BIS On Financial Regulation

Interesting panel remarks at the IMF conference “Rethinking macro policy III: progress or confusion?” by Jaime Caruana, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements in Washington DC. The comments were entitled “The international monetary and financial system:eliminating the blind spot”.

Introduction

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the international monetary and financial system (IMFS) at this engaging conference. The design of international arrangements suitable for the global economy is a long-standing issue in economics. The global financial crisis has put this issue back on the policy agenda. In my panel remarks, I would like to concentrate on an important blind spot in the system. The current IMFS consists of domestically focused policies in a world of global firms, currencies and capital flows – but are local rules adequate for a global game ? I shall argue that liquidity conditions often spill over across borders and can amplify domestic imbalances to the point of instability. In other words, the IMFS as we know it today not only does not constrain the build-up of financial imbalances, it also does not make it easy for national authorities to see these imbalances coming.

Certainly, some actions have been taken to address this weakness in the system: the regulatory agenda has made significant progress in strengthening the resilience of the financial system. But we also know that risks and leverage will morph and migrate, and that the regulatory response by itself will not be enough. Other policies also have an important role to play. In particular, I shall argue that, in order to address this blind spot, central banks should take international spillovers and feedbacks – or spillbacks, as some may call them – into account, not least out of enlightened self-interest.

Local rules in a global game

Let me briefly characterise the present-day IMFS, before describing the spillover channels. In contrast to the Bretton Woods system or the gold standard, the IMFS today no longer has a single commodity or currency as nominal anchor. I am not proposing to go back to these former systems; rather, I will argue in favour of better anchoring domestic policies by taking financial stability considerations into account, internalising the interactions among policy regimes, and strengthening international cooperation so that we can establish better rules of the game.
So what are the rules of the game today? If there are any rules to speak of, they are mainly local. Most central banks target domestic inflation and let their currencies float, or follow policies consistent with managed or fixed exchange rates in line with domestic policy goals. Most central banks interpret their mandate exclusively in domestic terms. Moreover, the search for a framework that can satisfactorily integrate the links between financial stability and monetary policy is still work in progress with some way to go. The development and adoption of such a framework represent one of the most significant and difficult challenges for the central bank community over the next few years.

When one looks at the international policy discussions, the main focus there is to contain balance of payments imbalances, with most attention paid to the current account (ie net flows) and not enough attention to gross flows and stocks – ie stocks of debt. This policy design does not help us see – much less constrain – the build-up of financial imbalances within and across countries. This, in my view, is a blind spot that is central to this debate. Global finance matters – and the game is undeniably global even if the rules that central banks play by are mostly local!

International spillover channels

Monetary regimes and financial conditions interact globally and reinforce each other. The strength and relevance of the spillovers and feedbacks tend to be underestimated. Let me briefly sketch four channels through which this happens. The first works through the conduct of monetary policy: easy monetary conditions in the major advanced economies spread to the rest of the world via policy reactions in the other economies (eg easing to resist currency appreciation and maintain competitiveness). This pattern goes beyond emerging market economies: many central banks have been keeping policy interest rates below those implied by traditional domestic benchmarks, as proxied by Taylor rules.

The second channel involves the international use of currencies: most notably, the domains of the US dollar and the euro extend so broadly beyond their respective domestic jurisdictions that US and euro area monetary policies immediately affect financial conditions in the rest of the world. The US dollar, followed by the euro, plays an outsize role in trade invoicing, foreign exchange turnover, official reserves and the denomination of bonds and loans. A key observation in this context is that US dollar credit to non-bank borrowers outside the United States has reached $9.2 trillion, and this stock expands on US monetary easing. In fact, under this monetary policy for the United States, US dollar credit has been expanding much faster abroad than at home (Graph 1, top right-hand panel).

BIS-1-May-2015

Third, the integration of financial markets allows global common factors to move bond and equity prices. Uncertainty and risk aversion, as reflected in indicators such as the VIX index, affect asset markets and credit flows everywhere. In the new phase of global liquidity, where capital markets are gaining prominence and the search for yield is a driving force, risk premia and term premia in bond markets play an important role in the transmission of financial conditions across markets. This role has strengthened in the wake of central bank large-scale asset purchases. The Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases compressed not only the US bond term premium, but also long-term yields in many other bond markets. More recently, the new programme of bond purchases in the euro area put downward pressure not only on European bond yields but apparently also on US bond yields, even amid expectations of US policy tightening.

