Marked Slowdown In Dividends in Q3

A slowdown in global dividend growth is underway, according to the latest Janus Henderson Global Dividend Index (JHGDI). The trend began in the second quarter and continued in the third. Even at their slower pace, dividends are still growing comfortably, however.

Australia saw a big decline in dividends, with two fifths of companies in the index cutting dividends. The total dropped to $18.6bn, the lowest Q3 total since 2010 in US dollar terms, down 5.9% on an underlying basis. The biggest impact came from National Australia Bank, which made its first dividend cut in a decade, and Telstra. Australia already has the lowest dividend cover in the world among the bigger economies.

Globally, payouts rose 2.8% on a headline basis to reach a new third-quarter record of $355.3bn, equivalent to an underlying growth rate of 5.3% once the stronger dollar and minor technical factors were taken into account. This is exactly in line with the long-term trend, and Janus Henderson’s forecast. The Janus Henderson Global Dividend Index rose to 193.1, a new record.

Only US dividends reached an all-time record in Q3, up 8.0% on an underlying basis, well ahead of the global average. A slowdown in profit growth is however beginning to impact dividend payments. A rising proportion of US companies held their dividends flat – one in six companies in Q3, up from one in ten in Q1, though there remain few outright cutters. The largest dividend payer in the US this year will be AT&T, jumping ahead of Apple, Exxon Mobil and Microsoft. AT&T’s return to the top spot for the first time since 2012 is thanks to its acquisition of Time Warner in 2018; the combined company will distribute close to $14.9bn, though this will not be enough to dislodge Shell as the world’s largest payer for the fourth year in a row.

Allowing for seasonality Japan, Canada and the United Kingdom all saw third-quarter records, though in the UK’s case this was entirely due to very large special dividends from banks and miners. The underlying trend in the UK remains lacklustre with underlying growth of just 0.6%.

From a seasonal perspective, Q3 is especially important for Asia Pacific and China. Here there were distinct signs of weakness. Almost half the Chinese companies in the index reduced their payouts, and the modest growth that was achieved was dependent on big increases from one or two companies. Chinese dividends totalling $29.2bn crept ahead 3.7% year-on-year on an underlying basis and without Petrochina’s large increase, they would have been lower year-on-year. The slowdown in the Chinese     economy is affecting the dividend-paying capacity of its companies, particularly since in the short-term dividends are more closely tied to profits in China than in other parts of the world such as the US and UK due to companies largely adopting a fixed payout-ratio policy.

Across Asia-Pacific, Australia and Taiwan led payouts lower, and only Hong Kong delivered strong growth. It was a difficult quarter in Australia with two fifths of companies in the index cutting dividends. The total dropped to $18.6bn, the lowest Q3 total since 2010 in US dollar terms, down 5.9% on an underlying basis. The biggest impact came from National Australia Bank, which made its first dividend cut in a decade. Australia already has the lowest dividend cover in the world among the bigger economies, so if the slowing domestic economy leads to a decline in corporate profitability, it will be bad news for income investors, highlighting the importance of taking a diversified global investment approach. Hong Kong’s payouts jumped 8.1% on an underlying basis, contrasting with the mainland trend. This was mainly due to dividends from oil company CNOOC and from the real estate sector.

Q3 marks the seasonal low point for European dividends. They rose 7.0% on an underlying basis, though the growth rate was flattered by positive developments at just a few companies, and the total will not be enough to affect the annual rate significantly.

The energy sector saw the strongest growth in Q3, with dividends up by just over a fifth on an underlying basis. Most of this came from Russian oil companies, but China and Hong Kong, Canada and the United States also made a significant contribution to the increase. Basic materials headline growth was boosted by special dividends, but telecoms companies around the world were dogged by cuts, with the biggest impact from Vodafone in the UK, China Mobile and Telstra in Australia. Only just over half of the telcos in the index increased their payouts year-on-year.

Janus Henderson has left its $1.43trillion forecast for global dividends unchanged for 2019. This represents a headline increase of 3.9%, equivalent to underlying growth of 5.4%. By contrast 2018 saw underlying growth of 8.5%. 2019 will mark the tenth consecutive year of underlying growth for dividends.

IMF Says Sluggish Global Growth Calls for Supportive Policies

In the IMF’s July update of the World Economic Outlook they revised downward projections for global growth to 3.2 percent in 2019 and 3.5 percent in 2020. While this is a modest revision of 0.1 percentage points for both years relative to projections in April, it comes on top of previous significant downward revisions. The revision for 2019 reflects negative surprises for growth in emerging market and developing economies that offset positive surprises in some advanced economies. From The IMF Blog.

Growth is projected to improve between 2019 and 2020. However, close to 70 percent of the increase relies on an improvement in the growth performance in stressed emerging market and developing economies and is therefore subject to high uncertainty.

