Markets have been speculating for months about whether the US Federal Reserve would raise interest rates in September. The day has finally arrived, and interestingly, there’s much less certainty now about which way it will go than there was just a few weeks earlier.
In August, more than three-quarters of economists surveyed by Bloomberg expected a rate hike this month. Now, only about half do. Traders were also more certain back then, putting the odds at about 50-50. Now the likelihood of a rate hike based on Fed Funds Futures is about one in four.
The Federal Reserve may be on the verge of lifting rates for the first time in more than nine years because unemployment has dropped to pre-crisis levels, the housing market is the healthiest it’s been in 15 years and the economic recovery, while tepid, has continued.
Investors’ and economists’ uncertainty, meanwhile, has been fueled by weak growth in China, Europe and Latin America, giving the Fed pause about whether now’s the right time to start the return to normal.
There is growing alarm that a rate hike will make things even worse for the rest of the world. The Fed risks creating “panic and turmoil” across emerging markets such as China and India and triggering a “global debt crisis.”
The reality, however, will likely be very different. For one, the Fed lacks the power it once did, meaning the actual impact of a rate hike will be more muted than people think. Second, the effect of uncertainty and speculation may be far worse than an actual change in rates, which is why central bankers in emerging markets are pushing their American counterparts to hurry up and raise them already.
The Fed’s waning influence
The Fed, and more accurately the rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), is simply no longer the center of the universe it once was, because the central banks of China, India and the eurozone have all become monetary policy hubs in their own right.
The US central bank may still be preeminent, but the People’s Bank of China, the Reserve Bank of India, and the European Central Bank are all growing more influential all the time. That’s particularly true of China’s central bank, which boasts the world’s largest stash of foreign currency reserves (about US$3.8 trillion) and increasingly hopes to make its influence felt beyond its borders.
Some argue that central banks in general, not just the Fed, are losing their ability to affect financial markets as they intend, especially since the financial crisis depleted their arsenal of tools. Those emergency measures resulted in more than a half-decade of near-zero interest rates and a world awash in US dollars. And that poses another problem.
All eyes will be on Fed Chair Janet Yellen.Reuters
Can the Fed even lift rates anymore?
The old toolkit of market leverage that the Fed used is losing relevance since the FOMC has not raised rates since 2006. And it has rather frantically been trying to experiment with new methods to affect markets.
The Fed and the market (including companies and customers) are beginning to understand that it’s not a given that the Fed can even practically raise rates any more, at least not without resorting to rarely or never-tried policies. That’s because its primary way to do so, removing dollars from the financial system, has become a lot harder to do.
Normally, one way the Fed affects short-term interest rates is by buying or selling government securities, which decreases or increases the amount of cash in circulation. The more cash in the system, the easier (and cheaper) it becomes to borrow, thus reducing interest rates, and vice versa.
And since the crisis, the Fed has added an enormous quantity of cash into the system to keep rates low. Removing enough of that to discourage lending and drive up rates won’t be easy. To get around that problem, it plans to essentially pay lenders to make loans, but that’s an unconventional approach that may not work and on some level involves adding more cash into the equation.
Uncertainty and speculation
In addition, the uncertainty and speculation about when the Fed will finally start the inevitable move toward normalization may be worse than the move itself.
As Mirza Adityaswara, senior deputy governor at Indonesia’s central bank, put it:
We think US monetary policymakers have got confused about what to do. The uncertainty has created the turmoil. The situation will recover the sooner the Fed makes a decision and then gives expectation to the market that they [will] increase [rates] one or two times and then stop.
While the timing of its first hike is important – and the sooner the better – the timing of the second is more so. This will signal the Fed’s path to normalization for the market (that is, the end of an era of ultra-low interest rates).
Right now, US companies appear ready for a rate hike because the impact on them will be negligible, and some investors are also betting on it.
That’s no surprise. Companies have borrowed heavily in recent years, allowing them to lock in record-low rates and causing their balance sheets to bulge. This year, corporate bond sales are on pace to have a third-straight record year, and currently tally about $1 trillion. Most of that’s fixed, so even if rates go up, their borrowing costs won’t change all that much for some time.
At the end of 2014, non-financial companies held a record $1.73 trillion in cash, double the tally a decade ago, according to Moody’s Investors Service.
Beyond the US, there are reports that Chinese and Indian companies are ready for a rate hike as well.
Foregone conclusion
So for much of the world, a hike in rates is already a foregone conclusion – the risk being only that the Fed doesn’t see it. The important question, then, is how quickly, or slowly, should the pace of normalization be. While the Fed may find it difficult to make much of an impact with one move, the pace and totality of the changes in rates will likely make some difference.
But the time to start that process is now. It will end the uncertainty that has embroiled world markets, strengthen the dollar relative to other currencies, add more flexibility to the Fed’s future policy-making and, importantly, mark a return to normality.
Author: Tomas Hult, Byington Endowed Chair and Professor of International Business, Michigan State University
Analysis from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis shows that in the US, whilst overall household credit is lower now, this is being driven by reduced credit creation, and not increased credit destruction. We see a very different profile of debt compared with Australia, where household debt has never been higher. However, our analysis shows that core debt is also being held for longer, so the same effect is in play here, although new debt is also accelerating, driven by housing.
