It’s the bank’s new computer model of the Australian economy, made up
of 147 equations working in concert. Some are quite simple, such as how
global oil prices affect domestic petrol prices, whereas others are
more complex, such as how a rise in the unemployment rate affects
household spending.
Unveiled in August in a discussion paper entitled “MARTIN has its place”,
the model is available for use by analysts outside the bank for whom it
can serve as something of a guide as to what the bank might be
thinking.
It provides useful insights into what the bank will do next, after it
has cut its cash rate as close to zero as possible and needs to
stimulate the economy further.
Economists use models like drivers use maps – to take a large and
complicated country and simplify it to its essential ingredients in the
hopes of providing a useful guide to navigating it.
A map doesn’t tell you everything about a route – that would be hard
to come to grips with – but it highlights important features or paths
you should watch for. Models do the same – simplifying the complex
Australian economy into the paths that matter.
But instead of breaking Australia down into rivers and roads, or
cities and states like a map might do, MARTIN divides the Australian
economy into different sectors such as households, firms and the
government with the 147 equations describing the ways they interlink
with each other.
This map is principally designed for two purposes.
The first is forecasting. Every three months the bank looks
inside its crystal ball to try and divine how the economy will evolve in
the years to come. MARTIN has become a key input into that process.
The second use is the ability to run “what if” simulations to see
how the economy would react in different scenarios. For example, what
would happen if the price of iron ore crashed tomorrow, or what would be
the impact if the government ramped up its spending on infrastructure?
What does MARTIN say about quantitative easing?
MARTIN will have been put to work pondering the implications of
deploying so-called “quantitative easing” after the Reserve Bank’s cash
rate gets too low to cut.
Quantitative easing involves the Reserve Bank buying financial
assets, such as government or mortgage bonds, in order to continue to
supply money to the economy after its cash rate has fallen to zero.
I have used MARTIN to model three different scenarios for quantitative easing in the Australian economy.
The first is what would happen if quantitative easing isn’t used at all.
The second is what would happen if the bank started a modest quantitative easing program in early 2020 lasting around a year.
The third is what would happen if the bank commenced an aggressive
quantitative easing program to simulate the economy for 18 months.
I assume the bank would purchase assets in a similar manner to how
the US conducted quantitative easing after the global financial crisis,
buying bonds to lower interest rates on two year and ten year government
securities.
MARTIN says quantitative easing would have two major effects on the
economy. First, it would lower the cost of borrowing for Australian
businesses. They would be expected to increase investment as more
projects become viable as the interest rates they were charged fell.
Second, the lower rate structure would weaken the Australian dollar
by as much as 5 US cents. A cheaper dollar would make our exports more
competitive and make foreign imports more expensive.
MARTIN thinks it could work
MARTIN predicts quantitative easing would boost manufacturing,
agriculture and mining exports relative to where they would be without
it.
The depreciation would also encourage Australian households to spend
more on local goods and less on what would be dearer imports. This
should lead to higher wages, increased household incomes and spending,
and improved economic growth.
In fact, MARTIN predicts that, by boosting economic growth,
quantitative easing would actually lead to higher interest rates as
inflation returns to the Reserve Bank’s target, allowing interest rates
to return to more normal levels.
Combining these two effects, MARTIN suggests a large quantitative
easing program would reduce unemployment by 0.3 percentage points,
equivalent to 40,000 extra jobs, and boost wages across the economy.
The output of any model is only as good as the information and data that are fed into it, but the output of MARTIN is why more and more economists expect the bank to quantitatively ease in the new year. Its brain says it should work.
This suggests the bank still thinks monetary policy – in this case
lowering interest rates to stimulate the economy – could help “support
sustainable growth in the economy, full employment and the achievement
of the medium-term inflation target”.
But in the wake of the bank last month lowering the official interest
rate to a record low and the current somewhat sad state of the
Australian economy, many commentators have speculated that monetary policy doesn’t work any more.
Is that right?