Global growth is sluggish and precarious, but it does not have to be this way because some of this is self-inflicted. Dynamism in the global economy is being weighed down by prolonged policy uncertainty as trade tensions remain heightened despite the recent US-China trade truce, technology tensions have erupted threatening global technology supply chains, and the prospects of a no-deal Brexit have increased.

Global growth is sluggish and precarious, but it does not have to be this way because some of this is self-inflicted.

The negative consequences of policy uncertainty are visible in the diverging trends between the manufacturing and services sector, and the significant weakness in global trade. Manufacturing purchasing manager indices continue to decline alongside worsening business sentiment as businesses hold off on investment in the face of high uncertainty. Global trade growth, which moves closely with investment, has slowed significantly to 0.5 percent (year-on-year) in the first quarter of 2019, which is its slowest pace since 2012. On the other hand, the services sector is holding up and consumer sentiment is strong, as unemployment rates touch record lows and wage incomes rise in several countries.

Among advanced economies—the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the euro area—grew faster than expected in the first quarter of 2019. However, some of the factors behind this—such as stronger inventory build-ups—are transitory and the growth momentum going forward is expected to be weaker, especially for countries reliant on external demand. Owing to first quarter upward revisions, especially for the United States, we are raising our projection for advanced economies slightly, by 0.1 percentage points, to 1.9 percent for 2019. Going forward, growth is projected to slow to 1.7 percent, as the effects of fiscal stimulus taper off in the United States and weak productivity growth and aging demographics dampen long-run prospects for advanced economies.

In emerging market and developing economies, growth is being revised down by 0.3 percentage points in 2019 to 4.1 percent and by 0.1 percentage points for 2020 to 4.7 percent. The downward revisions for 2019 are almost across the board for the major economies, though for varied reasons. In China, the slight revision downwards reflects, in part, the higher tariffs imposed by the United States in May, while the more significant revisions in India and Brazil reflect weaker-than-expected domestic demand.

For commodity exporters, supply disruptions, such as in Russia and Chile, and sanctions on Iran, have led to downward revisions despite a near-term strengthening in oil prices. The projected recovery in growth between 2019 and 2020 in emerging market and developing economies relies on improved growth outcomes in stressed economies such as Argentina, Turkey, Iran, and Venezuela, and therefore is subject to significant uncertainty.

Financial conditions in the United States and the euro area have further eased, as the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank adopted a more accommodative monetary policy stance. Emerging market and developing economies have benefited from monetary easing in major economies but have also faced volatile risk sentiment tied to trade tensions. On net, financial conditions are about the same for this group as in April. Low-income developing countries that previously received mainly stable foreign direct investment flows now receive significant volatile portfolio flows, as the search for yield in a low interest rate environment reaches frontier markets.

Increased downside risks

A major downside risk to the outlook remains an escalation of trade and technology tensions that can significantly disrupt global supply chains. The combined effect of tariffs imposed last year and potential tariffs envisaged in May between the United States and China could reduce the level of global GDP in 2020 by 0.5 percent. Further, a surprise and durable worsening of financial sentiment can expose financial vulnerabilities built up over years of low interest rates, while disinflationary pressures can lead to difficulties in debt servicing for borrowers. Other significant risks include a surprise slowdown in China, the lack of a recovery in the euro area, a no-deal Brexit, and escalation of geopolitical tensions.

With global growth subdued and downside risks dominating the outlook, the global economy remains at a delicate juncture. It is therefore essential that tariffs are not used to target bilateral trade balances or as a general-purpose tool to tackle international disagreements. To help resolve conflicts, the rules-based multilateral trading system should be strengthened and modernized to encompass areas such as digital services, subsidies, and technology transfer.

Policies to support growth

Monetary policy should remain accommodative especially where inflation is softening below target. But it needs to be accompanied by sound trade policies that would lift the outlook and reduce downside risks. With persistently low interest rates, macroprudential tools should be deployed to ensure that financial risks do not build up.

Fiscal policy should balance growth, equity, and sustainability concerns, including protecting society’s most vulnerable. Countries with fiscal space should invest in physical and social infrastructure to raise potential growth. In the event of a severe downturn, a synchronized move toward more accommodative fiscal policies should complement monetary easing, subject to country specific circumstances.

Lastly, the need for greater global cooperation is ever urgent. In addition to resolving trade and technology tensions, countries need to work together to address major issues such as climate change, international taxation, corruption, cybersecurity, and the opportunities and challenges of newly emerging digital payment technologies.

IMF warns – World has run out of firepower to fight next recession!

David Lipton, the deputy director of the Washington-based International Monetary Fund, delivered a stark warning about the depleted power of central banks and governments to combat another sharp economic shock.

