Tag: BBSW

The Economic Outlook (According to the RBA)

We got some more data on the state of the Australian Economy today from RBA Deputy Governor, Guy Debelle, which built on the recently released Statement on Monetary Policy (SMP).

There were four items which caught my attention.

First, the recent rise in money market interest rates in the US, particularly LIBOR. He said there are a number of explanations for the rise, including a large increase in bill issuance by the US Treasury and the effect of various tax changes on investment decisions by CFOs at some US companies with large cash pools.  This rise in LIBOR in the US has been reflected in rises in money market rates in a number of other countries, including here in Australia. This is because the Australian banks raise some of their short-term funding in the US market to fund their $A lending, so the rise in price there has led to a similar rise in the cost of short-term funding for the banks here; that is, a rise in BBSW. This increases the wholesale funding costs for the Australian banks, as well as increasing the costs for borrowers whose lending rates are priced off BBSW, which includes many corporates.

However, he says the effect to date has not been that large in terms of the overall impact on bank funding costs. It is not clear how much of the rise in LIBOR (and hence BBSW) is due to structural changes in money markets and how much is temporary. In the last couple of weeks, these money market rates have declined noticeably from their peaks.  But to my mind it shows one of the potential risks ahead.

Second the gradual decline in spare capacity is expected to lead to a gradual pick-up in wages growth. But when? The experience of other countries with labour markets closer to full capacity than Australia’s is that wages growth may remain lower than historical experience would suggest. In Australia, 2 per cent seems to have become the focal point for wage outcomes, compared with 3–4 per cent in the past. Work done at the Bank shows the shift of the distribution of wages growth to the left and a bunching of wage outcomes around 2 per cent over the past five years or so.

The RBA says that recent data on wages provides some assurance that wages growth has troughed. The majority of firms surveyed in the Bank’s liaison program expect wages growth to remain broadly stable over the period ahead. Over the past year, there has been a pick-up in firms expecting higher wage growth outcomes. Some part of that is the effect of the Fair Work Commission’s decision to raise award and minimum wages by 3.3 per cent.  They suggest there are pockets where wage pressures are more acute. But, while those pockets are increasing gradually, they remain fairly contained at this point

But he concluded that there is a risk that it may take a lower unemployment rate than we currently expect to generate a sustained move higher than the 2 per cent focal point evident in many wage outcomes today.

Third, he takes some comfort from the fact that arrears rates on mortgages remain low. This despite Wayne Byres comment a couple of months back, that at these low interest rates, defaults should be even lower! Debelle said that even in Western Australia, where there has been a marked rise in unemployment and where house prices have fallen by around 10 per cent, arrears rates have risen to around 1½ per cent, which is not all that high compared with what we have seen in other countries in similar circumstances and earlier episodes in Australia’s history. To which I would add, yes but interest rates are ultra-low. What happens if rates rise as we discussed above or unemployment rises further?

Finally, the interest rate resets on interest-only loans will potentially require mortgage payments to rise by nearly 30–40 per cent for some borrowers. There are a number of these loans whose interest-only periods expire this year. It is worth noting that there were about the same number of loans resetting last year too. The RBA says there are quite a few mitigants which will allow these borrowers to cope with this increase in required payments, including the prevalence of offset accounts and the ability to refinance to a principal and interest loan with a lower interest rate. While some borrowers will clearly struggle with this, our expectation is that most will be able to handle the adjustment so that the overall effect on the economy should be small.

This switch away from interest-only loans should see a shift towards a higher share of scheduled principal repayments relative to unscheduled repayments for a time. We are seeing that in the data. It also implies faster debt amortisation, which may have implications for credit growth.

And there is a risk of a further tightening in lending standards in the period ahead. This may have its largest effect on the amount of funds an individual household can borrow, more than the effect on the number of households that are eligible for a loan. This, in turn, means that credit growth may be slower than otherwise for a time. That he says has more of an implication for house prices, than it does for the outlook for consumption. To which I would add, yes, but consumption is being funded by raiding deposits and higher debt. Hardly sustainable.

