Blockchain technology could be a game changer for developing communities

From The Conversation.

Blockchain technology is being developed in everything from financial technology companies to the GLAM industries. Some, such as Backfeed, are using blockchain for decentralised coordination through smart contracts. As the recent attack on the DAO has revealed, blockchain-based innovations can also create social harm by being difficult to fix when things go wrong. While it is likely that platforms such as Ethereum will evolve to deal with these risks, a further consideration is who will reap the benefits of blockchain applications in the long term. To understand that, we need to consider the infrastructures on which these technologies are run and accessed, not just the code.

Small-Chain-PictureOriginally developed to support bitcoin, Blockchain is essentially a public ledger. It’s like a giant spreadsheet for recording assets, which can be utilised for any form of exchange and which no individual entity controls. By providing a secure and distributed means of authentication and recording, Blockchain eliminates the need for intermediaries that pull information to verify transactions. The technology can therefore be used for autonomous machine-to-machine communications, taking the Internet of Things and the sharing economy to the next level (for instance, cars that manage their own rental and re-fuelling).

The benefits of blockchain technology for developing economies have so far only been discussed in terms of remittance payments and providing an alternative currency in unstable fiscal environments.

However it could also be applied in sharing economies that are present in some developing communities, just like the one I observed during field work in the Kedaya Telang Usan area in Sarawak, Malaysia.

The sharing economy of the Orang Ulu

In a sharing economy, people make use of their excess assets by charging others to access them – houses for holiday accommodation, garages for storage, cars (and their drivers) for rides.

During British colonial rule, the Orang Ulu began to grow crops for profit not just for subsistence, and out of this came the kinds of payment for services that characterise the sharing economy. One of my fellow researchers, Simpson Njock, a Kenyah man from the region, said it was once the case that you had to share a wild boar, but now if someone asks you for some of your wild boar you say to them “how much?”

Until logging roads were built a decade ago, it would take the Orang Ulu days to get to their kampung (village) by longboat. As only a small number of people in each kampung own a car, the Orang Ulu developed a ride-sharing system, whereby you pay someone with a ute to take you where you need to go – a lot like ride sharing service Uber but without the internet platform. In another example, the house of the headman may include rooms for those on their way upriver.

These systems have also developed in a region where many fall into the unbanked category (those without bank accounts or credit) and live a largely subsistence lifestyle, but where money is required for schooling, medical treatment, and home maintenance. Many make that money from handicrafts or food they have grown on their padi farms. Some goods are bartered rather than sold.

A different form of international development

Using technology in development projects has been controversial, with research showing some projects reinforce exploitative economic and political hierarchies whilst claiming to encourage entrepreneurship from the so-called “bottom of the pyramid”.

Blockchain will not necessarily resolve the complexities of the development industry, but it might assist the coordination of existing systems, making them more efficient, rather than imposing different ones. For instance, it could make possible a shift from forest industries, such as logging and oil palm, to economies that rely on a healthy forest, where natural heritage and culture are valued rather than diminished. In the nearby Bario region, a technology project has helped facilitate local tourism since 1998, primarily through websites that promote home stays.

Technology is already changing life in remote Sarawak, enabling people to coordinate car rides and handicraft sales through instant messaging and social media. Emerging peer-to-peer platforms could be of significant further economic benefit through more efficient and automated systems, without the high transaction costs or standards required by commercial platforms.

The most interesting and important blockchain transformations could be those built for economies that have been underserved by established financial institutions and classified as ‘informal’. Current blockchain debates are focused on the conflicts between law and automated governance. We need to remember that there are many spheres of interaction that have not be well served by markets, regulations and institutions, which could benefit from technologies that reduce the need to interact with them while providing simple, trusted transactions.

Such possibilities are a long way off, and not just because of bugs in the code. For these technologies to run, there must be reliable connectivity and infrastructure. While some communities have mobile broadband base stations, we found that these are often poorly maintained or suffering from congestion. The possibilities for economic development via blockchain applications will be nothing more than an idealistic and novel concept unless more fundamental digital infrastructure needs are addressed.

Author: Ellie Rennie, Deputy Director, Swinburne Institute for Social Research, Swinburne University of Technology

It’s time to borrow to build

From The Conversation.

The most interesting numbers at the moment are the yields on long term government securities. As economist Paul Krugman pointed out, the yield on US 10-year bonds is 1.36%. In Germany that number is minus 0.19%.

Australia typically has materially higher rates than the US or Germany: reflecting both the greater risk investors see in Australia, and our huge thirst for capital.

Yet, the Commonwealth government can borrow money for 10 years at 1.93% per annum.

Australian government bond 10-year

Trading Economics/Australia Dept of Treasury

There are two things to note about all these very low bond yields.

First, it is worrying. It reflects a firehose of global savings chasing very few productive investment opportunities. As I have been saying for a couple of years now, this essentially lowers the speed limit on Australian income growth. And I’m in good company. The first person to point this out was former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers.

Second, it is an opportunity. The world is willing to lend us money at less than 2% a year for a long time. If Australia was a business we would ask ourselves this question: do we have any productive investment opportunities that return at least 2% per annum? If so, then we should borrow money and invest in them.

And surely, in roads and rail, and ports and airports, and education, these productive opportunities are plentiful.

Easy, then? Not so fast.

Cheap money also opens the door to every hair-brained boondoggle imaginable. I once described the downside as “pink bats on steriods”.

This tension, by the way, pretty much captures the difference between the two major parties on spending right now. The ALP sees education and other social investments that return well over 10% per annum and want to make them. The Liberal party sees this too, but recognises that, since the future is hard to predict, almost anything can pass the “do it!” test.

This sceptical position is a reasonable one – although I’m more bullish on these investments. The sceptics’ case, however, was hugely strengthened by an ALP that locked in long term spending commitments that are very hard to reverse, in the midst of the financial crisis of 2008.

