Household Finances – Page 31 – Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog

Household Spending Remains Key to U.S. Economic Growth

From The St. Louis Fed On The Economy Blog.

Household-related spending is driving the economy like never before, according to a recent Housing Market Perspectives analysis.

Since the U.S. economy began to recover in 2009, close to 83 percent of total growth has been fueled by household spending, said William R. Emmons, lead economist with the St. Louis Fed’s Center for Household Financial Stability.

“Hence, the continuation of the current expansion may depend largely on the strength of U.S. households,” noted Emmons.

An Examination of the Current Expansion

In July, the U.S. economic expansion entered its ninth year, and it should soon become the third-longest growth period since WWII, Emmons said. He noted that it would become the longest post-WWII recovery if it persists through the second quarter of 2020.

However, the current expansion has been weak and ranks ninth among the 10 post-WWII business cycles, as shown in the figure below.¹ “Only the previous cycle, ending in the second quarter of 2009, was weaker,” he said. “That cycle was dominated by the housing boom and bust and culminated in the Great Recession.”

The Changing Composition of Economic Growth

Emmons noted that the composition of economic growth also has changed in recent decades and has generally shifted in favor of housing and consumer spending,² as shown in the figure below.

“Only during the brief 1958-61 cycle did residential investment—which includes both the construction of new housing units and the renovation of existing units—contribute proportionally more to the economy’s growth than it has during the current cycle,” Emmons said.

He noted that, perhaps surprisingly, homebuilding subtracted significantly from economic growth during the previous cycle even though it included the housing bubble. “The crash in residential investment was so severe between the fourth quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2009 that it erased all of housing investment’s previous growth contributions,” he said.

He noted that residential investment typically subtracts from growth during recessions. Thus, its ultimate contribution to the current cycle likely will be less than currently shown because the next recession will be included as part of the current cycle.

At the same time, he said, personal consumption expenditures (i.e., consumer spending) also have been very important in recent cycles.

Emmons noted that consumer spending has contributed close to 75 percent of overall economic growth during the current cycle. The share was higher in only two other cycles. “Not surprisingly, strong residential investment and strong consumer spending tend to coincide when households are doing well,” he said.

Notes and References

¹ The current business cycle began in the third quarter of 2009 and has not yet ended. The provisional “end date” used is the second quarter of 2017, which was the most recent quarter ended at the time this analysis was done.

² The other components of gross domestic product (GDP) are business investment, exports and imports of goods and services, and government consumption expenditures and gross investment.

Are There More Risks In The Mortgage Book Than Surveys Suggest?

The Bank of England issued a staff working paper – “A tiger by the tail: estimating the UK mortgage market vulnerabilities from loan-level data“.

They have taken data from 14 million mortgages and run modelling across the cohorts to determine the LVR, LTI and DSR of mortgages. This is approach is an alternative to the survey led methods used by the Bank of England. Significantly, they conclude that risks in the system are understated using the survey methods (an analogy would be HILDA here); compared with the granular data. Policy makes are, they say, understating the risks. We agree!

Our estimate provides an alternative source to track the tail of vulnerable borrowers in the UK. It suggests a larger tail compared to the available household surveys. While the Bank of England/NMG survey points to a falling tail of high DSR loans in recent years, our estimations indicate that it remained almost flat. Similarly, our estimations suggest a consistently higher share of high LTI loans over time. These results should make policy makers less sanguine about the developments in the UK mortgage market in recent years, which are traditionally analysed using these surveys.

In the absence of loan-level stock of mortgages in the previous years, policy makers have been relying on survey data to monitor risks to financial stability and calibrate policies. As already discussed, surveys can be subject to biases and small sample issues, so our work provides an alternative estimate of the LTI, DSR and LTV distributions. Notably, we find that size of the tail of vulnerable borrowers might have been higher in recent years than surveys suggest.

Figure 6 shows LTI, DSR and LTV distributions from our estimation against data from the NMG and WAS surveys as of 2015. Our estimate suggests a larger vulnerable tail (LTI above 4.5 and DSR above 40) compared to surveys. This is consistent with the finding that individuals tend to underestimate outstanding loan amount in surveys or highly indebted borrowers are under-represented in surveys. There is greater discrepancy in LTV distributions, which could be attributed to further bias in how individuals report property values in surveys.

Figure 7 compares the evolution of the tail of high LTI and DSR from our estimate and surveys over time. While the NMG survey suggests that the share of loans with DSR above 40% has decreased in recent years, our estimations indicate that it remained almost flat. Similarly, our estimations for high LTI shares are steadily higher. Our stock estimation can also shed light on the characteristics of specific cohorts of borrowers and loans. To illustrate the type of analysis can be done by using the loan-level estimate, we present the age distribution of high DSR (40%+), high LTI (4.5+) and high LTV (85%+) loans.