Household debt in the United States has been on a roller coaster since early 2004. As the first figure shows, between the first quarter of 2004 and the fourth quarter of 2008, total household debt increased by about 46 percent—an annual rate of about 8.3 percent. A process of household deleveraging started in 2009 and stabilized at a level 13 percent below the previous peak in the first quarter of 2013. During those four years, the household debt level decreased at a yearly rate of 3 percent. Since then, it has moved only modestly back toward its previous levels.
This essay provides a simple decomposition of the changes in debt levels to shed light on the sources of those changes. The analysis is similar to the decomposition of labor market flows performed by Haltiwanger (2012) and the decomposition of changes in business credit performed by Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2011). We use the term “credit change” to refer to the change in household debt: the difference between household debt (D) in the current period, t, and debt in the previous period, t –1, divided by debt in the previous period, t –1:
The total household debt is the sum of debt for each household i, so this can also be written as
Equivalently, one can add the changes in debt for each household i:
The key advantage of using household-level data is that one can separate positive changes (credit creation) from negative changes (credit destruction) and compute the change in debt as
These concepts are interesting because they can be linked to different household financial decisions. Credit creation can be linked to additional credit card debt or a new mortgage and credit destruction can be linked to repaying debt or simply defaulting.
As this decomposition makes clear, a stable level of debt (a net change of 0) could be the result of a large credit creation offset by an equally large credit destruction. Or it could indicate no creation and no destruction at all. To differentiate between these cases, it is useful to consider “credit activity” (also called reallocation), which is defined as
This is a useful measure because it captures credit activity ignored by the change in total debt.
The second figure shows credit creation, destruction, change, and overall activity. Recall that credit change is the difference between credit creation and destruction, while credit activity is the sum of credit creation and destruction. The credit change shown in the second figure traces the increase in debt before the 2008 crisis, the deleveraging that followed, and the relative stability of debt over the past 3 years. Analysis of debt creation and destruction shows that the expansion of debt was due to above-average creation of debt before the crisis—not insufficient credit destruction; credit destruction was actually slightly above average. Thus, credit activity was extensive during that period, with large amounts of both destruction and creation.
The deleveraging involved a decrease in creation (or origination) of debt: Creation started at nearly 10 percent in the expansion period but dropped below 5 percent after the financial crisis. Credit destruction was not the main contributor to the deleveraging: Destruction did not grow during the deleveraging period; it was actually slightly lower than during the expansion period. Thus, the deleveraging period of 2009-11 saw a very low level of credit activity, mainly due to the small amount of new credit issuance.
Finally, the stability of debt from 2011 to 2013 masked the increasing credit activity since both destruction and creation increased but offset each other. In sharp contrast, during the past year, the stability of debt has been due to very low levels of creation and destruction. In fact, credit activity is currently as low as it was in the middle of the financial crisis: about 9 percent of total household debt.
Overall, this analysis of household debt suggests that reduced credit creation, and not increased credit destruction, has been the key driver of the recent evolution of U.S. household debt. A topic for future investigation is that U.S. households are currently engaging in record low levels of financial intermediation, which is not obvious by simply observing the level of household debt.
Extract from a speech by Governor Powell at the Brookings Institution, Washington. The move to fully electronic trading raises important questions about the benefits of fully automated high-speed trading which may lead to industry concentration and liquidity fracturing as the arms-race continues. So it is a good time for market participants and regulators to collectively consider whether current market structures can be improved for the benefit of all.
Treasury markets have undergone important changes over the years. The footprints of the major dealers, who have long played the role of market makers, are in several respects smaller than they were in the pre-crisis period. Dealers cite a number of reasons for this change, including reductions in their own risk appetite and the effects of post-crisis regulations. At the same time, the Federal Reserve and foreign owners (about half of which are foreign central banks) have increased their ownership to over two-thirds of outstanding Treasuries (up from 61 percent in 2004). Banks have also increased their holdings of Treasuries to meet HQLA requirements. These holdings are less likely to turn over in secondary market trading, as the owners largely follow buy and hold strategies. Another change is the increased presence of asset managers, which now hold a bigger share of Treasuries as well. Mutual fund investors, who are accustomed to daily liquidity, now beneficially own a greater share of Treasuries.
Perhaps the most fundamental change in these markets is the move to electronic trading, which began in earnest about 15 years ago. It is hard to overstate the transformation in these markets. Only two decades ago, the dealers who participated in primary Treasury auctions had to send representatives, in person, to the offices of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to submit their bids on auction days. They dropped their paper bids into a box. The secondary market was a bit more advanced. There were electronic systems for posting interdealer quotes in the cash market, and the Globex platform had been introduced for futures. Still, most interdealer trades were conducted over the phone and futures trading was primarily conducted in the open pit.
Today these markets are almost fully electronic. Interdealer trading in the cash Treasury market is conducted over electronic trading platforms. Thanks to advances in telecommunications and computing, the speed of trading has increased at least a million-fold. Advances in computing and faster access to trading platforms have also allowed new types of firms and trading strategies to enter the market. Algorithmic and high-frequency trading firms deploy a wide and diverse range of strategies. In particular, the technologies and strategies that people associate with high frequency trading are also regularly employed by broker-dealers, hedge funds, and even individual investors. Compared with the speed of trading 20 years ago, anyone can trade at high frequencies today, and so, to me, this transformation is more about technology than any one particular type of firm.
