Martin North – Page 1002 – Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog

Digital Transformation Gets A Budget Boost

Following the earlier announcement to create a Digital Transformation Office, it now has a formal budget as last night the Treasurer directed more than $250m to the creation of the programme. The aim of the initiative is to recast Government service delivery digitally. The DTO will be responsible for digital service delivery across government. The DTO will lead and coordinate the government’s digital transformation and will work with government agencies as they invest in the technology that will underpin digital services. The DTO will not just be about user friendly websites. The DTO has been established to deliver digital by default and to make services simpler. The DTO will act as a digital champion across government and help agencies with limited digital expertise realise the benefits of digital government. Government agencies will retain responsibility for ICT investment decisions that do not relate to citizen focused digital service delivery. A recently released schematic tells the story.

User Needs

The budget included funding of $95.3 million has been allocated to establish the DTO as a standalone agency from 1 July and $159.3 million will be used to deliver phase one of the Digital Transformation Agenda. This involves progressing work in five key areas:

The Digital Service Standard outlines a digital by design approach to government services. The standard will ensure that all new and redesigned services are designed consistently and will be simpler and easier to use.
The Trusted Digital Identity Framework will give users choice and control if they choose to establish a digital identity. The use of digital identities will improve access to services, new products and markets for consumers and industry.
New and improved services for individuals that will improve the quality of online interactions with government. They include a Tell Us Once capability to update your personal details once across government, enhancements to the digital inbox through myGov, and a new voice identification service for identity.
Businesses will also receive new and improved services, including Tell Us Once for businesses and a new digital mailbox, which will be accessed with a wider range of credentials.
The Better Grants Administration initiative will streamline the administration of grants and reduce work for grants applicants. Two grants administration hubs will be developed, savings applicants and recipients time and money by enabling them to discover, register, and prequalify for grants that match their profile.

They plan to engage with individuals and businesses, and state and territory and local governments as work on the agenda moves into full gear.

NZ Property Investors Highly Geared – RBNZ

In the May Stability Report the RBNZ have drilled into the Investment Property sector. They say they will be publishing more detailed data, but the current article makes interesting reading. Housing investors have consistently accounted for over one-third of property purchase transactions over the past decade, with the share rising slightly following the introduction of loan-to-value ratio (LVR) restrictions in October 2013 (figure A1). Sales to investors in the Auckland market have picked up in line with the rise in sales activity since November, and this is likely to be contributing to recent strength in Auckland house prices. Investors are also a key source of new mortgage credit demand, with property investors accounting for approximately one-third of new mortgage lending over the six months ended March 2015.

Although New Zealand has not experienced a financial crisis associated with the housing market, a range of international evidence suggests that defaults on investor lending tend to be significantly higher than for owner occupiers during severe downturns. For example, Irish investor mortgage default rates were around 20 percent higher than total mortgage default rates in the two years following the GFC. Default probabilities were estimated to have been significantly higher than owner-occupiers at any given LVR. Evidence from the UK and the US also finds that default rates were relatively high among investors in severe downturns. The Reserve Bank’s proposal to apply higher risk weights to investor lending, and introduce a differential LVR threshold for investors relative to owneroccupiers in Auckland, is consistent with this evidence.

A key driver of the higher default propensity of residential property investors is higher debt-to-income ratios (income gearing) relative to owner-occupiers. For example, an investor who has borrowed to buy four houses will end up with much larger negative equity relative to their labour income, if house prices fall, than an owner-occupier with just one house and a similar LVR. Higher income gearing reduces the incentive for the investor to continue servicing the outstanding loans, resulting in a greater tendency for investors to default when they have negative equity.

Another possible reason for the higher risks associated with investor lending is that investor house purchases have, in some countries, tended to be concentrated in areas with high expected capital growth. These expectations are often based on recent house price appreciation.

Evidence from the US suggests that increases in house prices prior to the GFC were particularly pronounced in regions where the investor share of house purchases increased. In turn, areas with rapid house price inflation experienced relatively large house price falls in the aftermath of the crisis.

