Low interest rates could bite smaller banks: APRA

The current low interest rate environment could impact the ability of smaller banks to compete against the major institutions, APRA chair Wayne Byres has cautioned, via InvestorDaily.

In an address to the European Australian Business Council in Melbourne, Mr Byres spoke on financial stability and the challenges ahead for the banking system. 

To briefly recap the different experience

The return on equity (RoE) of the Australian major banks has certainly declined but has not fallen below 10 per cent, even during the GFC, and is now in the order of 12 per cent; for large global European banks, RoE was negative at the height of the crisis, and has struggled to get much above 5 per cent since then.

Reflecting this, the price-to-book (PTB) ratio of the Australian majors averages around 1.5x, and capital is readily available; for large European banks, PTB has typically been in the order of 0.5x and new capital is therefore expensive.

In 2018, a decade after the crisis, the four Australian majors were ranked in the top 35 banks in the world by market capitalisation. Europe, despite a much larger banking system and population, only had four banks in the top 35.

All four Australian major banks enjoy AA credit ratings, and ready access to funding; very few European banks (without explicit government support) enjoy similar ratings.

He compared the experience of the Australian market to Europe, noting local banks are having to get used to low interest rates, as opposed to their weathered overseas counterparts.

In Europe, where the continent’s GDP fell more than 5 per cent at the height of the global financial crisis and didn’t make it back to 2008 levels for another five years as well as unemployment rising to 11 per cent and only just recovering, he noted the environment has been tough. 

“For European banks, of course, it is nothing new – Europe has operated with its interest rate on the ECB’s main refinancing operations at 1 per cent or below since late 2011, and zero since early 2016,” Mr Byres said.

“In that regard, the European experience illustrates some of the challenges potentially ahead for Australian banks. A very low interest rate environment will see margins squeezed, adding to the headwinds from slow lending growth.

“Profitability, and therefore capital generation, will come under more pressure. And given their different funding profiles, these trends may well impact smaller banks more forcefully than larger ones, reducing the ability of the former to apply competitive pressure to the latter. But to be clear, neither group will welcome further rate reductions.”

He reflected on the market around 2014-15, when APRA was concerned the banks were not responding prudently to the environment of high house prices, high household debt, low rates and subdued income growth.

“Speculative activity was increasingly prominent,” Mr Byres said. 

“Such an environment would, one might think, see prudent bankers trimming their sails and battening down the hatches. Instead, intense competitive pressures across the industry saw a tendency for standards go by the wayside – for lenders, it was full steam ahead.”

APRA and ASIC worked to drive standards to more prudent levels, while ASIC focused on responsible lending.

“However, it is worth remembering that the original risks we were concerned about in 2014 – high prices, high debt, low interest rates and subdued income growth – have not gone away, and in some cases increased,” Mr Byres said. 

“When it comes to the supply of credit, it would therefore be unwise for lending standards to be allowed to erode again as a means of generating lending growth. And on the demand side, it would be unhelpful if recent (and prospective) interest rate reductions led to a resurgence in speculative activity.”

More Weak Consumer News And The Pressure On The Mutuals [Podcast]

We review the latest APRA data, consumer sentiment, and other burning issues.

Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
More Weak Consumer News And The Pressure On The Mutuals [Podcast]
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More Weak Consumer News And The Pressure On The Mutuals

We review the latest APRA data, consumer sentiment, and other burning issues.

https://www.westpac.com.au/content/dam/public/wbc/documents/pdf/aw/economics-research/er20190911BullConsumerSentiment.pdf

https://www.apra.gov.au/publications/quarterly-authorised-deposit-taking-institution-statistics

Mortgage Data To Jun 2019 (APRA) – Mutuals Alert!

APRA released their quarterly property exposures data to Jun 2019 today. We can see some of the moving parts in the Industry, though only at an aggregated levels.

At the top level we can see the impact of APRA first imposing restrictions on investment lending in 2015, and later in 2017 on interest only loans. The subsequent loosening of standards which APRA introduced has yet to hit the statistics.

We can see that mortgage lending growth did slow thanks to their measures, with total ADI mortgages at $1.67 trillion, comprising $547 billion of investor loans and $359 billion of interest only loans. This translates to 32.6% of loans being for investment purposes (still too high) and 21.4% of all mortgages being interest only. Not disclosed is the distribution of interest only loans between owner occupied and investment loans, but we can assume most are investment related.

We can pull out the same data for the four major banks. Here total loans are $1.33 trillion, with $452 billion being investment loans and $303 billion being interest only, giving a 34% share of investment loans and 22.8% of interest only loans, so they still have a larger share of investment loans and IO loans relative to the market. No bank level data is disclosed, though we know Westpac has a larger share of investment loans, and we assume interest only loans too.