Given all these changes, we need to have a more nuanced discussion as to the state of the markets. Are there important market failures that are not likely to self-correct? If so, what are the causes, and what are the costs and benefits of potential market-led or regulatory responses?
Some observers point to post-crisis regulation as a key factor driving any decline or change in the nature of liquidity. Although regulation had little to do with the events of October 15, I would agree that it may be one factor driving recent changes in market making. Requiring that banks hold much higher capital and liquidity and rely less on wholesale short-term debt has raised funding costs. Regulation has also raised the cost of funding inventories through repurchase agreement (repo markets). Thus, regulation may have made market making less attractive to banks. But these same regulations have also materially lowered banks’ probabilities of default and the chances of another financial crisis like the last one, which severely constrained liquidity and did so much damage to our economy. These regulations are new, and we should be willing to learn from experience, but their basic goals–to make the core of the financial system safer and reduce systemic risk–are appropriate, and we should be prepared to accept some increase in the cost of market making in order to meet those goals.
Regulation is only one of the factors–and clearly not the dominant one–behind the evolution in market making. As we have seen, markets were undergoing dramatic change long before the financial crisis. Technological change has allowed new types of trading firms to act as market makers for a large and growing share of transactions, not just in equity and foreign exchange markets but also in Treasury markets. As traditional dealers have lost market share, one way they have sought to remain competitive is by attempting to internalize their customer trades–essentially trying to create their own markets by finding matches between their customers who are seeking to buy and sell. Internalization allows these firms to capture more of the bid-ask spread, but it may also reduce liquidity in the public market. At the same time it does not eliminate the need for a public market, where price discovery mainly occurs, as dealers must place the orders that they cannot internalize into that market.
While the changes I’ve just discussed are unlikely to go away, I believe that markets will adapt to them over time. In the meantime, we have a responsibility to make sure that market and regulatory incentives appropriately encourage an evolution that will sustain market liquidity and functioning.
In thinking about market incentives, one observer has noted that trading rules and structures have grown to matter crucially as trading speeds have increased–in her words, “At very fast speeds, only the [market] microstructure matters. Trading algorithms are, after all, simply a set of rules, and they will necessarily interact with and optimize against the rules of the trading platforms they operate on. If trading is at nanoseconds, there won’t be a lot of “fundamental” news to trade on or much time to formulate views about the long-run value of an asset; instead, trading at these speeds can become a game played against order books and the market rules. We can complain about certain trading practices in this new environment, but if the market is structured to incentivize those practices, then why should we be surprised if they occur?
The trading platforms in both the interdealer cash and futures markets are based on a central limit order book, in which quotes are executed based on price and the order they are posted. A central limit order book provides for continuous trading, but it also provides incentives to be the fastest. A trader that is faster than the others in the market will be able to post and remove orders in reaction to changes in the order book before others can do so, earning profits by hitting out-of-date quotes and avoiding losses by making sure that the trader’s own quotes are up to date.
Technology and greater competition have led to lower costs in many areas of our economy. At the same time, slower traders may be put at a disadvantage in this environment, which could cause them to withdraw from markets or seek other venues, thus fracturing liquidity. And one can certainly question how socially useful it is to build optic fiber or microwave networks just to trade at microseconds or nanoseconds rather than milliseconds. The cost of these technologies, among other factors, may also be driving greater concentration in markets, which could threaten their resilience. The type of internalization now done by dealers is only really profitable if done on a large scale, and that too has led to greater market concentration.
A number of observers have suggested reforms for consideration. For example, some recent commentators propose frequent batch auctions as an alternative to the central limit order book, and argue that this would lead to greater market liquidity. Others have argued that current market structures may lead to greater volatility, and suggested possible alterations designed to improve the situation. To be clear, I am not embracing any particular one of these ideas. Rather, I am suggesting that now is a good time for market participants and regulators to collectively consider whether current market structures can be improved for the benefit of all.
The Federal Reserve System announced the appointment of Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Senior Vice President Sean Rodriguez as its Faster Payments Strategy Leader. In this role, Rodriguez will lead activities to identify effective approaches for implementing a safe, ubiquitous, faster payments capability in the United States.
Rodriguez will chair the Federal Reserve’s Faster Payments Task Force, comprised of more than 300 payment system stakeholders interested in improving the speed of authorization, clearing, settlement and notification of various types of personal and business payments. In addition to leading faster payments activities, Rodriguez will continue to oversee the Federal Reserve’s Payments Industry Relations Program.
“Sean’s leadership experience across payment operations, customer relations and industry outreach is exactly what we need to successfully advance the vision for a faster payments capability in the United States,” said Gordon Werkema, the Federal Reserve’s payments strategy director to whom Rodriguez will report. “His passion has contributed significantly to the momentum behind our initiative to date and we’re confident in his ability to carry our strategy forward in strong partnership with the industry.”
Rodriguez brings more than 30 years of experience with Federal Reserve Financial Services in operations, product development, sales and marketing. He helped establish the Federal Reserve’s Customer Relations and Support Office in 2001 and served on the Federal Reserve’s leadership team for implementing the Check 21 initiative. More recently, Rodriguez was instrumental in the design and launch of the Federal Reserve’s Payments Industry Relations Program charged with engaging a broad range of organizations in efforts to improve the U.S. payment system.
Additional information about the Federal Reserve’s Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System, including the Faster Payments Task Force, is available at FedPaymentsImprovement.org.