This was seen by many as using the financial crisis as an excuse for lavish spending without the long-term means to pay for it.

That really is a fair cop in this case.

So, the Labor party are for productive infrastructure (physical and human capital-based), and the Liberal party are sceptical for “public choice” reasons.

How to thread the needle

There is a simple way to silence critics on both sides of this debate. We need to change our national accounting system to distinguish productive investments from recurring expenditure.

Private enterprise does this all the time: by distinguishing capital expenditures from operating expenses. Indeed, if they didn’t the directors would go to prison.

Pensions are a good thing to spend public money on, but they are operating expenses. Bridges may well be a good thing to spend public money on, but they are a capital expenditure: an investment.

We need to change our national accounting system to be more like the private sector. This is more than cosmetic. It then focuses debate on this investment versus that, rather than a squishy conversation about deficits as a whole.

The bottom line is this. There is good debt, and bad debt. Good debt produces returns in the future, and private enterprise never shies away from it. That’s why, by the way, the typical private company’s capital structure is about 25% debt (and 75% equity).

Bad debt pays the ongoing bills with an IOU from future generations. There’s nothing good about that.

Right now, good debt and bad debt are conflated.

Let’s fix the accounting, separate good debt and bad debt, and let the real debate about national priorities begin.

Author: Richard Holden, Professor of Economics, UNSW Australia

Without smarter governance, blockchains will fall victim to more attacks

From The Conversation.

Ethereum, a network designed to extend blockchain technology to uses beyond crypto-currencies, has been gaining traction around the world.

Billed as “a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts…without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third party interference,” Ethereum has been enthusiastically embraced by organisations like Microsoft, IBM and Azure.

How then does the equivalent of tens of millions of dollars get stolen in one day, from an individual account?

This is the situation that those affiliated with The DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) awoke to on June 17 as transactions were made from their Ethereum account to an account whose owner is unknown.

It was a timely reminder that sometimes “smart” technology acts stupidly. Bitcoin suffered a near-death experience in 2014 when the equivalent of US$450 million in bitcoins went missing after Mt. Gox declared bankruptcy. Ethereum now faces a similar moment.

Important lessons about the risks, true capabilities and need for better governance of blockchain networks unfortunately have to be learned once again.

Small-Chain-Picture

How Ethereum and The DAO work

Started in 2014 by teenage programming prodigy Vitalik Buterin, the Ethereum network is unique for its pioneering use of “smart contracts”. Just like regular contracts, terms and conditions are developed and agreed upon by consenting parties. What makes them supposedly “smart” is that, when the conditions of the contract are met, the contracts execute automatically.

The DAO is an online, investor-directed venture capital fund built on the Ethereum blockchain network. The DAO’s goal is to collectively channel investment into new projects, similar to the way that crowdfunding works, but using Ether, the crypto-currency that underpins Ethereum. It uses specialised code (based on Ethereum’s Solidity language) to allow its members to execute automated investment decisions.

The DAO has no single leader, though there is a group of overseers who are elected by holders of special DAO tokens (which people purchase with ether). Voting rights are determined by one’s DAO token holdings.

After raising 10.7 million ether (the equivalent of US$120 million in May 2016) in an initial crowdfunding effort, one of the biggest in history, hopes were high for The DAO.

Then, on June 17, crisis struck. An unknown person or group of people funnelled out about one-third of The DAO’s ether holdings the equivalent of between US$45 million and $77 million (the value depends on whether one uses the pre- or post-incident ether market price).

Within days, the market price of ether crashed around 50%. A good deal of soul searching for both projects has been underway ever since.

Smart thieves or dumb programming?

In the fallout of the incident, much was made about how The DAO was “hacked”. Upon closer examination though, The DAO was not hacked at all. The attacker(s) used two features of The DAO’s specialised code to siphon out ether in amounts small enough to not result in the destruction of their DAO tokens.

Moreover, The DAO’s terms and conditions do not permit theft or fraud. In short, it is perfectly legitimate to do whatever a smart contract’s code permits, even if this is beyond the original intention of those who wrote the code.

Like all technologies, “smart contracts” are dual use and might be used in ways that their creators did not intend. The complexity of the technology only compounds this issue.

When considered in this context, not only is what occurred above board (though not in the spirit of The DAO), funnelling money out of The DAO’s account ironically turns out to be a feature, not a bug.

Important decisions now face the Ethereum community. The fate of the network and the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars hang in the balance.

Sensibly, a backstop mechanism was built into the Ethereum network for incidents such as this one. The account holding the (mis)appropriated funds (a so-called Child DAO) has been frozen for 27 days and soon the Ethereum community will hold a referendum of sorts, “voting” on what course of action to pursue. This will determine whether holders of DAO tokens will be able to recoup their lost ether, or see it remained locked in limbo forever.

Lessons for blockchain enthusiasts

This episode introduces nuance to Ethereum’s pitch on enabling applications to run “without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third party interference”. Similar claims are made by the promoters of crypto-currencies and blockchains more generally.

Smart contracts may run exactly as programmed but this does not mean that they will run as the creators intended. The DAO incident demonstrates how the complexity of these contracts is outstripping the comprehension of the people who wish to write them. This in turn introduces bugs and vulnerabilities, some of which are known, but others will only become known when something goes wrong.

While the Ethereum network’s users might be decentralised, certain features of the network are not. For instance, the decision as to what changes will be made to the code as a part of the upcoming referendum is determined by a small group of Ethereum developers. The check on this concentration of control is that 51% of nodes in the network must agree to the changes.

However, a 51% threshold is not ideal given the network’s tendencies towards centralisation. The difference between the Ethereum blockchain network vs a referendum is that the former is not “one person, one vote” it is “one node, one vote”.