A fourth channel works through the availability of external finance in general, regardless of currency: capital flows provide a source of funding that can amplify domestic credit booms and busts. The leverage and equity of global banks jointly drive gross cross-border lending, and domestic currency appreciation can accelerate those inflows as it strengthens the balance sheets of local firms that have financed local currency assets with US dollar borrowing. In the run-up to the global financial crisis, for instance, cross-border bank lending contributed to raising credit-to-GDP ratios in a number of economies.

Through these channels, monetary and financial regimes can interact with and reinforce each other, sometimes amplifying domestic imbalances to the point of instability. Global liquidity surges and collapses as a result. What I have just described is the spillovers and feedbacks – and the tendency to create a global easing bias – with monetary accommodation at the centre. But these channels can also work in the opposite direction, amplifying financial tightening when policy rates in the centre begin to rise, or even seem ready to rise – as suggested by the taper tantrum of 2013. Nevertheless, it is an open question whether the effect of the IMFS is symmetric in this regard, creating as much of a tightening bias as it does an easing bias. In both cases, it is important to try to eliminate the blind spot and keep an eye on the dynamics of global liquidity.

Policy implications: from the house to the neighbourhood

This leads to my second point, that central banks should take the international effects of their own actions into account in setting monetary policy. This takes more than just keeping one’s own house in order; it will also require contributing to keeping the neighbourhood in order.  An important precondition in this regard is the need to continue the work of incorporating financial factors into macroeconomics. If policymakers can better manage the broader financial cycle, that would in itself already help constrain excesses and reduce spillovers from one country to another.

But policymakers should also give more weight to international interactions, including spillovers, feedbacks and collective action problems, with a view to keeping the neighbourhood in order. How to start broadening one’s view from house to neighbourhood? One useful step would be to reach a common diagnosis, a consensus in our understanding of how international spillovers and spillbacks work. The widely held view that the IMFS should focus on large current account imbalances, for instance, does not fully capture the multitude of spillover channels that are relevant in this regard.

An array of possibilities then presents itself in terms of the depth of international policy cooperation, ranging from extended local rules to new global rules of the game.  To extend local rules, major central banks could internalise spillovers so as to contain the risk of financial imbalances building up to the point of blowing back on their domestic economies. Incorporating spillovers in monetary policy setting may improve performance over the medium term. This approach is thus fully consistent with enlightened self-interest. The need for policymakers to pay attention to global effects can be seen clearly in the major bond markets. Official reserve managers and major central banks hold large portions of outstanding government debt.

BIS-2-May-2015

If investors treat bonds denominated in different currencies as close substitutes, central bank purchases that lower yields in one bond market also weigh on yields in other markets. For many years, changes in US bond yields have been thought to move yields abroad; in the last year, many observers have ascribed lower global bond yields to the ECB’s consideration of and implementation of large-scale bond purchases. Central banks ought to take account of these effects when setting monetary policy. However, even if countries do optimise their own domestic policies with full information, a global optimum cannot be reached when there are externalities and strategic complementarities as in today’s era of global liquidity. This means that we will also need more international cooperation. This could mean taking ad hoc joint action, or perhaps even developing new global rules of the game to help instil additional discipline in national policies. Given the pre-eminence of the key international currencies, the major central banks have a special responsibility to conduct policy in a way that supports global financial stability – a way that keeps the neighbourhood in order.

Importantly, the domestic focus of central bank mandates need not preclude progress in this direction. After all, national mandates in bank regulation and supervision have also permitted extensive international cooperation and the development of global principles and standards in this area.

Conclusion

To conclude, the current environment offers us a good opportunity to revisit the various issues regarding the IMFS. Addressing the blind spot in the system will require us to take a global view. We need to better anchor domestic policies by taking financial factors into account. We also need to understand and internalise the international spillovers and interactions of policies. This new approach will pose challenges. We have yet to develop an analytical framework that allows us to properly integrate financial factors – including international spillovers – into monetary policy. And there is work to be done to enhance international cooperation. All these elements together would help establish better global rules of the game.

The global financial crisis has demonstrated that international cooperation in crisis management can be effective. For instance, the establishment of international central bank swap lines can be seen as an example of enlightened self-interest. However, we must also recognise that there are limits to how far and how fast the global safety nets can be extended to mitigate future strains. This puts a premium on crisis prevention. Each country will need to do its part and contribute to making the global financial system more resilient – and I would add here that reinforcing the capacity of the IMF is one element in this regard. And taking international spillovers and financial stability issues into account in setting monetary policy is a useful step in this direction.

