Brokers key to success for new market in 2016

From Australian Broker.

Mortgage refinancing will drive the market in 2016, according to a new report, and brokers are in the prime position to capitalise.

According to the J.P. Morgan Australian Mortgage Industry Report (Vol 22), produced in collaboration with Digital Finance Analytics, there has been a noticeable change in who has been transacting, with a clear switch from investors to refinancers.

Investor demand has been reducing driven by lower expectations of house price appreciation and a tougher regulatory outlook. Investors have seen the sharpest reduction in intention to transact, reducing from around 50% to 40% for solo investors and around 75% to 60% for portfolio investors in 2015.

However, with interest rates still at record lows, the number of borrowers intending to refinance has been continuously increasing. Those looking to refinance has risen from 10% in early 2015 to 35%, according to the report, as they look to establish better terms on their mortgage or release equity for other investments as house prices have risen.

J.P. Morgan banking analyst Scott Manning says brokers will be key to success in capturing the surge of refinancing activity this year, with around 75% of refinancers expecting to use brokers versus other channels.

According to Manning, we are already starting to see the major banks adapt. For example, ANZ has been increasing its broker usage while simultaneously decreasing its branch footprint – a trend which he says will continue across the banking landscape over the next five years.

“Certainly brokers are not only a high proportion of flow but they are a significantly higher proportion of that of new bank business. They are very important for banks to try and grow their book basically. So I think [brokers] are here to stay and I think that proportion will continue to improve over time,” Manning told Australian Broker at the release of the report.

“If you look at what the banks of doing, they are reducing the size of the footprint in terms of square metres by moving banks. They are using smart ATMs where you can bank cash and bank deposits without going into a branch. They have kiosks with after-hours access where you can get coin change for SMEs.

“They are migrating their footprint off branches already. I think ANZ has just been a bit more aggressive on that path… We can see that in Westpac as well. Their branches were down last year in particular and they have renegotiated the new deal with Australia Post to do more of the day-to-day banking in remote areas through the post office.”

Joint DFA and JP Morgan Mortgage Industry Report 22 Released Mar 2016

The March 2016 edition of our joint mortgage industry report used data from the Digital Finance Analytics household surveys to discuss the  evolution of the home loan market.

jpm-mar-2016Specifically, volume 22 focuses on three important issues

  1. Building A Picture Of Credit Demand – We consider the changing inputs into housing credit growth over time, initially through a model of household gearing tolerance, and more recently through the transition from heightened investor activity towards increased owner occupied re-financing.
  2. Taking A Closer Look At Investors – Given that the investor market (largely centered around Sydney and Melbourne) has been a key area of focus of banks, regulators and politicians, we assess four areas of potential risk in greater detail.
  3. Implications For Australian Banks – It is clear that Australian banks will need to target re-financers going forward as a key area of focus – not only to maintain market share, but also to offset the ongoing amortisation headwind from lower rates. Accordingly, target market identification and distribution strategies will hold even greater importance.

Note that due to regulatory compliance, the full report is only available from JP Morgan. However, the underlying survey data and analysis is available on request from DFA via the Property Imperative. This publication contains considerably more detailed information than was used in the final joint report.

New Investor Mortgage LVR’s Being Trimmed

The peak LVR’s on investment mortgage transactions is down according to a speech today given by Heidi Richards, General Manager, Industry Analysis APRA, which developed further the information published yesterday relating to mortgage underwriting standards. This is important because 62% of bank lending is mortgage related (a high). Whilst much of the information in the speech covered the same ground, which we discussed yesterday, there was a striking piece of data on the LVR’s of investment loans.

More recently, APRA’s initiative to rein in growth in the investor segment of the market has prompted a number of ADIs to use LVR caps as a lever to reduce loan approvals in this segment. Although many ADIs traditionally required more equity for investment loans, some ADIs reduced maximum LVRs for investors significantly over the course of 2015. Note the actual distribution of loans approved for investors is much lower than these maximum levels, and overall, LVRs for investors on average tend to be lower than for owner-occupiers.

APRA-LVR's-Speech

Two observations. First different lenders clearly had – and have different policies relating to LVR limits, and second LVR limits have been reduced, by some in recent times. For example, a maximum from 92.5% down to 65%! Others have not changed their maximum ratios (though may not be lending to the maximum of course).

Towards the end of her speech she brings together the various steps taken to reduce lending, and referring to the hypothetical borrower model summaries:

…the hypothetical borrower exercise illustrated a material tightening of lending standards that we believe is appropriate and reflects more sensible risk assessment practices. Between 2014 and 2015, the maximum loan sizes that could have been extended to our four hypothetical borrowers declined by, on average, around 12 per cent for investors and 6 per cent for owner-occupiers. The actual change for individual ADIs was greater, up to 25 per cent in some cases. This should not be interpreted as an indication that actual loan sizes are shrinking, however, only that the maximum allowable loan for a given borrower income profile is now more conservative.

The next two charts illustrate the key drivers of this result. For owner-occupiers, the largest impact has come from the use of more realistic estimates of living expenses. For investors, interest-rate buffers that ADIs now apply more consistently to the borrower’s other debts are most significant. I should mention that there are also changes to standards at some ADIs that are yet to be implemented, due to systems constraints or other hurdles, so these results will continue to evolve and we will most likely conduct additional exercises in the future.

Change-1

CHange-2 These changes reflect the policies of each lender, but it is always possible that practice may be divergent from policy. Lenders generally allow some scope for the standard credit criteria to be overridden by experienced lending staff. APRA would clearly be concerned if these tighter policies were being undermined in practice to any material degree.