In New Zealand, a significant proportion of property investors have large portfolios, implying a large degree of gearing relative to their underlying labour income. For example, the 2014 ANZ Residential Property Investment Survey shows that 26 percent of surveyed investors held seven or more investment properties (figure A2). Around half of investor commitments are at LVRs of more than 70 percent. Preliminary Reserve Bank survey data suggests that investors tend to make greater use of interest-only loans, which may partly reflect investors’ ability to offset mortgage expenses against personal income for tax purposes. As a result, investor loans are likely to retain a higher level of gearing over the long term than their owner-occupier counterparts.

The risks associated with investor lending are likely to be greatest in the Auckland region. Rapid house price appreciation in Auckland has compressed rental yields, and this is likely increasing income gearing among Auckland investors. Auckland rental yields are at record lows, while national yields are close to their 10-year average (figure A3). Relatively strong capital gain expectations among Auckland investors may explain why they are willing to accept such low rental yields. According to the 2014 ANZ Residential Property Investment Survey, investors in Auckland expected house price inflation to average 12 percent per annum in the region over the coming five years, compared to 8 percent nationwide. CoreLogic data also show that investors in the Auckland region are more likely to use mortgage finance than investors outside the Auckland region.

This Budget Won’t Fix Australia’s Limping Economy. It Shouldn’t Try – The Conversation

The Australian economy is limping along – growing barely fast enough to absorb new workers, with interest rates at record lows, slow wage growth constraining household consumption, and investment relatively weak and declining due to weak business confidence according to Ross Guest Professor of Economics and National Senior Teaching Fellow at Griffith University in his post on The Conversation.

The 2015-16 Budget is not going to turn this around. The deficit is expected to decrease from A$39.4 billion to A$33 billion which, given the margin for error that we’ve observed in past budgets, is neither here nor there in its economy-wide impact. It is the change in the deficit, not the size of the deficit itself, that determines whether a budget is contractionary or expansionary. So this budget will have a roughly neutral impact on the aggregate demand for goods and services.

This is the right fiscal policy stance. In fact, a neutral fiscal policy stance should be the general rule for Australia. It is unwise to attempt to use the Australian federal budget to manage economic growth.

Fiscal vs monetary policy

The Australian economy is periodically buffeted by large swings in commodity prices – base metal prices in particular, the last decade being a prime example. These swings are a major influence on growth in nominal GDP – the dollar value of the goods and services we produce. And this, in turn, is a key driver of the budget balance.

These relationships are illustrated in the chart below. You can see how closely the swings in base metals prices match growth in nominal GDP, especially over the past decade.

Attempting to use fiscal policy to smooth out these fluctuations is fraught with risks. Commodity prices can bounce back quite suddenly and unexpectedly, as they did in 2010-11 following the financial crisis (see chart). Fiscal stimulus is not so nimble.

In fact, the A$42 billion National Building and Jobs Plan – introduced in 2009-10 by then-Treasurer Wayne Swan to stimulate Australia in the aftermath of the global financial crisis – took years to roll out, with some school buildings still to be constructed in 2014.

As the chart shows, commodity prices had by, that time, risen and then fallen again, as had nominal GDP growth. That meant the government’s fiscal stance was out of sync with the state of the economy; it wasn’t clear exactly what cyclical downturn the stimulus was supposed to be smoothing out.

The claim that the Federal Government should have spent more in this Budget because Australia’s debt is low by international standards misses the point.

If you have no debt and then take a four week overseas holiday on your credit card, is it all OK because your debt is still lower than most other people’s? That depends on whether the holiday was better than the alternative use of the funds. Or is it OK because in a couple of years your income will pick up and you’ll be able to pay down the debt then? What if your income doesn’t pick up or you don’t have the discipline to pay down the debt?

This is what governments face when they try to stimulate the economy with borrowed money. Six years after the spending binge that started in 2009, the economy has not bounced back to enable the debt to be repaid as a naïve textbook model might assume. Rather, it sits on the balance sheets of current and future households, through their government, as future tax liabilities which will dampen future growth and cost future jobs.

Managing the swings in the economy is best left to the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). The RBA is more nimble than the government when it comes to stimulating aggregate demand.