Reserve Bank cash rate
There are a number of variants of the “monetary policy doesn’t work”
argument. The most basic is that the Reserve Bank has this year cut
rates from 1.50% to 0.75% without any improvement to the Australian
economy.
This is a textbook example of one of the classic logic fallacies known as “post hoc ergo propter hoc” (from the Latin, meaning “after this, therefore because of this”).
Put simply, it assumes the rate cuts have had no effect and doesn’t
account for the possibility things might have been worse had there been
no cuts.
Things might have been even worse. We’ll never know.
It also ignores what might have happened if the RBA had cut sooner.
Again, we can’t know for sure. It is possible, though, to make an
educated guess.
When to cut rates
Had Reserve Bank governor Philip Lowe acted, say, 18 months earlier
to cut rates, he would have signalled that Gross Domestic Product growth
was indeed lower than desired, that the sustainable rate of
unemployment was more like 4.5% than 5%, and, most importantly, that he
understood the need to act decisively.
That would have sent a powerful signal.
It would also have ameliorated the huge decline in housing credit
that pushed down housing prices in Sydney and Melbourne by double
digits.
That, in turn, would have prevented some of the weakening in the
balance sheets of the big four banks that has occurred (witness this
annual general meeting season).
All of this would have pumped more liquidity into the economy and put
households in a much stronger position, likely leading to stronger
consumer spending than we have seen.
It is true there is a problem
with banks not being able to cut deposit rates below zero, and as a
result having less scope to cut mortgage rates, which are majority
funded from deposits.
But there are, of course, other ways monetary policy can work. The leading example is quantitative easing (QE).
This is where the central bank pushes down long-term interest rates
by buying government and corporate bonds. At the same time this expands
the money supply, thereby adding some upward inflationary pressure.
There is little reason to think such measures wouldn’t work.
The power of free money
Perhaps paradoxically, the closer interest rates get to zero the more powerful those rates may end up being.
To put it bluntly, if someone shoves a pile of money into your hand
and asks almost nothing in return, you’re likely to use it. In fact, you
would be pretty silly not to.
You might decide to redraw that and spend the money on a home
renovation or some other productive purpose. Or you might decide to buy a
more expensive house.
Such spending provides an economic boost.
The effect is all the more pronounced if people expect interest rates
to be low for a long period of time. Aggressive cutting coupled with
quantitative easing – which lowers long-term rates – signal just that.
But not only monetary policy
Just because monetary policy still has some effect at near-zero rates
doesn’t mean we should pin all of our economic hopes to it.
A near consensus of economists have argued repeatedly for the use of
more aggressive fiscal policy – including more infrastructure spending
and more tax cuts.
Indeed, Philip Lowe has raised eyebrows by speaking so forthrightly on this issue. That doesn’t make him wrong, though.
There is little doubt the Reserve Bank should have acted much earlier
to cut official interest rates. There is also a very good chance it
will need to begin to use other measures such as quantitative easing in
the relatively near future.
All of that says the Australian economy, like most advanced economies around the world, is in bad shape.
But it doesn’t mean monetary policy has completely run out of puff.
Author: Richard Holden, Professor of Economics, UNSW
The RBA held rates today, as expected, but their explanation is turning pretty sour as reality bites. Expect more downgrades and rate cuts ahead, just a matter of time.
I also find it amazing that unlike UK, USA, and NZ there is no streamed press conference nor questions from the media after the announcement. The RBA continues to be more covert than its peers and less exposed to questions about its policy.
At its meeting today, the Board decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 0.75 per cent.
While the outlook for the global economy remains reasonable, the risks are tilted to the downside. The
US–China trade and technology disputes continue to affect international trade flows and
investment as businesses scale back spending plans because of the uncertainty. At the same time, in most
advanced economies, unemployment rates are low and wages growth has picked up, although inflation
remains low. In China, the authorities have taken steps to support the economy while continuing to
address risks in the financial system.
Interest rates are very low around the world and a number of central banks have eased monetary policy
in response to the persistent downside risks and subdued inflation. Expectations of further monetary
easing have generally been scaled back over the past month and financial market sentiment has improved a
little. Even so, long-term government bond yields are around record lows in many countries, including
Australia. Borrowing rates for both businesses and households are also at historically low levels. The
Australian dollar is at the lower end of its range over recent times.