As a result, we are taking a hard look at loans approved outside serviceability policy. Many loans are approved or declined based on automated criteria. In some cases, however, an application might be referred for a manual decision because it marginally fails a serviceability test. The loan might ultimately be approved by a lending officer with appropriate delegation if there is other evidence that the borrower can service the loan—this might be, for example, because there is other income that was not captured in the decisioning tool, the borrower is on maternity leave with temporarily lower income, or for bridging finance. However, there is also the potential for weaker loans being approved, and in our view ADIs need to have good oversight and monitoring of these approvals. APRA data shows a recent uptick in loans approved outside serviceability; anecdotal evidence indicates much of this relates to loans in the pipeline that were preapproved under older, looser criteria now being settled. So we expect to see this volume taper off.

Another way to look at the situation is that there are tranches of loans which were written under more generous underwriting terms, for at least the last 2-3 years. These loans may well have a higher probability of default down the track (after all why else would APRA want to tighten the criteria), so it will be interesting to see if indeed defaults rise higher than average in these loan pools. Across the board defaults are up, if only a little.  For the major bank issuers, the 30 day delinquency rate increased to 1.15 per cent at December also up from 0.94 per cent at September according to Moody’s.

Mortgage Underwriting Standards Vary By Lender, and Over Time

APRA’s Insight Issue One 2016 included a section on mortgage underwriting standards. The recent falls in average loan sizes noted in the recent monthly banking data reflects tighter underwriting standards. APRA data also highlights the diversity of underwriting standards in the market.

One key element of ADIs’ lending practices is the method by which they assess a customer’s ability to service a loan against a range of potential future circumstances. This assessment of loan serviceability is not merely a legal obligation for lenders; it is also an important, prudent risk management practice.

Loan serviceability methodologies

In making serviceability assessments of borrowers, most ADIs currently use a methodology in which they calculate the borrower’s Net Income Surplus (NIS). Computing NIS is a multi-faceted calculation, with a number of different inputs, and for which the relative importance of each input is not always clear. Assessing the relative prudence of NIS assessments across ADIs can therefore be problematic, as it can be difficult to determine the extent to which one conservative assumption outweighs another less- conservative assumption, and apparent minor differences in methodology can sometimes have a significant impact on the overall outcome.

To assess and compare lending standards across ADIs, one technique used by APRA has been a Hypothetical Borrower Exercise (HBE). In early 2015, APRA asked a number of the larger ADIs to provide their serviceability assessments for four hypothetical mortgage borrowers — two owner-occupiers and two investors — using their policies in place as at 31 December 2014. This allowed APRA to compare the lending decisions of ADIs based on identical borrower characteristics. Importantly, it also allowed APRA to disassemble assessments into their component parts. In May 2015, APRA outlined some results and conclusions from the first HBE.1

To test how lending policies had changed in response to APRA’s scrutiny, APRA ran a second HBE in late 2015, based on the policies ADIs had in place as at 30 September 2015. By asking the same population of ADIs to assess the same four hypothetical borrowers, not only could APRA compare across ADIs, it could also compare the same ADI at two different points in time.

The four charts below relate to the four calculation components for one of the hypothetical borrowers — in this case, a ‘typical’ investor. The blue bars show the results for December 2014, while the red dots show the September 2015 results for the same lender. Each chart is sorted with the most conservative lender for that particular component (as at September 2015) on the left, and the least conservative on the right.

Chart A – Income recognised (less tax and haircuts)

Percentage of gross pre-tax income

 Chart A shows income recognised, as a percentage of the borrower's gross pre-tax income. A number of ADIs have reported more prudent income recognition in September 2015 than in December 2014.

Bars represent individual lender data

Chart B – Minimum living expense assumptions

Percentage of borrower pre-tax salary income

 Chart B shows ADIs' minimum living expense assumptions as a percentage of the borrower's pre-tax salary income. Many ADIs have reported higher minimum living expense assumptions in September 2015 compared to December 2015.

Bars represent individual lender data

Chart C – New mortgage

Interest rate used in serviceability assessment

Chart C shows the interest rate used in the serviceability assessment for a new mortgage. The interest rate used in December 2014 ranged from 6.3 - 8.1 per cent. The range for September 2015 was 7.1 - 8.6 per cent.

Bars represent individual lender data

Chart D – Existing mortgage

Interest rate used in serviceability assessment

 Chart D shows the interest rate used in the serviceability assessment for an existing mortgage commitment.The interest rate used in December 2014 ranged from 5.3 - 8.1 per cent. The range for September 2015 was 6.4 - 9.2 per cent.

Bars represent individual lender data
The current interest rate on the existing mortgage debt is 5.2%
 Chart A shows income recognised, as a percentage of gross pre-tax income.  While the assessment of PAYG salary income has usually remained the same between the two periods, a number of lenders have applied larger haircuts (i.e. discounts) to less stable sources of income such as overtime, bonuses, commissions, investment dividends and rental income.

Chart B shows minimum living expense assumptions as a percentage of pre-tax salary income.  Some lenders have made quite large changes to this component of their NIS assessment.  This impact has typically arisen from two main sources:

  • considering borrower-declared expenses where these are greater than calculated benchmarks; and/or
  • scaling living expense assumptions in line with income.

Chart C shows the interest rate used in the serviceability assessment for this new mortgage.  Various lenders have increased that rate in response to APRA’s December 2014 letter, in which APRA stated that prudent serviceability policies should incorporate a ‘serviceability buffer of at least 2 per cent above the loan product rate, with a minimum floor assessment rate of 7 per cent.’