The Federal Reserve believes that the U.S. payment system is at a critical juncture in its evolution. Technology is rapidly changing many elements that support the payment process. High-speed data networks are becoming ubiquitous, computing devices are becoming more sophisticated and mobile, and information is increasingly processed in real time. These capabilities are changing the nature of commerce and end-user expectations for payment services. Meanwhile, payment security and the protection of sensitive data, which are foundational to public confidence in any payment system, are challenged by dynamic, persistent and rapidly escalating threats. Finally, an increasing number of individuals and businesses routinely transfer value across borders and demand better payment options to swiftly and efficiently do so.
Considering these developments, traditional payment services, often operating on decades-old infrastructure, have adjusted slowly to these changes, while emerging players are coming to market quickly with innovative product offerings. There is opportunity to act collectively to avoid further fragmentation of payment services in the United States that might otherwise widen the gap between U.S. payment systems and those located abroad.
Collaborative action has the potential to increase convenience, ubiquity, cost effectiveness, security and cross-border interoperability for U.S. consumers and businesses when sending and receiving payments.
Since the Federal Reserve commenced a payment system improvement initiative in 2012, industry dialogue has advanced significantly and momentum toward common goals has increased. Many payment stakeholders are now independently initiating actions to discuss payment system improvements with one another—especially the prospect of increasing end-to-end payment speed and security. Responses to the Federal Reserve’s Consultation Paper indicate broad agreement with the gaps/opportunities and desired outcomes advanced in that paper. Diverse stakeholder groups have initiated efforts to work together to achieve payment system improvements. There is more common ground and shared vision than was previously thought to exist. We believe these developments illustrate a rare confluence of factors that create favorable conditions for change. Through this Strategies to Improve the U.S. Payment System paper, the Federal Reserve calls on all stakeholders to seize this opportunity and join together to improve the payment system.
The Federal Reserve Board has proposed a rule to modify its capital planning and stress testing regulations. The proposed changes would take effect for the 2016 capital plan and stress testing cycles.
The proposed rule would modify the timing for several requirements that have yet to be integrated into the stress testing framework. Banking organizations subject to the supplementary leverage ratio would begin to incorporate that ratio into their stress testing in the 2017 cycle. The use of advanced approaches risk-weighted assets–which is applicable to banking organizations with more than $250 billion in total consolidated assets or $10 billion in on-balance sheet foreign exposures–in stress testing would be delayed indefinitely, and all banking organizations would continue to use standardized risk-weighted assets.
Banking organizations are currently required to project post-stress regulatory capital ratios in their stress tests. As the common equity tier 1 capital ratio becomes fully phased in under the Board’s regulatory capital rule, it would generally require more capital than the tier 1 common ratio. The proposal would remove the requirement that banking organizations calculate a tier 1 common ratio.
The Board is also currently considering a broad range of issues related to its capital plan and stress testing rules. Any modifications will be undertaken through a separate rulemaking and would take effect no earlier than the 2017 cycle.
Comments on the proposal will be accepted through September 24, 2015.
The outlook for the economy and inflation is broadly consistent with the central tendency of the projections submitted by FOMC participants at the time of our June meeting. Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or accelerate this first step. We will be watching carefully to see if there is continued improvement in labor market conditions, and we will need to be reasonably confident that inflation will move back to 2 percent in the next few years.
Let me also stress that this initial increase in the federal funds rate, whenever it occurs, will by itself have only a very small effect on the overall level of monetary accommodation provided by the Federal Reserve. Because there are some factors, which I mentioned earlier, that continue to restrain the economic expansion, I currently anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.
Long-Run Economic Growth
Before I conclude, let me very briefly place my discussion of the economic outlook into a longer-term context. The Federal Reserve contributes to the nation’s economic performance in part by using monetary policy to help achieve our mandated goals of maximum employment and price stability. But success in promoting these objectives does not, by itself, ensure a strong pace of long-run economic growth or substantial improvements in future living standards. The most important factor determining continued advances in living standards is productivity growth, defined as the rate of increase in how much a worker can produce in an hour of work. Over time, sustained increases in productivity are necessary to support rising household incomes.
Here the recent data have been disappointing. The growth rate of output per hour worked in the business sector has averaged about 1‑1/4 percent per year since the recession began in late 2007 and has been essentially flat over the past year. In contrast, annual productivity gains averaged 2-3/4 percent over the decade preceding the Great Recession. I mentioned earlier the sluggish pace of wage gains in recent years, and while I do think that this is evidence of some persisting labor market slack, it also may reflect, at least in part, fairly weak productivity growth.
There are many unanswered questions about what has slowed productivity growth in recent years and about the prospects for productivity growth in the longer run. But we do know that productivity ultimately depends on many factors, including our workforce’s knowledge and skills along with the quantity and quality of the capital equipment, technology, and infrastructure that they have to work with. As a general principle, the American people would be well served by the active pursuit of effective policies to support longer-run growth in productivity. Policies to strengthen education and training, to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation, and to promote capital investment, both public and private, could all potentially be of great benefit in improving future living standards in our nation.