For Ethereum, there is no telling how many people control how many nodes. This is because the account holders are pseudonymous. What is known is that the distribution of ether holdings is heavily skewed across accounts. At present, of a total of 440,741 accounts, the top five Ethereum accounts alone possess 25% of the total outstanding ether. Moreover, the distribution of mining is also not uniform. Three mining pools currently occupy more than 50% of Ethereum’s mining capacity. Amassing 51% of the required resources for control becomes relatively easier under such a configuration. For Bitcoin, where votes are determined by the distribution of mining, and mining is similarly distributed, the ability to game the network is even greater.

Smart contracts require smarter governance

If blockchains are to be sustainable in the long run, serious consideration of appropriate governance mechanisms is needed.

A skewed distribution of mining power and crypto-currency holdings is combined with pseudonymity of account holders and a strong incentive to game the system. This has all the makings for deceptive, unaccountable, fraudulent, and self interested decision making.

Until hard questions around governance of blockchains are asked, and solutions implemented, we should brace ourselves for more incidents like that which has befallen The DAO. At stake is not just the fate of projects like Ethereum but the future potential of blockchain technology more generally.

Author: Benjamin Dean, Fellow for Cyber-security and Internet Governance, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

Demystifying the blockchain: a basic user guide

From The Conversation.

Most people agree we do not need to know how a television works to enjoy using one. This is true of many existing and emerging technologies. Most of us happily drive cars, use mobile phones and send emails without knowing how they work. With this in mind, here is a tech-free user guide to the blockchain – the technology infrastructure behind bitcoin, and many other emerging platforms.

Small-Chain-PictureWhat does the blockchain do?

The blockchain is software that stores and transfers value or data across the internet.

What can I store and transfer using the blockchain?

To use the blockchain, you will need to set up an account or address (a virtual wallet). At this time, the most popular use for the blockchain is to make micro-payments with virtual currencies. For example, you can buy bitcoin with real money and then spend it on the internet using the blockchain.

Authorising a payment using the blockchain is similar to using a credit card to buy something online. Instead of a 16-digit credit card number, you provide the vendor with a unique string of numbers and letters generated for each transaction. With this unique identifier, the blockchain can verify and authenticate the transaction.

Can I use the blockchain to transfer real money?

Not yet. Some companies are using the blockchain to make international financial transfers, but most of these transactions are enabled by bitcoin or other digital currencies. Exchanging real money for bitcoin incurs fees for the sender, but the benefit is speed, security and convenience.

How is transferring value or virtual currency on the blockchain different from transferring money from my bank account?

Depending on the amount and the destination, when you transfer money from your bank account, your bank will limit the amount you can transfer. Most banks impose daily limits for all transactions. When you use virtual money on the blockchain, there are no limits.

When you transfer value or currency from your bank account to an account with a different bank or other financial institution, the transfer can take days. When you use the blockchain, the transfer is immediate. If a transfer from your bank account puts your account into debit, your bank will charge you a fee. The blockchain will not allow a transfer in excess of your balance and so your virtual wallet will never be in debit.

How is storing value using the blockchain different from keeping my money in a bank account?

Bank accounts and credit cards are vulnerable to attack from fraudsters and hackers. The blockchain is a more secure way to store and transfer funds, particularly if you keep a modest value in your virtual wallet. Hacking the blockchain is difficult, time-consuming and expensive. No one breaks into Fort Knox for just $500. Of course, value stored on the blockchain will not earn you interest or improve your credit rating; and the blockchain will not lend you money to buy a house or car. The blockchain does not replace your bank, but very soon banks will be using the blockchain too.

How is transferring data using the blockchain different to attaching a file to an email?

Unlike emails with attachments, the blockchain enables the immediate transfer of data no matter how big the file. Also, there is less danger of spam or viruses and no need for firewalls or junk folders.

How is storing data using the blockchain different to storing my files on my computer?

If you lose or break your computer or if it is attacked by a hacker or virus, you could lose that data. The blockchain resides in the cloud. Like any web-based storage, you just need your username and password to access your data from anywhere anytime.

What else can I use the blockchain for?

Very soon the blockchain will be used for online transactions. It will enable smart contracts, crowdfunding and auctions. It will verify the provenance of artworks and diamonds; transfer title to real estate and other assets; and store information about people, products and property. Apps for music distribution, sports betting and a new type of financial auditing are also being tested.

Why is the blockchain described as “riskless”?

The blockchain verifies and authenticates both ends of each transaction. It will not release a purchaser’s funds until it has checked that the vendor will deliver as promised.

Is the blockchain safe?

Standards and regulations are needed so that the technology can be readily used across different organisations, industries and jurisdictions. Blockchains can be private (like an email) or public (like Facebook), so users need to know which type is being operated before joining a new blockchain.

My tips for safe use of the blockchain are: keep your virtual wallet details secure; do not let an unknown third party hold virtual currency or data for you; and do not provide your online banking details to anyone. As seen in a recent attack on a crowdfunding project, the blockchain is at its most vulnerable when significant value is stored in a single address. The blockchain may be trustworthy, but the people on it might not be.

Author: Philippa Ryan, Lecturer in Civil Practice and Commercial Equity, University of Technology Sydney

How the Paperless Property Market Works

From The Conversation.

Paperless house sales are now a reality but it might be some time before we’ll all be buying and selling property online. The electronic system, Property Exchange Australia or PEXA, set up by financial institutions and a number of state governments, changes conveyancing of real estate in a way not seen since the introduction of title by registration in the mid-1800s.

What this transition achieves is a remote electronic based system for the buying and selling of land. The new process from contract to settlement can be paperless. The only physical aspect of the transaction involved the vendor moving out, the purchaser moving in, and the stakeholders, such as mortgagees and conveyancing agents entering keystrokes on a remotely maintained work space.

Generic-Houses-1

How PEXA works

Once the parties enter into a contract for the sale of real estate, an online work space is created through PEXA, whereby relevant information is populated by all stakeholders who retain password verified access to the site.

