Fed Holds Rate

The US Federal Reserve has kept rates on hold this month, because inflation remains below target, and some other economic indicators are slowing. Here is their announcement.

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in April indicates that the pace of improvement in the labor market has slowed while growth in economic activity appears to have picked up. Although the unemployment rate has declined, job gains have diminished. Growth in household spending has strengthened. Since the beginning of the year, the housing sector has continued to improve and the drag from net exports appears to have lessened, but business fixed investment has been soft. Inflation has continued to run below the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run objective, partly reflecting earlier declines in energy prices and in prices of non-energy imports. Market-based measures of inflation compensation declined; most survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance, in recent months.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee currently expects that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace and labor market indicators will strengthen. Inflation is expected to remain low in the near term, in part because of earlier declines in energy prices, but to rise to 2 percent over the medium term as the transitory effects of past declines in energy and import prices dissipate and the labor market strengthens further. The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments.

Against this backdrop, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1/4 to 1/2 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting further improvement in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.

The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions.

Limiting access to payday loans may do more harm than good

From The US Conversation.

One of the few lending options available to the poor may soon evaporate if a new rule proposed June 2 goes into effect.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) announced the rule with the aim of eliminating what it called “debt traps” caused by the US$38.5 billion payday loan market.

But will it?

What’s a payday loan?

The payday loan market, which emerged in the 1990s, involves storefront lenders providing small loans of a few hundred dollars for one to two weeks for a “fee” of 15 percent to 20 percent. For example, a loan of $100 for two weeks might cost $20. On an annualized basis, that amounts to an interest rate of 520 percent.

In exchange for the cash, the borrower provides the lender with a postdated check or debit authorization. If a borrower is unable to pay at the end of the term, the lender might roll over the loan to another paydate in exchange for another $20.

Thanks to their high interest, short duration and fact that one in five end up in default, payday loans have long been derided as “predatory” and “abusive,” making them a prime target of the CFPB since the bureau was created by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2011.

States have already been swift to regulate the industry, with 16 and Washington, D.C., banning them outright or imposing caps on fees that essentially eliminate the industry. Because the CFPB does not have authority to cap fees that payday lenders charge, their proposed regulations focus on other aspects of the lending model.

Under the proposed changes announced last week, lenders would have to assess a borrower’s ability to repay, and it would be harder to “roll over” loans into new ones when they come due – a process which leads to escalating interest costs.

There is no question that these new regulations will dramatically affect the industry. But is that a good thing? Will the people who currently rely on payday loans actually be better off as a result of the new rules?

In short, no: The Wild West of high-interest credit products that will result is not beneficial for low-income consumers, who desperately need access to credit.

I’ve been researching payday loans and other alternative financial services for 15 years. My work has focused on three questions: Why do people turn to high-interest loans? What are the consequences of borrowing in these markets? And what should appropriate regulation look like?

One thing is clear: Demand for quick cash by households considered high-risk to lenders is strong. Stable demand for alternative credit sources means that when regulators target and rein in one product, other, loosely regulated and often-abusive options pop up in its place. Demand does not simply evaporate when there are shocks to the supply side of credit markets.

This regulatory whack-a-mole approach which moves at a snail’s pace means lenders can experiment with credit products for years, at the expense of consumers.

Who gets a payday loan

About 12 million mostly lower-income people use payday loans each year. For people with low incomes and low FICO credit scores, payday loans are often the only (albeit very expensive) way of getting a loan.

My research lays bare the typical profile of a consumer who shows up to borrow on a payday loan: months or years of financial distress from maxing out credit cards, applying for and being denied secured and unsecured credit, and failing to make debt payments on time.

Perhaps more stark is what their credit scores look like: Payday applicants’ mean credit scores were below 520 at the time they applied for the loan, compared with a U.S. average of just under 700.

Given these characteristics, it is easy to see that the typical payday borrower simply does not have access to cheaper, better credit.

Borrowers may make their first trip to the payday lender out of a rational need for a few bucks. But because these borrowers typically owe up to half of their take-home pay plus interest on their next payday, it is easy to see how difficult it will be to pay in full. Putting off full repayment for a future pay date is all too tempting, especially when you consider that the median balance in a payday borrowers’ checking accounts was just $66.

The consequences of payday loans

The empirical literature measuring the welfare consequences of borrowing on a payday loan, including my own, is deeply divided.

On the one hand, I have found that payday loans increase personal bankruptcy rates. But I have also documented that using larger payday loans actually helped consumers avoid default, perhaps because they had more slack to manage their budget that month.

In a 2015 article, I along with two co-authors analyzed payday lender data and credit bureau files to determine how the loans affect borrowers, who had limited or no access to mainstream credit with severely weak credit histories. We found that the long-run effect on various measures of financial well-being such as their credit scores was close to zero, meaning on average they were no better or worse off because of the payday loan.

