RBA Minutes – Global Risks Rising

International Economic Conditions

The RBA released their minutes from their last meeting today. What is clear now is the a weakening global economic outlook may make them cut again, not just a weaker labour market – a significant shift, which actually gives them a paper thin alibi in terms of plausible deniability for bad policy! In fact they spun the local economic outlook more positively.

Yet we know they are considering government bond purchases to drive rates lower. QE is coming.

Members commenced their discussion of the global economy by noting that global growth had remained reasonable, having eased since mid 2018. Near-term indicators relating to trade, manufacturing and investment had remained subdued, although consumption growth had been relatively resilient, supported by strong labour market conditions especially in the advanced economies. Despite wages growth having generally trended higher over the preceding few years, inflation had remained below target in a range of economies.

Growth in major trading partners was expected to slow a little in 2019 and 2020. This outlook had been revised down a little since the May Statement on Monetary Policy in light of the escalation of the US–China trade and technology disputes and the related weakness in indicators of investment. Members noted the recent announcement by the US administration of a 10 per cent tariff to be imposed on a further US$300 billion of Chinese exports to the United States. Further escalation presented a downside risk to the outlook, particularly if heightened uncertainty weighed further on business investment. Members noted that investment intentions had already eased significantly in a number of economies, including the United States and the euro area, and investment had fallen in a number of economies with a high exposure to international trade, including South Korea.

In China, a range of activity indicators suggested that domestic economic conditions had slowed further in the June quarter. Further monetary and fiscal stimulus measures had also been announced. Fiscal support had encouraged investment in infrastructure, while residential construction had continued to grow relatively strongly, which in turn had supported steel production. The outlook for the Chinese economy had been revised lower, largely because of the ongoing US–China trade and technology disputes. Uncertainty about how these disputes would play out and how effective domestic policy measures would be in supporting Chinese demand continued to be an important consideration for the global growth outlook and, from an Australian perspective, the future demand for steel and bulk commodities.

The US–China disputes and the slowing in Chinese domestic demand had affected export and investment growth in the east Asian region. However, exports to the United States had increased for some economies in the region, including Vietnam, as a result of trade diversion. By contrast, growth in consumption in the east Asian region had generally remained more resilient. Growth in output in India had slowed and the outlook was weaker than previously forecast, largely because there had been less fiscal support and trade tensions with the United States were emerging.

In the major advanced economies, risks to the outlook remained tilted to the downside, reflecting the trade disputes. The US economy had continued to grow relatively strongly into the June quarter. This was despite the effects of the trade dispute on the manufacturing sector and on business investment more generally, partly because tight labour markets had supported strong consumption growth. Members noted that the most recent round of tariff announcements would affect US imports of consumption goods from China and could boost US consumer prices to some extent. Further slowing in investment seemed likely as the effect of earlier fiscal stimulus waned and the uncertainty related to the trade and technology disputes persisted.

Weaker global trade and greater uncertainty had also affected growth in output in the euro area. Growth in Japan was expected to be boosted temporarily by spending brought forward ahead of an increase in the consumption tax in October, although weaker external demand had weighed on export growth.

Commodity prices had generally fallen since the previous meeting, partly in response to the escalation of trade tensions in early August. After more than doubling in the first half of 2019, iron ore prices had declined to be below US$100 per tonne. Coal and oil prices had also declined over the previous month. Rural commodity prices had been little changed. Members noted that the terms of trade for Australia in the June quarter had been higher than expected.

Domestic Economic Conditions

Turning to the domestic economy, members noted that GDP growth was expected to have been firmer in the June quarter after three weak quarters. This was partly because resource exports had recovered from earlier supply disruptions and mining investment was likely to be less of a drag on growth. Partial indicators suggested that consumption growth had remained subdued in the June quarter; the volume of retail sales had been subdued and sales of new cars had declined. While dwelling investment was expected to have declined further in the June quarter, public demand and non-mining business investment were expected to have continued to support growth.