The outlook for the Australian economy is little changed from three months ago. After a soft patch in
the second half of last year, a gentle turning point appears to have been reached. The central scenario
is for the Australian economy to grow by around 2¼ per cent this year and then for growth
gradually to pick up to around 3 per cent in 2021. The low level of interest rates, recent tax
cuts, ongoing spending on infrastructure, the upswing in housing prices in some markets and a brighter
outlook for the resources sector should all support growth. The main domestic uncertainty continues to
be the outlook for consumption, with the sustained period of only modest increases in household
disposable income continuing to weigh on consumer spending. Other sources of uncertainty include the
effects of the drought and the evolution of the housing construction cycle.
Employment has continued to grow strongly and has been matched by strong growth in labour supply, with
labour force participation at a record high. The unemployment rate has remained steady at around
5¼ per cent over recent months. It is expected to remain around this level for some time,
before gradually declining to a little below 5 per cent in 2021. Wages growth remains subdued
and is expected to remain at around its current rate for some time yet. A further gradual lift in wages
growth would be a welcome development and is needed for inflation to be sustainably within the
2–3 per cent target range. Taken together, recent outcomes suggest that the Australian
economy can sustain lower rates of unemployment and underemployment.
The recent inflation data were broadly as expected, with headline inflation at 1.7 per cent
over the year to the September quarter. The central scenario remains for inflation to pick up, but to do
so only gradually. In both headline and underlying terms, inflation is expected to be close to
2 per cent in 2020 and 2021.
There are further signs of a turnaround in established housing markets, especially in Sydney and
Melbourne. In contrast, new dwelling activity is still declining and growth in housing credit remains
low. Demand for credit by investors is subdued and credit conditions, especially for small and
medium-sized businesses, remain tight. Mortgage rates are at record lows and there is strong competition
for borrowers of high credit quality.
The easing of monetary policy since June is supporting employment and income growth in Australia and a
return of inflation to the medium-term target range. Given global developments and the evidence of the
spare capacity in the Australian economy, it is reasonable to expect that an extended period of low
interest rates will be required in Australia to reach full employment and achieve the inflation target.
The Board will continue to monitor developments, including in the labour market, and is prepared to ease
monetary policy further if needed to support sustainable growth in the economy, full employment and the
achievement of the inflation target over time.
The RBA minutes for October are decidedly bearish, clearly the battery in their rose-tinted specs as run down, revealing the mounting risks in the economy. Probably more risks ahead, more cuts and the proverbial QE in some form…
International Economic Conditions
Members commenced their discussion of global economic conditions by noting that heightened policy
uncertainty was affecting international trade and business investment. This had continued to be
apparent
in a range of indicators, including new export orders and investment intentions. Conditions in
the
manufacturing sector had remained subdued, partly because of ongoing US–China trade
tensions.
These tensions had led to a contraction in bilateral trade between the United States and China,
which
was resulting in the diversion of some activity to other economies. Members noted that the trade
and
technology disputes continued to pose significant downside risks to the global economic outlook.
In general, conditions in the services sector had been relatively resilient in most advanced
economies,
supported by strong labour market conditions. Employment growth had continued to outpace growth
in
working-age populations, unemployment rates had remained at low levels and wages growth had
risen.
Nevertheless, inflation had remained low, although core inflation had picked up in the United
States in
recent months.
In the United States, GDP growth appeared to have slowed a little further in the September
quarter.
Growth in core capital goods orders and investment intentions had declined, whereas growth in
consumption had remained robust. In the euro area, the weakness in output growth in the June
quarter had
been broadly based. Industrial production had fallen, particularly in Germany, and investment
intentions
had remained below average. In Japan, exports had declined further, although output growth in
the
September quarter had been supported by above-average household spending ahead of an increase in
the
consumption tax in October.