We can then look at the new lending flows across the various lender types. The flow of new investment loans is running at 32% to June, and is rising (we expect it will be even higher next time as the APRA loosening is executed). As a result mutuals are writing a lower share of investment loans now.

The proportion of new loans via Brokers varies by lender category, with foreign banks sitting around 65%, compared with the 48% of major banks. Mutuals are seeing a fall, as competition from majors increases.

The proportion of new interest only loans is at around 17% for most lender types, with foreign banks writing less. Mutuals are writing more IO loans now.

Loans written outside serviceability has fallen across the industry, though major banks are still at 4.7%, and above the other lender types. Mutuals are writing more, as they attempt to gain share in the increasingly competitive market. There are higher risks in these loans.

Finally, we can look across the loan to value bands, at time of origination.

Major banks are writing around 7.4% of loans above 90%, compared to mutuals at 13% – once again showing mutuals having to break their rules more often to win business.

In the 80-90 bands, majors are at 16.1% and rising.

Nearly half of all loans written are around 50% of loan to value ratio – here the best deals are on offer, so refinancing is quite strong. There is little variation across the lender segments.

The lower LVR bands are around 26%, with other banks (including regionals) a little higher.

So this data suggests that mutuals are under pressure, the effect of the APRA tightening is obvious, the question now will be how this changes in the new “you set the risk” environment. It appears from our data lenders are more willing now, so we will be watching the serviceability and LVR metrics. But loan volumes remain constrained, which will limit potential excesses, at least for a time.

High Debt, Leverage And Asset Prices Concerns The RBA – But What About APRA? [Podcast]

We look at the latest corporate plans put out my the RBA and APRA

Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
High Debt, Leverage And Asset Prices Concerns The RBA - But What About APRA? [Podcast]
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High Debt, Leverage And Asset Values Concerns The RBA – What About APRA?

The RBA has released its corporate plan. Its a pretty vague document. APRA’s plan, also released, is worse.

But, the Reserve Bank of Australia has pointed to Australia’s high debt levels as a factor in its decision making for the cash rate, fearing that it will make the economy more vulnerable to shocks.

Just remember this in the context of APRA reducing the lending standards recently! And in APRA’s Corporate plan Australia’s banking watchdog will stress test the country’s banks every year, instead of the current three-year cycle, ramping up oversight of a sector that has been marred by misconduct.

In the most recent series of stress tests in 2017, all 13 of the country’s largest banks passed the “severe but plausible” scenarios applied by the regulator, despite projected losses of about A$40 billion in home loans alone.

This of course is based on individual bank modelling, and does not really consider the implications of multiple lenders tapping the markets at the same time. This means the stress tests are pretty weak.

Now back to the RBA. Via, InvestorDaily.

The RBA published its four-year corporate plan on Friday, pointing to the banks’ exposure to housing loans and cyber security in financial institutions as the largest risks to the country’s financial stability. 

In Australia, wages growth is low, reflecting spare capacity in the labour market as well as some structural factors. 

The central bank expects the unemployment rate will remain around 5.25 per cent for a time, before declining to around 5 per cent in 2021, with wages growth expected to remain stable and then increase modestly from 2020. 

Consumer price inflation is forecast to increase to be a little under 2 per cent over 2020 and a little above 2 per cent over 2021.

The RBA noted over the next four years, “movements in asset values and leverage may be more important for economic developments than in the past given the already high levels of debt on household balance sheets. 

“Especially in the context of weak growth in household income, high debt levels could complicate future monetary policy decisions by making the economy less resilient to shocks,” the RBA said. 

The central bank noted policymakers in the US and other countries employing quantitative easing as a result of intensifying trade and technology disputes.

Globally, the RBA reported, labour market conditions remain tight in major advanced economies, although unemployment rates are at multidecade lows.

“Global interest rates and measures of financial market volatility both remain low compared with historical experience,” the RBA said in its corporate plan. 

“The future path of global monetary policy and financial conditions more generally remain subject to substantial uncertainty. These global factors significantly influence the environment in which monetary policy in Australia is conducted,” the RBA said.

Last week, RBA governor Philip Lowe reflected on the RBA’s decision on the cash rate during an address to Jackson Hole Symposium in Wyoming. 

“So the question the Reserve Bank Board often asks itself in making its interest rate decision is how our decision can best contribute to the welfare of the Australian people,” Mr Lowe said. 

“Keeping inflation close to target is part of the answer, but it is not the full answer. Given the uncertainties we face, it is appropriate that we have a degree of flexibility, but when we use this flexibility we need to explain why we are doing so and how our decisions are consistent with our mandate.”

He said a challenge the central bank is facing is elevated expectations that monetary policy can deliver economic prosperity. 