Instead of the buyer and seller signing forms to be lodged at land titles offices, agents on behalf of these parties (such as conveyancing agents) will digitally sign on their behalf. Overseeing this is the Australian Registrars National Electronic Conveyancing Council a regulatory agency providing guidance and oversight through operating and participation rules.

These rules govern the relationship between the PEXA operator and the land title registry, as well as the electronic lodgement operator and direct participants such as conveyancing agents and financial institutions.

At the moment only conveyancing agents and other subscribers such as financial institutions can lodge online and have direct access to PEXA. To facilitate the use of the system, some land contracts now require that the conveyancing be done through PEXA.

In the foreseeable future its unlikely that the consumers will be able to use PEXA themselves. The cost and impediments to obtaining access are only feasible for someone engaging in transactions on a routine basis.

In theory, the system should reduce costs and unintentional errors through embedding checks in the process of lodging these forms. Currently the paper-based system is arguably more prone to human error, though computer systems depend greatly on the security that sits behind them and the mistakes potentially made by the keystroke operators.

From the point of the real estate industry, it increases productivity and can provide simpler and easier access to real-time data in relation to the property and to the state of the transaction.

Because money is transferred electronically within moments of the settlement occurring, it reduces the current gap that occurs between settlement and registration within paper-based systems. The new system should streamline the complex legal problems that can sometimes occur in transactions.

It should help resolve a category of irreconcilable legal decisions around the priority between two unregistered interests, where there’s one interest in a property and a second interest is also created in the period between settlement and registration. At the moment, judicial bodies resolve these on a case by case basis, but with PEXA reducing the gap between settlement and registration, the opportunity for these sorts of conflicts should disappear.

Risks of paperless property exchange

The first sale using PEXA has already occurred with the five largest states already using the system.

But with any development comes risks. At its heart conveyancing requires that a purchaser be able to identify the vendor, verify that the vendor is indeed the owner of the land, and finally, confirm that this vendor has the right to deal with that land and is not constrained by others (such as a mortgagee). These requirements are key to preventing identity fraud.

PEXA’s response has been to impose significant identity verification requirements that can exceed the well-known 100 point requirements to open a bank account. Purchases by overseas parties have had significantly greater requirements for identity verification imposed upon them.

However identity fraud will continue to pose a threat in the PEXA environment if users are not vigilant in complying with these enhanced identity requirements. There may also be risks in the movement of funds at settlement. Because this occurs electronically, the capacity to cancel cheques paid in settlement before these cheques are cashed will disappear.

The risk of a person accessing the computer system fraudulently and altering multiple records is palpable.

At its heart, what this new era does is reallocate risk. Lawyers, conveyancing agents, mortgagees, assurance funds and land title registries have for close to 150 years of private law jurisprudence on title by registration developed a complex series of rules governing this allocation.

The new dawn of electronic conveyancing will inevitably provoke new jurisprudence with the stakeholders jousting for position. Whoever emerges with the least amount of risk attached to them will be a powerful player in this new paperless property market.

Authors: Lynden Griggs, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania; Rouhshi Low, Lecturer, QUT Business School, Queensland University of Technology

What the government should do now: economic growth

From The Conversation.

The Coalition has scraped into a second term. How credible is its economic growth program, and what else should it do to strengthen growth?

The good news is that the transition from the mining boom is proceeding about as well as should have been expected. It is true that national income per person is lower than five years ago (see figure below) and that wages are also stagnating. But these changes are mostly due to falling resource prices. GDP growth, while subdued in recent years, has been fast enough to keep unemployment in check (though average hours per worker have declined), and it even shows signs of picking up. And while non-mining investment has remained flat despite record low interest rates, it’s not unrealistic to hope that Australia will, for the first time in our history, complete a mining cycle without ending in recession.

But deeper economic challenges persist. Global growth remains weak, with China’s economy likely to slow, and the European Union more fragile since the UK’s Brexit vote. Slow growth and rising inequality helped drive the populist anger and political instability we now see in the EU and US.

The first term leaves a mixed legacy

The Coalition’s first term economic policy achievements were a mixed bag. The 2015 innovation package and the decision to implement most of the Harper Review competition policy recommendations were standout initiatives. Free trade agreements with China, Japan and South Korea will offer real, if modest, benefits. Others, such as signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and accelerated environmental project approvals, carry risks and costs that could outweigh their benefits.

And some initiatives, such as scrapping a broad-based carbon price, were outright mistakes. Critically, in its first term the Coalition failed to get the budget under control.

Growth plans leave many good ideas off the table

The coalition campaigned on jobs and growth, but in reality its growth program is patchy. The signature policy – phased cuts in the company tax rate – would ultimately increase national income by about 0.6%. But business tax cuts could drag on national income for up to a decade, as foreign investors pay less tax from the beginning, while benefits from greater investment take time.

Other parts of the coalition plan are far from being fleshed out. The government will seek to implement its already announced innovation and competition policy agendas. It plans to ratify the TPP, though the TPP itself may now be doomed to fail, as neither of the likely US presidential candidates supports it.

The Turnbull government also plans to pursue further trade agreements with the European Union, India, and Indonesia. On the downside, its Smart Cities Plan, which aims to finance improvements in urban transport and housing, lacks detail. And its plan to slowly reduce the budget deficit relies mostly on revenue increases that may not materialise.

Overall, the plan for jobs and growth is far from complete. The government should consider five further options to increase economic growth.

Taxes and work

First, the government should shift the tax base towards taxes that do less to discourage investment and work. For example, cutting the capital gains discount to 25%, and limiting negative gearing, would create space to reduce other more distorting taxes. So would broadening the GST base and/or increasing the GST rate (while cutting income tax and adjusting welfare payments), though benefits may be modest.