In east Asia, export volumes had been flat for several months. Other indicators of activity, such
as
industrial production and surveys of manufacturing conditions, had shown tentative signs of
stabilising.
Growth in output had also slowed in India, driven by weakness in consumption. Members noted that
the
political unrest in Hong Kong had affected economic activity there to a significant extent.
In China, a range of indicators suggested that the pace of economic activity had slowed since the
start
of the year. Economic indicators remained subdued in August, although they had recovered a
little from
broad-based weakness in July. Growth in industrial production and retail sales had edged higher
in
August, and fixed asset investment growth had been broadly unchanged. Conditions in housing
markets also
appeared to have softened. In response to the slowing in activity, the authorities had announced
further
measures to ease policy in September. Chinese demand for imported iron ore and coal had
increased,
supported by ongoing investment in infrastructure.
The iron ore benchmark price had continued to be volatile since the previous meeting. Members
noted
that supply concerns in the iron ore market had eased somewhat, and ongoing strength in Chinese
steel
demand had been met by an increase in iron ore imports. Oil prices had also been volatile, with
the
attacks on oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia having disrupted oil supply and exacerbated
uncertainty in
the region.
Domestic Economic Conditions
Members noted that the main domestic economic news over the previous month had been the release
of the
national accounts data for the June quarter and updates on the labour and housing markets. On
balance,
the data had pointed to a continuation of recent trends.
The national accounts reported that the Australian economy had grown by 0.5 per cent in the June quarter. Year-ended growth had slowed to 1.4 per cent, the lowest outcome in a decade. Nevertheless, there had been a pick-up in quarterly GDP growth over the first half of 2019 compared with the second half of 2018. The pick-up had been driven by stronger growth in exports, led by exports of resources and manufacturing goods. Members noted that export demand was being supported by the lower level of the Australian dollar. Public demand had also been growing strongly, partly because of spending on the National Disability Insurance Scheme. Members observed that the drought had continued to affect the rural sector to a significant extent and that, as a result, farm output was expected to remain weak over the following year.
Growth in household disposable income had been subdued. Strong growth in income tax paid by households had been a contributing factor, as had been low growth in non-labour income, partly reflecting the effects of the drought on the farm sector. By contrast, strong employment growth had boosted growth in labour income.
Consistent with the ongoing low growth in household disposable income, household consumption had increased by only 1.4 per cent over the year to the end of June. Members noted that there had not yet been evidence of a pick-up in household spending following the recent reductions in the cash rate and receipt of the tax offset payments, although they acknowledged that it may be too early to expect any signs of a pick-up. Retail sales had remained subdued in July and car sales had decreased in August. Despite weak reported retail sales conditions generally, on a slightly more positive note some contacts in the Bank’s liaison program had reported a mild pick-up in retail sales since July. Responses to consumer surveys in September had suggested that, on average, households planned to spend around half of their lump-sum tax payments, broadly in line with what had been assumed in the Bank’s most recent forecasts.
The residential construction sector had contracted further and this was expected to continue for some time. The decline in dwelling investment in the June quarter was greater than had been expected a few months earlier. Higher-density approvals had declined in July, to be at their lowest level in seven years; detached approvals had also declined in July. The Bank’s liaison program had continued to report weak pre-sales for higher-density developments. Taken together, this information implied that dwelling investment would decline further over coming quarters.
The turnaround in the established housing market had continued in September. Housing prices had increased further in Sydney and Melbourne, and auction clearance rates had remained high in both cities. The pace of growth in housing prices had also picked up in some other capital cities in recent months. However, housing turnover had remained low.
Business investment had decreased a little in the June quarter, driven by a decline in non-residential construction outside the mining sector. Nevertheless, the outlook for non-mining business investment remained favourable, supported by investment in infrastructure. Mining investment had picked up largely as expected. Members noted that mining investment was expected to continue to increase gradually, supported by projects both to sustain and to expand production. Survey measures of business conditions had remained around average in August; members noted that conditions in retailing were reported to have been very weak, while conditions in the mining industry had remained well above average.