Other researchers have found that payday loans help borrowers avoid home foreclosures and help limit certain economic hardships.

It is therefore possible that even in cases where the interest rates reach as much as 600 percent, payday loans help consumers do what economists call “smoothing” over consumption by helping them manage their cash flow between pay periods.

In 2012, I reviewed the growing body of microeconomic evidence on borrowers’ use of payday loans and considered how they might respond to a variety of regulatory schemes, such as outright bans, rate caps and restrictions on size, duration or rollover renewals.

I concluded that among all of the regulatory strategies that states have implemented, the one with a potential benefit to consumers was limiting the ease with which the loans are rolled over. Consumers’ failure to predict or prepare for the escalating cycle of interest payments leads to welfare-damaging behavior in a way that other features of payday loans targeted by lawmakers do not.

In sum, there is no doubt that payday loans cause devastating consequences for some consumers. But when used appropriately and moderately – and when paid off promptly – payday loans allow low-income individuals who lack other resources to manage their finances in ways difficult to achieve using other forms of credit.

End of the industry?

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s changes to underwriting standards – such as the requirement that lenders verify borrowers’ income and confirm borrowers’ ability to repay – coupled with new restrictions on rolling loans over will definitely shrink the supply of payday credit, perhaps to zero.

The business model relies on the stream of interest payments from borrowers unable to repay within the initial term of the loan, thus providing the lender with a new fee each pay cycle. If and when regulators prohibit lenders from using this business model, there will be nothing left of the industry.

The alternatives are worse

So if the payday loan market disappears, what will happen to the people who use it?

Because households today face stagnant wages while costs of living rise, demand for small-dollar loans is strong.

Consider an American consumer with a very common profile: a low-income, full-time worker with a few credit hiccups and little or no savings. For this individual, an unexpectedly high utility bill, a medical emergency or the consequences of a poor financial decision (that we all make from time to time) can prompt a perfectly rational trip to a local payday lender to solve a shortfall.

We all procrastinate, struggle to save for a rainy day, try to keep up with the Joneses, fail to predict unexpected bills and bury our head in the sand when things get rough.

These inveterate behavioral biases and systematic budget imbalances will not cease when the new regulations take effect. So where will consumers turn once payday loans dry up?

Alternatives that are accessible to the typical payday customer include installment loans and flex loans (which are a high-interest revolving source of credit similar to a credit card but without the associated regulation). These forms of credit can be worse for consumers than payday loans. A lack of regulation means their contracts are less transparent, with hidden or confusing fee structures that result in higher costs than payday loans.

Oversight of payday loans is necessary, but enacting rules that will decimate the payday loan industry will not solve any problems. Demand for small, quick cash is not going anywhere. And because the default rates are so high, lenders are unwilling to supply short-term credit to this population without big benefits (i.e., high interest rates).

Consumers will always find themselves short of cash occasionally. Low-income borrowers are resourceful, and as regulators play whack-a-mole and cut off one credit option, consumers will turn to the next best thing, which is likely to be a worse, more expensive alternative.

Author: Paige Marta Skiba, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University

Many US Families Struggle Financially

American families overall reported continued mild improvement in their financial well-being in 2015 although many families were struggling financially and felt excluded from economic advancement, according to the Federal Reserve Board’s latest Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households.

The report, based on the Board’s third annual Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking, presents a contrasting picture of the financial well-being of U.S. families. Aggregate-level results show several signs of improvement. Sixty-nine percent of respondents said they are either “living comfortably” or “doing okay,” up 4 percentage points from 2014 and up 6 percentage points from 2013. Seventy-seven percent of non-retired adults without a disability are confident that they have the skills necessary to get the kind of job that they want now–an increase of 10 percentage points from the 2013 survey results.

“The new survey findings shed important light on the economic and financial security of American families seven years into the recovery,” said Federal Reserve Board Governor Lael Brainard. “Despite some signs of improvement overall, 46 percent say they would struggle to meet emergency expenses of $400, and 22 percent of workers say they are juggling two or more jobs. It’s important to identify the reasons why so many families face continued financial struggles and to find ways to help them overcome them,” she said.

The survey results also emphasize that not all groups report improvement in their financial well-being. Respondents with higher levels of education are most likely to say that their financial situation has improved over the past year. Thirty-one percent of respondents with at least a bachelor’s degree reported an improvement in 2015 and 15 percent reported a decline. Among those with a high-school degree or less, 22 percent of respondents say that their well-being improved over the past 12 months, while 21 percent say that their well-being has declined.