So in summary, there are still significant risks in the system and the net effect could well drive prices lower, as credit tightens. And I see the RBA slowly turning towards the views we have held for some time. I guess if there is more of a down turn ahead, they can claim they warned us (despite their settings setting up the problem in the first place).

CBA and ASIC agree in-principle settlement over BBSW

Commonwealth Bank (CBA) announces it has reached an in-principle agreement with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to settle the legal proceedings in relation to claims of manipulation of the Bank Bill Swap Rate (BBSW).

As part of the in-principle settlement, CBA will acknowledge that, in the course of trading on the BBSW market in Australia on five occasions between February and June 2012, CBA attempted to engage in unconscionable conduct in breach of the ASIC Act. CBA will also acknowledge it did not have adequate policies and systems in place to monitor the trading and communications of its staff in order to prevent that conduct from occurring.

Subject to Federal Court approval of the settlement, CBA has agreed to pay a $5 million penalty, a payment of $15 million to a financial consumer protection fund and a $5 million payment towards ASIC’s costs of the litigation and its investigation. The impact of this settlement will be reflected in CBA’s 2018 Financial Year results.

CBA has also agreed to enter into an enforceable undertaking with ASIC, under which an independent expert will be appointed to review controls, policies, training and monitoring in relation to its BBSW business.

CBA and ASIC will make an application to the Federal Court for approval of the settlement

BBSW Rates Higher; Signals Rate Lifts

The latest BBSW data shows the trajectory in recent weeks. This will add more pressure to bank funding costs.

The question to consider is whether these moves are reflective of changes in global rates – LIBOR for example is higher (see below) – or whether this reflects the perceived risks in the local bank market in the light of the first rounds from the Royal Commission, which has generally underscored potential risks in their lending books. Or both.

The international rates are probably more the cause of the move of 25 basis points or more, which is significant because it suggests more upward pressure ahead, irrespective of what the RBA may choose to do.

We think mortgage rates will likely (and quietly) go higher in the months ahead.

 

 

 

What Does CBA And The BBSW Case Mean?

Just 24 hours after the announcement of a new CEO, when we were assured that CBA were well on the way to addressing their known issues; ASIC lobbed a bombshell in the shape of the BBSW case.

CBA said today:

Commonwealth Bank has fully co-operated with ASIC’s investigation over the last two years.

Commonwealth Bank disputes the allegations made by ASIC. As this matter is before the courts, it is not appropriate to comment further at this time.

Put to one side whether CBA was part of the group of banks that fixed the pricing of BBSW, and the knock-on effect on product pricing; surely this issue was on the “risk” list in the bank, and should have been disclosed.

If it was not, it should have been. This may once again speak to cultural issues in the organisation.  There is clearly much to fix.  What else is on the risk list?

We discussed the implications on 2GB with Ross Greenwood.

More broadly, we have to consider whether the sheer complexity of the organisation is part of the problem. Perhaps CBA should be split into a series of small entities, for example, separated into its retail division, corporate, wealth, insurance and trading divisions. The question of whether CBA is simply too big and complex to manage, is in our view the underlying and most critical question to be addressed.

 

ASIC commences civil penalty proceedings against Commonwealth Bank of Australia for BBSW conduct

ASIC has today commenced legal proceedings in the Federal Court in Melbourne against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) for unconscionable conduct and market manipulation in relation to CBA’s involvement in setting the bank bill swap reference rate (BBSW) between 31 January 2012 and October 2012.

The BBSW is the primary interest rate benchmark used in Australian financial markets and was administered by the Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) during the relevant period. On 27 September 2013, AFMA changed the method by which the BBSW is calculated. The conduct that the proceedings relate to occurred before this change in methodology. Since 1 January 2017 ASX Limited has been the administrator of the BBSW, introducing a new Volume Weight Average Price (VWAP) based calculation methodology.