The IMF released their report on the United States. They reiterated the need for a credible medium-term fiscal strategy that would anchor ongoing consolidation efforts, underpin debt sustainability, and reduce fiscal uncertainties. Although the U.S. banking system has strengthened its capital position, the search for yield during the prolonged period of low interest rates, rapid growth in assets in the nonbank sector, and signs of stretched valuations across a range of asset markets point to emerging pockets of vulnerabilities. Potential financial sector risks include the migration of intermediation to the nonbanks; the potential for insufficient liquidity in a range of fixed income markets that could lead to abrupt moves in market pricing; and life-insurance companies that have taken on greater market risk.
Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.
The U.S. economy’s momentum in the first quarter was sapped by unfavorable weather, a sharp contraction in oil sector investment, and the West Coast port strike. But the underpinnings for a continued expansion remain in place. A solid labor market, accommodative financial conditions, and cheaper oil should support a more dynamic path for the remainder of the year. Despite this, the weaker outturn in the first few months of this year will unavoidably pull down 2015 growth, which is now projected at 2.5 percent. Stronger growth over the next few years is expected to return output to potential before it begins steadily declining to 2 percent over the medium term.
Inflation pressures remain muted. In May headline and core personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation declined to 0.2 and 1.2 percent year on year, respectively. Long-term unemployment and high levels of part-time work both point to remaining employment slack, and wage indicators on the whole have shown only tepid growth. When combined with the dollar appreciation and cheaper energy costs, inflation is expected to rise slowly staring later in the year, reaching the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent medium-term objective by mid 2017.
An important risk to growth is a further U.S. dollar appreciation. The real appreciation of the currency has been rapid, reflecting cyclical growth divergences, different trajectories for monetary policies among the systemically important economies, and a portfolio shift toward U.S. dollar assets. Lower oil prices and increasing energy independence have contained the U.S. current account deficit, despite the cyclical growth divergence with respect to its main trading partners and the rise in the U.S. dollar. Nevertheless, over the medium term, at current levels of the real exchange rate, the current account deficit is forecast to widen toward 3.5 percent of GDP.
Despite important policy uncertainties, the near term fiscal outlook has improved, and the federal government deficit is likely to move modestly lower in the current fiscal year. Following a temporary improvement, the federal deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios are, however, expected to begin rising again over the medium term as aging-related pressures assert themselves and interest rates normalize. In the near-term, the potential for disruption from either a government shutdown or a stand-off linked to the federal debt ceiling represent important (and avoidable) downside risks to growth and job creation that could move to the forefront, once again, later in 2015.
Much has been done over the past several years to strengthen the U.S. financial system. However, search for yield during the prolonged period of low interest rates, rapid growth in assets in the nonbank sector, and signs of stretched valuations across a range of asset markets point to emerging pockets of vulnerabilities. The more serious risks are likely to be linked to: (1) the migration of intermediation to the nonbanks; (2) the potential for insufficient liquidity in a range of fixed income markets that could lead to abrupt moves in market pricing; and (3) life-insurance companies that have taken on greater market risk. But several factors mitigate these downsides. In particular, the U.S. banking system has strengthened its capital position (Tier 1 capital as a ratio of risk-weighted assets is at about 13 percent) and appears resilient to a range of extreme market and economic shocks. In addition, overall leverage does not appear excessive, household and corporate balance sheets look generally healthy, and credit growth has been modest.
The consultation focused on the prospects for higher policy rates and the outlook for, and policy response to financial stability risks, integrating the findings of the latest IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program for the U.S.
Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They noted that the economic recovery continues to be underpinned by strong fundamentals, despite a temporary setback, while risks remain broadly balanced. Directors observed that considerable uncertainties, both domestic and external, weigh on the U.S. economy, with potential repercussions for the global economy and financial markets elsewhere. These include the timing and pace of interest rate increases, prospects for the dollar, and risks of weaker global growth. Directors stressed that managing these challenges, as well as addressing longstanding issues of public finances and structural weaknesses, are important policy priorities in the period ahead.
Directors agreed that decisions on interest rate increases should remain data-dependent, considering a broad range of indicators and carefully weighing the trade-offs involved. Specifically, they saw merit in awaiting clear signs of wage and price inflation, and sufficiently strong economic growth before initiating an interest rate increase. Noting the importance of the entire path of future policy rate changes, including in terms of the implications for outward spillovers and for financial markets, Directors were reassured by the Federal Reserve’s intention to follow a gradual pace of normalization. They welcomed the Federal Reserve’s efforts, and commitment to continue, to communicate its policy intentions clearly and effectively. Directors acknowledged that financial stability risks could arise from a protracted period of low interest rates. In this regard, they underscored the importance of strong regulatory, supervisory, and macroprudential frameworks to mitigate these risks.
Directors commended the authorities for the progress in reinforcing the architecture for financial sector oversight. They concurred with the main findings and recommendations of the Financial Sector Assessment Program assessment. Directors highlighted the need to complete the regulatory reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act and to address emerging pockets of vulnerability in the nonbank financial sector. They encouraged continued efforts to monitor and manage risks in the insurance sector, close data gaps, and improve the effectiveness of the Financial Stability Oversight Council while simplifying the broader institutional structure over time. Directors looked forward to further progress in enhancing cross-border cooperation among national regulators, and the framework for the resolution of cross-jurisdiction financial institutions.
Directors noted that there remain a range of challenges linked to fiscal health, lackluster business investment and productivity growth, and growing inequality. They agreed that reforms to the tax, pension, and health care systems will help create space for supporting near-term growth, including through infrastructure investment. Directors reiterated the need for a credible medium-term fiscal strategy that would anchor ongoing consolidation efforts, underpin debt sustainability, and reduce fiscal uncertainties. They called for renewed efforts to implement structural reforms to boost productivity and labor force participation, tackle poverty, address remaining weaknesses in the housing market, and advance the multilateral trade agenda.