Chart D shows the interest rate used in the serviceability assessment for an existing mortgage commitment. Here, the changes are even more dramatic than for Chart C, as at the time of the first HBE a number of ADIs were not using any serviceability buffer on existing debt.

These four components combine to calculate NIS. Whilst there was little overall change in NIS for the lenders that were already relatively conservative in December 2014, lenders that were the least conservative in December 2014 generally reported a significant drop in calculated NIS using their September 2015 policies. These changes had the effect of tightening the spread of calculated NIS from the most to the least conservative ADI. Overall, the maximum loan sizes reported by ADIs for the four hypothetical borrowers declined by, on average, around 12 per cent for investors and 6 per cent for owner-occupiers. (Note that this does not imply actual loan sizes are falling across the board; indeed the average size of loans continues to rise.)

Conclusion

APRA’s HBEs have proven a simple but effective tool for examining the impact of changes to residential mortgage lending policies during 2015.

Overall, debt serviceability assessments now appear to be both more prudent and more consistent across ADIs, relative to December 2014.  APRA will continue to engage ADIs on this issue in 2016 to assess whether the observed improvements in sound underwriting practices are maintained. APRA will also be examining the extent to which loans are able to be approved outside an ADI’s own (tightened) policy parameters.

1 Sound lending standards and adequate capital: preconditions for long-term success
http://www.apra.gov.au/Speeches/Pages/Sound-Lending-Standards-and-Adequate-Capital.aspx

APRA Warns On Mortgage Reclassification

APRA has written to all ADI’s with regards to the spate of mortgage reclassification between investment and owner occupied loans which amounts now to around $35bn of adjustments in the past few months. Reclassification seem to emanate from internal review within the banks when APRA introduced 10% speed limit on investment loans, and also is customer initiated following the price differences between owner occupied and investment mortgages which have emerged. These movements are “strange” and may reflect some divergence from the true state of play.  The mix of loans clearly has an impact on policy, and has the potential later to impact potential capital requirements.

So APRA’s warning is timely. There are however no overt penalties of inaccurate reporting and some banks have made adjustments without any formal statements, although others did disclose significant recalculations.

A number of ADIs have recently reported significant changes in housing loan purpose between investment and owner-occupied. This letter provides guidance to assist authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) report these data to APRA consistently and accurately.

These data are used in public policy decisions, prudential supervision and statistical publications. Where the change in loan purpose is not reported correctly (i.e. from the period that the change occurred), APRA, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) are impeded in accurately ascertaining the underlying movements in housing loans.

Reporting of fixed term housing loans must reflect the current purpose of the loan because the split by housing loan purpose is important for monetary policy and financial stability considerations.

Use of data

APRA uses these data for supervision and publication. The data are also used by the RBA and the ABS.

The classification of investment and owner-occupied housing loans is used by the RBA to:

  • calculate the financial aggregates;
  • assess the transmission of monetary policy through the financial system;
  • assess potential risks to financial stability; and
  • meet international statistical standards and reporting obligations.

The ABS uses the domestic books data to compile Gross Domestic Product, of which ADIs are a major component

Banks’ reporting of Statement of Financial Position ARF 320.0 (ARF 320.0)

In order to report loan data on the ARF 320.0 accurately each period, according to whether a loan is owner occupied or investment housing, ADIs must report data for existing (non-revolving) housing loans by current loan purpose.

The instructions to ARF 320.0 item 5.1.1.1 owner-occupied housing loans state that the figure reported must:

Include:

  • the value of housing loans to Australian households, for the construction or purchase of dwellings for owner occupation; and
  • revolving credit or redraw facilities originally approved for a purpose of predominantly owner-occupied housing.

The instructions to ARF 320.0 item 5.1.1.2 investment housing loans state that the figure reported must:

Include:

  • the value of investment housing loans to Australian households, for the construction or purchase of dwellings for non-owner occupation; and
  • revolving credit or redraw facilities originally approved for a purpose of predominantly non-owner-occupied housing.

Therefore:

  • when an ADI becomes aware there is a change in the purpose of an existing (non-revolving) housing loan between investment and owner-occupied, the ADI must report that loan under the new purpose on the ARF 320.0 from the month that the change in purpose occurred; but
  • for housing loans to households comprising revolving credit secured by residential mortgage, the instructions state that the loan must NOT be reported under the new purpose but continue to be reported under the purpose of the loan for which it was originally approved.

Loans must be reported according to the purpose of the loan. Where the purpose of a loan is not for the purchase or construction of a dwelling, the loan should NOT be recorded under item 5.1.1.1 or 5.1.1.2 of ARF 320.0: the loan should be reported under the relevant loan item elsewhere in ARF 320.0. In particular, non-housing loans that are secured by residential property mortgages should not be reported under item 5.1.1.1 or 5.1.1.2, but reported under the relevant loan item elsewhere in ARF 320.0. For example, a loan to a sole trader business secured by a residential property mortgage would be reported in item 5.3 Loans to non-financial corporations.

Credit unions’ and building societies’ reporting of Statement of Financial Position ARF 323.0 (ARF 323.0)

In order to report data on the ARF 323.0 accurately each period, according to whether a loan is owner occupied or investment housing, ADIs must report data for existing (non-revolving) housing loans by current loan purpose. Switching of purpose between investment and owner-occupied housing loans should be recorded under the new purpose on the ARF 323.0 from the month that the change in purpose occurred.

As per the ARF 323.0 instructions, fixed term housing loans should be reported per the current purpose and therefore should change category when the purpose changes. Revolving credit and redraw facility housing loans should continue to be reported under the purpose that the loan was originally approved for.