The survey found that individuals with lower incomes, racial and ethnic minorities, and individuals with parents of modest financial means report greater financial challenges. Forty-three percent of adults with a family income under $40,000 do not have a bank account or use an alternative financial service; non-Hispanic blacks are 19 percentage points less likely to be satisfied with the overall quality of their neighborhood than are non-Hispanic whites; and young adults whose parents did not attend college are 48 percentage points less likely to attend college–and more likely to attend a for-profit institution if they do–than are those whose parents have a bachelor’s degree.

Educational satisfaction differed significantly by the type of institution attended. Forty-nine percent of adults who attended a for-profit institution report that if they could make their educational decisions again they would have attended a different school.

Among individuals who went to college, education debt is common. More than half of adults younger than 30 who went to college took on at least some debt to do so. This debt extends beyond just student loans. Twenty-one percent of all adults with debt from their own education have education-related credit card debt, with a median balance of $3,000.

The survey also provide insights into saving for retirement. Thirty-one percent of non-retired respondents have no retirement savings or pension. Among those who have a defined contribution pension plan or other self-directed retirement account, 49 percent are either “not confident” or just “slightly confident” in their ability to make the right investment decisions in these accounts.

Previous surveys have informed the Federal Reserve and other government agencies about consumer financial behavior and opinions. The survey was conducted on behalf of the Board in October and November 2015. More than 5,600 respondents completed the survey. Topics covered in the survey and the report include savings behavior, economic preparedness, banking and credit access, housing and living arrangements, auto lending, education and student debt, and retirement planning.

Here is a link to a video summarizing the survey’s findings.

Federal Reserve Board proposes rule to address risk associated with excessive credit exposures of large banking organizations to a single counterparty

The Federal Reserve Board on Friday proposed a rule to address the risk associated with excessive credit exposures of large banking organizations to a single counterparty. As demonstrated during the financial crisis, large credit exposures, particularly between financial institutions, can spread financial distress and undermine financial stability.

The proposal would apply single-counterparty credit limits to bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. The proposed limits are tailored to increase in stringency as the systemic footprint of a firm increases:

  • A global systemically important bank, or G-SIB, would be restricted to a credit exposure of no more than 15 percent of the bank’s tier 1 capital to another systemically important financial firm, and up to 25 percent of the bank’s tier 1 capital to another counterparty;
  • A bank holding company with $250 billion or more in total consolidated assets, or $10 billion or more in on-balance-sheet foreign exposure, would be restricted to a credit exposure of no more than 25 percent of the bank’s tier 1 capital to a counterparty;
  • A bank holding company with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets would be restricted to a credit exposure of no more than 25 percent of the bank’s total regulatory capital to another counterparty;
  • And bank holding companies with less than $50 billion in total consolidated assets, including community banks, would not be subject to the proposal.

“We are determined to do as much as we can to reduce or eliminate the threat that trouble at one big bank will bring down other big banks,” said Federal Reserve Board Chair Janet L. Yellen.

Similarly tailored requirements would also be established for foreign banks operating in the United States.

“This regulation would complement overall capital requirements, which are generally based on the size and nature of a bank’s assets, but do not address the concentration of risk in specific borrowers or counterparties,” Governor Daniel K. Tarullo said.

The proposed rule implements part of the Dodd-Frank Act and builds on earlier proposals released by the Board in 2011 and 2012, and includes some modifications based on comments received. Additionally, the proposal seeks to promote global consistency by generally following the international large exposures framework released by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2014.

The Board on Friday also released a white paper explaining the analytical and quantitative reasoning for the proposed rule’s tighter 15 percent limit for credit exposures between systemically important financial institutions. Because systemically important financial institutions are generally engaged in similar activities and exposed to similar risks, the paper discusses why systemically important firms are more likely to come under stress at the same time and, as a result, generally incur more risk when exposed to other systemically important firms compared to non-systemically important counterparties.

Comments on the proposed rule are invited until June 3, 2016.

Subprime gets bad rap in ‘Big Short’ but is key to easing housing affordability crisis

From The Conversation.

Anyone who’s dug into the 2008 financial crisis knows the role that bundling and selling subprime housing loans played in bringing the world to the brink of economic collapse – out-of-control behaviors well-depicted in the movie “The Big Short.”

But one thing I hope “The Big Short” doesn’t do is further tarnish the image of subprime lending.

Despite their poor reputation, such loans remain a key tool in easing the housing affordability crisis and expanding the availability of mortgages to low-income Americans seeking to realize the dream of homeownership. They also can help policymakers cope with the growing ranks of the homeless.

I’ve been studying the world of subprime in recent years, and these are some of the lessons from my current and past research. First, we need to fix the subprime mortgage market, so that the ways in which it contributed to the financial crisis aren’t repeated.

Shocking levels of homelessness

Los Angeles, New York and other cities in America are struggling to cope with the problem of homelessness and the lack of affordable housing.