During the relevant period CBA had a large number of products which were priced or valued off BBSW. ASIC alleges that on three specific occasions CBA traded with the intention of affecting the level at which BBSW was set so as to maximise its profits or minimise its losses to the detriment of those holding opposite positions to CBA’s.

ASIC alleges it was unconscionable for CBA to trade in this way, and also to enter into products priced off the BBSW without disclosing its trading practices to its customers and counterparties. ASIC also alleges that CBA’s trading  created an artificial price and a false appearance with respect to the market for some of these products.

ASIC is seeking declarations that CBA contravened s12CA, s12CB, s12DA, 12DB and s12DF of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act), s912A(1), s1041A, s1041B and s1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act).

Further, ASIC has sought from the Court pecuniary penalties against CBA and an order requiring CBA to implement a compliance program.

ASIC will be making no further comment at this time.

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Background

ASIC commenced legal proceedings in the Federal Court against the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) on 4 March 2016 (refer: 16-060MR) and against National Australia Bank (NAB) on 7 June 2016 (refer: 16-183MR).

On 10 November 2017, the Federal Court made declarations that each of ANZ and NAB had attempted to engage in unconscionable conduct in attempting to seek to change where the BBSW set on certain dates and that each bank failed to do all things necessary to ensure that they provided financial services honestly and fairly. The Federal Court imposed pecuniary penalties of $10 million on each bank (refer: [2017] FCA 1338).

On 20 November 2017, ASIC accepted enforceable undertakings from ANZ and NAB which provides for both banks to take certain steps and to pay $20 million to be applied to the benefit of the community, and that each will pay $20 million towards ASIC’s investigation and other costs (refer: 17-393MR).

On 5 April 2016, ASIC commenced legal proceedings in the Federal Court against the Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) (refer: 16-110MR). The matter is awaiting judgment.

ASIC has previously accepted enforceable undertakings relating to BBSW from UBS-AG, BNP Paribas and the Royal Bank of Scotland (refer: 13-366MR, 14-014MR, 14-169MR). The institutions also made voluntary contributions totaling $3.6 million to fund independent financial literacy projects in Australia.

In July 2015, ASIC published Report 440, which addresses the potential manipulation of financial benchmarks and related conduct issues.

The Government has recently introduced legislation to implement financial benchmark regulatory reform and ASIC has consulted on proposed financial benchmark rules.

ASIC accepts enforceable undertakings from ANZ and NAB to address conduct relating to BBSW

ASIC says Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) and National Australia Bank (NAB) have today entered into enforceable undertakings (EUs) with ASIC in relation to each bank’s bank bill trading business and their participation in the setting of the Bank Bill Swap Rate (BBSW), a key Australian benchmark and reference interest rate.

On 10 November 2017, the Federal Court made declarations that each of ANZ and NAB had attempted to engage in unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply of financial services in attempting to seek to change where BBSW set on certain dates (in respect of ANZ, on 10 occasions in the period 9 March 2010 to 25 May 2012, and in respect of NAB, on 12 occasions in the period 8 June 2010 to 24 December 2012). The Court also declared that each bank failed to do all things necessary to ensure that they provided financial services honestly and fairly.

The Federal Court imposed pecuniary penalties of $10 million each on ANZ and NAB for the attempts to engage in unconscionable conduct in respect of the setting of BBSW. The Court also noted that each of ANZ and NAB will give EUs to ASIC which provides for them to take certain steps and to pay $20 million to be applied to the benefit of the community, and that each will pay $20 million towards ASIC’s investigation and other costs.

Background

ASIC commenced legal proceedings in the Federal Court against ANZ on 4 March 2016 (refer: 16-060MR) and against NAB on 7 June 2016 (refer: 16-183MR). The EUs form part of an agreed resolution to those proceedings.

On 16 November 2017 Jagot J of the Federal Court published her decision in both the ANZ and NAB proceedings ([2017] FCA 1338).

On 5 April 2016, ASIC commenced legal proceedings in the Federal Court against the Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) (refer: 16-110MR). These proceedings are ongoing.