Housing Loan Reconciliation ARF 320.8 (ARF 320.8)

Loans which switched purpose between investment and owner-occupied housing loans should be reported under the new purpose in the outstanding stocks on ARF 320.8 Tables 1, 2 and 3.

In Table 1 of ARF 320.8, if the changed purpose of housing loans is recorded in an ADI’s system as an internal refinance, then the change in classification should be reported as ‘Excess repayments due to sale of property or refinancing’ under the original purpose, and also as ‘Drawdowns (new loans and redraws)’ for the new purpose. An example of an internal refinance is when a new contract is signed by the customer. If the reclassifying by housing loan purpose is not recorded in your system as an internal refinance, then the reclassification should be recorded as ‘Other adjustments’ under both the original and new purpose. Once the reclassifying by housing loan purpose has occurred, any other flows related to that loan should be recorded under the new purpose.

In Table 1, the flow for the reporting period should be recorded under the new purpose. Opening balances in Table 1 of the supplementary information template should be reported as nil. In Tables 2 and 3, the balances should be recorded under the new purpose.

As per the Housing Finance ARF 392 series and Personal Finance ARF 394 series instructions, reclassifying by housing loan purposes should not be reported as a new loan approval if there is no change in the property offered as security or the lender. As such, it should not be captured in Table 4.

Housing Finance ARF 392 (ARF 392) series

The general instructions for ARF 392 (page 5) state that institutions should exclude commitments to refinance existing loans where there is no change in the property offered as security and the institution was the original lender. Therefore, switching of purpose between existing investment and owner-occupied housing loans should not be reflected in the housing approvals reported on the ARF 392. Loan purpose switching does not qualify as a new commitment, nor is it an external refinance.

Personal Finance ARF 394 series

Switching of purpose between existing investment and owner-occupied housing loans should not be reflected in new commitments reported on the ARF 394 in ‘Loans for personal investment purposes – dwellings for rent/resale’ and ‘Loans for personal investment purposes – refinancing’. Loan purpose switching does not qualify as a new commitment, nor is it an external refinance.

Banks’ reporting of Impaired Assets ARF 220.0

Loans which switched by purpose between impaired investment and owner-occupied housing loans and between past due investment and occupied housing loans should be recorded under the new purpose categories on the ARF 220.0 Parts 1B and 2B from the reporting period that the reclassification occurred.

 

Housing Lending Finance Takes a Tumble

The latest data from the ABS on housing finance to January 2016 shows that the total value of dwelling commitments excluding alterations and additions (trend) fell 0.6% in January 2016 compared with December 2015. $32.4 bn of loans were written, with loans for owner occupation worth $21.2bn (down 0.1%)  and investment loans $11.2bn down 1.6%. The number of refinancing commitments for owner occupied housing (trend) rose 1.7% in January 2016, following a rise of 2.0% in December 2015.  Banks are fighting for refinance market share. We think that tighter lending standards are biting, this is reflected in a rise in the number of households who are having problems getting the loan they want. One in ten are having difficulties.

OO-Loans-Jan-2016-ABSThe total value of owner occupied housing commitments (trend) fell (down $19m, 0.1%) in January 2016. A fall was recorded in commitments for the purchase of established dwellings (down $46m, 0.3%) while rises were recorded in commitments for the construction of dwellings (up $19m, 1.0%) and commitments for the purchase of new dwellings (up $8m, 0.6%).

Per-Change-OO-Jan-2016-ABSThe number of owner occupied housing commitments (trend) rose 0.4% in January 2016, following a rise of 0.6% in December 2015. Rises were recorded in commitments for the refinancing of established dwellings (up $346m, 1.7%), commitments for the purchase of new dwellings (up $37m, 1.2%) and commitments for the construction of dwellings (up $31m, 0.5%), while a fall was recorded in commitments for the purchase of established dwellings excluding refinancing (down $188m, 0.7%).

The total value of investment housing commitments (trend) fell (down $186m, 1.6%) in January 2016 compared with December 2015. Falls were recorded in commitments for the purchase of dwellings by others for rent or resale (down $23m, 1.9%) and commitments for the purchase of dwellings by individuals for rent or resale (down $178m, 1.9%), while a rise was recorded in commitments for the construction of dwellings for rent or resale (up $15m, 1.7%).

OO-and-INV-Flows-Jan-2016-ABSBetween December 2015 and January 2016, the number of owner occupied housing commitments (trend) rose in Queensland (up $146m, 1.4%), Victoria (up $128m, 0.8%), New South Wales (up $23m, 0.1%), Tasmania (up $15m, 1.7%), the Australian Capital Territory (up $13m, 1.2%) and the Northern Territory (up $4m, 1.2%), while falls were recorded in South Australia (down $6m, 0.2%) and Western Australia (down $15m, 0.2%).

State-PC-OO-Jan-2016-ABSIn original terms, the number of first home buyer commitments as a percentage of total owner occupied housing finance commitments remain unchanged at 15.1% in January 2016 from December 2015. However, the number of loans fell from 9,357 to 6,669 in the month. Between December 2015 and January 2016, the average loan size for first home buyers fell $-9,300 to $338,800. The average loan size for all owner occupied housing commitments fell $-5,400 to $372,400 for the same period.

FTB-Trends-Jan-2016-ABSThe number of first time buyers going direct to the investment market fell 3%, but remains elevated compared with previous years. These transactions are based on our survey data and are not counted in the ABS FTB OO data.

All-FTB-DFA-Jan-2016 At the end of January 2016, the value of outstanding housing loans financed by Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) was $1,466b, up $8b (0.5%) from the December 2015 closing balance. Owner occupied housing loan outstandings financed by ADIs rose $8b (0.8%) to $939b and investment housing loan outstandings financed by ADIs was flat at $528b. Overall 36% of loans are for investment housing purposes.