Conditions in the labour market had continued to be mixed. Employment growth in August had remained stronger than growth in the working-age population, and the employment-to-population ratio had reached its highest level since late 2008. Employment had increased by 2½ per cent over the preceding year, the third successive year of strong employment growth. The participation rate had also increased to another record high. Members noted that the strong demand for labour had been met by an equally strong increase in supply. The unemployment rate had been around 5¼ per cent since April and the underemployment rate had remained above its recent low point. Looking ahead, job vacancies and advertisements had declined, suggesting that employment growth would probably moderate over the subsequent few quarters. Members noted that the ongoing subdued growth in wages implied that there continued to be spare capacity in the labour market.
Financial Markets
Members noted that financial conditions remained accommodative internationally and in Australia.
Several major central banks had eased policy in September and market pricing implied that market
participants expected the global economic expansion to be sustained by an extended period of
policy
stimulus. Expectations of further monetary easing had been partially scaled back in response to
tentative signs of progress in the trade and technology negotiations between the United States
and China
and some better-than-expected US economic data. These developments had also supported the prices
of
equities and corporate bonds.
As expected, the US Federal Reserve had reduced its policy rate again by 25 basis points in
September. The Federal Reserve had noted that, although the US economy had remained strong,
easier
policy was warranted given muted domestic inflation pressures, a weakening in global activity
and
persistent downside risks. Members of the Federal Open Market Committee did not anticipate a
prolonged
easing cycle, but continued to signal that they were willing to ease policy further if needed to
sustain
growth and meet the Federal Reserve’s inflation objective. Market pricing suggested that
the
federal funds rate was expected to decline by a further 50 basis points or so by mid 2020,
which was a little less than had previously been anticipated.
The European Central Bank (ECB) had delivered a package of stimulus measures in response to
inflation
being persistently below the ECB’s target, protracted weakness in economic growth and
continued
downside risks. The package included cutting the ECB’s policy rate by 10 basis points
to
–0.5 per cent, exempting a portion of banks’ excess reserves from negative
deposit
rates, committing to not lifting rates until inflation returned sustainably to target, renewing
purchases of government and private sector securities, and easing the conditions of the targeted
long-term refinancing operations designed to encourage banks to lend to the private sector.
The People’s Bank of China had provided additional but targeted monetary stimulus, further
cutting
its reserve requirements, with larger adjustments for some smaller banks that are important
providers of
finance to small businesses. Chinese banks had also lowered the benchmark lending rate for
corporate
borrowers slightly.
Government bond yields in major markets had risen a little, with yields in Australia following suit. Nonetheless, bond yields remained very low, with a large portion of bonds in Europe and Japan trading at negative yields. Members noted that a sizeable proportion of the investors holding these negative-yielding bonds were constrained by their mandates or regulatory requirements, including asset managers, banks, insurance companies and pension funds.
Members noted that financing conditions for corporations remained favourable globally. Equity
prices
had remained close to recent peaks, spreads on corporate bonds were low and issuance volumes had
been
strong. In Australia, the cost of capital for corporations had been quite stable for some years,
although more recently it had declined a little. Members also discussed hurdle rates for
business
investment, which had not changed much over recent times.
Major exchange rates had generally been little changed over September, with the US dollar
having
appreciated over the preceding two years or so on a trade-weighted basis. The Chinese renminbi
had
stabilised after its earlier depreciation, while the Japanese yen had depreciated, consistent
with some
easing of concerns about global risks. The Australian dollar had been little changed and
remained around
its lowest level in recent years.
In Australia, borrowing rates for households and businesses, as well as banks’ funding costs, were at historically low levels. Housing loan approvals to both owner-occupiers and investors had increased in the three months to August, consistent with stronger conditions in some established housing markets. However, members noted that this increase in approvals had not yet translated into faster growth in housing credit. The pace of growth in housing credit for owner-occupiers had been fairly steady since the beginning of the year and the stock of housing credit for investors had continued to decline a little.
Financial market pricing indicated that a 25 basis points reduction in the cash rate was
largely
priced in for the October meeting, with a further reduction expected by mid 2020.