“The reality is more complicated than this, not least because weak growth in output and incomes is largely reflecting structural factors,” Mr Lowe commented.

“Another element of the reality we face is that monetary policy is just one of the levers that are potentially available for managing the economy. And, arguably, given the challenges we face at the moment, it is not the best lever.”

The RBA is due to deliver its cash rate decision tomorrow.

Phony And Troublesome Numbers

We discuss the latest credit data from the RBA, APRA and also building approvals from the ABS. Wall to wall disappointment!

https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/frequency/fin-agg/2019/fin-agg-0719.html

https://www.apra.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/apra-releases-new-monthly-authorised-deposit-taking-institution

https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/8731.0Jul%202019?OpenDocument

Credit Data Fudge Anyone?

APRA released their monthly statistics to end July 2019. They are rubbish, in terms of trend tracking because thanks to a revised method of data capturing the value of investment lending rose considerably, offset by a fall in owner occupied loans.

The RBA said that there were reclassifications of loans between owner occupied and investment, plus off shore and onshore borrowers.

The changes from last month are therefore considerable. Westpac made the largest switch with $40 billion dropping from the owner occupied side of the house.

The overall portfolio mix by lender changed less.

But the proportion of investment loans jumped to 37.6%, compared with 33% the previous month. This means that banks ARE EVEN MORE EXPOSED to investment lending than had been previously reported!

Given the size of the changes, it is impossible to tell what is happening within individual lenders (which is convenient?). So we will have to start from this point as a series break.

For the record, the value of owner occupied loans fell 5% from $1.13 trillion to $1.10 trillion, while investment loans rose by 16% from $557.3 billion to $647.4 billion.

Total lending rose from $1.68 trillion to $1.72 trillion, up more than 2%. But this is meaningless.

Frankly this is a joke, and I feel it is designed to hide, not inform. The investment debt bomb just got bigger!

APRA On The Changing Landscape – And What We Don’t Know

Interesting speech from Wayne Byers “Reflections on a changing landscape“. He discussed the ” extraordinary intervention” to save our banks a decade ago (in a footnote), significant in my view, for what it said, and for what it missed out. There is no mention that both NAB and Westpac required bailing out by the FED’s TAF after the GFC. An important little fact?

APRA’s activities have expanded significantly over the past five years. This has not been a smooth transition: the regulatory pendulum has swung between periods of significant regulatory change, and times when there have been demands to pare back. But overall there is no doubt that expectations of APRA have grown, and they have pushed us into new fields of endeavour. There is no sign that tide is going to turn soon.

I’m not sure what the issues de jour will be in five years’ time but there’s a very good chance they will not be the issues we think are most important today. The past five years has shown that what might seem unusual or out of scope today, can quickly become a core task tomorrow. Some of the topics that I have talked about tonight were not seen, five years ago, to be at the heart of APRA’s role.

In contrast, later this week we will publish our 4 year Corporate Plan and a number of them will be called out as our core outcomes, ranking alongside maintaining financial safety and resilience. 

If there is one lesson from the past five years, it is that – be it regulators or risk managers – being ready and able to respond to the demands of a rapidly changing landscape is probably the most important attribute we all need to possess.

But the footnote was the most interesting in my view. For what it said, and for what it missed out.

It is sometimes said the Australian banking system ‘sailed through’ the financial crisis. While the system did prove relatively resilient, there was extraordinary intervention necessary to keep the system stable and the wheels of the economy turning.

That included (i) an unprecedented fiscal response – one of the largest stimulus packages in the world;

(ii) an unprecedented monetary response – the official cash rate was cut by 425 basis points in a little over six months;

(iii) the RBA substantially expanded its market operations and balance sheet;

(iv) ASIC imposed an 8-month ban on the short selling of financial stocks; and

(v) the Federal Government initiated a guarantee of retail deposits of up to $1 million, and a facility for authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) to purchase guarantees for larger deposits and wholesale funding out to 5 years (indeed, at one point more than one-third of the banking system’s entire liabilities were subject to a Commonwealth Government guarantee).

As I have said previously, if all of the above was needed to keep the system stable and operational, then it is difficult to argue that the system sailed through or that some further strengthening of regulation was not justified.

He failed to mention the massive bail-out of our banking system from the FED and the fact that it was China’s response which supported our economy. The evidence suggests we were much closer to the abyss than was acknowledged at the time. Westpac and NAB both required support from the FED, as revealed in papers from the FED.

The US Dodd-Frank Act requires the US Federal Reserve to reveal which institutions it loaned money to under the various bail out programmes.

One of their programmes was the Term Auction Facility (TAF).

“Under the program, the Federal Reserve auctioned 28-day loans, and, beginning in August 2008, 84-day loans, to depository institutions in generally sound financial condition… Of those institutions, primary credit, and thus also the TAF, is available only to institutions that are financially sound.