“ The bottom line is this: the tools used to confront the Global Financial Crisis may not be available or may not be as potent next time. The space for additional monetary policy accommodation will surely be more constrained; fiscal resources may not be as available in many countries; and political resistance to bailouts may be greater because many people feel that those who brought about the last crisis did not shoulder their share of the burden.”

So, in short, the emergency tool kit that helped to pull the global economy out of the Great Financial Crisis might not work a second time, the world’s lender of last resort has warned.

Global Challenges

Obviously, this is not a matter for Europe alone. The U.S. needs to get its fiscal house in order as well. U.S.-China trade tensions pose the largest risk to global stability. Beijing needs to continue its shift toward high-quality growth and should support a sustainable globalization. All emerging markets should face up to external shocks and volatile capital flows.

While most baseline forecasts show some recovery ahead for Europe, many have been surprised by the size and pace of the recent deceleration. So, it is important to acknowledge the continuing uncertainty about the coming year, including with the crucial issue of Brexit still unresolved.

Each country should act now to strengthen their defenses ahead of a potential downturn. That includes those who have not addressed glaring vulnerabilities, most notably Italy. A serious recession could be very damaging for these countries, because they will be shown to be ill prepared. Their weaknesses could present a serious setback for Europe’s goal of convergence—of standards of living, productivity, of national well-being.

On the other hand, there are countries that are in a strong position to face a downturn—most notably Germany.

He warned that many countries need to drive reforms to deal with the emerging risks.

Emerging Markets Growth Eases

Potential growth projections for the larger emerging market (EMs) economies have deteriorated due mainly to a gloomier outlook for investment, says Fitch Ratings’ Economics team.

“One over-arching theme from our updated estimates of potential growth is a slowdown in projected investment growth over the next few years. This feeds through to lower labour productivity growth as we see less scope for increases in the capital to labour ratio, or ‘capital deepening'”, said Maxime Darmet, Associate Director in Fitch Ratings’ Economics team. “Prospects for a sharp re-acceleration in wider production efficiencies in emerging markets also still look quite limited.”

Fitch’s updated potential supply-side growth estimates over the next five years for the 10 major EMs covered in the agency’s Global Economic Outlook (GEO) show downward revisions for Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and Indonesia and an upward revision for India. China’s potential growth estimate remains unchanged at 5.5%.

Tukey’s potential growth is now estimated at 4.3%, down 0.5pp since our last report. This reflects the sharp external adjustment since last year’s currency crisis, which has been achieved partly through a collapse in the investment-to-GDP ratio. This will result in significantly lower growth in the capital stock (and hence labour productivity) than previously projected.

Brazil’s potential growth has been revised down slightly to 1.7% from 1.8%. Even though we expect trend investment growth to be quite robust over the next few years, on the fading effects of past large negative shocks, the very low starting point for the investment-to-GDP ratio means that the capital stock is unlikely to grow significantly, dampening GDP growth prospects.

Mexico’s potential growth is now estimated at 2.5%. This has been revised down by 0.3pp on the back of less favourable investment prospects – particularly in the energy sector – as the new government puts the implementation of reforms to the sector on hold.

South Africa’s potential growth has been revised down by 0.2pp to 1.7%. Sustained deterioration in business confidence is weighing on investment, and total factor productivity (TFP) – which captures improvements in the efficiency of the production process – continues to decline.

Weaker trend investment growth is also the main reason why China’s projected potential growth is much lower than recent historical growth outturns. A declining investment-to-GDP ratio has been necessary to limit the growth of corporate leverage, but has resulted in slower growth in the capital stock. However, this rebalancing may also have helped productivity at the margin: TFP growth has recently stabilised after falling steadily from 2008.

India is still estimated to have the highest potential GDP growth, at 7%. This has been revised up by 0.3pp, in part reflecting the revised national statistics showing significantly better growth performance in recent years than previously estimated.

Indonesia’s estimated potential growth is 5.3%, revised down by 0.2pp. Growth outturns since 2015 have been remarkably stable at around 5%, reflecting that potential growth has ratcheted down.

TFP growth has not been particularly impressive historically in most large EMs. Moreover, it has weakened substantially over the past 10 years or so in virtually all countries – with the notable exceptions of Indonesia and India. This may reflect waning momentum in structural reform and a decline in manufacturing as a share of GDP since the late 1990s, a sector that has traditionally exhibited higher productivity growth.

Cracks Appearing in Global Growth Picture as 2020 Headwinds Rise

Global growth is slowing and becoming less well-balanced, while downside risks are rising, particularly for 2020, says Fitch Ratings in its new Global Economic Outlook (GEO).

“The world economy is still expanding at a rapid pace, but cracks are starting to appear in the global growth picture,” said Fitch Chief Economist, Brian Coulton

“Eurozone growth outturns have disappointed once again, world trade is decelerating and the China slowdown is now fact, not forecast,” added Coulton.