When Is Macroprudential Policy Effective?

Given the buoyant housing market, and the potential risks which are exposed, there has been significant interest in the potential use of macroprudential tools to try and help alleviate the worst excesses. But some question whether they are, in fact, effective. A recent Bank For International Settlements Working paper casts some interesting light on this question. BIS Working Papers No 496 When is macroprudential policy effective? by Chris McDonald of the Monetary and Economic Department was released in late March.

Loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) limits have become increasingly popular tools for responding to house price volatility since the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, our understanding of the effects of these policies is uncertain. One aspect not well understood is how their effectiveness varies over the cycle. It is also not clear if the effects of tightening and loosening are symmetric. This paper seeks to address these issues by considering the effects of policy changes at different parts of the housing cycle. Then, controlling for this, I evaluate if the effects of tightening and loosening are symmetric or not.

There are at least two inter-related reasons for using macroprudential policies: (i) to create a buffer (or safety net) so that banks do not suffer overly heavy losses during downturns; and (ii) to restrict the build-up of financial imbalances and thereby reduce the risk of a large correction in house prices. Here I examine the relationship between changes in LTV and DTI limits and the build-up of financial imbalances. There is a growing group of economies that use macroprudential policies to target imbalances in their housing markets in this way. This analysis relies on the experience of these economies: many of which are from Asia, though the results are likely to be relevant to other economies as well.

The literature on the effectiveness of macroprudential policies at taming real estate cycles has grown quickly since the 2008 financial crisis. For a wider discussion on the effectiveness of macroprudential policies, the background papers by the Committee on the Global Financial System (2012) and the International Monetary Fund (2013) provide a good overview. The consensus is that these measures can contain housing credit growth and house price acceleration during the upswing. Kuttner and Shim (2013) estimate the effects of a range of policy changes on housing credit growth and house price inflation across 57 economies. They find that tightening DTI limits reduces housing credit by 4 to 7 percent, while tightening LTV limits reduces housing credit by around 1 percent. Crowe et al (2011) also find evidence that LTV limits prevent the build-up of financial imbalances. They find that the maximum allowable LTV ratio between 2000 and 2007 was positively correlated with the rise in house prices across 21 economies.

By looking at 100 policy adjustments across 17 economies, I find that changes to LTV and DTI limits tend to have bigger effects when credit is expanding quickly andwhen house prices are relatively expensive. Tightening measures (such as lowering the maximum LTV ratio) during upturns lower the level of housing credit over the following year by 4-8 percent and the level of house prices by 6-12 percent.

Conversely, during downturns they reduce housing credit by 2-3 percent and house prices by 2-4 percent. This is consistent with the finding of Classeans et al (2013): that the persistent (or long-run) effects of LTV and DTI limits increase with the intensity of the cycle. Several measures of the housing cycle correlate with the effects of changes to LTV and DTI limits. Stronger credit growth before tightening is associated with bigger effects. While there might be several reasons for this, one explanation is that lending is available to more marginal borrowers during booms. High house-priceto-income ratios are also correlated with bigger tightening effects. Limits on LTV and DTI ratios appear to become more constraining when houses are expensive. This may be an important element for explaining cross-country differences in the effectiveness of macroprudential policies, given that house-price-to-income ratios can differ substantially.

Tightening LTV and DTI limits appears to be more effective than loosening them, as found in past research. In downturns, ie when credit growth is weak and house prices are relatively cheap, tightening reduces the level of housing credit by around 2-3 percent and loosening raises it by 0-3 percent. Given the bounds of uncertainty, these are not that different – consistent with loosening having small effects because it usually occurs during downturns.

Why A Larger Finance Sector Is Killing The Economy

The Bank for International Settlements released a paper “Why does financial sector growth crowd out real economic growth?” The paper suggests that rather than encouraging a bigger banking sector, we should be careful because a larger finance sector actually kills growth in the real economy. That is an important insight, given that in Australia, the ratio of bank assets to GDP is higher than its ever been, and growing, at a time when economic growth in anemic.

GDP-to-Bank-Assets-Sept-2014Other countries have significantly higher ratios. The mythology that a bigger banking sector is good for Australia should be questioned. At a time when banks are growing in Australia, thanks to high house prices and lending, inflating their size, we should be looking hard at these findings, because if true, we are on the wrong track.