For example, the RBA increased the cash rate seven times between 2009 and 2011 when nominal GDP recovered (see chart) at the same time as the Government was still pumping out billions of (borrowed) stimulus spending. So we had conflicting policy responses.

Also, the Australian dollar is very responsive to the RBA’s interest rate policy and supports it. It falls when rates are cut (which stimulates tradable goods and services) and rises when rates are increased.

Not so for active fiscal policy – the Australian dollar fights against active fiscal policy. It wants to rise when the government is trying to pump up the economy and fall when the government tries to slow down the economy.

Consumer confidence

Going forward, the main brake on the Australian economy is the lack of business and consumer confidence, as noted in the RBA’s May Statement on Monetary Policy. Consumers seem to be less responsive to lower interest rates than they have typically been. They have not responded much to the eight cuts in official interest rates from 4.75% to 2.25% that occurred between 2011 to 2014.

Why are consumers and business so cautious? One reason is because we have no idea whether a range of government policies in relation to taxation, superannuation, pensions, family benefits and so on, will get through the fractious Australian Parliament. So the less controversial this budget is, the better for consumer and business confidence.

There may be another factor at play. Households may worry that the Australian Government’s rising debt is, in fact, their own future tax liabilities (which they are, or those of their children). This debt has reduced the Government’s net financial worth by 20% of GDP since 2007, according to the latest Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (Table D9).

Worse, the Budget Papers project a further 20% decline in the Government’s net worth in the next two years. This is a large transfer of net worth from future households to today’s households. So even though the deficit is stabilising and projected to decline, it is still significant and adding to government debt and future tax liabilities.

If this Budget does not kick-start confidence, we have to ask whether the large build up of future tax liabilities is partly to blame.

RBNZ Announces New LVR Restrictions on Auckland Housing

New Zealand’s financial system is sound and operating effectively, but faces significant risks, Reserve Bank Governor, Graeme Wheeler, said today when releasing the Bank’s May Financial Stability Report.

Mr Wheeler identified three systemic risks facing the New Zealand financial system.

“Auckland’s median house price is 60 percent above its 2008 level, and house prices in Auckland have been rising rapidly since late last year. This reflects ongoing supply constraints and increased demand, driven by record net immigration, low interest rates and increasing investor activity. Prices in the Auckland region have become very stretched, increasing the risk of financial instability from a sharp correction in prices.

“A second area of risk for the financial system relates to the dairy sector, which is experiencing a sharp fall in incomes due to lower international prices. Many highly leveraged farms are facing negative cash-flows, and the risks will become more pronounced if low milk prices persist beyond the current season.

“The third key risk arises from the current very easy global financial conditions. Low interest rates are encouraging investors into riskier assets in the search for yield. Prices of both financial and real assets are becoming overextended in many markets. There is an increasing risk that the current benign conditions unwind in a disorderly fashion, disrupting the cost and availability of funding for the New Zealand financial system.”

LVR Restrictions

In response to the growing housing market risk in Auckland, the Reserve Bank is today announcing proposed changes to the loan-to-value ratio (LVR) policy. The policy changes, proposed to take effect from 1 October, will:

• Require residential property investors in the Auckland Council area using bank loans to have a deposit of at least 30 percent.

• Increase the existing speed limit for high LVR borrowing outside of Auckland from 10 to 15 percent, to reflect the more subdued housing market conditions outside of Auckland.

• Retain the existing 10 percent speed limit for loans to owner-occupiers in Auckland at LVRs of greater than 80 percent.

“We are proposing these adjustments to the LVR policy to more directly target investor activity in the Auckland region, where house prices relative to incomes and rent are far more elevated than elsewhere in New Zealand.

“The objective of this policy is to promote financial stability by reducing the rate of increase in Auckland house prices, and to improve the resilience of the banking system to a potential downturn in the Auckland housing market.”

Mr Wheeler emphasised that while the new measures aim to moderate housing demand, policies to ease housing supply constraints in Auckland remain the key to addressing the region’s housing imbalances over the longer term.

Deputy Governor, Grant Spencer, said that the Bank will issue a consultation paper in late May, providing further details and seeking feedback on the new LVR proposals.

“Prior to the proposed introduction of the policy in October, we expect banks to observe the spirit of the restrictions and not seek to expand high-LVR investor lending in Auckland.

“Given the importance of encouraging residential construction activity in Auckland, and consistent with the existing LVR policy, the proposed LVR restrictions will not apply to loans to construct new houses or apartments.

“Consistent with the LVR measures, the Reserve Bank is establishing a new asset class for bank loans to residential property investors. Banks will be expected to hold more capital against this asset class to reflect the higher risks inherent in such lending.

“Following a lengthy consultation process, we have decided that a residential property investor loan will be defined as any retail mortgage secured on a residential property that is not owner-occupied.”

A summary of submissions received in response to the consultation will be released later this month, and details will be provided on the implementation of the new asset class, including on the proposed capital treatment of residential investor loans.

The new asset class will take effect from 1 October 2015 for new lending, with a further phase-in period of nine months for the reclassification of existing loans.

“Given the broader risks facing the financial system, it is crucial that banks maintain their capital and liquidity buffers and apply prudent lending standards. Later this year the Reserve Bank will be reviewing bank capital requirements in light of global and domestic developments affecting the safety of the banking system,” Mr Spencer said.

Investor Loans Still Hot – ABS

The ABS released their housing finance data to March 2015. Pretty common story, with the trend estimate for the total value of dwelling finance commitments excluding alterations and additions rising 0.8%. Owner occupied housing commitments rose 0.8% and investment housing commitments rose 0.8%. In trend terms, the number of commitments for owner occupied housing finance rose 0.4% in March 2015.

In trend terms, the number of commitments for the purchase of established dwellings rose 0.7%, while the number of commitments for the construction of dwellings fell 1.4% and the number of commitments for the purchase of new dwellings fell 0.1%. The growth in investor property loans continued, with more than half in March (excluding refinance). Refinancing also grew in value and in percentage terms, from 18% of all loans a year ago, to over 20%, stimulated by ultra low rates.

Looking at the First Time Buyer data, in original terms, WA had the highest share of FTB, and NSW the lowest.

The percentage of FTB compared with all dwellings is relatively static.

However, if we overlay the DFA survey data on first time buyers who are going straight to investment property, this continues to rise, and pushes the true number of FTB higher. We continue to see a rotation away from owner occupation to investor first time buyers.

Bank of England Maintains Bank Rate at 0.5%

The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee at its meeting on 8 May voted to maintain Bank Rate at 0.5%. The Committee also voted to maintain the stock of purchased assets financed by the issuance of central bank reserves at £375 billion. The Committee’s latest inflation and output projections will appear in the Inflation Report to be published at 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday 13 May. At the same time, an open letter from the Governor to the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be published, following the release of data for CPI inflation of 0.0% in March.

The previous change in Bank Rate was a reduction of 0.5 percentage points to 0.5% on 5 March 2009. A programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves was initiated on 5 March 2009. The previous change in the size of that programme was an increase of £50 billion to a total of £375 billion on 5 July 2012.

The Bank will continue to offer to purchase high-quality private sector assets on behalf of the Treasury, financed by the issue of Treasury bills, in line with the arrangements announced on 29 January 2009 and 29 November 2011.

Credit Losses At Australian Banks Are All About Lending Standards – RBA

A very timely paper from David Rodgers at the Economic Research Department RBA. An analysis of credit losses in the banking system highlights the importance of lending standards, and that although up to now higher risks lay in the business sector, lending standards in the household sector, especially with the concentration on housing lending, are critically important (and we would add in the light of current household debt ratios, see the earlier post). A rise in unemployment on par with that in the early 1990s could be expected to have a more severe influence on household credit losses, given the large rise in household indebtedness over the intervening period. A corollary of this rise in household indebtedness is the greater share of banks’ lending now made up by housing and personal lending. These considerations suggest that any weakening in lending standards in these areas could have a larger systemic impact than in the past.