On a single night in January 2015, more than 560,000 people nationwide were homeless – meaning they slept outside, in an emergency shelter or in a transitional housing program. Almost a quarter were children. Meanwhile, homeownership is hovering at 20-year lows, while about half of renters struggle to pay their landlords.

Last fall, Los Angeles Mayor Eric Carcetti asked the City Council to declare “a state of emergency” on homelessness and committed US$100 million to solving the problem, suggesting that subsidies would play a role.

But a focus on rental subsidies to solve homelessness and other affordable housing issues has adverse consequences, as evidenced by New York’s experience.

Its cluster-site housing program, in which privately owned apartment buildings are used to house homeless families when the city’s shelters are full, relies on such subsidies. But because the city typically pays market rents (or more), many landlords responded by pushing out regular (and low-income) tenants in favor of this steady stream from the government.

Such programs reduce the overall supply of affordable units, crowding out other groups in need. As more affordable housing units are allotted to the homeless, there are fewer available for low-income residents who don’t qualify for those programs and are at risk of becoming homeless themselves.

Fortunately, Mayor Bill de Blasio aims to phase out the costly program over the next three years.

While there are many other approaches to tackling homelessness, they rely on addressing an important underlying problem: the housing affordability crisis. It may seem improbable, but subprime lending could help ease the housing affordability crisis.

The role of subprime lending

The relationship between homelessness and the strains in the housing rental market is well-known: when there are more rental vacancies available, homelessness decreases (I survey the academic findings on the topic here).

This suggests that if we reduce home affordability problems, we can effectively reduce homelessness.

A powerful tool to help ease the housing affordability crisis is subprime mortgage lending – defined as loans made to borrowers with credit scores below 640.

The idea is simple: by helping more low-income tenants qualified to take out a subprime mortgage become homeowners, there’ll be more affordable rental housing available for everyone else. More supply on the market helps reduce average rents, which in turns helps more of those pushed to the streets afford a roof over their heads with less government aid. Thus this makes the policies still based on rental subsidies more effective.

However, this idea cannot be implemented until we fix the subprime mortgage market. As you can see from the graph below, the market has not yet recovered from its collapse in 2008.

The subprime market has yet to recover from its collapse. Inside Mortgage Finance, Author provided

One of the reasons the market collapsed was that investors lost confidence in the ability of loan originators and regulators to use credit scoring models to accurately assess a borrower’s creditworthiness – remember the NINJA loans (no income, no job, no assets)?

This market won’t be back up and running at full strength – and able to help address the affordability crisis – until these credit-scoring models improve and mechanisms are put in place to ensure loan quality remains adequate.

The FHFA sets new goals

There has been some movement to get the subprime market moving again.

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent federal agency that regulates Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks, recently set goals for the next two years meant to expand the availability of mortgages to low-income buyers.

This policy will keep its focus on helping a small segment of borrowers with incomes no greater than 50 percent of their area’s median income to purchase or refinance a single-family home.

But many affordable housing advocates expressed concern that these targets do not go far enough. The Woodstock Institute – a leading research and policy nonprofit organization focused on fair lending, wealth creation and financial systems reform – for example, argued that the policy won’t do enough to promote affordable and sustainable home ownership for low-income families.

How to bring back subprime

Even with the FHFA embracing the idea of expanding the availability of subprime mortgages to low-income buyers, their perceived role in the 2008 crisis and bringing down the housing market may cause justifiable resistance from the general public as a means of tackling the affordability crisis.

And one cannot blame this reaction, as it was the average American taxpayer who bailed out the reckless financial system, brought down by greedy bankers and weak politicians and regulators.

So how we can encourage more subprime lending while avoiding a repeat of 2008? In my recent research, I suggest a few ways to do this.

One of the reasons subprime loans became such a problem in the run-up to the crisis is just the sheer volume (see the boom in subprime lending from 2001 to 2005 in the above graph). This expansion was fueled by the generous homeownership subsidies given to low-income households.

One way to help prevent this is to vary the size of the homeownership subsidy countercyclically to control the amount of credit flowing into the economy and prevent overborrowing during expansionary periods. It would be higher at times when the housing market contracts, and lower when it’s booming.

Another problem was that lenders had an incentive to originate mortgages to borrowers who couldn’t afford them because all the risk was passed along to banks and other investors through collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO) and other sophisticated financial instruments.

The Federal Reserve in conjunction with other regulators could reduce this risk by carefully monitoring how many mortgages lenders keep in their own portfolios. When the share lenders hold increases, they have more incentives to better screen borrowers and thus originate better mortgages.

Lastly, the so-called adverse selection problem on the part of the mortgage originator in the secondary market should also be taken into account. This problem occurs when the mortgage originator has more information about the quality of mortgages that are securitized than the secondary market investors who snap up the CMO. That allows the originator to keep the low-risk mortgages in its own portfolio while distributing the high-risk mortgages to investors.