Figure 8 shows the characteristics of current high LTV loans. We find that most of the LTV loans were originated pre-2009, before credit conditions tightened materially in the UK. We also see that a large proportion of outstanding loans with high LTVs (85%+) are interest-only. This suggests that if policy makers are concerned with the tail of high-LTV mortgages that are interest-only, analysing the flow of new loans is unlikely to provide much insight, as interest-only loans are currently very rare. The focus needs to be turned to the high-LTV cohort in the stock and the interest-only loans originated in pre-crisis period.

Our estimate provides an alternative source to track specific cohorts of borrowers in the UK mortgage market. We find that a larger tail of vulnerable borrowers than household surveys suggest. While survey data suggest that the share of high DSR loans has decreased in recent years, our estimations indicate that it remained almost flat. Similarly, our estimate of high LTI shares over time are steadily higher than surveys. All these results suggest that policy makers should be less sanguine about the developments in the UK mortgage market in recent years. As these analyses are based on very detailed granular regulatory data, we believe the results are more reliable than surveys.

Note: Staff Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. Any views expressed are solely those of the author(s) and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of England or to state Bank of England policy. This paper should therefore not be reported as representing the views of the Bank of England or members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Financial Policy Committee or Prudential Regulation Committee.

US Financial Stability In The Spotlight

The US Financial Stability Oversight Council has published their 2017 Annual Report. Their mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act is to identify risks to the financial stability of the US, promote market discipline and respond to emerging threats. At more than 150 pages, its is a long read, but well worth the effort. Also compare and contrast with the high household debt levels here!

A couple of things caught my attention. First, the rise in the 2-Year Treasury Bonds, as rate are normalized. Rates are in their way up.

Yields on 2-year Treasury notes fell in the first half of 2016, reaching a low of 0.56 percent in July before reversing course (Chart 4.1.3). The 2-year Treasury yield has since risen 104 basis points to 1.60 percent, as of October 2017. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) raised its target range for the federal funds rate 25 basis points four times since December 2016. Also, in October 2017, the Federal Reserve began normalizing its balance sheet.

Next, household debt to disposable income is around 100%, significantly lower than Australian households, and on a very different trajectory.

There has been significant growth in auto loans and student loans, compared with mortgage debt. But the household debt service ratio is lower than here, a low interest rates helped keep the debt service ratio—the ratio of debt service payments to disposable personal income—unchanged in 2016 and the first half of 2017, near a 30-year low (Chart 4.4.3). Although the ratio of debtservice payments to disposable personal income for consumer credit has edged steadily upward since 2012, this trend has been fully offset by a decrease in the service ratio of mortgage debt.

Finally loan delinquency is lower now than back in 2009.

Continued decreases in delinquency rates on home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) and mortgage debt pushed household debt delinquencies to less than 5 percent, the lowest year-end level since 2006 (Chart 4.4.5). Decreased overall delinquency among subprime borrowers, continued write-downs of mortgage debt accumulated during the pre-crisis housing bubble, and a shift from subprime to prime mortgage balances drove the decline. The delinquency rate on student loans remained unchanged at 11 percent over the past few years after nearly doubling between 2003 and 2013. Despite elevated delinquency rates on student loans, default risk is generally limited for private lenders, since the federal government owns or guarantees most student loan debt outstanding. Signs of stress have emerged in auto lending in recent years, driven by increased subprime borrower delinquency. In the second quarter of 2017, auto loan balances that were delinquent for at least 90 days reached 3.9 percent of total auto loan balances, up from 3.3 percent three years prior. In recent quarters, credit card delinquency rates have increased slightly, and the percent of credit card loans that were delinquent for at least 90 days increased to 4.4 percent, compared to 3.7 percent three years prior. Despite this trend, the balance of credit card debt that was delinquent for at least 90 days has remained relatively stable at 7.4 percent in the second quarter of 2017, compared to 7.8 percent three years prior.

They discussed some highly relevant issues:

Managing Vulnerabilities in an Environment of Low, but Rising, Interest Rates – In previous annual reports, the Council identified vulnerabilities that arise from a prolonged period of low interest rates. In particular, as investors search for higher yields, some may add assets with higher credit or market risks to their portfolios. They may also use more leverage or rely on shorter-term funding. These actions tend to raise the overall level of financial risk in the economy and may put upward pressure on prices in certain markets. If prices in those markets were to fall sharply, owners could face unexpectedly large declines in their overall portfolio value, potentially creating conditions of financial instability. Although both short-term and long-term interest rates have risen since the last annual report, the consequences of past risk-taking may persist for some time. While the rise in short-term rates has benefitted net interest margins (NIMs) and net interest income at depository institutions and broker-dealers, a flatter yield curve and expectations for higher funding costs going forward may increasingly lower the earnings benefits from higher interest rates. In addition, the transition to higher rates may expose vulnerabilities among some market participants through a reduction in the value of their assets or an uncertain rise in costs of funding for depository institutions. These vulnerabilities can be mitigated by supervisors, regulators, and financial
institutions closely monitoring increased risk-taking incentives and risks that might arise from rising rates.