The purpose of this paper is to examine why financial sector growth harms real growth. We begin by constructing a model in which financial and real growth interact, and then turn to empirical evidence. In our model, we first show how an exogenous increase in financial sector growth can reduce total factor productivity growth. This is a consequence of the fact that financial sector growth benefits disproportionately high collateral/low productivity projects. This mechanism reflects the fact that periods of high financial sector growth often coincide with the strong development in sectors like construction,  where returns on projects are relatively easy to pledge as collateral but productivity (growth) is relatively low.

Next, we introduce skilled workers who can be hired either by financiers to improve their ability to lend, increasing financial sector growth, or by entrepreneurs to improve their returns (albeit at the cost of lower pledgeability). We then show that when skilled workers work in one sector it generates a negative externality on the other sector. The externality works as follows: financiers who hire skilled workers can lend more to entrepreneurs than those who do not. With more abundant and cheaper funding, entrepreneurs have an incentive to invest in projects with higher pledgeability but lower productivity, reducing their demand for skilled labour. Conversely, entrepreneurs who hire skilled workers invest in high return/low pledgeability projects. As a result, financiers have no incentive to hire skilled workers because the benefit in terms of increased ability to lend is limited since entrepreneurs’ projects feature low pledgeability. This negative externality can lead to multiple equilibria. In the equilibrium where financiers employ the skilled workers, so that the financial sector grows more rapidly, total factor productivity growth is lower than it would be had agents coordinated on the equilibrium where entrepreneurs attract the skilled labour. Looking at welfare, we are able to show that, relative to the social optimum, financial booms in which skilled labour work for the financial sector, are sub-optimalwhen the bargaining power of financiers is sufficiently large.

Turning to the empirical results, we move beyond the aggregate results and examine industry-level data. Here we focus on manufacturing industries and find that industries that are in competition for resources with finance are particularly damaged by financial booms. Specifically, we find that manufacturing sectors that are either R&D-intensive or dependent on external finance suffer disproportionate reductions in productivity growth when finance booms. That is, we confirm the results in the model: by draining resources from the real economy, financial sector growth becomes a drag on real growth.

Their conclusions are important.

First, the growth of a country’s financial system is a drag on productivity growth. That is, higher growth in the financial sector reduces real growth. In other words, financial booms are not, in general, growth-enhancing, likely because the financial sector competes with the rest of the economy for resources. Second, using sectoral data, we examine the distributional nature of this effect and find that credit booms harm what we normally think of as the engines for growth – those that are more R&D intensive. This evidence, together with recent experience during the financial crisis, leads us to conclude that there is a pressing need to reassess the relationship of finance and real growth in modern economic systems.

 

Further High House Price Evidence – BIS

The BIS has published the latest data from their analysis of house prices across countries. “The BIS currently publishes more than 300 price series for 55 countries, among which it has selected one representative series for each country. For 18 countries, it also publishes series that span the period back to the early 1970s. House prices can serve as key indicators of financial stability risks, as property booms are often the source of vulnerabilities that lead to systemic crises.”

They show that in trend terms, after correcting for inflation and seasonality, Australian prices are relatively higher than other advanced countries. This is consisted with data from the IMF, Economist, and DFA’s own analysis. “Year-on-year residential property prices, deflated by CPI, rose by 9.5% in the United States and 6% in the United Kingdom. Real house prices also grew, by 7% in Canada, 7.7% in Australia and 2.2% in Switzerland, three countries that were less affected by the crisis, as well as in some countries that were severely affected by the crisis, such as Ireland (+7.2%) and Iceland (+6.4%)”.

BISHousePricesSept2014They also show the relative benchmark between house price growth and price to rent. Here, overall average house price growth, after inflation, in Australia is close to zero over the last three years (because of averages across the states, the ABS shows how prices vary state by state), and Australia has high price to rent rations, but not the highest. This is because rents are more linked to interest rates and income growth than house prices directly.

BISPricetoRentRatioSept2014Turning to their other measure, comparing house prices to income ratios (the measure we prefer as the best judge of house prices), we find that Australia is shown as the second highest, after Belgium, despite the close of zero growth in absolute prices, after inflation, in the past 3 years.

BISPricetoIncomeSept2014The codes for the various countries are listed below:

BISCountryList2014Their comments are important:

Work at the BIS has pointed to the early warning indicator properties of real estate prices. Leverage fuelled housing booms that turn into busts have so often been at the very heart of episodes of systemic distress. Historical experience has demonstrated that the interactions between rapidly growing house prices and excessive credit expansion are a tell-tale sign of the build-up of vulnerabilities in the household sector and the source of future losses for banks.