Improving existing credit scoring models is crucial to ameliorating this problem. Also, the Fed should more carefully monitor the quality of mortgages that are sold to investors and share its information with them. At the very least, that would reduce the investors’ information disadvantage with respect to originators.

Accompanied by the right means to regulate the housing market, we can support subprime while avoiding the disastrous outcomes highlighted in “The Big Short.“ And we can create an environment in which making low-cost mortgages available to people helps resolve the problem of unaffordable housing and homelessness.

Author: Jaime Luque, Assistant Professor, Real Estate & Urban Land Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison

What Happened to the Great Divergence?

Governor Lael Brainard, spoke at the 2016 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York, New York. The speech highlighted that whilst there was a phase when different economic centres were diverging, now there are more common elements, including low growth, low interest rates and low inflation. Global shocks are being transmitted via the financial system, creating volatility and spillover effects.

To the extent that we are observing limited divergence in inflation outcomes and less divergence in realized policy paths than many anticipated, this could be attributable to common shocks or trends that cause economic conditions to be synchronized across economies. The sharp repeated declines in the price of oil have been a major common factor depressing headline inflation and are also likely feeding into low core inflation, although to a lesser extent. As noted previously, these price declines have led headline inflation across the globe to behave quite similarly over this time period. Even so, most observers expect this source of convergence in inflationary outcomes to eventually fade and thereafter not affect monetary policy paths over the medium term.

In contrast, a more persistent source of convergence may be found in an apparent decline in the neutral rate of interest. The neutral rate of interest–or the rate of interest consistent with the economy remaining at its potential rate of output and inflation remaining at target level–appears to have declined over the past 30 years in the United States and is now at historically low levels. Similarly, longer-run interest rates appear also to have fallen across a broad group of advanced and emerging market economies, suggesting that neutral rates are at historically low levels in many countries around the world and near or below zero in the major advanced foreign economies. Although the reasons for the declines in neutral rates are not perfectly understood and may differ across countries, there are some common drivers, such as slower productivity and labor force growth and a heightened sensitivity to risk.

The very low levels of the shorter run neutral rate reflect in part headwinds from the crisis that are likely to dissipate over time. However, if many of the common forces holding down neutral rates prove persistent, then neutral rates may remain low through the medium term, implying a shallower path for policy trajectories.

The global economy is also experiencing a downshift in emerging market growth momentum led by China, which may prove somewhat persistent. Whereas earlier in the recovery there was a striking divergence between the relatively buoyant growth in major emerging economies and depressed growth in advanced economies, lately the extent of divergence has diminished noticeably. China is undergoing a challenging set of economic transitions. Trend growth has slowed substantially and is expected to slow further, and the composition of growth is shifting away from resource-intensive manufacturing and exports toward a greater share for consumption and services. China’s investment has slowed sharply recently after accounting for nearly one-third of global investment over the past three years and about one-half of global consumption in certain metals such as iron ore, aluminum, copper, and nickel. Commodity exporters and close trading partners in Asia will be most affected, but the changes in the composition and rate of growth in a country that has accounted for about one-third of the growth in world output and trade will likely ripple through the global economy much more generally.

Amplified Spillovers
Of course, policy divergence among major economies could be limited by rapid and strong transmission of foreign shocks across borders. In particular, although the U.S. real economy has traditionally been seen as more insulated from foreign trade shocks than many smaller economies, the combination of the highly global role of the dollar and U.S. financial markets and the proximity to the zero lower bound may be amplifying spillovers from foreign financial conditions. By one rough estimate, accounting for the net effect of exchange rate appreciation and changes in equity valuations and long term yields, over the past year and a half, the United States has experienced a tightening of financial conditions that is the equivalent of an additional increase of over 75 basis points in the federal funds rate.10

The transmission of divergent economic conditions across borders typically occurs though a couple of different channels. First, a decline in demand in one country reduces its demand for imports from other countries. Second, the fall in economic activity would be expected to trigger a more accommodative monetary policy, which helps offset the effect of the shock by both supporting domestic demand and weakening the exchange rate. The weaker exchange rate in turn leads domestic consumers to switch their expenditures away from more expensive foreign imports to cheaper domestic products while increasing the competitiveness of exports. The extent to which monetary policy offsets the shock by dispersing it to trade partners as opposed to strengthening domestic demand depends on the responsiveness of domestic demand relative to the exchange rate. The exchange rate channel, by raising the price of imports in domestic currency, also pushes up domestic inflation and exerts downward pressure on foreign inflation.