Housing Finance Reform – The government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are now into their tenth year of conservatorship. While regulators and supervisors have taken great strides to work within the constraints of conservatorship to promote greater investment of private capital and improve operational efficiency with lower costs, federal and state regulators are approaching the limits of their ability to enact wholesale reforms that are likely to foster a vibrant, resilient housing finance system. Housing finance reform legislation is needed to create a more sustainable system that enhances financial stability.

They called out a number of areas for focus where technology intersects finance:

Cybersecurity – As the financial system relies more heavily on technology, the risk that significant cybersecurity incidents targeting this technology can prevent the financial sector from delivering services and impact U.S. financial stability increases. Through collaboration and partnership, substantial gains have been made by both government and industry in response to cybersecurity risks, in part by refining their shared understanding of potential vulnerabilities within the financial sector. It is important that this work continue and include greater emphasis on understanding and mitigating the risk that significant cybersecurity incidents have business and systemic implications.

Financial Innovation – New financial market participants and new financial products can offer substantial benefits to consumers and businesses by meeting emerging needs or reducing costs. But these new participants and products may also create unanticipated risks and vulnerabilities. Financial regulators should continue to monitor and analyze the effects of new financial products and services on consumers, regulated entities, and financial markets, and evaluate their potential effects on financial stability.

And finally, a range of other material structural issues:

Central Counterparties – Central counterparties (CCPs) have the potential to provide considerable benefits to financial stability by enhancing market functioning, reducing counterparty risk, and increasing transparency. These benefits require that CCPs be highly robust and resilient. Regulators should continue to coordinate in the supervision of all CCPs that are designated as systemically important financial market utilities (FMUs). Member agencies should continue to evaluate whether existing rules and standards for CCPs and their clearing members are sufficiently robust to mitigate potential threats to financial stability. Agencies should also continue working with international standard-setting bodies to identify and address areas of common concern as additional derivatives clearing requirements are implemented in other jurisdictions. Evaluation of the performance of CCPs under stress scenarios can be a very useful tool for assessing the robustness and resilience of such institutions and identifying potential operational areas for improvement. Supervisory agencies should continue to conduct these exercises. Regulators should also continue to monitor and assess interconnections among CCPs, their clearing members, and other financial institutions; consider additional improvements in
public disclosure; and develop resolution plans for systemically important CCPs.

Short-Term Wholesale Funding – While some progress has been made in the reduction of counterparty risk exposures in repurchase agreement (repo) markets in recent years, the potential for fire sales of collateral by creditors of a defaulted broker-dealer remains a vulnerability. The SEC should monitor and assess the effectiveness of the MMF rules implemented last year. Regulators should also monitor the potential migration of activity to other cash management vehicles and the impact of money market developments on other financial markets and institutions.

Reliance on Reference Rates – Over the past few years, regulators, benchmark administrators, and market participants have worked toward improving the resilience of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) by subjecting the rate and its administrator to more direct oversight, eliminating little-used currency and tenor pairings, and embargoing the submissions of individual banks to the panel for a three-month period. However, decreases in the volume of unsecured wholesale lending has made it more difficult to firmly ground LIBOR submissions in a sufficient number of observable transactions, creating the risk that publishing the benchmark may not be sustainable. Regulators and market participants have been collaborating to develop alternatives to LIBOR. They are encouraged to complete such work and to take appropriate steps to mitigate disruptions associated with the transition to a new reference rate.

Data Quality, Collection, and Sharing – The financial crisis revealed gaps in the data needed for effective oversight of the financial system and internal firm risk management and reporting capabilities. Although progress has been made in filling these gaps, much work remains. In addition, some market participants continue to use legacy processes that rely on data that are not aligned to definitions from relevant consensus-based standards and do not allow for adequate conformance and validation to structures needed for data sharing. Regulators and market participants should continue to work together to improve the coverage, quality, and accessibility of financial data, as well as data sharing between and among relevant agencies.

Changes in Financial Market Structure and Implications for Financial Stability – Changes in market structure, such as the increased use of automated trading systems, the ability to quote and execute transactions at higher speeds, the increased diversity in the types of liquidity providers in such markets, and the expansion in trading venues all have the potential to increase the efficiency and improve the functioning of financial markets. But such changes and complexities also have the potential to create unanticipated risks that may disrupt financial stability. It is therefore important that market participants and regulators continue to try to identify gaps in our understanding of market structure and fill those gaps through the collection of data and subsequent analysis. In addition, evaluation of the appropriate use or expansion of coordinated tools such as trading halts across interdependent markets, particularly in periods of market stress, will further the goal of enhancing financial stability, as will collaborative work by member agencies to analyze developments in market liquidity.

Saving Less, Income Flat, Home Ownership Dream Fading – MLC

The latest MLC Wealth Sentiment Survey contains further evidence of the pressure on households and their finances.

Being able to save has been a challenge for a number of Australians – almost 1 in 5 of us have been unable to save any of our income in recent years, and for more than 1 in 4 of us only 1-5%.

Expectations for future income growth are very conservative – nearly 1 in 3 Australians expect no change in income over the next few years and 15% expect it to fall.

So, not surprisingly, our savings expectations for the future are also very conservative – with more than 1 in 5 Australians believing their savings will fall.