DFA has been tracking the progress of Peer-to-Peer lending, and it continues to grow fast round the world. Here is a summary from the Lending Mag covering the best U.S. Peer-to-Peer Lending Sites for Borrowers. It is quite interesting comparing the different business models, charging structures and sheer scale of lending through this channel. In the US, at least, it is becoming a valid alternative funding source.
#1 Prosper Marketplace
Prosper Marketplace is The Lending Mag’s first choice among U.S. peer-to-peer lending companies for borrowers. This popular p2p lending platform made history in the United States when they became the first peer-to-peer lending site in the country in 2006. Since that time, Prosper has experienced tremendous growth and success, having recently surpassed $3 billion in loans. Recently, they were named by Forbes as one of the most promising companies in America.
Prosper places as number #1 on our list of p2p lenders because of the accessibility and attention to customers that they provide. Out of all the p2p lenders we have had interactions with, Prosper representatives were the most accommodating and reachable. You don’t feel like you are dealing with a cold, unreachable entity. You can sense the humanity behind the big name and they are there to help you. Here are more details about Prosper’s peer-to-peer lending site:
Maximum Loan Amount Available: $35,000
Minimum Loan Amount Available: $2,000
Average Time to Receive Funds (in days): 4 to 10 days
APR: 6.73% to 35.97%
Interest Rate: 6.05% to 31.90%
Term of Loan (years): 3 or 5
Minimum Credit Score Required: 640
Maximum Debt-to-Income Ratio: 30%
Loan Type (Secured or Unsecured): Unsecured loan
Application Affect On Your Credit: None
States Eligible To Borrow From p2p Lending Sites In Question: 47 + DC
Origination Fee: 1% to 5%
Late Fee: Greater of $15 or 5%
Unsuccessful Payment Fee: None
Check Processing: $15
Application Fee Charge: None
Prepayment Penalty Cost: None
Best Method of Contacting Their Support: Phone
#2 Lending Club
Lending Club is an absolute giant in the US peer-to-peer lending space. You really can’t talk about U.S. peer-to-peer lending without mentioning them. Their peer loans platform was founded shortly after Prosper in 2007, they’ve actually surpassed Prosper in the amount of loans funded. Many p2p loan investors feel that Lending Club’s website has the best user interface and it definitely has the largest and most impressive 3rd-party investor ecosystem.
In December of 2014 Lending Club had a wildly successful IPO on the NYSE, becoming the first publicly traded online peer-to-peer lender in US history. If this p2p lending site review was focused on investing, Lending Club would probably have been ranked #1. But getting approved to borrow through Lending Club can be a bit more difficult than with Prosper, knocking them to number #2 on our list from a borrower’s perspective. Here are more details about Lending Club’s peer-to-peer lending site:
Maximum Loan Amount Available: $35,000 ($300,000 for business loans)
Minimum Loan Amount Available: $1,000 ($15,000 for business loans)
Average Time to Receive Funds (in days): 4 to 10 days
APR: 5.99% to 32.99%
Interest Rate: 5.9% to 25.9%
Term of Loan (years): 1, 3 or 5
Minimum Credit Score Required: 660
Maximum Debt-to-Income Ratio: 35%
Loan Type (Secured or Unsecured): Unsecured loan
Application Affect On Your Credit: None
States Eligible To Borrow From p2p Lending Sites In Question:
Origination Fee: 0.99% to 5.99%
Late Fee: Greater of $15 or 5%
Unsuccessful Payment Fee: $15
Check Processing: $15
Application Fee Charge: None
Prepayment Penalty Cost: None
Best Method of Contacting Their Support: Phone
#3 Upstart
If you’ve recently graduated from college, you probably don’t need us to tell you how hard it is to convince a bank to give you a loan. Young people fresh out of college don’t usually have the type of income needed, enough credit history or a high enough credit score to get a reasonable loan rate, if you can get a loan at all.
This is where Upstart steps in. This innovative lending site began facilitating p2p loans in April 2014. They aim to help those who are under-served by traditional loan companies but are filled with potential. Instead of only judging creditworthiness from your credit score, employment history and income, Upstart looks at a wide range of nontraditional factors in order to determine whether you should get a shot at getting your loan funded. These other factors include which college you graduated from, your grade point average and it’s possible that they even take your SAT scores into account.
Upstart prides itself on looking past the cold numbers and saying yes to your requests when other lenders say no. Most of Upstart’s borrowers use the funds as debt consolidation loans in order to pay off high-interest credit cards, but you can use the funds as you please.
This fast-growing p2p lending site is becoming popular among Millennials especially because they are often in a situation where they don’t have a long track record of credit history and are often offered very high loan rates because of it. Taking a bad loan at an early age can easily set your financial life on the wrong road and Upstart realizes that such poor options are not necessary or fair.
Company officials have expressed that the company’s loan products are meant to serve a young and potential-laden population that is very likely to build a solid credit profile in the future, but just hasn’t had the opportunity to do so yet. By using their sophisticated algorithm to decipher key data, the peer-to-peer lending site is able approve the extension of consumer credit at affordable rates to young borrowers who are well-positioned to handle the loans responsibly.
