates, and that they might indeed take them into negative territory. This is all to do with “secular stagnation” (reflecting poor productivity, globalisation, weak wages growth, and monetary policy intervention by central banks).
Last year the IMF in a working paper suggested that a cut of 4% or there abouts would be required to react to a financial crisis similar to the scale of the GFC. That would pull rates deeply negative, and of course so far (Sweden apart) no one has found a way back, as Japan and the Eurozone illustrates.
Many sovereign rates sit in negative territory, and there is an unprecedented $10 trillion in negative-yielding debt. This new interest rate climate has many observers wondering where the bottom truly lies.
Now, most economists are on a quest to return to a “stable positive rate”, eventually, considering negative rates to be there for am emergency, and temporary.
The paper creates a long term global series, weighted by GDP from 1310 to the present day. The series only includes yields which are not contracted short-term, which are not paid in-kind, which are not clearly of an involuntary nature, which are not intra-governmental, and which are made to executive political bodies. In other words, cash lending against annual payments in “chicken” and other commodities, or against leases for offices, against jewellery, land or other real estate with no known equivalent cash value are all excluded.
The GDP weights over time, and the share of advanced economy GDP covered by the series varies as history played out and empires rose and fell.
Data robustness is an issue, as the paper recognises as late medieval and early modern data can of course never be established with the same granularity as modern high-frequency statistics. One still has to rely on interpolations, deal with the peculiarities of early modern finance, and acknowledge that the permanency of wars, disasters, and destitution since medieval times may have irrecoverably destroyed a significant share of the evidence desired. However, the story is pretty clear.
The data here suggests that the “historically implied” safe asset provider long-term real rate stands at 1.56% for the year 2018, which would imply that against the backdrop of inflation targets at 2%, nominal advanced economy rates may no longer rise sustainably above 3.5%. Whatever the precise dominant driver –simply extrapolating such long-term historical trends suggests that negative real rates will not just soon constitute a “new normal” – they will continue to fall constantly. By the late 2020s, global short-term real rates will have reached permanently negative territory. By the second half of this century, global long-term real rates will have followed.
The standard deviation of the real rate – its “volatility” – meanwhile, has shown similar properties over the last 500 years: fluctuations in benchmark real rates are steadily declining, implying that rate levels are set to become both lower, and stickier. But downward-trending absolute levels, and declining volatilities have persisted against a backdrop of a secularly growing importance of public and monetary balance sheets. This would suggest that expansionary monetary and fiscal policy responses designed to raise real interest rates from current levels may at best have a cyclical effect in the longer-term context.
According to the report, another trend has coincided with falling interest rates: declining bond yields. Since the 1300s, global nominal bonds yields have dropped from over 14% to around 2%.
He concludes:
I sought to suggest that a long-term reconstruction of real rate developments points towards key revisions concerning at least two major current debates directly based on – or deriving from – the narrative about long-term capital returns.
First, my new data showed that long-term real rates – be it in the form of private debt, non-marketable loans, or the global sovereign “safe asset” – should always have been expected to hit “zero bounds” around the time of the late 20th and early 21st century, if put into long-term historical context.
In fact, a meaningful – and growing – level of long-term real rates should have been expected to record negative levels. There is little unusual about the current low rate environment which the “secular stagnation” narrative attempts to display as an unusual aberration, linked to equally unusual trend-breaks in savings-investment balances, or productivity measures. To extent that such literature then posits particular policy remedies to address such alleged phenomena, it is found to be fully misleading: the trend fall in real rates has coincided with a steady long-run uptick in public fiscal activity; and it has persisted across a variety of monetary regimes: fiat- and non-fiat, with and without the existence of public monetary institutions.
Secondly, sovereign long-term real rates have been placed into context to other key components of “nonhuman wealth returns” over the (very) long run, including private debt, and real land returns, together with a suggestion that fixed income-linked wealth has historically assumed a meaningful share of private wealth. There is a very high probability, therefore, to suggest that “non-human wealth” returns have by no means been “virtually stable”, only if business investments have both shown an extreme increase in real returns, and an extreme increase in their total wealth share, could the framework be saved.
If compared to real income growth dynamics we equally detect a downward trend across all assets covered in the above discussion.
There is no reason, therefore, to expect rates to “plateau”, to suggest that “the global neutral rate may settle at around 1% over the medium to long run”, or to proclaim that “forecasts that the real rate will remain stuck at or below zero appear unwarranted” as some have suggested.