ASIC has previously accepted enforceable undertakings relating to BBSW from UBS-AG, BNP Paribas and the Royal Bank of Scotland (refer: 13-366MR, 14-014MR, 14-169MR). The institutions also made voluntary contributions totaling $3.6 million to fund independent financial literacy projects in Australia.

In July 2015, ASIC published Report 440, which addresses the potential manipulation of financial benchmarks and related conduct issues.

The Government has recently introduced legislation to implement financial benchmark regulatory reform and ASIC has consulted on proposed financial benchmark rules.

NAB settles BBSW court case for $50m

From InvestorDaily.

In an announcement made late on Friday, NAB admitted that on 12 occasions between 2010 and 2011 its employees “attempted to engage in unconscionable conduct in breach of the ASIC Act”.

The settlement will see NAB fork out a $10 million penalty, cover ASIC’s costs of $20 million and donate $20 million to an ASIC-nominated financial consumer protection fund – all of which will be reflected in its 2017 financial year results.

NAB is the second of three major banks to settle with ASIC following claims of rigging the bank bill swap rate (BBSW). ANZ has already settled, leaving Westpac as the last bank remaining defending the court case.

Commenting on the settlement, NAB group chief executive Andrew Thorburn said the way BBSW was calculated “had changed since that time”.

“We accept we did not meet the high standards of professional conduct that ASIC, the community and NAB expects of itself, in that market during that period,” Mr Thorburn said.

“The ASX is now responsible for the administration of BBSW and NAB fully supports the reforms that are being introduced by the ASX to enhance trust and transparency in the BBSW market.

ANZ and ASIC Agree to Settle the BBSW case

In a short release, ANZ says it has reached a confidential in-principle agreement with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to settle court action relating to the Australian interbank BBSW market.

As a result, this morning ASIC has asked the Court to stand down the trial for 48 hours, which ANZ will consent to, so as to progress the in-principle agreement following which ANZ will make a more detailed statement.

Based on the in-principle agreement, the financial impact to ANZ will be reflected in the 2017 Financial Year results and is largely covered by the provisioning held as at 31 March 2017.

After LIBOR

RBA Deputy Governor Guy Debelle spoke about Interest Rate Benchmarks at FINSA today. He made three points:

First, the longevity of LIBOR cannot be assumed, so any contracts that reference LIBOR will need to be reviewed.

Second, actions to ensure the longevity of BBSW are well advanced. While these changes entail some costs, the cost of not doing so would be considerably larger.

Third, consider whether risk-free benchmarks are more appropriate rates for financial contracts than credit-based benchmarks such as LIBOR and BBSW.

Today I am going to talk again about interest rate benchmarks, as recently there have been some important developments internationally and in Australia. These benchmarks are at the heart of the plumbing of the financial system. They are widely referenced in financial contracts. Corporate borrowing rates are often priced as a spread to an interest rate benchmark. Many derivative contracts are based on them, as are most asset-backed securities. In light of the issues around the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and other benchmarks that have arisen over the past decade, there has been an ongoing global reform effort to improve the functioning of interest rate benchmarks.

I will focus on the recent announcement by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) on the future of LIBOR, and the implications of this for Australian financial markets. I will then summarise the current state of play in Australia, particularly for the major interest rate benchmark, the bank bill swap rate (BBSW). Our aim is to ensure that BBSW remains a robust benchmark for the long term. I will also discuss the important role for ‘risk-free’ interest rates as an alternative to credit-based benchmarks such as BBSW and LIBOR.

The Future of LIBOR and the Implications for Australia

LIBOR is the key interest rate benchmark for several major currencies, including the US dollar and British pound. Just over a month ago, Andrew Bailey, who heads the FCA which regulates LIBOR, raised some serious questions about the sustainability of LIBOR. The key problem he identified is that there are not enough transactions in the short-term wholesale funding market for banks to anchor the benchmark. The banks that make the submissions used to calculate LIBOR are uncomfortable about continuing to do this, as they have to rely mainly on their ‘expert judgment’ in determining where LIBOR should be rather than on actual transactions. To prevent LIBOR from abruptly ceasing to exist, the FCA has received assurances from the current banks on the LIBOR panel that they will continue to submit their estimates to sustain LIBOR until the end of 2021. But beyond that point, there is no guarantee that LIBOR will continue to exist. The FCA will not compel banks to provide submissions and the panel banks may not voluntarily continue to do so.