Here are more details about Upstart’s peer-to-peer lending site:
Maximum Loan Amount Available: $35,000
Minimum Loan Amount Available: $3,000
Average Time to Receive Funds (in days): 2 to 16
APR: 5.67% to 29.99%
Interest Rate: 5% to 25.26%
Term of Loan (years): 3
Minimum Credit Score Required: 640
Maximum Debt-to-Income Ratio: 40% to 50%
Loan Type (Secured or Unsecured): Unsecured loan
Application Affect On Your Credit: None
States Eligible To Borrow From p2p Lending Sites In Question: 50
Origination Fee: 1% to 6%
Late Fee: Greater of $15 or 5%
Unsuccessful Payment Fee: $15
Check Processing: $15
Application Fee Charge: None
Prepayment Penalty Cost: None
Best Method of Contacting Their Support: Phone
#4 Funding Circle
Funding Circle is one of the world’s biggest peer-to-peer lending sites that actually focuses primarily on small business loans. They have a US counterpart to their peer to peer lending UK branch. They’ve facilitated more than $1 billion in loans to more than 8,000 businesses in the US and UK combined. Today, 40,000 retail investors (normal people), major banks, financial institutions and even the UK Government are lending to small businesses through the Funding Circle marketplace.
Funding Circle is intensely focused on helping small businesses get loans through their p2p lending site because they have roots in small business. Their U.S. co-founders started the peer-to-peer lending site because they were small business owners themselves, they were getting rejected for small business funding at every turn and after getting rejected for small business loans nearly 100 times, they realized something was very wrong with the traditional bank lending system, it was internally flawed. They saw first hand that even when you have a growing and successful business venture that’s doing well, it’s still far too difficult to get a business loan. From that point forward, they were more determined than ever to build a more sensible small business loan solution for American business owners.
Maximum Loan Amount Available: $500,000 for business loans
Minimum Loan Amount Available: $25,000 for business loans
Average Time to Receive Funds (in days): 5 to 14
APR:
Interest Rate: 5.99% to 20.99%
Term of Loan (years): 1 to 5
Minimum Credit Score Required: 620
Maximum Debt-to-Income Ratio: Not Disclosed
Loan Type (Secured or Unsecured): Secured loan
Application Affect On Your Credit: Hard pull on your credit
States Eligible To Borrow From p2p Lending Sites In Question: 47 + DC
Origination Fee: 2.99%
Late Fee: 10%
Unsuccessful Payment Fee: $35
Check Processing: $0
Application Fee Charge: None
Prepayment Penalty Cost: None
Best Method of Contacting Their Support: Phone
#5 Peerform
Peerform was started by Wall Street executives with extensive backgrounds in Finance and Technology in 2010, the peer-to-peer lending site’s creators saw an opportunity to make funding available to borrowers when they noticed that banks seemed unwilling to lend to people and small businesses in need.
Peerform has built a good track record of giving borrowers an opportunity that the banking system had denied them and a very positive experience when seeking unsecured personal loans through an online lending process that is transparent, fast and easy to understand.
To apply for an online peer-to-peer loan from Peerform, you fill out the application on their site and they will make a soft pull on your credit to see if you meet the minimum requirements for a loan. They are one of the few major peer-to-peer lending sites that accepts borrowers with FICO scores as low as 600. Those who qualify for a loan have their loan request posted on the website and it stays active for 14 days while peer-to-peer investors decide if the loan is an attractive investment or not. If your loan is fully funded within the 2 week time period, you’ll be contacted by Peerform to approve and accept the loan. If your loan is not fully funded in the 2 week time period but has raised at least $1,000, you may choose to accept or reject the lesser amount. It is completely your call, you are not obligated to accept the loan. If you do choose to accept the loan, it will be deposited to your bank account within a few business days.
When we tested their customer service and contacted Peerform, we had positive experiences both via email and on the phone. After sending an email we received a written response within 24 hours, and most of our questions were answered to satisfaction. When talking to them by phone, we noted that the company rep was very knowledgeable about the loan process and able to give helpful answers. Their site also provides all of the most important information you’d need to know about their peer-to-peer loan process, including APRs, interest rates, potential loan amounts and fees, etc. You can also contact a customer rep using the live chat option they have on the website. Here are more details about Peerform’s peer-to-peer lending site:
Maximum Loan Amount Available: $25,000
Minimum Loan Amount Available: $1,000
Average Time to Receive Funds (in days): 2 to 16
APR: 7.12% to 28.09%
Interest Rate: 6.4% to 25%
Term of Loan (years): 3
Minimum Credit Score Required: 600
Maximum Debt-to-Income Ratio: Varies
Loan Type (Secured or Unsecured): Unsecured loan
Application Affect On Your Credit: None
States Eligible To Borrow From p2p Lending Sites In Question: 23
Origination Fee: 1% to 5%
Late Fee: Greater of $15 or 5%
Unsuccessful Payment Fee: $15
Check Processing: $15
Application Fee Charge: None
Prepayment Penalty Cost: None
Best Method of Contacting Their Support: Phone
#6 Sofi
Sofi is a highly respected marketplace lending website, with nearly $3 billion in peer loans issued to this date.
They made it onto this peer-to-peer lending sites review because they do a good job at assisting early stage professionals accelerate their success with student loan refinancing, mortgage refinancing, mortgages and unsecured personal loans.