Growth dynamics within the three main economies have become more divergent, with US growth still rising on a year-on-year basis, while growth in the eurozone and China is falling.

A historically tight US labour market and the ongoing fiscal boost to growth from higher government spending will keep the Fed on a course for three more rate hikes in 2019 despite a softer external environment. US GDP growth remains on track to reach around 3% this year. While we expect growth to slow next year, the economy will still expand at an above-trend pace of 2.6%.

But downgrades to the eurozone growth outlook, which continue a pattern seen in the last few editions of the GEO, and stubbornly low core inflation now look likely to persuade the ECB to hold off from raising interest rates until 2020. We are no longer forecasting the ECB to raise rates in 2019. This will help provide further support to the US dollar, keeping pressure on emerging markets (EMs), where financing conditions have tightened significantly.

Our base case remains a soft landing for global growth in 2020 as US fiscal support fades. But downside risks – from a faster-than-expected tightening of global financial conditions as central bank liquidity shrinks, or an escalation in market fears about eurozone fragmentation – have increased. Notably, this year has shown the capacity for tightening global liquidity to adversely affect the growth outlook, particularly for EMs. Trade protectionism also remains a key downside risk despite some recent more positive news flow on the US/China trade war, with the announcement of fresh negotiations and a 90-day extension of the deadline before the next increase in US tariffs.

Fitch’s December 2018 GEO sees global growth forecasts unchanged for this year and next, with growth peaking in 2018 at 3.3% before moderating to 3.1% in 2019 and then falling below 3% in 2020. Forecasts for eurozone growth in 2018 and 2019 have been revised down to 1.9% and 1.7%, respectively (compared with 2% and 1.8% in the September GEO). EM growth forecasts for 2019 and 2020 have also been cut, partly reflecting tighter financial conditions in India, Indonesia and Turkey. Our forecasts for China have not changed in this edition of the GEO, but the slowdown we have been expecting for a while is now materialising.

Trade War Escalation Would Knock 0.4% off World Growth

An escalation of global trade tensions that results in new tariffs on USD2 trillion in global trade flows would reduce world growth by 0.4% in 2019, to 2.8% from 3.2% in Fitch Ratings‘ June 2018 “Global Economic Outlook” baseline forecast. The US, Canada and Mexico would be the most affected countries.

The imposition of further tariff measures currently being considered by the US administration and commensurate retaliatory tariffs on US goods by the EU, China, Canada and Mexico would mark a significant escalation from tariff measures imposed to date, as noted in a recent Fitch Wire published on July 3 (“Risks to Global Growth Rise as Trade Tensions Escalate”).

Using the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model – a global macroeconomic model taking into account trade and financial linkages between economies – Fitch’s economics team assessed the economic impact of a scenario in which the US imposes auto import tariffs at 25% and additional tariffs on China, where trading partners retaliate symmetrically, and NAFTA collapses.

We factored in new tariffs on a total of USD400 billion of US goods imports from China in our simulations in light of recent statements from the US administration. This is twice as large as the scenario outlined in the aforementioned Fitch Wire. The tariffs under our new scenario would cover 90% of total Chinese goods exports to the US when added to tariffs on USD50 billion of exports already announced.

The tariffs would initially feed through to higher import prices, raising firms’ costs and reducing real wages. Business confidence and equity prices would also be dampened, further weighing on business investment and reducing consumption through a wealth effect. Over the long run, the model factors in productivity being affected as local firms are less exposed to international competition and so would face fewer incentives to seek efficiency gains. Export competitiveness in the countries subject to tariffs would decline, resulting in lower export volumes. The negative growth effects would be magnified by trade multipliers and feed through to other trading partners not directly targeted by the tariffs. Import substitution would offset some of the growth shock in the countries imposing import tariffs.

The US, Canada and Mexico would be the most affected countries. GDP growth would be 0.7% below the baseline forecast in 2019 in the US and Canada and 1.5% in Mexico. The level of GDP would remain significantly below its baseline in 2020. The results only consider tariff impacts, but the non-tariff barriers associated with the collapse of NAFTA could be equally if not more significant as supply chains are disrupted.

China would be less severely impacted, with GDP growth around 0.3% below the baseline forecast. China would only be affected directly by US protectionist measures in this scenario, whereas the US would be imposing tariffs on a large proportion of its imports while being hit simultaneously by retaliatory measures from four countries or trading blocs.

Most countries not directly involved in the trade war would see their GDP falling below baseline, though generally at a much lower scale. Net commodity exporters would be more severely hit, as slower world growth would push oil and hard commodity prices down. On the other hand, for some net commodity importers, the benefits from lower hard commodity prices would more than offset the impact of lower world growth.