Now of course the question is what does “financially sound” institutions mean. Well, look at the entire list – its long, but some of the names will be familiar. The FED data shows more than 4,200 separate transactions across more than 400 institutions globally between 2008 and 2010.

UK based Lloyds TSB plc received USD$10.5 billion – and was later partially nationalised by the UK government.

And another UK Bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) got US$53.5 billion plus and additionally US$1.5 billion for its exposures via ABN Amro after RBS bought it. That was nationalised too.

In Ireland, Allied Irish Bank needed US$34.7 billion of loans from the Fed between February 2009 and February 2010 . This is the bank bailed out via the Irish taxpayer.

And Deutsche Bank needed a massive US$76.8 billion in loans in total (and that bank continues to struggle today).

The list goes on. Bayerische Landesbank required a US$13.4 billion bailout from the state of Bavaria, but also borrowed US$108.19 billion between December 2007 and October 2009.

Where these banks sound?

And our own “financially sound” institutions National Australia Bank and Westpac needed help from the Fed. NAB needed around $7 billion in total (allowing for the exchange rate).

In fact NAB raised $3 billion from shareholders in 2008 to add capital to its business in parallel.

And in January 2008 Westpac said everything was fine with its US exposures, just one month after they got their first bail-out from the FED, worth US$90 million.

In fact, there was a long queue then, as the Fed spreadsheet shows that alongside Westpac, was Citibank, Lloyds TSB Bank, Bayerische Landesbank and Societe Generale, all of whom where bailed out by Governments in their respective countries.

Now, the RBA wrote at the time:

The Australian financial system has coped better with the recent turmoil than many other financial systems. The banking system is soundly capitalised, it has only limited exposure to sub-prime related assets, and it continues to record strong profitability and has low levels or problem loans. The large Australian banks all have high credit ratings and they have been able to continue to tap both domestic and offshore capital markets on a regular basis.”

So the question is did APRA and the RBA know what was going on?

And my question more generally is how prepared are we for a similar crisis now – given the changed economic and geopolitical forces in play?

Clarification on APRA’s data on average housing loan figures

As we recently highlighted APRA only looks at loan data not household mortgage data in their analysis. They have now confirmed this again in a piece in their newly released APRA insight 01 2019.

As I have argued before, this myopic view of mortgage land helps to explains the excesses we have seen in the sector, and the lack of effective supervision.

The Quarterly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Property Exposures (QPEX) statistical publication provides bank, credit union and building society aggregate statistics on commercial property exposures, residential property exposures and new residential loan approvals. The QPEX publication is published each quarter on APRA’s website.

In the most recent QPEX publication – March 2019 (issued in June 2019), APRA’s data (as seen in Chart 1) highlighted negative growth in housing lending over 2018. Between the year ending 31 March 2019 and 31 March 2018, there was a decrease of:

  • 7.2 per cent in owner-occupied new housing loan approvals, and
  • 14.9 per cent in new housing investment loans. 

While there has been a decrease in housing loan approvals, the average loan size has continued to grow (as seen in Chart 2). 

APRA Insight Chart 1 Clarification Article

Chart showing data for new housing loan approvals

APRA Insight Chart 2 Clarification article

Chart showing data for number and average balance of residential term loans to households

Since the last QPEX (December 2018) was published, some commentators have misinterpreted APRA’s data in their analysis of the average balance of housing loans.  They have assumed that an increase in the number of housing loans (as seen in Chart 2) meant an increase in the number of borrowers with a housing loan. This misinterpretation has resulted in a suggestion that the average balance of housing loans represents the level of indebtedness of Australian households. This conclusion cannot be drawn from the data. 

The QPEX publication reports data from the ADI’s perspective (e.g. the value of loans and number of loan accounts on the ADI’s books) rather than the borrower’s perspective. The data is a simple average calculated as the total balance of all housing loans divided by the total number of housing loans extended by ADIs. In practice, a customer may have multiple housing loans, which means that the average balance of housing loans cannot be used to determine the average housing debt of each borrower. When APRA supervises an ADI, we do not consider the average loan size to be a reliable indicator of risk; rather the data is just one of many inputs to identify potential changes to the overall structure and size of loans. 

APRA requires ADIs’ to maintain high lending standards to ensure they are effectively managing risk when issuing new housing loans to borrowers. When a borrower applies for a housing loan, APRA requires the ADI to assess the borrower’s ability to repay the loan, taking into account the borrower’s other debt commitments and everyday expenses. We set out our expectations for ADIs on lending standards in Prudential Practice Guide APG 223 Residential Mortgage Lending

The article was first published in APRA Insight – Issue 1 2019.