Financial Stability
Members were briefed on the Bank’s regular half-yearly assessment of the financial system.
Globally, investors were accepting low rates of compensation for bearing risk, despite the increased chance of significantly weaker economic growth. Members noted that a sharp slowdown in global growth could result from an escalation of the US–China trade and technology disputes or geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, Hong Kong or the Korean peninsula. Central banks had eased monetary policy in response to the potential for weaker growth, and additional easing was expected by markets, leading to falls in long-term government bond yields. Despite the increased uncertainty, risk premiums were low and in some cases had fallen further. The lower risk-free interest rates and low term, credit and liquidity risk premiums had seen many asset prices increase further. Any shock that caused markets to increase risk premiums or revise upwards expectations of future policy rates, such as a pick-up in inflation without accompanying stronger growth, could see a broad range of asset prices fall. Given debt levels were high in some non-financial sectors in some economies, a fall in asset prices could result in financial stress for some businesses and households, which could spill over to financial institutions.
Members observed that there had been strong growth in corporate debt in the United States, France
and
Canada, particularly lower-quality debt. Members noted that borrowers whose credit ratings fell
below
investment grade, and who relied on market-based finance, could face difficulty accessing
funding, given
many investors’ mandates were constrained by credit ratings. The interaction of high
sovereign debt
and less resilient banks in Japan and some European economies was also seen as a risk. However,
in the
United States and the United Kingdom, the resilience of the banking system had increased as
profitability had improved.
Corporate debt in China had increased sharply over the previous decade, although in relation to
GDP it
had declined recently in response to policy measures to promote deleveraging. These measures
included
closing some unprofitable state-owned firms, restructuring some debt, reducing the size of
non-bank
financing and reducing non-banks’ interactions with banks.
In Australia, near-term risks related to the housing market had eased in the preceding few months with a turnaround in housing prices in Sydney and Melbourne. Prices in those cities had fallen by a little under 10 per cent over the preceding 18 months, reducing the housing equity of households and resulting in a small share with negative equity. The recent increase in housing prices in those cities had reduced the risk of large increases in negative equity, which could result in losses for lenders if declines in income reduced households’ ability to meet debt repayments. Half of all loans in negative equity were in Western Australia and the Northern Territory, where housing price declines had persisted over the previous few years. Members noted that the rate of mortgage arrears in Western Australia had increased by more for riskier types of lending, including lending with smaller deposits, higher repayments relative to income, and loans to investors and self-employed borrowers.
Despite the high level of household debt in Australia relative to other countries, the risks from household debt appeared to be mostly contained. While the share of mortgages in arrears had continued to rise, it remained at a low rate relative to many other countries and in absolute terms. In addition, the quality of new lending had increased in recent years. The shares of loans with high loan-to-valuation ratios and with interest-only repayment terms had declined following a focus by regulators on this higher-risk lending. Further, members noted that households continued to have large prepayments on their housing debt. In aggregate, mortgage prepayments were equal to two-and-a-half years of repayments. However, while one-third of borrowers had prepayments exceeding two years of mortgage repayments, a slightly lower share had very little or no buffers. Of these, a little less than half appeared more likely to be vulnerable to shocks to their ability to meet their mortgage payments.
The resilience of Australian banks had increased since the financial crisis. Banks had largely
completed their transition to their higher ‘unquestionably strong’ capital ratios.
Banks’ resilience would increase further with the introduction by the Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority of a Loss Absorbing Capacity (LAC) regime, which will require banks to
raise an
additional 3 percentage points of capital by 2024. Members observed that banks were already
issuing
new Tier 2 securities to meet their LAC requirements. Banks’ profitability had
declined a
little over the prior year or two, although banks remained highly profitable. The increase in
housing
arrears had resulted in a small decline in banks’ overall asset quality, although asset
quality
remained high. Rates of non-performing business loans were a little below rates for housing
loans.