Their nontraditional loan underwriting approach takes into account merit and employment history among other determining factors, in effect, allowing their peer-to-peer lending site to offer loans that often are hard to find elsewhere.
From The Conversation. Until recently, affordable housing was mentioned only in conversations involving low-wage or unemployed workers – or the homeless. The only groups that focused on rising rental costs were low-income housing advocacy groups.
That has now changed.
For the first time since possibly the Great Depression, the lack of affordable housing is being viewed as a crisis that affects Americans of all ages, races and income groups.
While the US Supreme Court spotlighted the issue in Thursday’s ruling allowing parties to challenge housing practices even if they do not (or cannot) prove there was intentional bias or discrimination, the mainstream media is finally catching on as well.
In the last three weeks, the Washington Post, New York Times and Wall Street Journal have all sounded the alarm about the country’s looming affordable housing crisis. In addition, well-heeled non-profit groups – like the foundation recently formed by the former CEO of the nation’s largest apartment developer – have begun urging politicians to address the growing problem of rental housing unaffordability.
Growing more somber
Some of the recent media attention on the unaffordability of housing was triggered by the 2015 State of the Nation’s Housing report, just released by the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS). While the JCHS has issued a similar report every year since 1988, the latest edition opens with an unusually somber tone about the state of housing in this country.
“Homeownership at 20-Year Lows,” bellows the opening line of the 2015 report.
By comparison, the first line in 2013 highlighted the “Housing Market Revival,” while the 2014 report only hinted at the growing problems with “Single-Family Slowdown.”
This change in tone was very slow in coming. The 2013 report optimistically reported that “the long-awaited housing recovery finally took hold in 2012.” The 2014 report, while less rose-tinted, still noted that “the housing market gained steam in early 2013.”
The 2015 report strikes a decidedly different and more alarmist tone by emphasizing that the housing recovery “lost momentum” as homeownership rates continued to fall. This report then chronicles the increase in the number of renters who are “cost-burdened” and cannot find affordable housing and the number of minority neighborhoods that still have not recovered from the recession.
Who’s struggling
While news sources have intermittently reported on housing affordability issues since the recession, what is new about the current affordable housing reports is who is struggling to find affordable housing. It’s no longer just millennials or the poor or homeless people.
Prior accounts have described the low homeownership rates of cash-starved millennials who live with their parents because of high student loan debt and low-wage jobs.
The recent New York Times article discusses former homeowners who are now forced to rent because they lost their homes to foreclosure and cannot qualify for a mortgage loan because of blemished credit. Likewise, the Washington Post article discusses middle- and even upper-income renters and the fact that many parents of millennials are now struggling to find affordable housing.
The JCHS report explains that homeownership rates for Americans aged 35 to 44 have now dropped to levels not seen since the 1960s. In describing the housing affordability crisis for renters, the report shows that from 2004 to 2014, older Americans (aged 45 to 64) became renters at greater rates than millennials households under the age of 35.
Today’s rental crisis
Housing affordability is no longer limited to the lowest-paid workers. The JCHS report stresses that renters whose earnings place them in the highest-income quartile now account for more than 20% of new renters.
Renters are no longer the low-income, working-class Americans typically featured in news reports. Today’s rental crisis is now affecting just about everyone but the really rich.
The Wall Street Journal article assumes that policymakers are either blissfully unaware of the affordable housing crisis, or they are unwilling to do anything about it.
Politicians have not been willing to make changes to popular housing laws or policies that benefit upper-income homeowners, like the mortgage interest deduction. And they haven’t been willing to provide additional relief to lower-income renters by, for example, expanding the low income tax credit.
Politicians may be unwilling to do anything to solve the affordable housing crisis. But, after these recent reports, they can no longer say they don’t know the crisis exists.
Author: Mechele Dickerson, Professor of Law at University of Texas at Austin
A gradual hike in interest rates would increase the cost of borrowing for US companies, likely resulting in lower profits and slower growth, according to Fitch Ratings.
But while higher rates would cause some discomfort, Fitch continues to believe a gradual rise would have limited impact for U.S. corporate credits as a whole, given the offsetting backdrop of US economic growth and aggressive refinancing by most corporates over the last few years that has resulted in maturities being pushed out with low-coupon, long dated debt.
In contrast, under our stress case scenario, rapid interest rate increases by the Federal Reserve would put additional pressure on credit metrics and could prompt more rating changes. Our stress case scenario includes more rapid rate increases, a choking off of near-term credit, a flattening of the yield curve and a spike in inflation. Against a backdrop of increased M&A activity, interest rate pressure could also impair the financial flexibility of buyers as acquisitions become more expensive to finance.
The ability to handle interest rate increases varies by corporate sector. U.S. Corporate sectors with cost recovery mechanisms (utilities, master limited partnerships (MLPs)) or strong pricing power (aerospace and defense, engineering and construction) are generally among those best able to counter the challenges in the stress case stemming from faster rising inflation and interest rates, while sectors with limited pricing power(such as homebuilders) may encounter more issues.
The secondary effects of a stress scenario are also important, as rising rates in a stagnant economic environment are likely to dampen equity values. Sectors where ongoing access to capital markets is critical for funding growth (REITs and MLPs) are likely to be especially sensitive to the stress scenario, given their high distributions and limited ability to retain cash.