ADI-Loan-Stovck-Jan-2016-ABS

New Edition of “The Property Imperative” Just Released

The updated edition of “The Property Imperative”, our flagship report on the residential housing sector, which includes survey data to March 2016 is now available free on request.

From the introduction:

The Property Imperative is published twice each year, drawing data from our ongoing consumer surveys, research and blog. This edition dates from March 2016 and offers our latest perspectives on the ever-changing residential property sector.

As usual, we begin by describing the current state of the market by looking at the activities of different household groups using our recent primary research and other available data.

In this edition, we also look at rental yields, household interest rate sensitivity and the role of mortgage brokers, plus data on negative gearing.

Residential property remains in the cross-hairs of many players who wish to influence the economic, fiscal and social outcomes of Australia. In policy terms, debates around negative gearing and capital gains tax breaks for investment properties have hotted up.

By way of context, the Australian residential property market of 9.53 million dwellings is currently valued at over $5.86 trillion and includes houses, semi-detached dwellings, townhouses, terrace houses, flats, units and apartments. In the past 10 years the total value has more than doubled. It is one of the most significant elements driving the economy, and as a result it is influenced by state and federal policy makers, the Reserve Bank (RBA), banking competition and regulation and other factors. Indeed, the RBA is “banking” on property as a critical element in the current economic transition.

According to the RBA, as at January 2016, total housing loans were a record $1.53 trillion. There are more than 5.4 million housing loans outstanding with an average balance of about $249,000. Approximately 64% of total loan stock is for owner occupied housing, while 36% is for investment purposes. In recent months there has been a restatement of the mix between owner occupied and investment loans, and as a result the true blend is hard to decipher.

The RBA continues to highlight their concerns about potential excesses in the housing market. In addition, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) has been tightening regulation of the banks, in terms of supervision of lending standards, the imposition of speed limits on investment lending and has raised capital requirements for some bank. The latest RBA minutes indicates their view is these regulatory changes are slowing investment lending somewhat, though we observe that demand remains, and in absolute terms, borrowing interest rates are low.

As a result, momentum in the market has changed, with growth in investment lending relatively static, but counterpointed by a massive focus on owner occupied refinancing and the rise of differential pricing. In addition, 37% of new loans issued were interest-only loans, a drop from 46% last year as the regulators have been bearing down on the banks’ lending standards.

The story of residential property is far from over!

Request a copy of the report here. Please note this is an archived edition now, so if you are after this version – volume 6 please specify so in the comment section of the request form. Otherwise you will receive the latest edition.

 

 

NAB Set To Lift Investment Mortgage Rates

From Mortgage Professional Australia.

National Australia Bank will announce a rate rise for a group of its property investors, according to the Australian Financial Review.

Street Talk has revealed that NAB will up rates by 0.15 of a percentage point for property investors who are paying off principal, as well as interest.

The rate increase is part of a new tiered home loan pricing structure and expected to come into effect on April 4.

The move comes as the bank launches a new mortgage pricing structure where it will group its home loan products by both borrower type (owner-occupier or investor) and loan structure (interest-only or principal and interest).

ASIC and brokers: Communication breakdown?

Further information on the debate about Mortgage Brokers, this time from MPA. The article highlights the issues in play.

From Sam Richardson, Mortgage Professional Australia.

Navigating Regulation is part and parcel of running a business. Occasionally however, it determines the future direction, not only of a business, but of an entire industry, as it did in 2008/9 with the passing of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act. Eight years on, 2016/17 looks likely to have an equally strong impact on brokers’ businesses, driven by a perfect storm of regulatory and political activity.

At the request of the Assistant Treasurer, brokers’ remuneration is set to be investigated by ASIC, who are themselves the subject of a government ‘capability review’ – just one of many consequences of 2014’s Financial System Inquiry. That’s not to mention debates over user-pays funding, interest-only lending and more.

In short, brokers and ASIC will need to closely engage with each other – more than they have at any time since the NCCP. Yet, a recent poll by MPA sister-title Australian Broker found that understanding between the industry and regulators appears to be at alarming lows. The magazine asked its readers, ‘Do you agree that ASIC understands the mortgage industry?’, and 86% of respondents disagreed. The magazine took the results of the poll to several prominent brokers, who provided suggestions for this lack of trust.

What they found is that brokers have four areas of concern: that ASIC doesn’t understand the technical aspects of brokers’ compliance procedures; that ASIC should instead be investigating the banks; and finally – and crucially – that ASIC don’t communicate enough with brokers or industry associations. Undoubtedly, current debates, such as over interest-only lending, have not endeared the regulator to brokers, and this dissatisfaction appears both more deeply engrained and wide-ranging. Therefore, this article will also look beyond current debates, examining where communication between brokers and their regulator has broken down, and what can be done to repair the relationship.

1 Broking’s industry bodies and ASIC
Beginning with ASIC’s understanding of the industry, it seems that brokers hold a very different view to their own industry associations. MPA put the 86% statistic to the FBAA’s Peter White, whose reply was unequivocal. “Unfortunately, that is the brokers’ problem,” he explained. “ASIC understands brokers, and to say that they don’t is very, very wrong.”

Drawing on his work with regulators from the introduction of the NCCP onwards, White insisted that “ASIC’s got some enormous skillsets and [people] who understand broking very, very well”.

Similarly, the MFAA’s CEO Siobhan Hayden doesn’t believe the statistic is completely fair. “They [ASIC] are fairly well versed,” she said. “They come out to some of our broker events, they talk to brokers, they engage with us regularly. They have a good understanding of how brokers work and how they’re remunerated.”

Indeed, ASIC personnel have attended recent broker events, including the FBAA’s national conference last November, where they addressed attendees and then answered brokers’ questions.

Within ASIC’s corporate structure – illustrated in our box out – there are several individuals of whom brokers should be aware. The MFAA point to Michael Saadat, senior executive leader of deposit takers, credit & insurers (which includes brokers), who is overseen by ASIC deputy chair Peter Kell. In terms of experience, Saadat worked in compliance at ASIC, Citibank and previously PwC, while Kell comes from a consumer protection background, at ASIC, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and CHOICE. Both are well established in their jobs – Saadat has been at ASIC since 2005 (excluding a brief two year spell at Citibank), Kell from 1998-2004, rejoining the regulator in 2013.

2 How ASIC relates to other regulators
Saadat and Kell certainly have the experience to understand broking, but they’re not the only decision makers brokers have to deal with. Australia’s regulatory framework has several layers, of which ASIC is just one. As FBAA chief White notes, ASIC isn’t necessarily the decision maker, but instead the ‘policeman’ tasked with enforcing them. The Treasury sets ASIC’s priorities and is thus the cause of much misunderstanding. “We get changes of ministers on a regular basis now,” says White. “Not all the ministers understand brokers on a federal level.” The remuneration inquiry, for instance, was announced by assistant treasurer Kelly O’Dwyer, although the inquiry itself will  e carried out by ASIC.

The importance of the Federal Government in fi nancial regulation was underlined by the MFAA’s appointment of a professional lobbyist, GRACosway, which CEO Hayden says at the time was a response to members who believed government needed to be educated about broking. “It is clear from media comments in the past 12 months that some representatives of Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and Treasury do not have a detailed understanding of our industry and this needs to change,” says Hayden.

Indeed, while not the subject of this article, APRA have enormous infl uence over brokers. As Hayden puts it, brokers are not APRA’s ‘direct customers’ – the organisation regulates lenders – but deals with brokers as a distribution channel of those lenders. APRA regularly makes comments about brokerintroduced loans, as they did in 2015, but has a much lower level of engagement – it meets with the MFAA around twice a year, unlike ASIC’s quarterly consultations. The two have clashed, notably in August last year when APRA chairman Wayne Byres warns that broker-originated loans were ‘higher risk’.

While ASIC and APRA co-ordinate through the Council of Financial Regulators, brokers who approach ASIC about APRA policies (or vice versa) will get nowhere, leading to frustration and confusion between the two. “I think sometimes the mandates ASIC and APRA have are not well understood by brokers”, MFAA CEO Hayden tells MPA. “I understand why, when a broker’s business is affected by these changes, they do get a sense of frustration from it, but sometimes it’s not channelled at the correct regulator.” She mentioned complaints by brokers aimed at ASIC about recent bank rate rises and serviceability changes – measures that were driven by APRA.

3 Where communication is failing
Both the MFAA and FBAA see broker misinformation as a cause for their distrust of ASIC, but it’s also a symptom. What it indicates is that a significant number of brokers aren’t being provided with the information so that they can deal with the appropriate regulator at the right time – and it’s not the fi rst time this problem has been raised. In 2013, ASIC commissioned a report into its stakeholders – including brokers – where ‘clearly communicating what ASIC is doing’ was among four key limitations identified by ASIC Chairman Greg Medcraft in his introduction to the report.

In response, Medcraft proposed four measures, two of which related to ASIC’s MoneySmart fi nancial literacy program for consumers, the others being to improve social media channels and review ASIC’s website. He defended ASIC’s record on communication, noting the organisation sends out around 300 media releases and takes part in 100 interviews a year. With tens of thousands of stakeholders, a large quantity of communication is understandably necessary, yet brokers still don’t appear to be getting the information they need.

ASIC’s communication directly with brokers and the press is generally to the point, relating to the results of individual enforcement actions, bans and other penalties. There are notable exceptions: ASIC’s publicly available corporate plans (which are generalist in scope); Saadat’s talk at the FBAA’s conference; and deputy chairman Kell’s interview with Australian Broker in April 2015, in which he discussed the ASIC’s focus on interest-only lending for the year ahead. Overall, however, ASIC rarely discusses future priorities or coming regulation in public, despite this being exactly the sort of information brokers need.

So how does ASIC consult and communicate with brokers? The answer – or rather the impression brokers get – is almost entirely through the two industry bodies, the MFAA and FBAA.

There are good reasons for a top-down approach, MFAA CEO Hayden explains. “They just don’t have the resources to adequately engage with all the brokers that may seek them out with enquiries or questions to ASIC.” The MFAA invites ASIC personnel to its PD days and relays its messages through its email and LinkedIn networks, in part because ASIC are “defi nitely not resourced adequately to directly support the market”. Indeed, a glance at ASIC’s budget (illustrated in the accompanying sidebar) shows that just five per cent of its budget for credit licensees goes into engagement and education.

Both the MFAA and FBAA told MPA that ASIC involves them throughout the development of regulation, but as White puts it, “What you’ll see when it becomes public domain is nearing the end of the stick”. Until that point, ASIC’s dealings take place not only behind closed doors, but under the understanding that everything discussed is confi dential. That explains why, when consultation papers do appear, the regulation they discuss is relatively fully formed. The advantage of this for brokers is that the consultations are more relevant, both in their subject matter and timing, Hayden explains. “It’s prudent to talk about information when it’s meaningful and you’re wanting feedback.”