General property taxes should replace stamp duties, which deter people from moving to a home that suits their current needs. A 0.5% levy on unimproved land values could raise enough to replace stamp duties nationwide, would provide a more stable tax base for states, spread the tax burden more fairly, and add up to $9 billion a year to GDP. While these are state matters, the Commonwealth could consider providing incentive payments to states to make the switch, since its revenues will ultimately rise as the reforms increase incomes.

Second, government should help people stay in work, or get back to work. Female labour force participation in Australia is below that of many high-income economies. Low rates of take-home pay deter some women from joining the labour force or working full-time. The system of family payments and childcare support needs an overhaul to encourage greater female labour force participation.

Older Australians, too, are less likely to work than in many comparable economies. The age at which people can access superannuation or the age pension affects when some workers decide to retire. Australia is already increasing the pension eligibility age from 65 to 67, and phasing up from 55 to 60 the age at which people can begin to draw down their superannuation. Government should further increase pension and superannuation access ages.

Flexibility and innovation

Third, government should remove remaining impediments to flexibility in the economy. Reforms over the past 30 years (including a floating exchange rate, low barriers to trade and capital flows, and the shift to enterprise bargaining) have helped the economy adjust through the mining boom. But many policies, including a wide array of regulation, occupational licensing, and industry support such as anti-dumping tariffs that delay the exit of less efficient firms, still limit flexibility.

Fourth, government should remove barriers to innovation, while only funding programs that are supported by evidence that they actually help innovators at a reasonable cost. The National Innovation and Science Agenda will cut barriers to new business creation and improve research-business collaboration.

The vast majority of innovations used in Australia are produced elsewhere. Government should remove barriers to the local spread of global innovations such as cloud computing and peer-to-peer business models such as Uber and Airbnb. States are responsible for barriers such as taxi regulation, while labour regulation and tax are largely Commonwealth responsibilities. Intellectual property rules can also impede the spread of productive ideas.

Sector-specific reforms

Fifth, if much of the low-hanging fruit of economy-wide reform has been picked, many opportunities in individual sectors remain. The superannuation industry charges fees of more than $16 billion a year, or about 1% of GDP. Government should introduce tougher competition, close excess accounts, and push subscale funds to close.

More generally, regulated industries can “capture” the government agencies that regulate them, so it can be valuable to bolster institutions that provide countervailing pressure. The Harper Competition Policy Review recommended creating a new national competition body, the Australian Council for Competition Policy, to advocate policy reform to increase competition.

Finally, investment in high quality infrastructure (along with rules such as user charging to encourage efficient use) promotes growth. Yet governments have already spent large amounts of money, not always wisely, on new public infrastructure over the past decade.

Political realities

To enact any of these policies, the coalition will likely first seek support in the Senate from Labor or the Greens, rather than from the 10 or so independent and small party senators. Some policies are very unlikely to pass the Senate: for example, the proposed broad corporate tax cut is probably dead (though an alternative like an investment allowance might get up).

But some policies have a fighting chance, such as the City Deals, borrowed from the UK and new initiatives to cut superannuation costs. If many other policies (including family payments reform and the flexibility initiatives) are to have a chance of making it into law, the Coalition will first have to make a case for them and win public support.

The Coalition campaigned on its ability to provide jobs and growth. But its campaign platform for jobs and growth was far too narrow. To turn talk into action, it will need to win support for a much more expansive and ambitious agenda.

Author: Jim Minifie, Productivity Growth Program Director, Grattan Institute

Fed’s focus on ‘too big to fail’ won’t save taxpayers from next bank bailout

From The Conversation.

Last month, the Federal Reserve announced that 31 out of 33 U.S. banks had passed its latest “stress test,” designed to ensure that the largest financial institutions have enough capital to withstand a severe economic shock.

Passing the test amounts to being given a clean bill of health by the Fed. So are taxpayers – who were on the hook for the initial US$700 billion TARP bill to bail out the banks in 2008 – now safe?

Yes, but only until the next crisis.

Skeptics of these tests (myself included) argue that passing them will not prevent any bank (large or small) from failing, in part because they’re not stressful enough and the proposed capital requirements are not high enough.

But beyond this, the stress tests highlight a significant shortcoming in how regulators hope to prevent the next wave of bank failures: They’re focusing way too much on size, particularly with the designation of so-called systemically important, “too-big-to-fail” banks.

U.S. lawmakers in search of a solution are currently working on legislation that would make it easier for too-big-to-fail banks to actually fail through bankruptcy. While doing so would be a good thing, it still raises important questions.

Are policymakers right to focus on size in determining whether a bank poses a major risk to the financial system and taxpayers? Would splitting larger banks into smaller ones free taxpayers from the repeated burden of rescuing them during times of crisis? Does calling a bank “too big to fail” even mean anything?

To me, this focus on size and “too big to fail” seems misplaced. I’m among those who advocate replacing our current system with something known as “narrow banking,” which would totally separate deposits from riskier lending activities. This would have the best chance of protecting taxpayers from having to foot the bill for future bailouts, as I’ll explain below.

What’s too big to fail

The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires the Fed to conduct an annual stress test of bank holding companies with $50 billion in assets, often referred to as too big to fail.

Dodd-Frank also says that banks and other companies that “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States” if they fail or engage in very risky activities must write bankruptcy plans known as living wills and meet stricter capital requirements.

Some policymakers contend that the increased regulation and capital are not enough and have called for breaking up big banks into smaller ones in order to reduce the probability of having to use taxpayer money to bail them out.

Neel Kashkari, president of the Minneapolis Fed, has called for breaking up the big banks. Brendan McDermid/Reuters

A question of size

In order to make sense of the too-big-to-fail slogan, we first must agree (or disagree) on what we mean by “big.” So, let us examine the biggest bank in the U.S.: JPMorgan Chase.