The strength of spillovers across countries and the extent to which that affects policy divergence across countries depend on a foreign economy’s openness to these different channels. The recent experience of Sweden suggests that for highly open economies, the effect of foreign shocks can be extremely powerful. Sweden’s economic growth has been relatively rapid recently, reaching nearly 4 percent over the most recent four quarters. Moreover, the employment gap is estimated to be nearly closed, and there are signs of financial excess in the housing market. In ordinary times, these conditions would be consistent with relatively tight monetary policy. However, inflation has run persistently well below the central bank’s 2 percent inflation target. Given the relative openness of Sweden’s economy, moving the inflation rate back up to target has been greatly complicated by the sensitivity of Sweden’s exchange rate and financial conditions to developments in the euro area, where domestic economic conditions are consistent with much more accommodative policy. As a result, the Riksbank has been pursuing extremely accommodative monetary policy, most recently lowering the interest rate on deposits to minus 0.5 percent and authorizing the Governor and Deputy Governor to intervene in foreign currency markets.

Even in the much larger United States economy, with imports accounting for a little over 15 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), spillovers can be quite strong, in part reflecting the international role of U.S. financial markets and the dollar. Since the middle of 2014, with a reassessment of demand growth in the euro area and subsequently in emerging markets and other commodity exporters, the real trade-weighted value of the dollar has increased nearly 20 percent. As a result, in 2014 and 2015, net exports subtracted a little over 1/2 percentage point from GDP growth each year, and econometric models point to a subtraction of a further 1 percentage point this year.12 In addition, the dollar’s appreciation is estimated to have put significant downward pressure on inflation: Non-oil import prices fell 3-1/2 percent in 2015, subtracting an estimated 1/2 percentage point from core PCE inflation.

Financial channels can powerfully propagate negative shocks in one market by catalyzing a broader reassessment of risks and increases in risk spreads across many financial markets. Since the beginning of the year, U.S. financial markets have reacted strongly to adverse news on emerging market growth, even though the news on the U.S. labor market has remained positive. In this regard, although China’s direct imports from the United States are modest, uncertainty about changes to its exchange rate system and financial imbalances, together with changes in the composition of its growth, have had broader global spillovers that may pose risks to the U.S. outlook.

Recent events suggest the transmission of foreign shocks can take place extremely quickly such that financial markets anticipate and indeed may thereby front-run the expected monetary policy reactions to these developments. It also appears that the exchange rate channel may have played a particularly important role recently in transmitting economic and financial developments across national borders. Indeed, recent research suggests that financial transmission is likely to be amplified in economies with near-zero interest rates, such that anticipated monetary policy adjustments in one economy may contribute more to a shifting of demand across borders than a boost to overall demand. This finding could explain why the sensitivity of exchange rate movements to economic news and to changes in foreign monetary policy appear to have been relatively elevated recently.

Financial tightening associated with cross-border spillovers may be limiting the extent to which U.S. policy diverges from major economies. As policy adjusts to the evolution of the data, the combination of heightened spillovers from weaker foreign economies, along with a lower neutral rate, could result in a lower policy path in the United States relative to what many had predicted.

Policy
In circumstances where many economies face common negative shocks or where negative shocks in one country are quickly transmitted across borders, it is natural to consider whether coordination can improve outcomes. Under certain conditions–such as flexible exchange rates, deep and well-regulated financial markets, and flexible product and labor markets–policies designed for the domestic economy can readily offset any spillovers from economic conditions abroad, and policies designed to address domestic conditions can achieve desirable outcomes both within the national economy and more broadly.

In some circumstances, however, cooperation can be quite helpful. If, for example, economies face a common challenge, coordination can communicate to markets that policymakers recognize the challenge and will work to address it. Reducing uncertainty about the direction of policy and addressing concerns about policies working at cross-purposes can boost the confidence of businesses and households. With intensified transmission effects in the vicinity of the zero lower bound, there is a risk that uncoordinated policy on its own could have the effect of shifting demand across borders rather than addressing the underlying weakness in global demand. The difficult start to the year should be a prompt for greater policy coherence and clarity. This might be a good time for policymakers to reaffirm their commitment to work toward the common goal of strengthening global demand.

Similarly, with anemic global demand and interest rates near zero, in some economies there is scope for monetary policy to be more effective with fiscal policy working in the same direction. With potential growth and nominal borrowing rates both low, public investment that increases potential in the longer run and demand in the shorter run could make an important contribution. A joint determination by policymakers across major economies to better deploy policy tools to provide support for global demand could be beneficial.

The Dynamics of US Mortgage Debt in Default

Research from the USA highlights the fact that when house prices fall, and household debt is high, the rise in defaults is more correlated to  the number of households falling behind in their mortgage payments that the debts of those already in default.