Except in Canada and Mexico, a trade war scenario would ultimately be deflationary as lower growth and hard commodity prices would reduce inflation, outweighing the initial direct impact of higher tariffs in raising prices. The US Federal Reserve’s monetary tightening would be scaled back given lower growth and lower overall inflation in the US, with the level of the Fed Funds rate around 0.5pp below baseline.

Where will the Growth Really Come From?

Luci Ellis RBA Assistant Governor (Economic) delivered the Stan Kelly Lecture on “Where is the Growth Going to Come From?“. An excellent question given the fading mining boom, and geared up households!

Over time, some industries grow faster than others. For a while, the mining industry was growing faster than the rest. Other industries take the lead at other times. But it doesn’t really get at the underlying drivers of growth. We need to ask: where will the growth really come from, over the longer term?

In answering this question, it is hard to go past the ‘three Ps’ popularised by our colleagues at Treasury: population, participation and productivity. I’ll go through each in turn.

Population

As the Governor noted in a speech a few years ago, Australia’s population is growing faster than in almost any other OECD economy (Lowe 2014). That has remained true over the past couple of years. The rate of natural increase is higher than many other countries, but most of the difference is the large contribution from immigration.

Of course, just adding more people and growing the economy to keep pace wouldn’t boost our living standards.[5] But there are two reasons why we should not assume that this is all that happens. Firstly, recent migrants have a different profile to the incumbent Australian population. They are generally younger, and the youngest age group are significantly more likely to have non-school qualifications (Graph 5). This is possibly because so many recent migrants initially arrive on student visas and then stay. In line with that, service exports in the form of education have grown rapidly over the past few decades.

Older migrants are on average less likely to have such a qualification than existing residents in the same age groups, but they are a small fraction of all migrants. The average education level of newly arrived Australians is actually higher than that of existing residents, precisely because they are younger. So Australia’s migration program is structured in a way that, in principle at least, it can grow the economy while raising average living standards.

Graph 5: Recent Migrants and Australian Residents

Secondly, increasing economic scale is not neutral. There is more to it than just getting bigger. This is the lesson of what is sometimes called New Economic Geography: scale economies arise from product differentiation (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999). Bigger, denser cities are more productive. Perhaps more importantly, larger population centres allow more variety in the goods and services produced. Fujita and Thisse (2002) quote Adam Smith making the same point (Smith 1776, p 17).

There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kinds, which can be carried on no where but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find employment and subsistence in no other place. A village is by much too narrow a sphere for him; even an ordinary market town is scarce large enough to afford him constant occupation.So it is also with management consultants, medical specialists and a myriad of other occupations that can only be sustained in a large market.

Participation

The second of the three Ps, participation, can and has been increasing average incomes and living standards. It is usually presumed that ageing of the population will reduce participation. In Australia at least, other forces have offset that tendency in recent years.

In our Statement on Monetary Policy, released last week, we noted that the participation rate has been rising recently. The increase has been concentrated amongst women and older workers. That is true of the pick-up over recent months. It is also true over a somewhat longer period, as shown in this graph (Graph 6). Older workers have increased their participation in the workforce as the trend to earlier retirement has abated. Mixed in with this is a cohort effect related to the increasing participation of women more generally. Each generation of women participates in the labour force at a greater rate than the previous generation of women did at the same age.

Graph 6: Participation Rate

There is a connection here with the increase in health and education employment I mentioned earlier. Better healthcare outcomes means that fewer people retire early because of ill-health, so participation rises. More extensive childcare options make it easier for both parents to be in paid work. Given the usual presumptions in our society about who has primary responsibility for caring for children, this shift affects participation of women more than that of men. So it’s no surprise that the participation rates of women aged 35–44 have also been rising strongly. And more flexible work arrangements tend to encourage participation by both female and older workers.

In the end, though, lifting participation is a once-off adjustment. Once someone enters the workforce, they can’t enter it a second time without leaving first. Greater participation raises the level of living standards but it isn’t an engine of ongoing growth. We must also remember that the objective is not that everyone must be in paid employment. Many people are outside the labour force for good reasons, for example because they are in full-time education, caring for children or other relatives, or doing volunteer work by choice.

Productivity and Innovation

That leaves us with productivity, arguably the most important of three Ps, but unfortunately also the hardest to measure. It is also an area where distributions and firm-specific decisions really matter. Some recent international evidence shows that the firms at the global productivity frontier can be several times more productive than the average firm in their industry (Andrews, Criscuolo and Gal 2015).[6] This research also finds that firms tend to adopt a new technology only after the leading firms in their own country have adopted it. That is, the national productivity frontier first has to catch up to the global frontier, by adapting the new technology to local conditions. So the average productivity of firms in an economy depends on three things.