With regards to policy, very low real rates can be expected to become a permanent and protracted monetary policy problem – but my evidence still does not support those that see an eventual return to “normalized” levels however defined, who contemplate a “nadir” in global real rates in the 2020s): the long-term historical data suggests that, whatever the ultimate driver, or combination of drivers, the forces responsible have been indifferent to monetary or political regimes; they have kept exercising their pull on interest rate levels irrespective of the existence of central banks, (de jure) usury laws, or permanently higher public expenditures. They persisted in what amounted to early modern patrician plutocracies, as well as in modern democratic environments, in periods of low-level feudal Condottieri battles, and in those of professional, mechanized mass warfare.
In the end, then, it was the contemporaries of Jacques Coeur and Konrad von Weinsberg – not those in the financial centres of the 21st century – who had every reason to sound dire predictions about an “endless inegalitarian spiral”. And it was the Welser in early 16th century Nuremberg, or the Strozzi of Florence in the same period, who could have filled their business diaries with reports on the unprecedented “secular stagnation” environment of their days. That they did not do so serves not necessarily to illustrate their lack of economic-theoretical acumen: it should rather put doubt on the meaningfulness of some of today’s concepts.
So negative rates are coming and are here to stay!
The outlook for the global economy remains reasonable. There have been signs that the slowdown in global growth that started in 2018 is coming to an end. Global growth is expected to be a little stronger this year and next than it was last year and inflation remains low almost everywhere. One continuing source of uncertainty, despite recent progress, is the trade and technology dispute between the US and China, which has affected international trade flows and investment. Another source of uncertainty is the coronavirus, which is having a significant effect on the Chinese economy at present. It is too early to determine how long-lasting the impact will be.
Interest rates are very low around the world and a number of central banks eased monetary policy over
the second half of last year. There is an expectation of a little further monetary easing in some
economies. Long-term government bond yields are around record lows in many countries, including
Australia. Borrowing rates for both businesses and households are at historically low levels. The
Australian dollar is around its lowest level over recent times.
The central scenario is for the Australian economy to grow by around 2¾ per cent this year and 3 per cent next year, which would be a step up from the growth rates over the past two years. In the short term, the bushfires and the coronavirus outbreak will temporarily weigh on domestic growth. The household sector has been adjusting to a protracted period of slow wages growth and, last year, to a decline in housing prices, with the result that consumption has been quite weak. Following this period of balance-sheet adjustment, consumption growth is expected to pick up gradually. The overall outlook is also being supported by the low level of interest rates, recent tax refunds, ongoing spending on infrastructure, a brighter outlook for the resources sector and, later this year, an expected recovery in residential construction.
The unemployment rate declined in December to 5.1 per cent. It is expected to remain around
this level for some time, before gradually declining to a little below 5 per cent in 2021.
Wages growth is subdued and is expected to remain at around its current rate for some time yet. A
further gradual lift in wages growth would be a welcome development and is needed for inflation to be
sustainably within the 2–3 per cent target range. Taken together, recent outcomes
suggest that the Australian economy can sustain lower rates of unemployment and underemployment.
Inflation remains low and stable. Over 2019, CPI inflation was 1.8 per cent and underlying
inflation was a little lower than this. The central scenario is for CPI inflation to be around
2 per cent in the near term and to fluctuate around that rate over the next couple of years.
In underlying terms, inflation is expected to increase gradually to 2 per cent over the next
couple of years.
There are continuing signs of a pick-up in established housing markets. This is especially so in Sydney and Melbourne, but prices in some other markets have also increased. Mortgage loan commitments have also picked up, although demand for credit by investors remains subdued. Mortgage rates are at record lows and there is strong competition for borrowers of high credit quality. Credit conditions for small and medium-sized businesses remain tight.
The easing of monetary policy last year is supporting employment and income growth in Australia and a
return of inflation to the medium-term target range. The lower cash rate has put downward pressure on
the exchange rate, which is supporting activity across a range of industries. Lower interest rates have
assisted with the process of household balance sheet adjustment. They have also boosted asset prices,
which in time should lead to increased spending, including on residential construction. Progress is
expected towards the inflation target and towards full employment, but that progress is expected to
remain gradual.
With interest rates having already been reduced to a very low level and recognising the long and
variable lags in the transmission of monetary policy, the Board decided to hold the cash rate steady at
this meeting. Due to both global and domestic factors, it is reasonable to expect that an extended
period of low interest rates will be required in Australia to reach full employment and achieve the
inflation target. The Board will continue to monitor developments carefully, including in the labour
market. It remains prepared to ease monetary policy further if needed to support sustainable growth in
the economy, full employment and the achievement of the inflation target over time.