This four year notice period should give market participants enough time to transition away from LIBOR, but the process will not be easy. Market participants that use LIBOR, including those in Australia, need to work on transitioning their contracts to alternative reference rates. This is a significant issue, since LIBOR is referenced in around US$350 trillion worth of contracts globally. While a large share of these contracts have short durations, often three months or less, a very sizeable share of current contracts extend beyond 2021, with some lasting as long as 100 years.

This is also an issue in Australia, where we estimate that financial institutions have around $5 trillion in contracts referencing LIBOR. Finding a replacement for LIBOR is not straightforward. Regulators around the world have been working closely with the industry to identify alternative risk-free rates that can be used instead of LIBOR, and to strengthen the fall-back provisions that would apply in contracts if LIBOR was to be discontinued. The transition will involve a substantial amount of work for users of LIBOR, both to amend contracts and update systems.

Ensuring BBSW Remains a Robust Benchmark

The equivalent interest rate benchmark for the Australian dollar is BBSW, and the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) is working closely with industry to ensure that it remains a robust financial benchmark. BBSW is currently calculated from executable bids and offers for bills issued by the major banks. A major concern over recent years has been the low trading volumes at the time of day that BBSW is measured (around 10 am). There are two key steps that are being taken to support BBSW: first, the BBSW methodology is being strengthened to enable the benchmark to be calculated directly from a wider set of market transactions; and second, a new regulatory framework for financial benchmarks is being introduced.

The work on strengthening the BBSW methodology is progressing well. The ASX, the Administrator of BBSW, has been working closely with market participants and the regulators on finalising the details of the new methodology. This will involve calculating BBSW as the volume weighted average price (VWAP) of bank bill transactions. It will cover a wider range of institutions during a longer trading window. The ASX has also been consulting market participants on a new set of trading guidelines for BBSW, and this process has the strong support of the CFR. The new arrangements will not only anchor BBSW to a larger set of transactions, but will improve the infrastructure in the bank bill market, encouraging more electronic trading and straight-through processing of transactions. The critical difference between BBSW and LIBOR is that there are enough transactions in the local bank bill market each day relative to the size of our financial system to calculate a robust benchmark.

For the new BBSW methodology to be implemented successfully, the institutions that participate in the bank bill market will need to start trading bills at outright yields rather than the current practice of agreeing to the transaction at the yet-to-be-determined BBSW rate. This change of behaviour needs to occur at the banks that issue the bank bills, as well as those that buy them including the investment funds and state treasury corporations. The RBA is also playing its part. Market participants have asked us to move our open market operations to an earlier time to support liquidity in the bank bill market during the trading window, and we have agreed to do this.

While we all have to make some changes to systems and practices to support the new methodology, the investment in a more robust BBSW will be well worth it. The alternative of rewriting a very large number of contracts and re-engineering systems should BBSW cease to exist would be considerably more painful.

The new regulatory framework for financial benchmarks that the government is in the process of introducing should provide market participants with more certainty. Treasury recently completed a consultation on draft legislation that sets out how financial benchmarks will be regulated, and the bill has just been introduced into Parliament. In addition, ASIC recently released more detail about how the regulatory regime would be implemented. This should help to address the uncertainty that financial institutions participating in the BBSW rate setting process have been facing. It should also support the continued use of BBSW in the European Union, where new regulations will soon come into force that require benchmarks used in the EU to be subject to a robust regulatory framework.

Risk-free Rates as Alternative Benchmarks

While the new VWAP methodology will help ensure that BBSW remains a robust benchmark, it is important for market participants to ask whether BBSW is the most appropriate benchmark for the financial contract.