  1. How quickly the leading firms in that country adopt the technology and match the productivity levels of the globally leading firms in that industry.
  2. How large the leading firms are in the national economy.
  3. How quickly the laggard firms can catch up, once the national leading firms have adopted a particular technology.

The findings of this research suggest that this last factor – the rate of technology adoption – has slowed down since the turn of the century.

The policy implications of these findings are subtle, and depend on whether you want to affect firms near the frontier, or the firms that are lagging far behind. For example, a more flexible labour market might make it easier for the leading firms to grow faster. Average productivity would rise because those leading firms account for a greater share of output. But then you would have an economy dominated by ‘superstar firms’ (Autor et al 2017). The implications of that are not necessarily benign. For a start, inequality could be greater. Median living standards might not rise.

The drivers of innovation, like the drivers of creativity more generally, are hard to pin down. But the literature does provide some pointers to them. First and perhaps most important is simply to grow: growth is more conducive to innovation than recession is. Recessions do not engender ‘creative destruction’; they produce liquidations, which are destructive destruction (Caballero and Hammour 2017). Indeed, when labour is plentiful, there is not much incentive to invest in productivity-boosting technology. And when everyone’s sales are weak, there is not much incentive to invest to try to increase them. There is nothing quite like a tight labour market to make firms think about how to do things more efficiently.

The pressures of strong sales or competition might spur innovation, but many other factors enable it. Infrastructure is a key enabler not only of productivity growth of existing firms, but whole new business opportunities. Often we think of communications infrastructure and the internet in this context. Transport infrastructure is at least as important, I would argue, which makes the current pipeline of public investment even more relevant to future growth outcomes. That’s because online commerce still needs good physical logistics. Unless it’s a purely digital product, something still needs to be delivered. Australia is a highly urbanised country, but it is also a highly suburbanised country. Improving urban transport infrastructure, as well as inter-urban transport infrastructure, could help boost productivity across a range of both traditional and new industries.

Also important is the political and regulatory environment. It would not surprise Stan and Bert Kelly that much of the literature finds that product market regulation and other devices protecting laggard firms tend to retard innovation. More generally, barriers to entry make it harder for new, potentially more innovative firms to break in.

It isn’t all about the start-ups, though. A lot depends on the propensity of existing firms to adopt new technologies and business practices. We think that this is one of the reasons for the slow rate of growth in retail prices in Australia at present. In the face of increased competition, incumbent retailers are having to both compress margins and use technology to become more efficient. Our liaison contacts tell us that they are investing heavily in better inventory management and other cost-saving measures, often by using data analysis more extensively.

Adopting these innovations takes time, because firms have to become familiar with the new technologies and change their business practices to take advantage of them. It wouldn’t be the first time that the computers – or perhaps this time, the machine learning algorithms – were visible everywhere except in the productivity statistics for just this reason.[7]

Adopting new technologies and business models also requires a willingness to change. Just as views to protection can change, so can society’s attitudes to risk, innovation and, thus, entrepreneurship. We saw, after all, that Australia’s economic culture could shift from being inward-looking to outward-looking over the course of a couple of decades.

Australia is normally seen as being a relatively fast adopter of technology. But there are some aspects where we seem to lag. One is R&D expenditure (Graph 7). While this isn’t greatly below the average of industrialised countries and many similar countries get by perfectly well doing much less, it has been declining in importance lately. Some other indicators also suggest that Australian firms have in recent years been less likely to adopt innovative technologies than their peers abroad. For example, while small firms are holding their own, large firms in Australia are less likely to use cloud computing services than large firms in many other countries.[8] This wasn’t always the case: a decade and a half ago, Australian firms were towards the front of the curve in adopting the e-commerce technologies that were new at the time (Macfarlane 2000). A lot depends on whether the workforce has the skills to use these new technologies, but at heart, technology adoption is a business decision.

Graph 7: Gross Research and Development Expenditure

IMF More Bullish On Global Financial Stability

The IMF Transcript of the release of the April 2017 Global Financial Stability Report suggests that global financial stability has improved in the last six months. They say global growth could strengthen, and deflation risks could continue to fade. This would benefit emerging markets and advanced economies alike, even as interest rates and monetary policies normalize. [DFA Note – more upward pressure on mortgage rates!]

However, the IMF warns that failing to get the policy mix right could reverse market optimism.

As Maury Obstfeld explained yesterday at the release of the World Economic Outlook, economic activity has gained momentum. We have greater confidence in the outlook. Hopes for reflation have risen. Monetary and financial conditions remain highly accommodative. Investor optimism over the new policies under discussion has boosted asset prices.

But failing to get the policy mix right could reverse market optimism. It could also ignite new downside risks to financial stability. In the United States, policies could increase fiscal imbalances and could push up interest rates and global risk premia. A shift toward protectionism globally could drag down trade and growth, triggering capital outflows from emerging markets.