JPMorgan maintains about $1.39 trillion worth of deposits. Suppose we break up JPMorgan into four banks, each with approximately $348 billion of depositors’ money. Are these “baby” JPMorgan banks now “too small to fail”? Clearly not, since in the event of a bank failure, taxpayers may still be on the hook for up to $348 billion, each.

So if that’s not small enough, let’s divide them another time, into eight banks that each handles $174 billion in deposits. Could we now regard these new “baby-baby” banks as “too small to fail?”‘ Again, should we consider $160 billion not a small sum if the bank goes under and needs to be rescued by the government?

By this logic, we’d of course also need to break up the other big banks, such as Bank of America and Wells Fargo (each with just under $1.3 trillion in deposits) and Citibank ($947 billion).

The idea that breaking up banks into smaller banks reduces risks is an abstraction since our repeated experience (from the Great Depression to the Great Recession) shows that many banks tend to fail at the same time like dominoes, which by definition we call a “financial crisis.”

Would it really matter to the taxpayer whether a large JPMorgan fails or several “baby JPMorgans” collapse at the same time?

So size does not matter after all. If the term “big” does not make a lot of sense, then why do regulators and central banks keep repeating this slogan?

JPMorgan is the biggest bank in the U.S. Eric Thayer/Reuters

Unintended consequences

In fact, my reading of too big to fail is that, intentionally or unintentionally, it sends banks the wrong message. That is, regulators and central banks are basically telling the “big” banks that they should not worry very much because taxpayers and the Fed will always rescue them because they are too big to fail.

Therefore, intentionally or not, the assertion of too big to fail and passing artificial stress tests may actually generate exactly the opposite incentive for financial institutions, which may encourage large banks to continue taking risks with depositors’ money. In fact, using data for more than 200 banks in 45 countries, a New York Fed paper found that banks classified by rating agencies as more likely to receive government support engage in more risk-taking. The authors also show that riskier banks are more likely to take advantage of potential government support.

The stated logic behind the classification of too big to fail was to impose more restrictions on these financial institutions and conduct stress tests so they will become less likely to fail. The additional restrictions that central bankers are now considering imposing on banks, such as maintaining capital ratios as high as 16 percent to 18 percent, still do not free the taxpayer from bearing the remaining 80 percent of the bailout cost.

Although 16 percent seems like a high number compared with the 12.3 percent capital that large banks were assumed to maintain during the recent stress test, even 20 percent capital requirement leaves banks with substantial leverage. (A capital ratio just shows how much of a bank’s assets are backed by cash or cash-like instruments, as opposed to leverage, or debt.)

Let banks fail

If the TBTF and stress tests send the wrong message to banks, then I would suggest replacing too big to fail with “all banks, regardless of size, should be allowed to fail” with no taxpayer bailout.

The problem is such a statement suffers from what economists call “time inconsistency.” That is, policymakers may be able to take a hard line now, but once the banking system collapses, there is no government in the world (democratic or otherwise) that would be able to resist the political pressure to pay the banks whatever they want just to bring them back to life.

To solve the time inconsistency problem – and ensure policymakers let banks fail – we need to prepare in advance for the next wave of bank failures by protecting depositors’ money, instead of just focusing on stress tests or size reductions.

And this is actually easier to implement than one may think.

Depositors should be simply allowed to have access to accounts that maintain 100 percent reserves. That is, every cent of their savings would be backed by hard currency. Research of mine has shown that moving in this direction improves social welfare relative to the current system of purely fractional banking, in which banks only hold a fraction of their deposits. Currently they are allowed to lend up to 90 percent (keeping 10 percent as reserves).

There are several ways to implement that. One is to allow each depositor to open an online account with the central bank. This could be done via existing commercial banks or directly with the central bank. In addition, if central banks, such as the Fed, provide direct access via nonbank money transmitters (such as PayPal, Square, Western Union or even Wal-Mart’s Bluebird), depositors would be able to secure their money in advance against any loss, even in the event many banks and money transmitters fail. In fact, Mark Carney, governor of the Bank of England, recently announced that the U.K. central bank will expand direct access to nonbank payment providers.

Why haven’t I mentioned the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which was set up explicitly to protect deposits in the case of bank failure? Simple: In 2015, the FDIC fund had just $67.8 billion. Dividing this amount by total U.S. deposits implies that the FDIC can bailout only 1.06 percent. In fact, even if JPMorgan is the only bank that fails, the FDIC can only bailout 5 percent of this bank’s deposits, thereby making the FDIC totally irrelevant during a financial crisis.

On the other hand, a 100 percent reserves policy would break our current system’s bundling of risk-taking with the job of keeping accounts safe and offering payment services. Only then, by ensuring depositors (and voters) aren’t at risk when there’s a crisis, would governments have the will to let banks fail – without any regard to their size – and at no cost to taxpayers.

Author: Oz Shy, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Just building more homes won’t fix the housing crisis – here’s why

From The Conversation.

In major cities across the globe – from London to Manila, Auckland to Los Angeles – housing is becoming less and less affordable. This has caused a great deal of angst over house prices. But so far, politicians and the media have been much more effective at whipping up public anxiety, than putting in place actual solutions.

Over-inflated house prices are caused by more than just supply and demand. Policy changes often focus too narrowly on increasing housing supply, by opening up more land for development and speeding up the planning process. Of course, supply is important. If more people want to buy houses than there are houses available then prices may be forced upward.

But it is not enough to address only one cause. Another major driver of price increases is a housing market “bubble”. A bubble can be detected when property prices increase significantly faster than rents. In investment terms, this means you’re buying a more expensive asset, but it doesn’t give a higher return from rental income.

When prices are rising rapidly, buyers tend to anticipate that this will continue, guaranteeing a tidy profit when they eventually sell the property. Add record low interest rates and the resulting abundance of low-cost debt means that house prices can easily become over-inflated, relative to people’s incomes.

The 2013 Nobel Prize-winner Robert Shiller theorised this buyer behaviour and called it “irrational exuberance”. Housing markets in many cities across the globe are stubbornly following Shiller’s theory. As a bubble grows, more people are priced out of the market for buying property, while the apparent urgency to get onto the property ladder increases. Even if housing supply is increasing, the expectation of increasing property values will continue to drive this kind of behaviour in the market.

It is thought that London alone requires 42,000 new homes each year, based on population estimates. Between 2001 and 2011, Greater London’s population increased by 12.6%, while housing supply grew only 7.5%. It is only physically possible to meet this demand by putting more people into existing houses, leading to overcrowding, which is harmful to health and well-being.

So, building more houses won’t discourage irrational investment on its own. In fact, it might encourage more people to take on debt and invest in an over-valued housing market. If the bubble bursts – which would most likely be caused by a recession, or an increase in the cost of debt – prices will undergo a “correction”. Whether this correction is large or small, the financial impact on households and the threat to the stability of the national economy are significant.

How to rent a home

To diffuse this situation, we need to question our common assumptions about housing. The key role of housing is to meet the basic human need for safe and secure shelter. Housing policies mostly assume that home ownership is the only way to do this.

This idea has its roots in the post-war era, when governments promoted the idea of owning your own home, as the mark of financial security. Home ownership is not wrong – although households should seriously consider the risks of taking on large, long-term debts. But arguably, it isn’t an appropriate one-size-fits-all solution for cities in 2016.

Not ideal. from www.shutterstock.com

So, what other options do we have? For starters, better rental regulations could allow for long-term tenure and provide better protection for tenants. In Germany, only 39% of the population owns their own home, compared with roughly 60% in the UK.

But they also rent under very different conditions to people in the UK. Local governments can limit the rate of rent increases, and tenants have more rights to occupy a property over a long-term period. These arrangements make renting a viable option for people looking for long-term accommodation, which frees up household income to invest in other assets, with lower risk.

The real crisis

There are even more inventive ways to emphasise the importance of access to shelter, over and above home ownership. For one thing, there are some creative and forward-thinking design solutions on show at this year’s “Home Economics” display, at the Venice Biennale.

But we also need to rethink the way we plan our cities. In reality, the housing crisis stems from the fact that house building is left largely to the private market. Private developments don’t always include smaller, more modest homes for low-income households as well as expensive homes for the wealthy (the latter are usually more profitable). A survey of developments between 2014 and 2015 found that only 20% of the total number of homes built were deemed to be “affordable”.

Local governments require a certain share of new houses to cater to those on low incomes, but these affordable housing requirements are notoriously weak, too. In London, as little as 12% of dwellings in new developments need to be “affordable” – a classification which allows rents as high as 80% of market rate. In some cases, the price of a home deemed “affordable” was equal to 30 times the average UK wage.

Policies focused purely on expanding supply, without catering to different income groups, ignore the fact that cities depend on people who earn many different levels of income to provide key services. There are wider costs to society if cleaners, bar staff, creatives, cashiers and nursery assistants cannot afford to live in urban areas. Even if cheaper accommodation is available on the outskirts, this won’t offer a solution if commutes are long and costly.

We don’t know how or when the UK’s housing market bubble will burst, or how much prices might fall when it does. For the moment, those who don’t own property can take comfort in the fact that they aren’t taking on a mortgage in an overvalued property market. Meanwhile, leaders need to consider more innovative housing options, which focus on access rather than ownership. They need to provide meaningful alternatives for people on low incomes – or risk driving them out of our cities altogether.

Author: Jenny McArthur, PhD candidate, infrastructure investment, urban growth and liveability, UCL

Property fears after Brexit vote are a sign of wider UK housing problems

From The Conversation.

Immediately after the UK voted to leave the European Union, a number of lead economic indicators went into reverse. Notable among them were housing, property and real estate shares that fell sharply both in the housebuilding sector and among banks with large property lending exposure. This was seen as a simple response to economic uncertainty; fears emerged of falling house prices and slowing activity in the property market.

This week the big story has been the weakening position of major real estate funds, primarily investing in commercial property – office buildings, shops, warehouses. The firms which manage the funds, Standard Life for example, are concerned that if investors rush to withdraw their money, there will be insufficient capital to repay them. At first, a number of funds reduced the amount that investors could get back. Now, at least six of them – including Standard Life, Aviva and M&G – have suspended trading altogether. This has not happened since the global financial crisis.

Commercial property is in the firing line. Hazel Nicholson/Flickr, CC BY

While it reflects the basic illiquidity of commercial property compared to the short-term needs of worried investors – it clearly speaks to a much more profound concern about the economy and the exposure to housing and property.

Most of us are not heavily exposed to property funds, but many of us are homeowners or hope to be. The risk of falling house prices in the post-referendum environment may threaten highly leveraged mortgages where home owners have taken on lots of debt. The most immediate risk is of “negative equity”, when the value of the house is lower than the loan amount outstanding.

Normally, such “underwater” loans prevent people moving home, but in the absence of repayment difficulties they are not an immediate problem. You just have to wait it out until prices turn. However, the current situation is complicated and potentially more worrying.

This is because of the government’s £31 billion commitment to various Help-to-Buy schemes, £12 billion of which in effect guarantees the exposed part of mortgage loans should prices fall. A sustained price fall which becomes associated with increased defaults on mortgages could mean the government has to make good those guarantees after repossessions on affected properties.

Taking a pounding

Falling house prices in the short run will also reduce existing owners’ capacity to support potential first time buyers: the bank of mum and dad (or granny and grandad) stepping in to help. This will further reduce access to home ownership because younger households increasingly face unaffordable deposit demands before they can get a mortgage. At the moment, access to the levels of cash needed often depends on rather arbitrary good fortune, timing and location. It often boils down to whether your family have the means to lend or give you what’s needed.