For some financial products, it can make sense to reference a risk-free rate instead of a credit-based reference rate. For instance, floating rate notes (FRNs) issued by governments, non-financial corporations and securitisation trusts, which are currently priced at a spread to BBSW, could instead tie their coupon payments to the cash rate.

However, for other products, it makes sense to continue referencing a credit-based benchmark that measures banks’ short-term wholesale funding costs. This is particularly the case for products issued by banks, such as FRNs and corporate loans. The counterparties to these products would still need derivatives that reference BBSW so that they can hedge their interest rate exposures.

It is also prudent for users of any benchmark to have planned for a scenario where the benchmark no longer exists. The general approach that is being taken internationally to address the risk of benchmarks such as LIBOR being discontinued, is to develop risk-free benchmark rates. A number of jurisdictions including the UK and the US have recently announced their preferred risk-free rates.

One issue yet to be resolved is that most of these rates are overnight rates. A term market for these products is yet to be developed, although one could expect that to occur through time. Another complication is that the risk-free rates are not equivalent across jurisdictions. Some reference an unsecured rate (including Australia and the UK) while others reference a secured rate like the repo rate in the US.

As the RBA’s operational target for monetary policy and the reference rate for OIS (overnight index swap) and other financial contracts, the cash rate is the risk-free interest rate benchmark for the Australian dollar. The RBA measures the cash rate directly from transactions in the interbank overnight cash market, and we have ensured that our methodology is in line with the IOSCO benchmark principles. However, the cash rate is not a perfect substitute for BBSW, as it is an overnight rate rather than a term rate, and doesn’t incorporate a significant bank credit risk premium.

ASIC consults on proposed financial benchmark regulatory regime

ASIC is seeking feedback on proposed rules for the administration of licensed financial benchmarks.

Initially and consistent with the Council of Financial Regulators (which includes ASIC (?))  advice, the following five benchmarks are likely to meet the criteria for significant benchmarks set out in the proposed legislation:

(a) the BBSW;
(b) Standard & Poor’s (S&P)/ASX 200 index;
(c) the ASX bond futures settlement price;
(d) the cash rate (including the total return index derived from the cash rate); and
(e) the consumer price index.

The proposed legislation requires administrators of significant benchmarks to hold a financial benchmark administrator licence, unless they are exempt from the requirement to hold a licence. Exemptions from the requirement to hold a licence would be rare.

Financial benchmarks are indices or indicators used to:

(a) determine the interest payable, or other sums due, under loan agreements or under other financial contracts or instruments;
(b) determine the price at which a financial instrument may be dealt, or the value of a financial instrument; or
(c) measure the performance of a financial instrument.

As benchmarks affect the pricing of key financial products, a number of benchmarks have become critical to a wide range of users in financial markets and throughout the broader economy. This means there is a risk of financial contagion or instability, or of undermining investor confidence, if the availability or integrity of key benchmarks is disrupted.

Concerns about the integrity and reliability of financial benchmarks have prompted a number of regulatory reform initiatives. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) issued the Principles for financial benchmarks (IOSCO benchmarks principles) in July 2013. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has also undertaken work on globally significant interest rate and foreign exchange benchmarks.

ASIC will establish a new licensing regime requiring administrators of significant benchmarks to obtain a new benchmark administrator licence from ASIC. Licensees would be required to comply with any conditions on the licence as well as a range of obligations imposed in the legislation.

The Government is currently consulting on draft legislation to implement financial benchmark regulatory reform. ASIC’s consultation is about the licensing regime for administrators of significant benchmarks and ASIC’s rule-making powers in the event the amendments to the Corporations Act are passed by Parliament. This early consultation and preparation will help Australia’s financial benchmark regulatory regime to be implemented more expediently.

Together, the draft legislation and ASIC’s proposals will help to ensure the robustness and reliability of financial benchmarks in the Australian economy in line with the IOSCO Principles for Financial Benchmarks. The proposals are also designed to facilitate equivalence assessments under overseas regimes including the European Benchmarks Regulation.