The loss of global cooperation on regulatory reforms could reverse some of the gains that have made financial systems safer. Markets expect these adverse developments will be avoided and policymakers will implement the right mix of policies. In the United States, this means policies that will invigorate corporate investment. In emerging markets, this means addressing domestic and external imbalances to enhance resilience to external shocks. Finally, in Europe, this means that policies will have to strengthen the outlook for banks by tackling the structural causes of weak profitability. That is why the focus of this report is on “Getting the policy mix right”.

Let me now turn to the key policy questions. First, can the corporate sector in the United States support a safe economic expansion? Investment spending has been languishing for over 15 years now. Recently, discussions of corporate tax reform, infrastructure spending, and reductions in regulatory burdens have boosted confidence. This could herald a much‑needed rebound in investment to build for the future.

The good news is that many firms have the capacity for capital expenditures. Increased cash flows from corporate tax reform could bring about increased investment. This would be welcome rather than financial risk taking, such as the acquisition of financial assets and using debt to pay out shareholders. The bad news is that sectors accounting for almost half of U.S. investment—namely, energy, utilities, and real estate—are already highly levered. This means that expanding investment, even with tax relief, could increase already elevated debt levels.

Why is this a problem? A sharp rise in interest rates—for example, owing to increased financial imbalances—could push corporate debt servicing capacity to its weakest level since the crisis. Under such a scenario, corporates with some $4 trillion of assets may find servicing their debt challenging. This is almost a quarter of the assets we capture in our analysis.

In an integrated world, what happens in advanced economies has repercussions for emerging markets. We all remember the taper tantrum in 2013, when interests rose sharply and emerging markets suffered badly. Is this time different? With the right policy mix, it can be.

Global growth could strengthen, and deflation risks could continue to fade. This would benefit emerging markets and advanced economies alike, even as interest rates and monetary policies normalize. So far, we have been on this good path. But emerging market economies could face trying times. In fact, political and policy uncertainty in advanced economies opens new channels for negative spillovers.

A sudden reversal of market sentiment could reignite capital outflows and hurt growth prospects, as could a global shift toward protectionism. We estimate that debt held by the weakest firms in emerging markets could rise to $230 billion under such a scenario. In turn, banks in some countries would need to rebuild their buffers of capital and provisions. Those are the banks that are already experiencing a decline in asset quality after a long credit boom.

China is a key contributor to global growth but has also notable vulnerabilities. Credit in relation to China’s economy has more than doubled in less than a decade, to over 200 percent. Credit booms this big can be dangerous. The longer booms last and the larger credit grows, the more dangerous they become. The Chinese authorities continue to adjust policies to limit the growth of the banking and shadow banking systems, but more needs to be done to slow credit growth and reduce vulnerabilities. The authorities’ progress and success are essential for global financial stability.

Turning to Europe, policymakers need to make further progress in addressing structural impediments to profitability in the banking system. Significant advances have already been made. European banks hold higher levels of capital, regulations have been strengthened, and supervision has been enhanced. Over the past six months, bank equity prices have risen as yield curves steepened and the economic recovery has firmed.

But this is not the end of the story. As we established in the last GFSR, a cyclical recovery is unlikely to fully resolve the profitability challenge that many banks face. Why is this important? Weak profitability limit the banks’ ability to retain capital, thus constraining their ability to weather shocks and increasing risks to financial stability.

In this GFSR, we examine many European banks, representing $35 trillion of assets. We divide them into three groups: global, European‑focused, and domestic. Domestic banks face the greatest profitability challenges, with almost three quarters of them having very weak returns in 2016. This analysis suggests that the domestic operating environment for banks plays a significant role.

While no single structural factor clearly explains chronic low profitability, overbanking is a common challenge. Overbanking takes many different forms: for example, weak banks with low buffers, too many banks with a regional focus or narrow mandate, or too many branches and low branch efficiency. Measures are being taken to address these concerns, but countries with the biggest challenges need to make more progress. Otherwise, low profitability could impede the recovery or, worse, reignite systemic risks.

Let me sum up. What does it take to get the policy mix right? US policy proposals should aim to increase economic growth but should also avoid creating fiscal imbalances and negative global spillovers. Healthy corporate balance sheets will be essential to facilitate an increase in productive investment. Policymakers should preemptively address areas in which risk‑taking appears excessive.

Emerging market policymakers should address their external and domestic imbalances. That includes improving corporate restructuring mechanisms, monitoring corporate vulnerabilities, and ensuring that banks have healthy buffers. In Europe, more comprehensive efforts are needed to address banking system and bank business model challenges. The authorities should focus on removing system‑wide impediments to profitability. Such measures should include promoting bank consolidation and branch rationalization, reforming bank business models, and addressing nonperforming loans.