Much has been made of the high level of speculation and overseas investment in London’s vertiginous housing market. There were already signs that the market was weakening cyclically prior to the referendum. Subsequently, however, we saw last week that some foreign banks were refusing to lend to their nationals for property investment in the UK. The depreciation of sterling may be encouraging such purchasers into the market, but only if they can find the means to borrow.

In this way we see that a UK housing market dominated by an open, world city in London, does become linked to currency movements and international capital flows, despite the fundamentally local nature of housing and real estate.

No more happy hunting ground? Davide D’Amico/Flickr, CC BY-SA

Home to roost

Falls in share prices, the forced intervention in real estate funds and worries about lending and government exposure to the downside of help-to-buy guarantees explain why the Bank of England says that the Brexit risks are crystalising and is moving to do something about it. However, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that the red flags going up across the housing and banking sectors reflect the underlying or chronic problems we know beset the housing market in Britain:

• Market imperfections in the form of the long term inability to build in sufficient numbers to address growing housing demand.

• Dwindling public investment in social and affordable housing in a period of high and rising housing need.

• Tax raids on the private rental market by targeting buy-to-let investors just when they are playing a critical role by filling the gap between the market and the non-market sectors.

• Tighter mortgage lending in the wake of the mortgage review that sought to reduce future lending risks after the global financial crisis.

• Privileged tax advantages to home owners which lock them in and create a society of insiders and outsiders. This worsens intergenerational inequalities and crowds out other forms of more productive business investment

Broken system. Ben Salter/Flickr, CC BY

Combining these points helps explain the underlying volatility in the housing market. It allows prices and market volumes to fluctuate more than the economy as a whole, while long-term real house price inflation encourages speculation in property assets and serves to frustrate people’s housing and labour mobility choices.

Governments and opposition parties must take concerted long-term action to normalise housing as an asset and a commodity. The policy world must recognise the need to approach housing more constructively, treating it as an entire system win which housing consumption rather than tenure matters most.

Frankly, we must seek to bring an end to a culture where politics is premised on defending existing asset owners’ housing capital rather than providing sufficient housing in the right places at prices and rents ordinary people can manage at different life-cycle stages. If not, we will be condemned to repeat these crises periodically, alongside slowly worsening chronic problems of exclusion, non-affordability and poisonous widening inequality.

Author: Kenneth Gibb, Professor of Housing Economics, University of Glasgow

Australia could be about to lose its AAA rating, and here’s why

From The Conversation.

Australia’s AAA credit rating was under pressure even before the election and is now looking decidedly shaky. Ratings agency Standard & Poors has moved Australia’s rating outlook from “stable” to “negative”, due to debt and a poor chance of budget repair.

This follows warnings from the other major credit rating agencies – Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. The problem is budget repair will only become harder over the coming years, whatever the final numbers in the parliament.

On the parties’ approach to budget repair, the Coalition and Labor are virtually indistinguishable as far as the credit agencies are concerned. The May budget projected a deficit (in underlying cash terms) of A$37 billion in 2016-17, gradually falling to $6 billion over the four-year forward estimates.

Labor’s plan is to reduce the deficit from $39 billion to $11 billion over that time. Both Coalition and Labor forecast a return to surplus over the subsequent years and indeed quite large surpluses ten years from now. Budget repair on this scale was utterly implausible before the election and is fiction now.

The government’s so-called “zombie” budget measures were baked into its projections over the forward estimate period. These were mainly the cuts to university funding, family payments and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. None of these had any prospect of being legislated with the past Senate, never mind with a larger, more powerful set of crossbench senators.

The Parliamentary Budget Office estimates these “zombie” measures to be worth $8 billion in total over the forward estimates. This accounts for roughly half of the difference between the total projected deficits of Coalition and Labor over the same period.

In short, there is little or no prospect of achieving the budget repair that is a pre-requisite for maintaining Australia’s AAA credit rating. Both sides of politics need to spell out to all Australians what this means. The effect of a credit downgrade is like an income cut to households, businesses and government.

It’s similar to the effect of a decline in the terms of trade (relative prices of our exports), and also similar to a loss of national productivity. All of these things effectively reduce our national disposable income. We become poorer as a nation.

Foreign lenders use Australia’s credit rating to set the interest rates that they charge Australian borrowers, mainly governments and businesses. A lower credit rating triggers a larger foreign risk premium in the interest rate that they charge borrowers.

This flows through to the general level of interest rates in the economy, so all firms and households with debts face higher borrowing costs. This can lead to less spending and hiring of workers by firms, and less disposable income for those households.

The major credit agencies are huge private organisations entrusted with capital of shareholders. They make calls about credit ratings not for political purposes but on the basis of what is in the best interests of investors.

The credit agencies are simply making rational assessments. The probability of Australia eventually defaulting on its debt is extremely low, but it is not zero and it is rising, which is important.

The slightly higher risk of default would result in a small downgrade from AAA, as occurred in the 1980s, by the major credit agencies. In turn this would imply higher interest rates, as it did back in the 1980s.

Higher interest rates are definitely bad news for those borrowing. It’s not necessarily good news for those saving either because rates on saving do not increase as much as rates on borrowing.

Also, when rates on overseas borrowing go up because of a larger foreign risk premium in our interest rates, the Australian dollar is likely to fall, as it did dramatically in the 1980s, from US 72 cents to 60 cents in the space of three months. When the Australian dollar falls for this reason our international purchasing power is reduced.

This is quite different to what happens when the Reserve Bank raises interest rates through its control over the official interest rate. In that case the Australian dollar is likely to rise, in the short term at least, which increases our international purchasing power – we can buy more from overseas with our income.

The parliament is like the Roman emperor Nero: “fiddling while Rome burns”, an apt analogy since Europe is where we are slowly headed economically and that won’t be pretty.

Author : Ross Guest, Professor of Economics and National Senior Teaching Fellow, Griffith University