The “great Australian dream” of home ownership is still a reality for many, but for some it’s just a dream – fewer than 1 in 10 Australians said they didn’t want to own their own home, but 1 in 4 said home ownership was something they aspired to but did not think it would happen. Young people still have broadly similar aspirations around home ownership as middle-aged Australians.

Most of us wait and save more before buying our first home and many are prepared to buy some way out of the city – almost 1 in 3 would/did wait longer to have a bigger deposit, and 1 in 4 would live in a suburb some way out of the city to purchase their first home. Around 16% would live in an apartment and 12% further away from work and family or a regional area.

Most Australians don’t plan to or are unwilling to use the family home to fund their retirement – only 18% would be willing to use the family home to fund their retirement either by selling it or using part of their home as equity. The average Australian home owner has around $547,000 of equity in the family home.

Is Record High Consumer Debt a Boon or Bane?

From The St.Louis Fed on The Economy Blog.

Amidst of lot of captivating headlines over the last few months, one may have missed the news that consumer debt has hit an all-time high of 26 percent of disposable income, as seen in the chart below.



In just the past five years, consumer debt (all household debts, excluding mortgages and home equity loans) has grown at about twice the pace of household income. This has largely been driven by strong growth in both auto and student lending.

But what does this say about the economy? Is it a sign of optimism or a cause for concern?

Increasing Debt Levels

Rising household debt levels could mean that:

More Americans are optimistic about the U.S. economy.

More people are making investments in assets that generally build wealth, like higher education and homes.

Consumers have paid off their loans to qualify for new ones.

At the same time, higher debt levels could reveal financial stress as families use debt to finance consumption of necessities. It could portend new waves of delinquencies and, eventually, defaults that displace these kinds of investments. And rising family debts could slow economic growth and, of course, even lead to a recession.

Three Key Themes

This dual nature of household debt is precisely why the Center for Household Financial Stability organized our second Tipping Points research symposium on household debts. We did so this past June in New York, in partnership with the Private Debt Project

We recently released the symposium papers, which were authored by my colleagues William R. Emmons and Lowell R. Ricketts and several leading economists, such as Karen Dynan and Atif Mian. They offer fascinating insights about how, when and the extent to which household debt impacts economic growth.

Looking at all the papers and symposium discussions together, a few key themes emerged.

No. 1: Short-Term vs. Long-Term Debt

Despite an incomplete understanding of the drivers and mechanism of household debt, we learned that increases in household debts can boost consumption and GDP growth in the shorter term (within a year or two) but suppress them beyond that.

Whether and how household debt affects economic growth over the longer term depends on three things:

Whether family debts improve labor productivity or boost local demand for goods and services

The extent of leverage concurrently in the banking sector, which is much less evident today than a decade ago

The stability of the assets, such as housing, being purchased with those debts

No. 2: Magnitude of Risk

Even with record-high levels of consumer debts, most symposium participants did not see household debts posing a systemic risk to the economy at the moment, though trends in student borrowing, auto loans and (perhaps) credit card debts are troubling to those borrowers and in those sectors.

Moreover, rising debt can be a drag on economic growth even if not a systemic risk, and longer-term reliance on debt to sustain consumption remains highly concerning as well.

No. 3: Public Policy

Public policy responses should also be considered. Factors that could further burden indebted families and impede economic growth include:

Low productivity growth

Higher interest rates

New banking and financial sector regulations

Rising higher-education costs

Indeed, levels of household debt have often served as a reflection of larger, structural, technological, demographic and policy forces that help or harm consumers. It only makes sense, then, that policy and institutional measures must be considered to ameliorate debt levels and their impact on families and the economy.

After all, what’s good for families is good for the economy, and vice versa.

More Warnings On The Sleeping Risks From Interest Only Loans

The SMH reported today on research from UBS suggesting that around one third of interest only mortgage holders are not aware of the fact that the loan will revert, normally at the end of 5 or sometimes 10 years to principal and interest only borrowing. A roll to a further IO period is not guaranteed.

We discussed a couple of years back, as well in this in October, Citi covered it a few months back, and last week we got Finder.com.au to discuss what borrowers might do; so there should be no surprise to readers of this blog. This chart shows the estimated value of IO loans which will now fall due outside current lending criteria, based on our research.

This is an extract from the SMH article:

A third of customers with interest-only mortgages may not properly understand the type of loan they have taken out, which could put many in “substantial” stress when the time comes to pay their debt, UBS analysts warn.

Amid a regulatory crackdown on interest-only loans, a new report by analysts led by Jonathan Mott highlights the potential for repayment difficulties with this type of mortgage

Their finding is based on a recent survey conducted by the investment bank, which found only 23.9 per cent of 907 respondents had an interest-only loan, compared with economy-wide figures that show 35.3 per cent of loans are interest-only.

Mr Mott said he initially suspected the survey sample had an error, but now believed a “more plausible” reason was that interest-only customers did not properly understand their loan.