Credit risk – the risk that borrowers will not repay their loans – is one of the main risks that financial intermediaries (such as banks) face. Credit risk has been the underlying driver of most systemic banking crises in advanced economies over recent decades. As credit risk materialises and borrowers fail to make repayments, banks are forced to recognise the reduction in current and future cash inflows this represents. These ‘credit losses’ reduce a bank’s profitability and can affect capital. In extreme cases, credit losses can be large enough to reduce a bank’s capital ratio below regulatory requirements or minimum levels at which other private sector entities are willing to deal with a bank, so can cause banks to fail.

This paper explores the historical credit loss experience of the Australian banking system. It does so using a newly compiled dataset covering the bank-level credit losses of larger Australian banks over 1980 to 2013. Portfolio-level credit loss data – data that break losses down by type of lending (e.g. business, housing and personal lending) – are available for a broad range of banks only from 2008 onwards, so this paper mainly uses total loan portfolio data. This paper provides the first narrative account of banking system credit losses in Australia that includes both the early 1990s and global financial crisis episodes.

Credit losses in Australian banking in the post-deregulation period have been concentrated in two episodes: the very large losses around the early 1990s recession and the smaller losses during and after the global financial crisis. They have a close temporal relationship with the economic cycle, peaking close to troughs in GDP during downturns. A narrative account attributes the key roles indriving credit losses to business sector conditions such as business indebtedness and commercial property prices. The available data on portfolio-level losses indicate that elevated losses during these downturns stemmed from banks’ lending to businesses, rather than their lending to households. Data available from 2008 onwards indicate losses on housing loans barely rose (from very low levels) during the global financial crisis, even though housing prices and employment fell noticeably in some geographical areas.One of the main contributions of this paper is an econometric panel-data model that properly controls for bank-level portfolio composition. This model indicates business sector conditions, rather than household sector conditions, have been the driver of domestic credit losses over the period studied. The relevant business sector conditions – interest burden, profitability and commercial property prices – are indicators of the ability of this sector to service its debts and of the value of the collateral behind these debts. As a corollary, the model indicates that most losses over the past three decades were incurred on banks’ business lending, and household losses were largely unresponsive to economic conditions in that period. Unlike past work, these results are consistent with the narrative account of credit losses in Australian banking.

Descriptive accounts attribute the scale of losses during the early 1990s to poor lending standards, and the data support this. One piece of evidence, based on quantile regressions, indicates that changes in macro-level conditions have had very different impacts upon banks with similar portfolios (in terms of the shares of business, housing and personal lending). Most compellingly, standard models cannot explain the extremely high credit losses experienced at some state government-owned banks in the early 1990s. Given the anecdotal evidence that these banks had below-average lending standards, this is consistent with the conclusion that poor lending standards have caused the very worst credit loss outcomes over recent decades.

These conclusions have practical implications for stress testing. The credit loss models in this paper that use least squares estimation, and include bank-level variables, are unable to explain, and so unlikely to predict, the very worst credit loss outcomes. Many stress-testing exercises use similar (and in some cases simpler) econometric models (see, for example, IMF (2012)). As the worst credit loss outcomes are the most relevant when stress testing, this suggests that alternative models are needed. Covas, Rump and Zakrajsek (2013) show that a type of quantile regression (quite different to that in this paper) can provide out-of sample forecasts that encompass the credit losses experienced by the US banking system during the global financial crisis. In an Australian context, Durrani, Peat and Arnold (2014) show that allowing variation in credit risk outcomes across banks, rather than applying the same average risk parameters to all banks, can lead to significantly larger loss estimates. Stress-testing models could also be improved by incorporating better data on lending standards. The Federal Reserve collects and makes use of loan-level data on borrower characteristics in its annual stress tests of the largest US banks (Board of Governors 2014). This captures some aspects of the risk profile of borrowers; more work is probably needed to make it possible to systemise and accurately record banks’ lending standards.

The historical experience of credit losses at Australian banks this paper describes should help to guide overall understanding of the credit risk they currently face. It supports a continued focus on the analysis of the financial health of the business sector (one output of this work is a chapter of the Reserve Bank’s semiannual Financial Stability Review). As another example, credit loss measures appear to peak before asset performance measures, potentially providing an early signal of future improvement in financial system stability.

The lack of a historical relationship between household sector conditions and credit losses should be used cautiously in contemporary debates on the riskiness of housing lending. It indicates that the macroeconomic shocks experienced by the household sector during the past three decades have been small relative to the lending standards in place for housing lending over this period. Future macroeconomic shocks may, however, have a larger impact on households. There have been, for example, no large nationwide falls in house prices during recent decades. In addition, a rise in unemployment on par with that in the early 1990s could be expected to have a more severe influence on household credit losses, given the large rise in household indebtedness over the intervening period. A corollary of this rise in household indebtedness is the greater share of banks’ lending now made up by housing and personal lending. These considerations suggest that any weakening in lending standards in these areas could have a larger systemic impact than in the past.

Australian Mortgage Holders Sensitive to Interest Rate Movements – CoreLogic RP Data

An article by Cameron Kusher, CoreLogic RP Data senior research analyst highlights that according to data from the Reserve Bank the ratio of household debt to disposable income is 153.8% and the ratio of housing deb to disposable income is 140.3% both of which are record highs.

Each quarter the Reserve Bank (RBA) publishes selected household finance ratios which show some key statistics about the level of debt held by Australian households. Although Australia has relatively low levels of public debt, private debt is extremely high and unlike many other countries there hasn’t been a decline in that debt in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

The latest household finances data from the RBA shows that in December 2014, the ratio of household debt to disposable income was 153.8%, its highest level on record. Housing debt accounts for 91% of total household debt and is recorded at a record high ratio of 140.3%. The chart shows that the level of debt has been relatively unchanged since 2005 but is now heading higher.

Focussing on the housing component of this debt, of the 140.3% ratio, 92.2% of that figure was owner occupier housing and 48.0% was investor housing. Once again, both are currently at record high levels. As with total housing debt, both had been relatively unchanged over recent years but have lifted over the past couple of years. It is important to note that the gap between owner occupier debt and investor debt is at near record high levels too.

Although household debt is high, the value of household assets is much higher than the debt. According to the data from the RBA the ratio of household assets to disposable income is 813.8%, much higher than the ratio of household debt at 153.8%. From the housing perspective, the ratio of housing assets to disposable income is recorded at 444.0% compared to a ratio of 140.3% for housing debt to household income. The chart shows that the ratio for both household and housing assets had been higher before the financial crisis however, both are now clearly trending higher again.

The data also shows that the ratio of household debt to household assets is 16.7% while the ratio of housing debt to housing assets is 28%. This highlights that although household and housing debts are high, the value of those assets is substantially higher than the level of debt. While this may be true at a national level it doesn’t mean that everyone is immune from the effects of an economic and/or housing market downturn.

Although these figures would provide some comfort that most households have the ability to sell assets to repay debt if they hit trouble, it is important to remember that it is a national view. There are areas of the country where households are much more susceptible to housing and economic downturns. Some specific areas and household types are recent first home purchasers, areas where there has been very little home value growth in recent years, single industry townships and areas where households have re-drawn a large proportion of their home’s equity.

With regards to the recent increases in household and housing debt, obviously very low interest rates (which have just got lower) are encouraging increased borrowing, particularly for housing. On the other hand, saving is not attractive because there is virtually no returns available. While most households can comfortably meet their mortgage requirements with mortgage rates at these levels, it is important to remember that a mortgage is usually a 25 to 30 year commitment and mortgage rates can fluctuate significantly over that time. The fact that household debt levels merely flat-lined rather than reduced following the financial crisis creates some concerns about what will happen once mortgage rates start to normalise (whenever that may be). Furthermore, the rate cut delivered this week may encourage even further leveraging into the housing market.

These are of course average figures across all household. However, as we have shown already, if you segment the household base, you discover that household debt is concentrated in different segments. Some are well able to cover the debts they owe, even if rates were to rise, but others are, even in the current low rate environment close to the edge, and with incomes static, vulnerable even to small rises in interest rate.