From St. Louis Fed Research

The large decrease in US house prices between 2006 and 2011 led to a dramatic increase in mortgage debt defaults. Since then, the share of mortgage debt in default has decreased significantly and is now close to the pre-2006 level. In this essay, we argue that these fluctuations are predominantly the consequence of changes in the number of households falling behind in their mortgage payments (the extensive margin) and not changes in the amount of debt of those in default (the intensive margin). On average, the extensive margin accounts for 78 percent of the increase in the 2006-09 period and 93 percent of the decrease in the 2011-15 period. This information may be useful in designing prudential policies to mitigate mortgage default.

The analysis is performed using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax. In our measure of default, we consider all households with mortgage payments 120 or more days late. Figure 1 shows the share of mortgage debt in default, which fluctuated between 0.7 percent and 1 percent in the 1999-2006 period and then jumped to 7.5 percent in 2009. The figure also shows the evolution of house prices, whose collapse coincided with increasing mortgage defaults. In a recent article, Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sánchez (2015) show how these two series are related: A rapid decrease in house prices causes a sharp increase in mortgage defaults because more households find themselves with negative home equity (“under water”), and some of these households find it beneficial to default after a negative shock to income (i.e., unemployment).

We decompose the changes in the share of debt in default into changes in four different components: average debt in default, number of households in default, average debt, and number of households with debt. Basically, since

we can compute the percentage change (%∆) in the share of debt in default as follows:

Figure 2 shows the results of the decomposition by year; the four colors in each column represent the changes in the four components. The percentage value (shown on the left vertical axis) illustrates the change in the share of debt in default generated by the changes in a particular component. According to the previous equations, the summation of changes in the four components equals the changes in the share of debt in default (represented by the values for the black dots as shown on the right axis). For example, the black dot for 2006-07 has a value of 92, which indicates that the share of debt in default increased by 92 percent in that time period.

There are three interesting findings. First, and most importantly, we find that fluctuations in the number of households in default accounted for most of the fluctuations in the share of debt in default (shown by the size of the orange part of the bars in Figure 2). The share of households in default was very large not only for the years when defaults were increasing (2006 to 2009), but also for the subsequent years when the share of debt in default decreased slowly but steadily. The changes in the number of households in default confirm our earlier claim that the drastic decline in house prices between 2006 and 2009 caused negative home equity for more households. For some of these households a negative income shock triggered default, thus leading to the sharp increase in mortgage debt default. Another reason for this pattern is the delay in foreclosure proceedings that started during the Great Recession. Chan et al. (2015) show that borrowers’ knowledge of a possible long delay between the formal notice of foreclosure and the actual foreclosure sale date affects the likelihood of default: Borrowers who anticipate a longer period of “free rent” have a greater incentive to default on their mortgages.

Second, our results indicate that from 2003 to 2007 the average amount of debt (the gray part of the bars in Figure 2) exerted downward pressure on the share of debt in default. That is, since the average amount of debt was increasing, if the other three components had not increased, the share of debt in default would have decreased.

Finally, we find that the average amount of debt in default (the yellow part of the bars in Figure 2) was important in the 2006-08 period. This finding indicates that part of the increase in the share of debt in default during that period was actually due to an increase in the amount of the debt of households in default. This increase is in line with the fact that the decline in house prices affected households with larger debt (not necessarily subprime loans) that were not falling into default before 2006. When house prices plummeted in 2006, more households from this group defaulted. Later in the recession, the importance of the average amount of debt was overtaken by the number of households in default as more and more households with similar characteristics chose to default.

To summarize, the rapid increases in mortgage debt in default between 2006 and 2011 captured the attention of the public, policymakers, and researchers. It is important to understand the main forces driving the default increase, especially in designing prudential policies that minimize mortgage default such as those analyzed by Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sánchez (2015). The decomposition exercise in this essay suggests that the evolution of the share of mortgage debt in default can be accounted for mostly by changes in the number of households in default rather than changes in the overall amount of mortgage debt and the number of households with mortgages. Changes in the amount of debt in default also played a nonnegligible role, especially during the pre-crisis to early crisis periods.

Federal Reserve Board announced a $131m penalty against HSBC North America

The Federal Reserve Board on Friday announced a $131 million penalty against HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. and HSBC Finance Corporation for deficiencies in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing. The penalty is being assessed in conjunction with an agreement involving similar deficiencies that HSBC announced Friday with the U.S. Department of Justice, other federal agencies, and the state attorneys general.

The penalty assessed by the Board is the maximum amount allowed under the law, taking into account the circumstances of HSBC’s unsafe and unsound practices and foreclosure activities. The penalty may be satisfied by providing borrower assistance or remediation in conjunction with the Department of Justice settlement, or by providing funding for nonprofit housing counseling organizations. If HSBC does not satisfy the full penalty amount within two years, the remaining amount must be paid to the U.S. Department of Treasury. The Board will closely monitor compliance by HSBC with the requirements of the order.