“We are concerned that it is likely that approximately one third of borrowers who have taken out an interest-only mortgage have little understanding of the product or that their repayments will jump by between 30 and 60 per cent at the end of the interest-only period (depending on the residual term),” he said.

You can read more about the risks from IO loans in our recent Property Imperative Report, free on request.

Safe as Houses? Not if You Live in Australia

An interesting perspective via a press release from online broker FXB Trading.

Whilst they are pushing their “hedge strategy” for Australian property, drawing parallels with the US crash of 2007; the key points they make are important and largely align with our view of the local property market. If they are right, recent price falls are just the start!

According to Jonathan Tepper, one of the world’s experts in housing bubbles, Australia is experiencing the biggest property bubble in history. It has lasted 55 years and seen prices increase 6556% since 1961. “It is the only country we know of where middle-class houses are auctioned like paintings,” he observed recently.

When it crashes it’s likely to bring Australia’s economy crashing down with it, as it’s the only sector which has driven GDP growth of late. It’s one of those rare opportunities traders relish because the volatility in the market will be big and significantly increases the chance of being able to make a huge gain from an investment.

You can thank State and Federal governments for this opportunity. They have done everything they can to fuel the housing market in an effort to boost Australia’s economy and offset the decline in the value and volume of its chief exports iron ore and coal. The growth of the economy has provided governments with a source of tax revenue and proof to voters that their policies result in economic success.

The Australian media has also been complicit in the perpetuation of the property bubble. Objective reporting on property has disappeared because the Murdoch and Fairfax duopoly, which controls media output in the country, have been protecting their only major growth profit centres realestate.com.au and Domain the country’s two largest real estate portals.

Headlines celebrating a 26-year-old train driver who services the debt on five million dollars worth of property with his salary and rental income have become commonplace, with hordes of others being similarly celebrated for their achievements.

The formula for success which has enabled individuals on modest incomes to gain ownership of seven figure property portfolios comes through the black magic of cross-collateralised residential mortgages, where Australian banks allow the unrealised capital gain of one property to secure financing to purchase another property.

This unrealised capital gain takes the place of a cash deposit. For instance, if the house bought a year ago for $350,000 is now valued at $450,000 the bank is willing to let the owner use that equity gain to finance the purchase of another property.

LF Economics describe this as a “classic mortgage ponzi finance model”. When the housing market falls, this unrealised capital gain becomes a loss, and the whole portfolio becomes undone. The similarities to underestimation of the probability of default correlation in Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), which led to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)in 2008, are striking.

However, unlike the US property situation there is no housing shortage in Australia. High housing prices in Australia have not come about because of the natural forces of supply and demand but by the banks’ willingness to lend. Credit from privatised and deregulated financial system has been the leading cause of the property bubble – as it was in the US – which has resulted in loans being granted to a very high percentage of the people who applied for one.

Loose credit was used to speculate on the property market, generating easy profits until the bubble peaked and then collapsed the financial sector in 2008 in the US. Following deregulation of Australia’s financial sector the amount of credit banks extended has increased dramatically. Mortgage debt has more than quadrupled from 19% of GDP in 1990 to 84% in 2012, which is a higher level than that of the US at its peak.

In many other parts of the world the GFC took the wind out of their real estate bubbles. From 2000 to 2008, driven to an extent by the First Home Buyer Grant, Australian house prices had already doubled. Rather than let the market as it was around the rest of the world during the GFC, the Australian Government doubled the bonus. Treasury notes recorded at the time reveal that it was launched to prevent the collapse of the housing market rather than make housing more affordable.

Already at the time of the GFC, Australian households were at 190% debt to net disposable income, 50% more indebted than American households, but the situation really got out of hand.

The government decided to further fuel the fire by “streamlining” the administrative requirements for the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) so that temporary residents could purchase real estate in Australia without having to report or gain approval.

In 2015-16 there were 40,149 residential real estate applications from foreigners valued at over $72 billion in the latest data by FIRB. This is up 320% by value from three years before. Most of these came from Chinese investors.

Many Chinese investors borrowed the money to buy these houses from Australian banks using fake statements of foreign income. According to the Australian Financial Review banks were being tricked with cheap photoshopped bank statements that can be obtained online.

UBS estimates that $500 billion worth of “not completely factually accurate” mortgages now sit on major bank balance sheets.

This injection of foreign investment has made Australian housing completely unaffordable for Australians. Urban planners say that a median house price to household income ratio of 4.1 to 5.0 is “seriously unaffordable” and 5.1 or over “severely unaffordable”.

At the end of July 2017 the median house price in Sydney was $1,178,417 with an average household income of $91,000. This makes the median house price to household income ratio for Sydney 13x, or over 2.6 times the threshold of “severely unaffordable”. Melbourne is 9.6x.

However, the CEOs of the Big Four banks in Australia think that these prices are “justified by the fundamentals”. More likely because the Big Four, who issue over 80% of the country’s residential mortgages, are more exposed as a percentage of loans than any other banks in the world.

How the fundamentals can be justified when the average person in Sydney can’t actually afford to buy the average house in Sydney, no matter how many decades they try to push the loan out is something only an Australian banker can explain.