There’s another reason why ASIC deals with industry bodies, according to FBAA CEO White. “The whole objective of writing regulation is not about achieving commercial bias,” he notes. “If I’m the head of a major brokerage or aggregator, and I’m pushing hard on the door of a regulator for something, it’s probably because it’s got a commercial advantage for me.” ASIC can deal with industry associations as “representatives of the total marketplace.”

While most major players in broking tend to deal with ASIC through the MFAA and FBAA, ASIC themselves say they also deal directly with major brokerages and aggregators. AFG managing director Brett McKeon revealed in a January letter to brokers that he’d met with representatives of ASIC and APRA, in addition to two senators.

Indeed, as regulation begins to really affect brokers businesses, one would expect an increasing number of aggregators and franchises to directly challenge the regulators. Their arguments are undoubtedly commercially biased, but their insights and data may nevertheless be valid, meaning regulators and legislators will (and indeed already do) listen to them. As ASIC tells MPA: “We are conscious that some perspectives are only available directly from the firms themselves.”

4 Finding a new approach to communication
Practically, the disadvantage of the behind closed-doors approach is that brokers experience new regulation as a fait accompli, with their opinion or expertise seemingly ignored by the regulator. So how can ASIC challenge that perception? MPA looked at the relationship between broking and regulation in New Zealand and how small business stakeholders can be better integrated in the
regulatory process.

Despite being a much smaller market than Australia, regulation of brokers and financial advisors in New Zealand makes for an interesting comparison. The MFAA has been working increasingly closely with New Zealand’s Professional Adviser’s Association, who will be involved in the MFAA’s Darwin and Beyond conference in June, and who, since 2012, represent brokers and financial advisors to the New Zealand regulator, the Financial Markets Authority.

MPA spoke to PAA board member Angus Dale-Jones about the difference between regulator-industry engagement in Australia and New Zealand. Dale-Jones is well equipped to make the comparison, having worked at ASIC for 17 years, including time as WA regional commissioner, before moving to the New Zealand Securities Commission, the predecessor of the FMA. As in Australia, the FMA are looking to strengthen financial services regulation, Dale-Jones tells us, but are doing so in a much more positive way.

Crucially, the way regulation is developed in New Zealand is “superbly better then Australia”, as Dale-Jones puts it. This is thanks to an extra layer in the process – the Code Committee, which is made up of 11 industry figures appointed by the FMA. The committee originally drew up and now periodically reviews the New Zealand code for financial advisors.

“It’s proved to be incredibly flexible and useful in the New Zealand context,” Dale Jones explains. “It’s meant that advisors and their associations have been able to get on board with the committee and understand their objectives and the direction of their thinking.”

According to Dale-Jones, the committee is a way of drawing on the expertise of “current practitioners who understand today’s issues.” It also means that minor changes to the code don’t have to involve changes in legislation, as the committee can make these changes. Moreover, Dale-Jones believes such regulator industry convergence isn’t just a New Zealand phenomenon. “In the past decade, around the world there has been a colossal change in the interaction between professional associations, industry bodies and the regulators,” he says. “Now it is seeking more of a convergence between those players, looking at ways of getting outcomes that makes everybody happy, so you’re starting to see far greater interest in self-regulatory solutions.”

5 Moving towards self-regulation in Australia
With regulatory initiative trickling down from government or even international level – such as the raising of bank capital requirements – Australia doesn’t appear to have a particularly self-regulating financial system, at least in the third-party mortgage space. Indeed, one might presume the level of misunderstanding between brokers and ASIC would stop such an initiative in its tracks. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why brokers should make themselves part of the regulatory process.

Whether or not they seek it, ASIC needs brokers’ input. One major changeover in the past 12 months has been ASIC’s use of industry-generated reports, according to MFAA CEO Hayden. “What I’ve tried to bring to the table, with the support of the board, is getting our hands on more data… Things like the Ernst and Young report, which [involved] 700 customers and nine key lenders in our industry, was really well received by ASIC. Michael Saadat and Robert Allen both called me and said, ‘That’s great information – how often will you run it?’”

Similar one-off reports will appear throughout the year, including a study at the major banks’ loan books by accountancy giant Deloitte to counter APRA’s comments about the risks relating to broker-originated loans. In late February, the MFAA released the first in a series of regular reports, the Industry Intelligence Service (IIS), providing regular twice-yearly statistics on brokers, in conjunction with business benchmarking firm Comparator.

In order for their reports to have the most impact, the MFAA has begun consulting with ASIC before commissioning reports. “We’re not an agent of them as such,” notes Hayden. “But we’re trying to ensure that if we’re investing money in this analysis, that we’re meeting the stakeholders’ requirements – not just aggregators and brokers, but ASIC as well… I don’t think they’ve got the time or the resources to do the detailed analysis that we conduct.”

Industry-driven reports have two beneficial effects. Firstly, by dictating the focus of the reports the industry can help influence the terms of the debate at a regulatory level, for example, countering accusations of broker commission distorting the market by showing how much the average broker actually makes (as the MFAA’s abovementioned benchmarking studies reveal). It also helps correct inaccuracies in reporting by external players, such as by consumer advocacy group CHOICE, which talked to just five homebuyers for their report slamming brokers back in May 2015.

Secondly, by showing the willingness to rigorously investigate itself, the industry demonstrates to ASIC it has the right culture. This might sound vague, but ensuring industries have the right culture, rather than simply processes, is the new focus of financial regulators worldwide, and ASIC is no exception.

“Culture is a significant driver of the behaviour of firms,” ASIC chairman Medcraft wrote in ASIC’s Corporate Plan 2015/16 to 2018/19. “Where we find a firm’s culture is lacking, it is a red flag that there may be broader regulatory problems.”