Members also discussed non-financial risks facing the financial system. Members noted that cyber
risks,
and IT risks more broadly, were increasing as technology systems become more complex and
embedded in all
operations. Members also noted that climate change presented a risk to financial institutions.
While
extreme weather events were thought unlikely to produce large losses for the financial system as
a
whole, at least at present, losses could be larger in future if financial institutions do not
manage the
risks carefully.
Considerations for Monetary Policy
In considering the policy decision, members observed that the risks to the global growth outlook remained tilted to the downside. The trade and technology disputes between the United States and China were affecting international trade and investment, as businesses scaled back their spending plans in response to increased uncertainty. In China, the authorities had taken further steps to support the economy, while continuing to address risks in the financial system. In most advanced economies, inflation remained subdued despite low unemployment rates and rising wages growth.
In this context, global interest rates had continued to decline, with the central banks in the
United
States and Europe reducing interest rates in the previous month. Further monetary easing was
widely
expected, as central banks continued to respond to the downside risks to the global economy and
subdued
inflation. Long-term government bond yields were close to record lows in many countries,
including in
Australia. Borrowing rates for both businesses and households were at historically low levels,
and the
Australian dollar was at its lowest level in recent years.
Members considered the case for a further easing in monetary policy at the present meeting, to support employment and income growth and to provide greater confidence that inflation would be consistent with the medium-term target. Members noted that the Bank’s most recent forecasts suggested that the unemployment and inflation outcomes over the following couple of years were likely to be short of the Bank’s goals. The most recent run of data had not materially altered this assessment and, on balance, had been on the softer side. The ongoing subdued rate of wages growth also suggested that the economy still had spare capacity. There was therefore a case to respond to the general outlook with a further easing of monetary policy.
Members were mindful, however, that monetary policy was already expansionary and that the lower
exchange rate was also supporting growth. They acknowledged that these factors and the recent
tax cuts
could combine to boost growth by more than their individual effects would imply, especially
given the
context of the mining and established housing sectors seeming to have reached turning points. At
the
same time, members recognised that it was possible that the effects may be smaller than expected
and the
global risks were to the downside.
Members also considered the argument that some monetary stimulus should be kept in reserve to address any future negative shocks. However, that argument requires changes in interest rates to be the key driver of demand, rather than the level of interest rates, which experience has shown to be the more important determinant. Members concluded that the Board could reduce the likelihood of a negative shock leading to outcomes that materially undershot the Bank’s goals by strengthening the starting point for the economy.
The Board’s discussions also focused on the ongoing strength in employment growth. The
period of
strong employment growth had not reduced spare capacity in the labour market significantly.
Almost all
of the strength in employment growth over the preceding three years had been matched by higher
participation, so there had been little progress on reducing unemployment and underemployment.
It was
also possible that participation was rising partly in response to weak growth in incomes.
Moreover,
employment growth was forecast to slow over the period ahead.
Members also discussed the possibility that policy stimulus might be less effective than past experience suggests. They recognised that some transmission channels, such as a pick-up in borrowing or the effect on the home-building sector, may not be operating in the same way as in the past, and that the negative effect of low interest rates on the income and confidence of savers might be more significant. Notwithstanding this, transmission through the exchange rate channel was still considered likely to work effectively, and evidence suggested that the positive effects of lower interest rates on aggregate household cash flows via lower debt repayments was likely to support household spending, given that household interest payments exceed receipts by more than two to one.
Members also noted that the housing market and other asset prices might be overly inflated by lower interest rates. Members acknowledged that asset prices were part of the transmission mechanism of policy, including by encouraging home building. By themselves, higher asset prices were considered unlikely to present a risk to macroeconomic and financial stability. This assessment would need to be reviewed if rapidly increasing asset prices were accompanied by materially faster credit growth, weak lending standards and rising leverage. Although household debt was still considered high, members saw only a limited risk of excessive borrowing at the current juncture: household disposable income growth (and thus borrowing capacity) is weak; the memory of recent housing price falls is still fresh; and banks are still quite cautious in their appetite to lend. Nonetheless, members assessed that close monitoring of this risk was warranted.
Members concluded that these various factors did not outweigh the case for a further easing of
monetary
policy at the present meeting. Taking into account all the available information, including the
reductions in interest rates since the middle of the year, the Board decided to lower the cash
rate by a
further 25 basis points. Members judged that lower interest rates would help reduce spare
capacity
in the economy by supporting employment and income growth and providing greater confidence that
inflation would be consistent with the medium-term target. Members also noted the trend to lower
interest rates globally and the effect this was having on the Australian economy and inflation
outcomes.
Members judged it reasonable to expect that an extended period of low interest rates would be required in Australia to reach full employment and achieve the inflation target. The Board would continue to monitor developments, including in the labour market, and was prepared to ease monetary policy further if needed to support sustainable growth in the economy, full employment and the achievement of the inflation target over time.
The Decision
The Board decided to lower the cash rate by 25 basis points to 0.75 per cent.
Understanding liquidity crises has long been, and will probably long be, an important objective for economic policymakers. Liquidity risk is inherent to banking systems because banks fund long-term assets (like mortgages) with short-term and at-call debt (like deposits). This process benefits the economy by making more credit available for households and businesses. However, it also generates the risk that if short-term debtholders withdraw their funds en masse, banks are unlikely to be able to pay them. This paper contributes to the research literature that studies how a policymaker can handle such a situation, which broad monetary stimulus is not designed for, by modelling the scenario faced by the United States and other global financial centres in late 2008. This type of situation appears highly unlikely in Australia in the foreseeable future.
The model depicts a banking system that is solvent, but a system-wide withdrawal by debtholders leaves banks with short-term payment obligations that exceed their available funds (i.e. their liquidity). It is then in the policymaker’s interests to inject liquidity into the banking system, which can prevent bank failures and the harm to the economy that would likely follow. However, injecting liquidity incentivises banks to take more liquidity risk the next time around, which makes future liquidity crises more likely. This paper compares different types of liquidity injection policies by where they sit in the trade-off between the perverse incentives generated, and the ability to support the banking system during a crisis.
To address the subject, I develop a game-theoretic model in which banks decide how many liquid assets to hold as protection against funding withdrawals. Banks consider the losses they would suffer if a crisis eventuated, which depend on the type of liquidity injection policy implemented by the policymaker. If a crisis eventuates, the type of policy also influences how the crisis unfolds. By placing a particular type of policy into the model, we can therefore analyse that policy’s influence on banks’ risk-taking decisions and on crisis outcomes. The model replicates some features of liquidity injection policies highlighted previously in the research literature. It also generates two new insights, which are the paper’s main contributions.
The first insight is that, if the policymaker injects liquidity by lending to banks, there is an indirect benefit of requiring them to provide collateral. The benefit arises through the (secondary) markets for the securities that the policymaker accepts as collateral. In the model, the crisis is characterised by falling prices in these markets, driven by selling pressure from the banks that need more cash. However, banks cannot sell securities that they are providing as collateral. Collateral requirements can therefore alleviate ‘fire sales’ in these markets, which benefits other banks through the higher market prices. In aggregate, the banking system ends up better off after the crisis, but, for each individual bank, there is no increase in the return to taking more liquidity risk.
The second insight is about whether a policymaker can disincentivise risk-taking by charging high ‘penalty’ interest rates on its emergency lending. Farhi and Tirole (2012) argue that, regardless of the effects on banks’ incentives, once a crisis occurs, the policymaker will then offer low rates. This is because the risk-taking that caused the crisis has already taken place, and charging banks penalty rates could now put them in further distress. Therefore, banks view any claims by the policymaker that it would charge penalty rates in a crisis as not credible, so such claims are powerless to influence risk-taking. I present a counterargument: penalty rates can be credible if the emergency loans are long term. In the crisis I model, banks are in liquidity distress but they are still solvent (i.e. they have not run out of capital). This means they will have no trouble making the repayments once liquidity conditions in the banking system improve. Charging banks penalty rates on long-term loans during a crisis will therefore not put them in further distress, which gives penalty rates more credibility.