In October this year Digital Finance Analytics estimated in a report that 910,000 households are now estimated to be in mortgage stress where net income does not cover ongoing costs. This has increased 50% in less than a year and now represents 29.2% of all households in Australia.

Despite record low interest rates, Australians are paying more of their income to pay off interest than they were when they were paying record mortgage rates back in 1989-90, which are over double what they are now.

The long period of prosperity and rising valuations of investments in Australia has led to increasing speculation using borrowed money which neither governments or banks did anything to quell.

The spiralling debt incurred in financing speculative investments has now resulted in cash flow problems for investors. The cash they generate is no longer sufficient to pay off the debt they took on to acquire them. Losses on such speculative assets prompt lenders to call in their loans. This is the point which results in a collapse of asset values.

Over-indebted investors are forced to sell even their less-speculative positions to repay their loans. However, at this point counterparties are hard to find to bid at the high asking prices previously quoted. This starts a major sell-off, leading to a sudden and precipitous collapse in market-clearing asset prices, a sharp drop in market liquidity, and a severe demand for cash.

FXB Trading’s experts have been monitoring Australia’s housing market and its economy for many months and are convinced it has now reached the point of no return and that a crash is imminent.

Its All About Momentum – The Property Imperative Weekly 16 Dec 2017

This week, it’s all about momentum – home prices are sliding, auctions clearance rates are slipping, mortgage standards are tightening and brokers are proposing to lift their business practices – welcome to the Property Imperative Weekly, to 16 December 2017.

Watch the video, or read the transcript. In this week’s edition we start with home prices.

The REIA Real Estate Market Facts report said median house price for Australia’s combined capital cities fell 0.8 per cent during the September quarter. Only Melbourne, Brisbane and Hobart recorded higher property prices and Darwin prices fell the most sharply, dropping 13.8 per cent.

The ABS Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) for Sydney fell 1.4 per cent in the September quarter following positive growth over the last five quarters. Hobart now leads the annual growth rates (13.8%), from a lower base, followed by Melbourne (13.2%) and Sydney (9.4%). Darwin dropped 6.3% and Perth 2.4%. For the weighted average of the eight capital cities, the RPPI fell 0.2 per cent and this was the first fall since the March quarter 2016. The total value of Australia’s 10.0 million residential dwellings increased $14.8 billion to $6.8 trillion. The mean price of dwellings in Australia fell by $1,200 over the quarter to $681,100.

So, further evidence of a fall in home prices in Sydney, as lending restrictions begin to bite, and property investors lose confidence in never-ending growth. So now the question becomes – is this a temporary fall, or does it mark the start of something more sustained? Frankly, I can give you reasons for further falls, but it is hard to argue for improvement anytime soon. Melbourne momentum is also weakening, but is about 6 months behind Sydney. Yet, so far prices in the eastern states are still up on last year!

CoreLogic said continual softening conditions are evident across the two largest markets of Melbourne and Sydney. This week across the combined capital cities, auction volumes remained high with 3,353 homes taken to auction and achieving a preliminary clearance rate of 63.1 per cent The final clearance rate last week recorded the lowest not only this year, but the lowest reading since late 2015/ early 2016 (59.5 per cent).

The employment data from the ABS showed a 5.4% result again in November. But there are considerable differences across the states, and age groups. Female part-time work grew, while younger persons continued to struggle to find work. Full-time employment grew by a further 15,000 in November, while part-time employment increased by 7,000, underpinning a total increase in employment of 22,000 persons. Over the past year, trend employment increased by 3.1 per cent, which is above the average year-on-year growth over the past 20 years (1.9 per cent). Trend underemployment rate decreased by 0.2 pts to 8.4% over the quarter and the underutilisation rate decreased by 0.3 pts to 13.8%; both still quite high.

The HIA said there have been a fall in the number of new homes sold in 2017. New home sales were 6 per cent lower in the year to November 2017 than in the same period last year. Building approvals are also down over this time frame by 2.1 per cent for the year. The HIA expects that the market will continue to cool as subdued wage pressures, lower economic growth and constraints on investors result in the new building activity transitioning back to more sustainable levels by the end of 2018.

The HIA also reported that home renovation spending is down, again thanks to low wage growth and fewer home sales by 3.1 per cent. A further decline of a similar magnitude is projected for 2018.

Moody’s gave an interesting summary of the Australian economy. They recognise the problem with household finances, and low income growth. They expect the housing market to ease and mortgage arrears to rise in 2018. They also suggest, mirroring the Reserve Bank NZ, that macroprudential policy might be loosened a little next year.

I have to say, given credit for housing is still running at three times income growth, and at very high debt levels, we are not convinced! I find it weird that there is a fixation among many on home price movements, yet the concentration and level of household debt (and the implications for the economy should rates rise), plays second fiddle. Also, the NZ measures were significantly tighter, and the recent loosening only slight (and in the face of significant political measures introduced to tame the housing market). So we think lending controls should be tighter still in 2018.

The latest ABS lending finance data for October, showed business investment was still sluggish, with too much lending for property investment, and too much additional debt pressure on households. If we look at the fixed business lending, and split it into lending for property investment and other business lending, the horrible truth is that even with all the investment lending tightening, relatively the proportion for this purpose grew, while fixed business lending as a proportion of all lending fell. I will repeat. Lending growth for housing which is running at three times income and cpi is simply not sustainable. Households will continue to drift deeper into debt, at these ultra-low interest rates. This all makes the RBA’s job of normalising rates even harder.

HSBC, among others, is suggesting a further fall in home price momentum next year, writing that slowdowns in the Sydney and Melbourne housing markets will continue to weigh on national house price growth for the next few quarters. They expect only a slow pace of cash rate tightening and some relaxation of current tight prudential settings as the housing market cools.

Despite this, most analysts appear to believe the next RBA cash rate move will be higher and ANZ pointed out with employment so strong, there is little expectation of rate cuts in response to easing home prices. In addition, the FED’s move to raise the US cash rate this week to a heady 1.5% despite inflation still running below target, will tend to propagate through to other markets later. More rate rises are expected in 2018. The Bank of England held theirs steady, after last month’s hike.

The UK Property Investment Market could be a leading indicator of what is ahead for our market. But in the UK just 15% of all mortgages are for investment purposes (Buy-to-let), compared with ~35% in Australia. Yet, in a down turn, the Bank of England says investment property owners are four times more likely to default than owner occupied owners when prices slide and they are more likely to hold interest only loans. Sounds familiar? According to a report in The Economist, “one in every 30 adults—and one in four MPs—is a landlord; rent from buy-to-let properties is estimated at up to £65bn a year. But yields on rental properties are falling and government policy has made life tougher for landlords. The age of the amateur landlord may be over”.

In company news, Genworth, the Lender Mortgage Insurer announced that it had changed the way it accounts for premium revenue. ASIC had raised concerns about how this maps to the pattern of historical claims. Genworth said that losses from the mining sector where many of the losses occur, do so at a late duration, and improvements in underwriting quality in response to regulatory actions, along with continued lower interest rates, extended the average time to first delinquency. As a result, Net Earned Premium (NEP) is negatively impact by approximately $40 million, and so 2017 NEP is expected to be approximately 17 – 19 per cent lower than 2016, instead of the previous guidance of a 10 to 15 per cent reduction.

CBA was in the news this week, with AUSTRAC alleging further contraventions of Australia’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing legislation. The new allegations, among other things, increase the total number of alleged contraventions by 100 to approximately 53,800. CBA contests a number of allegations but admit others. eChoice, in voluntary administration, has been bought by CBA via its subsidiary Finconnect Australia, saying the sale will allow eChoice’s employees, suppliers, brokers, lenders and leadership team to continue to operate and deliver for customers. Finally, CBA announced that, from next year, it will no longer accept accreditations from new mortgage brokers with less than two years of experience or from those that only hold a Cert IV in Finance & Mortgage Broking, in a move intended to “lift standards and ensure the bank is working with high-quality brokers who are meeting customers’ home lending needs.”

The Combined Industry Forum, in response to ASIC’s Review of Mortgage Broker Remuneration has come out with a set of proposals. The CIF defines a good customer outcome as when “the customer has obtained a loan which is appropriate (in terms of size and structure), is affordable, applied for in a compliant manner and meets the customer’s set of objectives at the time of seeking the loan.” Additionally, lenders will report back to aggregators on ‘key risk indicators’ of individual brokers. These include the percentage of the portfolio in interest only, 60+ day arrears, switching in the first 12 months of settlements, an elevated level of customer complaints or poor post-settlement survey results. Now this mirrors the legal requirement not to make “unsuitable” loans, but falls short of consumer advocates, such as CHOICE, who wanted brokers to be legally required to act in the best interests of consumers, in common with financial planners. But both the CBA and CIF moves indicate a need to tighten current mortgage broking practices, as ASIC highlighted, which can only be good for borrowers. By the end of 2020, brokers will also be given a “unique identifier number”.

ASIC says Westpac will provide 13,000 owner-occupiers who have interest-only home loans with an interest refund, an interest rate discount, or both. The refunds amount to $11 million for 9,400 of those customers. The remediation follows an error in Westpac’s systems which meant that these interest-only home loans were not automatically switched to principal and interest repayments at the end of the contracted interest-only period.

We featured a piece we asked Finder.com.au to write on What To Do When The Interest-only Period On Your Home Loan Ends. There is a sleeping problem in the Australian Mortgage Industry, stemming from households who have interest-only mortgages, who will have a reset coming (typically after a 5-year or 10-year set period). This is important because now the banks have tightened their lending criteria, and some may find they cannot roll the loan on, on the same terms. Interest only loans do not repay capital during their life, so what happens next?

The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics released their third report on their Review of the Four Major Banks. They highlight issues relating to IO Mortgage Pricing, Tap and Go Debt Payments, Comprehensive Credit and AUSTRAC Thresholds. The report recommended that the ACCC, as a part of its inquiry into residential mortgage products, should assess the repricing of interest‐only mortgages that occurred in June 2017, and whether customers had been misled. While the banks’ media releases at the time indicated that the rate increases were primarily, or exclusively, due to APRA’s regulatory requirements, the banks stated under scrutiny that other factors contributed to the decision. In particular, banks acknowledged that the increased interest rates would improve their profitability.

So, in summary plenty of evidence home prices are slipping, and lending standards are under the microscope. We think home prices will slide further, and wages growth will remain sluggish for some time to come, so more pressure on households ahead. You can hear more about our predictions for 2018 in our upcoming end of year review, to be published soon, following the mid-year Treasury forecast.

Meantime, do check back next week for our latest update, subscribe to receive research alerts, and many thanks for watching.

Wages Growth, Under The Skin, Is Concerning

The Treasury published a 66-page report late on Friday – “Analysis of Wage Growth“.

It paints a gloomy story, wage growth is low, across all regions and sectors of the economy, subdued wage growth has been experienced by the majority of employees, regardless of income or occupation, and this mirrors similar developments in other developed western economies. Whilst the underlying causes are far from clear, it looks like a set of structural issues are driving this outcome, which means we probably cannot expect a return to “more normal” conditions anytime some. This despite Treasury forecasts of higher wage growth later (in line with many other countries).

We think this has profound implications for economic growth, tax take, household finances and even mortgage underwriting standards, which all need to be adjusted to this low income growth world.

Here are some of the salient points from the report:

On a variety of measures, wage growth is low. Regional mining areas have experienced faster wage growth, but wage growth has slowed in both mining and non-mining regions. Wage growth has been fairly similar across capital cities and regional areas, although the level of wages is higher in the capital cities.

The key driver of wage growth over the long-term is productivity and inflation expectations. This means that real wage growth – wage growth relative to the increase in prices in the economy – reflects labour productivity growth. However, fluctuations across the business cycle can result in real wage growth diverging from productivity growth. There are two ways of measuring real wages. One is from the producer perspective and the other is from the consumer perspective. Producers are concerned with how their labour costs compare to the price of their outputs.

Consumers are concerned with how their wages compare with the cost of goods and services they purchase.

Generally, consumer and producer prices would be expected to grow together in the long-term, so the real producer wage and real consumer wage would also grow together. Consumer and producer prices diverged during the mining investment boom due to strong rises in commodity export prices. The unwinding of the mining investment boom and spare capacity in the labour market are important cyclical factors that are currently weighing on wage growth.

It is unclear whether these cyclical factors can explain all of the weakness in wage growth. Many advanced economies are also experiencing subdued wage growth. In particular, labour productivity growth has slowed in many economies. However, weaker labour productivity growth seems unlikely to be a cause of the current period of slow wage growth in Australia. Over the past five years, labour productivity in Australia has grown at around its 30-year average annual growth rate.

Wage growth is weaker than the unemployment rate implies. There may be more spare capacity than implied by the employment rate. [Is The Phillips curve broken?]. Labour market flexibility is a possible explanation for the change in the relationship between wage growth and unemployment, and the rise in the underemployment rate. Employers may be increasingly able to reduce hours of work, rather than reducing the number of employees when faced with adverse conditions. This may be reflected in elevated underemployment.

It is difficult to draw firm conclusions on the effect of structural factors on wage growth, given they have been occurring over a long timeframe and global low-wage growth is a more recent phenomenon. Three key trends are the increasing rates of part-time employment, growth in employment in the services industries, and a gradual decline in the share of routine jobs, both manual and cognitive, and a corresponding rise in non-routine jobs.
Both cyclical and structural factors can affect growth in real producer wages and labour productivity, so such factors can also affect the labour share of income. Changes in the labour share of income occur as a result of relative growth in the real producer wage and labour productivity. Since the early 1990s, the labour share of income has remained fairly stable. Nonetheless, different factors have placed both upward and downward pressure on the labour share of income.

An examination of wage growth by employee characteristics using the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey and administrative taxation data suggests that recent subdued wage growth has been experienced by the majority of employees, regardless of income or occupation. Workers with a university education had higher wage growth than those with no post-school education over the period 2005-2010, but have since experienced lower wage growth than individuals with no post-school education.

An examination of wage growth by business characteristics using the Business Longitudinal Analysis Data Environment (BLADE) suggests that higher-productivity businesses pay higher real wages and employees at these businesses have also experienced higher real wage growth. Larger businesses (measured by turnover) tend to be more productive, pay higher real wages and have higher real wage growth. Capital per worker appears to be a key in differences in labour productivity and hence real wages between businesses, with more productive businesses having higher capital per worker.

Wage growth is low across all methods of pay setting. In recent years, increases in award wages have generally been larger than the overall increase in the Wage Price Index. At the same time, award reliance has increased in some industries while the coverage of collective agreements has fallen. There are a range of reasons for the decline in bargaining including the reclassification of some professions, the technical nature of bargaining, natural maturation of the system and award modernisation which has made compliance with the award system easier than before.