Members observed that the lower near-term GDP growth forecast mostly reflected the fact that consumption growth had been weaker than expected over recent quarters. Members noted that consumption growth per capita had been particularly weak recently. The forecast for GDP growth over 2019 had been lowered to 2½ per cent. Growth was expected to pick up to 2¾ per cent over 2020 and to around 3 per cent over 2021. This was supported by a range of factors, including lower interest rates, tax measures, signs of an earlier-than-expected stabilisation in some established housing markets, the lower exchange rate, the infrastructure pipeline and a pick-up in activity in the mining sector.

Members noted that although the outlook for consumption remained uncertain, the risks around the outlook were more balanced than they had been for some time. The low- and middle-income tax offset was expected to boost income growth, with a surge in the lodgement of tax returns since the end of June. In addition, signs of a recovery in some established housing markets suggested that the dampening effect of declining housing prices on consumption could dissipate earlier than had previously been assumed.

The evidence that conditions in housing markets were showing signs of a turnaround had strengthened in July. In Sydney and Melbourne, housing prices had increased, housing turnover appeared to have reached a trough and auction clearance rates had risen further. Outside the two largest cities, housing market conditions had shown tentative signs of improvement; prices had risen in Brisbane, while the pace of decline had slowed in Perth. Rental vacancies had been low in most cities except in Sydney, where they had risen further as new apartments were added to the rental stock.

Members observed that it could take some time for the stabilisation of conditions in the established housing market to translate into a pick-up in construction activity. Indeed, leading indicators suggested that dwelling investment was likely to decline further in the near term. Residential building approvals had declined further over May and June and were around their lowest levels in six years. Timely information from liaison contacts suggested that increased buyer interest had yet to translate into more housing sales. However, members noted that signs of a turnaround in housing markets suggested there were some upside risks to dwelling investment later in the forecast period, particularly given the expected strength in population growth.

Forward-looking indicators for business investment had been mixed. Survey measures of business conditions had been less positive than a year earlier, especially in the retail and transport sectors, but generally had remained around average. By contrast, non-residential building approvals had trended up in recent months and the pipeline of work under way was already quite high. There was also a large pipeline of private sector projects to build transport and renewable energy infrastructure, which was expected to support non-mining business investment.

Although mining investment had declined in the March quarter as large liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects approached completion, the medium-term outlook for mining investment had remained positive. A number of projects had been committed and others were under consideration, which would add to investment in coming years if they went ahead. Members noted that the outlook for mining investment had not been affected by the recent elevated levels of iron ore prices. However, they observed that higher iron ore prices would add to government taxation revenues and boost household income and wealth through dividends and the effect on share prices. At the margin, this could provide greater impetus to spending than currently assumed.

Resource exports had picked up during the June quarter as some supply disruptions to iron ore had been resolved and LNG production had increased further. Resource exports were expected to contribute to growth over the forecast period and the recent depreciation of the Australian dollar was expected to support further growth in service and manufacturing exports.

Members noted that recent labour market data had been mixed. The unemployment rate had remained at 5.2 per cent for the third consecutive month, which was higher than had been expected in May. However, growth in employment had continued to exceed growth in the working-age population in the June quarter and had been stronger than forecast in May. As a result, the employment-to-population ratio and the participation rate had remained around record highs. Over the previous year, there had been a particularly notable increase in the participation rates of women aged between 25 and 54 years and workers aged 65 years and over. Members noted that the increase in participation by older workers had more than offset any tendency for the ageing of the population to reduce aggregate participation in the labour force. Members discussed some of the factors that could be contributing to these trends, including slow income growth, improvements in health and greater flexibility in the labour market.

Leading indicators implied a moderation in employment growth over the following six months: job vacancies had declined slightly over the three months to May (but remained high as a share of the labour force) and firms’ near-term hiring intentions had moderated, to be just above their long-run average. The unemployment rate forecast had been revised higher, with the unemployment rate expected to remain around 5¼ per cent for some time before declining to about 5 per cent as growth in output picked up.

Members noted that the outlook for the labour market was one of the key uncertainties for the forecasts, with implications for growth in wages, household income and consumption. The outlook for wages growth had been revised a little lower because the outlook for the labour market suggested that there would be more spare capacity than previously thought. Private sector wages growth was expected to pick up only modestly, while public sector wages growth would be contained by government caps on wage increases. Members observed that the outlook for household consumption spending could be weaker if households expected low income growth to persist for longer.

Members noted that the June quarter CPI had been largely as expected. Trimmed mean inflation had increased a little to 0.4 per cent in the June quarter, but had remained at 1.6 per cent over the preceding year, consistent with the forecast in May. Headline inflation had been 0.7 per cent (seasonally adjusted), partly because fuel prices had increased by around 10 per cent in the June quarter; over the year, headline inflation had also been 1.6 per cent. Overall, members noted that there had been few signs in the June quarter CPI numbers of inflationary pressures emerging.

Inflation in market-based services had remained steady, which was consistent with a lack of wage pressures in the economy. Inflation in the housing-related components of the CPI had been around historical lows. New dwelling prices had declined again in the June quarter, reflecting the use of bonus offers and purchase incentives by developers to counter the weak housing conditions. Rent inflation had been flat in the quarter in aggregate, but had fallen noticeably in Sydney, consistent with the rising vacancy rate; rent deflation had eased in Perth and had been steady in most other cities. Members noted that low inflation in new dwelling costs and rents, which represent around one-sixth of the CPI basket, was likely to persist in the near term.

There had been an increase in inflation for retail items because there had been some pass-through of the exchange rate depreciation and the drought had boosted certain food prices. These effects were expected to dissipate if there was no further exchange rate depreciation, as is usually assumed in the forecasts, and once normal seasonal conditions returned. Inflation in the prices of administered items and utilities had remained well below typical increases recorded a few years earlier.

Inflation was expected to pick up more gradually than previously forecast because of subdued wage outcomes and the evidence of spare capacity in the economy. The experience of other economies suggested that any pick-up in wages growth might take longer to translate into inflation than in the past. Underlying inflation and headline inflation were both expected to pick up to be a little above 2 per cent over 2021, as spare capacity in the labour market declined and as growth increased to run above potential. Members noted that there were downside risks to some individual CPI components. In the near term, electricity prices could grow at a below-average pace or even fall, and government cost-of-living initiatives could weigh on other items in the CPI basket. Inflation rates for both new dwelling prices and rents were also expected to remain low in the near term, but were more uncertain towards the end of the forecast period.

Financial Markets

Members commenced their discussion of financial markets by noting that central banks in the major economies had eased, or were expected to ease, policy settings in response to downside risks to growth and subdued inflation outcomes. Financial market volatility had increased recently from low levels, in response to the escalation of the trade and technology disputes between the United States and China.

The US Federal Reserve lowered its policy rate target by 25 basis points in July. Market pricing suggested that the federal funds rate was expected to decline by a further 100 basis points or so over the following year. The Federal Reserve noted that the US labour market had remained strong. However, it was perceived by members of the Federal Open Market Committee that there was room for some easing of monetary policy given the implications of global developments for the US economic outlook and subdued inflation pressures. Elsewhere, the European Central Bank (ECB) had foreshadowed additional monetary stimulus unless the outlook for inflation in the euro area improved. The ECB indicated that it could expand its bond-buying program, among other measures, and market pricing suggested that the ECB was likely to reduce its policy rate over the following months. Market participants were also expecting the Bank of Japan to ease monetary policy further in the period ahead.

In response to the shift in the outlook for monetary policy, long-term interest rates had declined to historical lows in several markets, including in Australia. Yields on government bonds were negative for a number of European sovereigns and Japan. In addition, corporate bond spreads were low globally, with a growing portion of corporate debt in the euro area trading at yields below zero. Members discussed the implications of the low level of bond yields for corporate balance sheets and investment.

Global equity markets had declined sharply prior to the meeting, in response to the recent escalation of the trade and technology disputes. Nevertheless, equity market indices were still well above their levels earlier in the year, supported by lower bond yields and expectations that earnings growth would be reasonable. During July, equity market indices in the United States and Australia had reached record high levels.

In foreign exchange markets, prior to the meeting there had been an increase in volatility, from very low levels, in response to the escalation of the trade and technology disputes. In particular, the yen had appreciated against the US dollar while the Chinese yuan had depreciated. Members took note of the market commentary that the US and Japanese authorities could intervene in an effort to lower the value of their currencies. The Australian dollar had depreciated in recent times to be at its lowest level in many years.

In Australia, the reduction in variable mortgage rates had been broadly consistent with the reduction in the cash rate in June and July. The degree of pass-through of the cash rate reductions was also comparable to that observed over the preceding decade. Housing credit growth had declined in June, for both owner-occupiers and investors. At the same time, however, loan approvals had picked up in June, which for investors was the first sizeable increase for some time. This was consistent with other indicators suggesting that the housing market had stabilised over recent months. However, loan approvals to property developers had remained subdued. Members also noted that access to finance for small businesses continued to be tight.

Banks’ debt funding costs and borrowing rates for households and businesses were at historically low levels. Rates in short-term money markets, bank bond yields and deposit rates had all declined to historically low levels. The proportion of bank deposits that attract no interest had increased marginally to be just under 10 per cent. Despite the low level of funding costs, banks’ bond issuance remained subdued. This reflected slow credit growth, along with the banks increasing their issuance of hybrid securities to fulfil new regulatory capital requirements. Members also noted that mergers and acquisitions activity had not been especially high, despite funding conditions being very accommodative for large businesses.

Market pricing implied that the cash rate was expected to remain unchanged in August. A 25 basis points reduction had been fully priced in by November 2019, with a further 25 basis points reduction expected in 2020. The low level of bond yields implied that the cash rate was expected to remain very low for several years.

Members reviewed the experience of other advanced economies with unconventional monetary policy measures over the preceding decade. These measures comprised: very low and negative policy interest rates; explicit forward guidance; lowering longer-term risk-free rates by purchasing government securities; providing longer-term funding to banks to support credit creation; purchasing private sector assets; and foreign exchange intervention. Members considered the key lessons from the international experience, noting that a full evaluation could not be undertaken as many of these measures were yet to be unwound. One key lesson was that the effectiveness of these measures depended upon the specific circumstances facing each economy and the nature of its financial system. Some measures had been successful in reducing government bond yields, which had flowed through to lower interest rates for private borrowers. Other measures had been effective in addressing dislocations in credit supply. Members noted that a package of measures tended to be more effective than measures implemented in isolation. Finally, it was important for the central bank to communicate clearly and consistently about these measures.

Considerations for Monetary Policy

Turning to the policy decision, members observed that the escalation of the trade and technology disputes had increased the downside risks to the global growth outlook, although the central forecast was still for reasonable growth. Uncertainty around trade policy had already had a negative effect on investment in many economies. Members noted that, against this backdrop, the low inflation outcomes in many economies provided central banks with scope to ease monetary policy further if required. Indeed, a number of central banks had reduced interest rates this year and further monetary easing was widely expected. In China, the authorities had taken steps to support economic growth, while continuing to address risks in the financial system.

Overall, global financial conditions remained accommodative. Long-term government bond yields had declined further and were at record lows in many economies, including Australia. Borrowing rates for both households and businesses were also at historically low levels and there was strong competition for borrowers of high credit quality. Despite this, demand for housing credit, particularly from investors, remained subdued, while access to credit for some types of borrowers, especially small businesses, remained tight. The Australian dollar had depreciated to its lowest level in recent times.

Domestically, growth had been lower than expected in the first half of 2019. Looking forward, growth was expected to strengthen gradually, to 2¾ per cent over 2020 and to around 3 per cent over 2021. This outlook was supported by a number of developments, including lower interest rates, higher growth in household income (including from the recent tax cuts), the depreciation of the Australian dollar, a positive outlook for investment in the resources sector, some stabilisation of the housing market and ongoing high levels of investment in infrastructure. Overall, the domestic risks to the forecast for output growth appeared to be tilted to the downside in the near term, but were more balanced later in the forecast period.

Employment growth had been stronger than expected and labour force participation had increased to a record high. However, the unemployment rate had increased and there appeared to have been more spare capacity in the labour market than previously appreciated, although there was uncertainty around the extent of this. The unemployment rate was expected to decline to around 5 per cent over the following couple of years, consistent with the gradual pick-up in GDP growth. Wages growth had been subdued and there were few signs of wage pressures building in the economy. Combined with the reassessment of spare capacity in the labour market, this had led to a more subdued outlook for wages growth than three months earlier.

In the June quarter, inflation had been broadly as expected at 1.6 per cent. Members noted that inflation had averaged a little below 2 per cent for a number of years. In the near term, there were few signs of inflationary pressures building, but, over time, inflation was expected to increase gradually to be a little under 2 per cent over 2020 and a little above 2 per cent over 2021.

Based on the information available and the central scenario that was presented, members judged it reasonable to expect that an extended period of low interest rates would be required in Australia to make sustained progress towards full employment and achieve more assured progress towards the inflation target. Having eased monetary policy at the previous two meetings, the Board judged it appropriate to assess developments in the global and domestic economies before considering further change to the setting of monetary policy. Members would consider a further easing of monetary policy if the accumulation of additional evidence suggested this was needed to support sustainable growth in the economy and the achievement of the inflation target over time.

The Decision

The Board decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 1.00 per cent.

Shock and Orr! [Podcast]

Property Expert Joe Wilkes and I discuss the recent moves by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and look at some of the latest data. How will lower rates play out?

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Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
Shock and Orr! [Podcast]
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DFA Submission On The Cash Ban Bill

I have today submitted my comments to Treasury on their proposed bill, as we discussed in our recent post. I sent it to blackeconomy@treasury.gov.au

My overriding concern is that Parliamentarians will only consider the narrow tax efficiency aspect of the Bill and vote it through without grasping the true intent and consequences. Civil liberties are being eroded, and the trap will be set to force households and businesses to transact within the banking system, thus facilitating experimental monetary policies, via the back door.

Currency (Restrictions on the Use of Cash) Bill 2019

I have carefully reviewed your exposure draft and wish to register my strong opposition to the bill as proposed (which I may say includes a whole blank section – which is surprising!).

Digital Finance Analytics is a boutique research and analysis firm specialising in financial service sector. We undertake primary research through our surveys, as well as deep research from the global literature relating to financial services. We publish regularly via our online channels at Digital Finance Analytics as well as preparing reports on a range of related subject matters for our clients, and we collaborate with a number of academics.

My objections are centred around the following points.

  • The Drafting of the bill is incomplete, so your review processes is flawed, plus there has been insufficient public discourse on the measures you propose thanks to the very limited time for consultation and the its release late on a Friday night. 
  • Civil Liberties Are Being Eroded. Further public debate on these measures are warranted as they are fundamentally restricting personal freedoms. This is one in a series of measures which have been taken (including media freedoms) which are curtailing the hard-won freedoms Australians use to enjoy. Surveillance of offending transactions would be required if the Bill were passed.  This is not explained, nor how it would be policed.
  • There Is No Cost Benefit. The stated objective of the bill is to close tax avoidance and money laundering loopholes. But there is no quantification of the potential “savings” – and this is also true of the earlier Black Economy Taskforce report. It appears that simply stating these desired objectives is seen as sufficient to justify the bill. What is the cost benefit of such a measure, bearing in mind that transactions which fall outside the exemptions would need to be tracked and examined?  Who would police them, at what cost?
  • There are other more pressing areas of tax leakage and AML risk. According to the OECD report “Implementing The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention” released as part of the OECD Working Group on Bribery, Real Estate is identified as at “significant risk” of being used for money laundering. Among a raft of recommendations, is one saying Australia should be “Taking urgent steps to address the risk that the proceeds of foreign bribery could be laundered through the Australian real estate sector. These should include specific measures to ensure that, in line with the FATF standards, the Australian financial system is not the sole gatekeeper for such transactions”.  To date these loopholes, remain open, as do those relating the corporates and big business who, partly thanks to the assistance of the large international accounting firms are responsible for the lions share of tax leakage and AML activity. Our research suggests that Government, under heavy corporate and business lobbying is deliberately letting this slide, preferring to target in on a relatively inconsequential area of tax leakage relating to cash transactions.
  • The Legislation Would Be Ineffective. Beyond that, it is clear from our wider research of a range of sources that such a proposed cash ban would have very little impact on hard core tax leakage. For example, Professor Fredrich Schneider, a research fellow at the Institute of Labor Economics at the University of Linz, Austria, a leading international expert on the black economy has stated that there is a lack of empirical evidence that cash transaction bans will help reduce the black economy. Schneider published a paper in 2017 titled “Restricting or Abolishing Cash: An Effective Instrument for Fighting the Shadow Economy, Crime and Terrorism in which he made this specific point.
  • There Is Another Agenda. In addition, while the Bill is silent on the connection to implementing negative interest rates as part of unconventional policy, the link was made clearly in the 2016 Geneva Report by the International Centre Monetary and Banking Studies (ICBM) titled: What else can Central Banks do?  This paper which was drafted by officials from international organisations such as the IMF/BIS and multiple central banks + commercial banks.
  • The IMF Shows Why. The same thematic came through in recent IMF Blogs and working papers.  In April 2019, the IMF published a new working paper on how to deeply negative interest rates work. In previous papers, the IMF has suggested that nominal interest rates may have to go deeply negative, for example, -3% – 4%.   First, they say “In summary, ten years after the crisis, it is clear that the zero-lower bound on interest rates has proved to be a serious obstacle for monetary policy. However, the zero lower bound is not a law of nature; it is a policy choice. We show that with readily available tools a central bank can enable deep negative rates whenever needed—thus maintaining the power of monetary policy in the future.” Next they declare “Our view is that, when needed, deep negative rates are likely to be worth the political cost. While the complete abolition of paper currency would indeed clear the way for deep negative interest rates whenever deep negative rates were called for, such proposals remain difficult to implement since they involve a drastic change in the way people transact.”
  • The Bill Is Connected to Negative Interest Rates. The connection is obvious in that in a negative interest rate environment households and businesses will be likely to withdraw funds from the banking system and transact in cash. If enough cash is extracted, negative interest rates will simply have no effect. We believe the measures proposed in the current Bill are truly about enabling negative rates, yet this is not mentioned within the Bill. This is misleading and deceptive. The true motivations should be on the record. But it explains the short time frames.
  • The Structure Allows Change by Regulation Subsequently. Finally, the structure of the Bill enables parameters to be changed subsequently by regulation (not via Parliament). This opens the door to removing some of the concessions contained in the current drafting by agencies without full scrutiny.  It is important to note that where cash transaction bans have been introduced, the value ceiling has been lowered.  France has legally prohibited cash transactions above 1,000 euros, Spain has legally prohibited cash transactions above 2,500 euros, Italy has legally prohibited cash transactions above 3,000 euros, and the European Central Bank ended the production and issuance of its 500 euro note at the end of 2018.

This Bill should not be allowed to pass.

RBA Still Up The Creek Without A Paddle

The latest Statement On Monetary Policy to me seem too optimistic, partly because of the accelerated risks internationally, and partly because their rose tinted spectacles appear to have been turned up to 11! Remember the current rate of growth is weakening, and the trade balance is flattered by ultra-high iron ore prices, which are now coming back. And frankly the statement appears to be an attempt to post rationalise their past poor decisions. We do agree the Government needs to do more, even if the “surplus” is sacrificed as a result.

Lowe’s opening address this morning, where he outlines the main points.

Our central forecast is for the Australian economy to expand by 2½ per cent this year and 2¾ per cent over 2020.

The growth forecast for this year has been revised down since we met six months ago, but the forecast for next year is unchanged. The downward revision this year mainly reflects weak consumption growth. It has become increasingly clear that the extended period of unusually slow growth in household incomes has been weighing on household spending, as has the adjustment in the housing market. Given this experience, the outlook for consumption continues to be the main domestic source of forecast uncertainty.

Even so, looking ahead, there are signs the economy may have reached a gentle turning point. Consistent with this, we are expecting the quarterly GDP growth outcomes to strengthen gradually after a run of disappointing numbers. This outlook is supported by a number of developments including: lower interest rates, the recent tax cuts, a depreciation of the Australian dollar, a brighter outlook for investment in the resources sector, some stabilisation of the housing market and ongoing high levels of investment in infrastructure. It is reasonable to expect that, together, these factors will see growth in the Australian economy return to around its trend rate next year.

The major uncertainty continues to be the trade and technology disputes between the United States and China. These disputes pose a significant risk to the global economy. Not only are they disrupting trade flows, but they are also generating considerable uncertainty for many businesses around the world. Worryingly, this uncertainty is leading to investment plans being postponed or reconsidered. It is also now generating volatility in financial markets and has increased the prospects of monetary easing in many countries. This means that we have a lot riding on these disputes being resolved.

Turning now to the Australian labour market, the unemployment rate, at 5.2 per cent, is a little higher than when we met six months ago. This is despite employment growth having been stronger than we had expected. What has happened is that increased demand for labour has been met with more labour supply, especially by women and older Australians. Reflecting this, a higher share of the Australian adult population is participating in the labour market than ever before. This is good news. But one side-effect of this flexibility of labour supply is that it is harder to generate a tight labour market and so, in turn, it is harder to generate a material lift in aggregate wages growth.

Looking forward, while some slowing in employment growth is expected, the central scenario is for the unemployment rate to move lower to reach 5 per cent again in 2021.

If things evolve in line with this central scenario, it is probable that we will still have spare capacity in the labour market for a while yet, especially taking into account underemployment. This means that the upward pressure on wages growth over the next couple of years is likely to be only quite modest, and less than we were earlier expecting. Caps on wages growth in public sectors right across the country are another factor contributing to the subdued wage outcomes. At the aggregate level, my view is that a further pick-up in wages growth is both affordable and desirable.

Turning now to inflation, the June quarter outcome was broadly in line with expectations, after a run of lower-than-expected numbers in earlier quarters. Over the year to June, inflation was 1.6 per cent, in both headline and underlying terms, extending the period over which inflation has been below the 2–3 per cent medium-term target range. The Reserve Bank Board remains committed to having inflation return to this range, but it is taking longer than earlier expected.

There are a few factors that I would highlight as contributing to the low inflation outcome over the past year. These are: the slow growth in wages; the ongoing spare capacity in the economy; various government initiatives to address cost-of-living pressures on households; and the adjustment in the housing market, which has contributed to unusually low increases in rents and declines in the price of building a new home in some cities. Working in the other direction, the drought and the depreciation of the exchange rate have been pushing some prices up.

Looking ahead, inflation is still expected to pick up, but the date at which it is expected to be back at 2 per cent has been pushed out again. Over 2020, inflation is forecast to be a little under 2 per cent and over 2021 it is expected to be a little above 2 per cent.

At this point, I would like to turn to monetary policy.

When we met with the Committee in February, I indicated that I thought the probabilities of a cash rate increase and a cash rate decrease were broadly balanced. Following that hearing, the situation continued to evolve and the Board reduced the cash rate twice – at its June and July meetings – to a new low of 1 per cent.

A reasonable question to ask is: what changed?

The answer is the accumulation of evidence that the economy could be on a better path than the one we looked to be on. The incoming data on wages, prices, GDP and unemployment all suggested that the Australian economy was some distance from running up against capacity constraints. It also suggested that the day at which inflation was comfortably back within the 2–3 per cent medium-term target range was not getting any closer.

Faced with this evidence, the Board decided that it was appropriate to lower the cash rate, after having kept it unchanged for more than 2½ years. It judged that a lower cash rate would boost jobs and help make more assured progress towards the inflation target.

In the current environment, easier monetary policy mainly works through two channels. The first is that it affects the exchange rate, which is now at the lowest level it has been for some time. The second is that it boosts aggregate household disposable income. I acknowledge that lower interest rates hurt the finances of the many Australians who rely on interest payments and the Board has paid close attention to this issue. At the aggregate level though, for every dollar the household sector receives in interest income, it pays well over two dollars in interest to the banks and other lenders. This means that lower interest rates put more money into the hands of the household sector and, at some point, this extra money gets spent and this helps the overall economy.

At its meeting earlier this week, the Board decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 1 per cent.

It judged that after having moved twice in quick succession it was appropriate to wait and assess developments both internationally and domestically.

As I mentioned earlier, there have been a number of developments that could be expected to support the Australian economy over the next couple of years. Determining with precision the combined effect of these developments is difficult. It is certainly possible that their combined effect will be greater than the sum of the individual parts. If so, growth would surprise on the upside. Of course, it is also possible that the concerning international developments and the ongoing weak growth in household incomes could see the economy underperform our central scenario. The labour market will continue to provide an important guide as to which path we are on.

It is, nevertheless, reasonable to expect an extended period of low interest rates in Australia. This reflects what is happening both overseas and here at home.

While we might wish it were otherwise, it is difficult to escape the fact that if global interest rates are low, they are going to be low here in Australia too. When the global appetite to save is elevated relative to the appetite to invest – as it is now – interest rates in all countries are affected. Our floating exchange rate gives us the ability to set our own interest rates from a cyclical perspective, but it does not insulate us from long-lasting shifts in global interest rates driven by saving/investment decisions around the world.

In the central scenario that I have sketched today, inflation will be below the target band for some time to come and the unemployment rate will remain above the level we estimate to be consistent with full employment. While this remains the case, the possibility of lower interest rates will remain on the table. The Board is prepared to ease monetary policy further if there is additional accumulation of evidence that this is needed to achieve our goals of full employment and inflation consistent with the target. Time will tell.

As I have discussed on other occasions, if further stimulus to demand growth is required to get us to full employment and closer to the economy’s capacity, monetary policy is not the country’s only option. Monetary policy certainly can help, and it is helping, but there are certain downsides from relying too much on monetary policy.

One option is for fiscal support, including through spending on infrastructure. Spending on infrastructure not only adds to demand in the economy but, done properly, it can boost the economy’s productivity. It can also directly improve the quality of people’s lives through reducing congestion and improving services. At the moment, there are some capacity constraints in parts of the infrastructure sector, but these should not prevent us from looking for further opportunities to boost the economy’s productive capacity and support domestic demand. There is no shortage of finance to do this, with interest rates the lowest they have ever been. This week, all governments in Australia can borrow for 10 years at less than 2 per cent.

Another option is structural policies that support firms expanding, investing, innovating and employing people. A strong, dynamic business sector is the best way of creating jobs and growing the overall economy. We will all do better if Australia is viewed as a great place to expand, invest, innovate and employ people. A program of structural reform would help move us in this direction. It would also help boost productivity growth, which over recent times has slowed noticeably. If this slowing is maintained, it will become a serious issue and as a society we will have to make some difficult adjustments. So it is important that we think about the possibilities here, not just from a short-term perspective but from a long-term perspective as well.

Danish Bank Offers 20-Year Mortgage At Zero for First Time in History

In this strange new environment could it be that borrowers will be paid to take a mortgage? It could be.

From Bloomberg.

In Denmark’s $495 billion mortgage-backed covered bond market, another milestone was reached on Wednesday as Nordea Bank Abp said it will start offering 20-year fixed-rate loans that charge no interest.

This is significant, as the Denmark 10-Year Government bond rate slides below minus 0.5%

The development follows an announcement earlier in the week by Jyske Bank A/S, which said it will start issuing 10-year mortgages at a coupon of minus 0.5%. Danes can also now get 30-year mortgages at 0.5%, and Nordea recently adjusted its prospectus to allow for home loans up to 30 years at negative interest rates.

“It’s never been cheaper to borrow,” Lise Nytoft Bergmann, chief analyst at Nordea’s home finance unit in Denmark, said in an email. “We expect this to contribute to driving home prices higher.”

Though good news for homeowners, Bergmann said the development is “almost eerie.”

“It’s an uncomfortable thought that there are investors who are willing to lend money for 30 years and get just 0.5% in return,” she said. “It shows how scared investors are of the current situation in the financial markets, and that they expect it to take a very long time before things improve.”

Don’t Believe the Establishment’s Cash Ban Lies and Propaganda [Podcast]

Economist John Adams And Analyst Martin North look more deeply into the connection between the attempt to limit cash transactions and the imposition of negative interest rates. Despite what the MSM are saying there is a direct connection. In fact negative interest rates cannot work as planned if cash is freely in circulation.

We cite the links and describe the impact. The deadline for submissions to stop the cash ban is 12 August 2019.

Make your views know to our “elected representatives.” Email: blackeconomy@treasury.gov.au with the subject line:
Submission: Exposure Draft—Currency (Restrictions on the Use of Cash) Bill 2019

As we discussed before, the real agenda is all about negative interest rates and extreme monetary policy, as prescribed by the IMF.

Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
Don’t Believe the Establishment’s Cash Ban Lies and Propaganda [Podcast]
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