Following from this, ASIC’s 2016 forum is titled ‘Culture Shock’, with culture being the main talking point. The wider financial community is following suit. In January 2016, ANZ bank was roundly criticised for the ‘toxic culture’ of its trading department, leading to major management changes.

Ultimately, the industry doesn’t just have an incentive to report upon itself, it has a responsibility, as FBAA CEO White explains. “ASIC can only police what they see. Some things go under the radar … if no-one’s brought it to attention [but] how can they? They’re reliant on us, the industry, to tell them what’s going on.”

6 What can you do?
By virtue of their size and public profile, the MFAA, FBAA, major franchises and aggregators all have a responsibility to involve themselves in regulation – but what about the individual broker? While acknowledging ASIC’s preference to work through industry associations, the MFAA and FBAA are keen to get their members more closely involved in responding to regulation.

That starts with an engaged broker effectively communicating their opinion on a new piece of regulation, notes White. “It’s one thing to make a momentary stand on a blog site, but the real depth comes from when people send in their submissions to their industry bodies, or write to their parliamentarian, but if people don’t come to us, we can’t express their view.

“You’ve got to be prepared to put some time in to get results. That time may be an email, or it may be getting more involved in the council, or at board level, of an industry body.”

For brokers who want to go further, the FBAA has a number of national and state representative positions, while the MFAA has various panels for different types of brokers and female brokers (i.e. the Women In Mortgage Broking Network). Hayden sends out a CEO column to members of these panels and believes there is definitely more scope for engagement. Although, she said: “Most people are too busy with their own jobs to worry about that and they rely on their industry association to manage it on their behalf.”

It’s this point which is crucial – negotiating regulatory politics is not what a broker is best at, nor what earns them a living. The vast majority who don’t want to get involved rely on ASIC to understand their industry and regulate accordingly, which is why it’s so alarming that 86% of polled brokers don’t believe that is the case.

As an industry, broking is increasingly producing the data and reporting that underresourced industry regulators need, driven by those brokers and industry leaders – often outside the MFAA and FBAA – who do care about the culture of third party channels. In return, these brokers and leaders need a regulator who actively and publicly engages with them and systematically integrates their expertise into its regulation.

ASIC RESPONDS
MPA asked ASIC to respond to the key points in this article. Here’s what they told us:

“ASIC engages in regular and ongoing communication with all sectors of the credit industry. A key way we do this is via industry peak bodies, and with more than 5,000 credit licensees, and more than 25,000 authorised credit representatives, the broker peak bodies play an important role. However, this is not the only way we engage with industry.

“ASIC delivers presentations to national industry events, such as the FBAA National Conference on the Gold Coast and the MFAA National Conference, including from ASIC Deputy Chair Peter Kell . In addition, ASIC staff regularly attend and make presentations at state-based industry functions for both the MFAA and FBAA and use those forums to discuss current industry issues and regulatory priorities.

“We are speaking in all states at the upcoming MFAA Broker 2020 series. We write articles for and engage in interviews with industry publications. And ASIC does have direct discussions and engagement with the larger mortgage broking and aggregator businesses, as we are conscious that some perspectives are only available directly from the firms themselves.”

ASIC advises brokers to look at the regulator guides on their website, including RG 209 on Responsible Lending, RG 205 on General Conduct, and INFO 146 on Responsible Lending. With regard to their regulation of lenders, they point to recent action taken against Bank of Queensland, Wide Bay (now Auswide Bank) and CUA in addition to their interest-only and low doc lending reviews.

They then conclude: “We do, however, believe that brokers play a very significant role in arranging lending, and that it is critical that consumers have trust and confidence in the broking industry, as well as lenders… ASIC’s job is to enforce the laws that are passed by Parliament so that, ultimately, consumers benefit from a safe and well-functioning market. There may be disagreement in some parts of industry about these laws, but that does not mean ASIC doesn’t understand the industry.”

Further Insights Into Mortgage Brokers Via LTI and LVR

My post yesterday “The Truth about Mortgage Brokers” created quite a a number of requests for more information, especially around my comment that broker originated loans tend to have higher loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios compared with bank originated loans.

So today, I am posting further data on these two dimensions, drawing more data from our household surveys.

First, here is a plot of the average loan to income (LTI) bands separated by bank direct and broker channels of origination, which clearly shows that broker loans have a relative distribution of higher LTI loans.

LTI-ChannelRunning the same analysis on loan to value (LVR) bands, we also see a higher distribution of broker loans above 85%.

LVR-CHannelWe can take the analysis a little further by comparing interest only loans and principal and interest repayment loans. The LVR distribution analysis shows that interest only loans have a higher LVR, and those with a third party channel of origination are the highest.

LVR-INTThe LTI picture is not so clear cut, though there is a slightly higher distribution of interest only loans via brokers across the LTI bands.

LTI-IntIt is worth thinking about what may be causing this. First, we know that different customer segments have different propensities to use brokers, and possibly those looking to borrow more, at higher LVR and LTI are more naturally inclined to go to a broker. Interest only loans have lower repayments, so for a given level of income, should allow access to a larger loan amount as the repayments only cover interest  (though of course the principal will need to be repaid eventually). In addition, brokers will know from their panel lists where the higher LVR and LTI deals can be done. The data in the surveys includes bank and non-bank lenders.

However, irrespective of the channel of origination, lenders still need to complete their underwriting analysis. So it would seem different criteria are being applied depending on the origination channel.

Also, we should say that the data in the survey comes from loans written in the past 12 months, and there have been some changes to underwriting in that time.

Nevertheless, the additional analysis reinforces the view that broker originated loans are on average more risky, supporting APRA’s statement.