The terms of the monetary assessment against HSBC are similar to those that were part of the penalties issued by the Board in February 2012 and July 2014 against six other mortgage servicing organizations that reached similar agreements with the U.S. Department of Justice and the state attorneys general.

The Board previously issued an enforcement action in April 2011 requiring HSBC to correct its servicing and foreclosure-related deficiencies. That action was among 14 corrective actions issued against Board-supervised mortgage servicers or their parent holding companies for unsafe and unsound practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing.

Fed Holds Rate

The latest release from the Fed highlights that any further lift in rates will be slow.

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December suggests that labor market conditions improved further even as economic growth slowed late last year. Household spending and business fixed investment have been increasing at moderate rates in recent months, and the housing sector has improved further; however, net exports have been soft and inventory investment slowed. A range of recent labor market indicators, including strong job gains, points to some additional decline in underutilization of labor resources. Inflation has continued to run below the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run objective, partly reflecting declines in energy prices and in prices of non-energy imports. Market-based measures of inflation compensation declined further; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance, in recent months.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee currently expects that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace and labor market indicators will continue to strengthen. Inflation is expected to remain low in the near term, in part because of the further declines in energy prices, but to rise to 2 percent over the medium term as the transitory effects of declines in energy and import prices dissipate and the labor market strengthens further. The Committee is closely monitoring global economic and financial developments and is assessing their implications for the labor market and inflation, and for the balance of risks to the outlook.

Given the economic outlook, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1/4 to 1/2 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting further improvement in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.

The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions.

The US Market fell 1.5% in response.

Fed December Minutes Signal Further Rate Rises … Later

The minutes of the December 2015 Federal Open Market Committee have been published, and outlines the discussions which underpinned the decision to lift the US federal funds rate. Here is an extract:

Regarding the medium-term outlook, inflation was projected to increase gradually as energy prices and prices of non-energy imports stabilized and the labor market strengthened. Overall, taking into account economic developments and the outlook for economic activity and the labor market, the Committee was now reasonably confident in its expectation that inflation would rise, over the medium term, to its 2 percent objective. However, for some members, the risks attending their inflation forecasts remained considerable. Among those risks was the possibility that additional downward shocks to prices of oil and other commodities or a sustained rise in the exchange value of the dollar could delay or diminish the expected upturn in inflation. A couple also worried that a further strengthening of the labor market might not prove sufficient to offset the downward pressures from global disinflationary forces. And several expressed unease with indications that inflation expectations may have moved down slightly. In view of these risks and the shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, members expressed their intention to carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward the Committee’s inflation goal.

After assessing the outlook for economic activity, the labor market, and inflation and weighing the uncertainties associated with the outlook, members agreed to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to ¼ to ½ percent at this meeting. A number of members commented that it was appropriate to begin policy normalization in response to the substantial progress in the labor market toward achieving the Committee’s objective of maximum employment and their reasonable confidence that inflation would move to 2 percent over the medium term. Members agreed that the post meeting statement should report that the Committee’s decision reflected both the economic outlook and the time it takes for policy actions to affect future economic outcomes. If the Committee waited to begin removing accommodation until it was closer to achieving its dual-mandate objectives, it might need to tighten policy abruptly, which could risk disrupting economic activity. Members observed that after this initial increase in the federal funds rate, the stance of monetary policy would remain accommodative.

However, some members said that their decision to raise the target range was a close call, particularly given the uncertainty about inflation dynamics, and emphasized the need to monitor the progress of inflation closely.

Members also discussed their expectations for the size and timing of adjustments in the target range for the federal funds rate going forward. Based on their current forecasts for economic activity, the labor market, and inflation, as well as their expectation that the neutral shortterm real interest rate will rise slowly over the next few years, members expected economic conditions would evolve in a manner that would warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate. However, they also recognized that the appropriate path for the federal funds rate would depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data. Members stressed the potential need to accelerate or slow the pace of normalization as the economic outlook evolved. In the current situation, because of their significant concern about still-low readings on actual inflation and the uncertainty and risks present in the inflation outlook, they agreed to indicate that the Committee would carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. In determining the size and timing of further adjustments to monetary policy, some members emphasized the importance of confirming that inflation would rise as projected and of maintaining the credibility of the Committee’s inflation objective. Based on their current economic outlook, they continued to anticipate that the federal funds rate was likely to remain, for some time, below levels that the
Committee expected to prevail in the longer run.

The Committee also maintained its policy of reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. In view of members’ outlook for moderate growth in economic activity, inflation moving toward its target only gradually, and the asymmetric risks posed by the continued proximity of short-term interest rates to their effective lower bound, the Committee anticipated retaining this policy until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate was well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee’s holdings of longer term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative
financial conditions.