At the global level, successful completion of the Regulatory Reform Agenda is vital. It relies on continued multilateral cooperation and coordination. Completing the Reform Agenda, especially the adoption of the Basel III enhancements, will ensure that the global financial system is safe and can continue to promote economic activity and growth.

Designed For Growth

From iMFdirect.

Productivity drives our living standards. In our April 2017 Fiscal Monitor, we show that countries can raise productivity by improving the design of their tax system, which includes both policies and administration. This would allow business reasons, not tax ones, to drive firms’ investment and employment decisions.

Countries can substantially increase productivity by eliminating barriers that hold more productive firms back. These barriers include badly designed economic policies, or markets that do not function as they should. We estimate that eliminating such barriers would, on average across countries, lift annual real GDP growth rates by roughly 1 percentage point over 20 years. We also find that emerging market and low-income countries can achieve one quarter of these gains by improving the design of their tax policies and revenue administrations.

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Doing more with the same

Countries can increase productivity by tackling the barriers that give rise to poor use of existing resources within countries—resource misallocation. Such barriers prevent productive firms from expanding and allow unproductive ones to survive.

When comparing a less efficient country with another closer to the world’s productivity frontier, the contrast is stark. As the figure below illustrates, the less efficient country does have several highly productive firms. The main difference stems from the fact that the less efficient country has many more unproductive firms.

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How can a better allocation of resources across firms raise productivity?

Imagine two firms that produce software, with identical technologies but different behavior towards taxation. Because of a weak tax administration, one firm avoids detection by the tax authority and doesn’t pay taxes, therefore facing a lower user cost of capital. The other firm is tax-compliant due to greater scrutiny from the tax authority, therefore facing a higher user cost of capital. The difference in user cost means that the tax-evading firm can afford to undertake investments in lower-return projects, while the fully taxed firm can only undertake investments in higher-return projects. In this example, aggregate output would be higher if capital were to move from the untaxed firm to the fully taxed firm, allowing for more investment in higher-return projects.

How governments tax matters for productivity

What drives the misallocation of resources? Misallocation arises when government policies or poorly functioning markets favor some firms over others. Examples include tax incentives that depend on firm size or type of investment, weak tax enforcement, tariffs applied to particular goods, product market regulations that limit market access, preferential loans granted to specific firms, and financial markets that are not fully developed. Tackling all these policies and practices is very complex.

The Fiscal Monitor explores a selection of tax policies that discriminate against firms in different ways, giving rise to resource misallocation. In this blog, we focus on one: tax evasion. This example is especially relevant for emerging market and low-income developing countries. It illustrates clearly that a weak tax administration not only hurts revenue collection, but it also hurts productivity.

Through tax evasion, “cheats”—by which we refer to firms that are registered with the tax authority but underreport their sales for tax purposes—enjoy a potentially large implicit subsidy that allows them to stay in business despite low productivity. As a result, “cheats” gain market share even if they are less productive, reducing the market share of more productive, tax compliant businesses.

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Our empirical results show that a stronger tax administration reduces the prevalence of cheats. By getting rid of the implicit subsidy, the less productive “cheats”, unable to compete, will go out of business. This makes room for productive, tax-compliant firms to gain market share and absorb greater amounts of labor and capital, raising aggregate productivity.

Our estimates show that in emerging market and low income developing countries, closing the productivity gap between tax compliant firms and cheats would add ½ to 1 percentage points to aggregate productivity.

All countries have much to gain from removing the policies and practices that prevent resources from going to where they are most productive. Upgrading the tax system can play an important part.

High Household Debt Kills Real Growth

A new working paper from the BIS “The real effects of household debt in the short and long run” shows that high household debt (as measured by debt to GDP) has a significant negative long term effect on consumption, and so growth.

A 1 percentage point increase in the household debt-to-GDP ratio tends to lower growth in the long run by 0.1 percentage point. Our results suggest that the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify as the household debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 60%. For GDP growth, that intensification seems to occur when the ratio exceeds 80%.

Moreover, the negative correlation between household debt and consumption actually strengthens over time, following a surge in household borrowing. What is striking is that the negative correlation coefficient nearly doubles between the first and the fifth year following the increase in household debt.

Bad news for Australian households where the ratio is well above 80%, at 130%.

This is explained by massive amounts of borrowing for housing (both owner occupied and investment) whilst unsecured personal debt is not growing. Such high household debt, even with low interest rates sucks spending from the economy, and is a brake on growth. The swelling value of home prices, and paper wealth (as well as growing bank balance sheets) do not really provide the right foundation for long term real sustainable growth.

Note: BIS Working Papers are written by members of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the Bank. The papers are on subjects of topical interest and are technical in character. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS.