In the latest RBA data series (E2) we get an update on household debt to income and debt to asset ratios, and they are ALL moving in the wrong direction. This is to December 2018.
The household debt to income moved higher to a new record of 189.6, and housing debt to income to a new record of 140.2.
The change in trajectory from 2014/5 is significant, as lending standards were weakened, and interest rates cut (forcing home prices higher).
The interest payments to income also rose, thanks to bigger mortgages, slightly higher interest rates, and little income growth.
But in contrast, the asset values are falling, so the asset to income ratios are falling. Housing assets in particular are dropping.
All pointing to a higher burden of debt on households. And remember only one third, or there about, have a mortgage, so in fact the TRUE ratios are much much worst. But the trends do not lie in relative terms, and by the way these are extended ratios compared with most western economies. We are drowning in rivers of debt!
This is quite starkly shown in the RBA’s 12 month series, with total credit annualised growth now standing at 4.2%. Housing credit also fell to the same 4.2% level, from 4.4% a month ago. The fall continues. Within the housing series, lending for owner occupation fell below 6% – down to 5.9% and investment housing lending fell to 0.9% annualised.
The seasonally adjusted RBA data showed that last month total credit for housing grew by 0.31%, up $5.6 billion to $1.81 trillion, another record. Within in that owner occupied lending stock rose 0.42%, seasonally adjusted to $1.22 trillion, up $5.11 billion. Lending for investment property rose 0.09%, or $0.5 billion to $595 billion. Personal credit fell slightly, down 0.07% and business credit rose 0.42% to $960 billion, up $4.06 billion.
The APRA data revealed that ADI growth was lower than the RBA aggregates. Some of this relates to seasonal adjustments plus, as we will see a rise in non-bank lending. The proportion of investment loans less again to 33.3% of loans outstanding.
Total owner occupied loans were $1.11 trillion, up 0.38%, or $4.2 billion, while investor loans were $557 billion, flat compared with last month. This shows the trends month on month, with a slight uptick in February compared to January, as holidays end and the property market spluttered back to life. The next couple of months will be interesting as we watch for a post-Hayne bounce in lending and more loosening of the credit taps, but into a market where demand, is at best anemic.
The portfolio movements are interesting (to the extent the data is reported accurately!), with HSBC growing its footprint by more that one billion across both investor and owner occupied lending. Only Westpac, among the big four grew their investor loans, with ANZ reporting a significant slide (no surprise they said they had gone too conservative, and recently introduce a 10-year interest only investor loan). Macquarie and Members Equity grew their books, with the focus on owner occupied loans.
The overall portfolios did not vary that much, with CBA still the largest owner occupied lender, and Westpac the largest investor lender.
The 12 month investor tracker whilst obsolete in one sense as APRA has removed their focus on a 10% speed limit, is significant, in that the market is now at 0.6% annualised.
But the final part of the story is the non-bank lending. This has to be derived, and we know the RBA data is suspect and delayed. But the gap between the RBA and APRA data shows the trends.
Non Bank annualised owner occupied credit is growing at 17.6%, and investor lending at 4.8%. It is clear the non-banks, with their weaker capital requirements, and greater funding flexibility are making hay. Total non bank credit for housing is now around $142 billion or around 7.8% of housing lending. This ratio has been rising since December 2016, and kicked up in line with the tighter APRA rules being applied to the banks.
We have out doubts that APRA is looking hard enough at these lending pools, especially as we are seeing the rise of higher risk “near-prime” offers to borrowers who cannot get loans from the banks.
So to conclude the rate of credit momentum continues to ease – signalling more home prices ahead. The non-banks sector, currently loosely regulated by APRA is growing fast, and just the before the US falls around the GFC, risks are higher here. And finally, and worryingly, household debt is STILL growing… so more stress and financial pressure ahead.
RBA’s Luci Ellis, Assistant Governor (Economic) spoke yesterday “What’s Up (and Down) With Households?“. We examined the conundrum that labour markets are strong, yet the economy is weaker. The disconnect is the household sector – which of course DFA examines closely in our surveys.
One of the most interesting comments relates to household spending slowing, especially on cars and household goods. We regard this as an important indicator. Income of course is under pressure in real terms, costs are rising, and home prices are falling. Households are hunkering down. As the RBA says ” at some point they might conclude that this is not temporary and that low income growth will persist. At that point they would be likely to adjust their spending plans. Consumption growth would then slow“.
This is what she said:
For a little while now, the team at the Bank has been grappling with how one might reconcile
apparently weak national accounts figures with the noticeably stronger labour market data.
The disconnect can be traced to the household sector. Many other parts of the national accounts
measure of output – gross domestic product (GDP) – are actually doing reasonably
well. Outside the mining sector, where some large projects are still winding down, business
investment is growing at a solid pace. Transport and renewable energy projects have been quite
important. Public demand, both consumption and investment, is supporting growth.
There are also some areas of weakness outside the household sector, such as the drought-affected
rural sector, which is weighing on exports at the moment. Droughts and other recent natural
disasters clearly pose difficulties for those directly affected. But the underlying trends in
the broader economy are not determined by these events. So in the main, outside the household
sector, the economy is not doing too badly.
The Labour Market has Unambiguously Improved
This makes sense, because employment has been strong and someone must be hiring all those extra
workers. Over the past year, total employment has increased by more than 2 per cent.
The unemployment rate declined by ½ percentage point over 2018, reaching the level of 5 per cent
before our forecasts implied it would (Graph 1). This is a good outcome. Youth unemployment
has declined and most measures of underemployment have also come down a bit.
Some industries are doing better than others, but overall the strength in employment has been
across a diverse range of sectors (Graph 2). We can see this either by looking at the
industry that people say they work in, or we can use the ABS’s new Labour Account to
triangulate this information with what firms say their industry is. Either way, we see jobs
being added in a range of industries. Employment in health care and social assistance has been
increasing for a while; the rollout of the NDIS is an important driver of this, but not the only
one. More recently, we have also seen employment increase in a number of business services
industries. Construction employment had also been strong for a while, reaching the highest share
of total employment in more than a century of records.
One can be reasonably confident in the steer the labour market data are giving us, because it is
coming from multiple, independently collected data sets. The employment and unemployment data
come from the ABS’s survey of households. But a survey of businesses, also from the ABS,
tells us that the number of job vacancies has been a very high share of the total jobs
available. Separate private-sector surveys of businesses tell us that many firms plan to hire
more workers. Many of our own liaison contacts also tell us that they are hiring.
And as the labour market gradually tightens, we are beginning to see the effects in wages growth.
This has been low for some time, but is gradually trending up now, especially in the private
sector (Graph 3). Part of this shift is that fewer workers are subject to wage freezes than
was the case a year or so ago. Minimum and award wage rises have also increased. Along with
other countries, it’s taking longer and a lower unemployment rate to start seeing faster
wages growth than historical experience might have suggested. Indeed, we still think Australia
is a little way off the levels of the unemployment rate that would induce materially faster
wages growth. But as the experience of other countries has also shown, if the labour market
tightens enough, wages growth does eventually pick up.
Household Consumption Spending is Slowing
In contrast to the positive picture implied by the labour market, growth in household income has
been slow, and growth in consumption has weakened recently (Graph 4).
If we drill down to see which kinds of spending have slowed the most, we can see that spending on
cars and household goods has been particularly affected (Graph 5). Spending on less
discretionary items like food has been less affected.
There has been a deal of talk about the possibility that ‘wealth effects’ from
declining housing prices might be weighing on spending. It’s important to remember, though,
that people’s reaction to a fall in prices is likely to depend partly on how far prices had
increased previously.
Some recent work by colleagues at the Bank suggests that the link is a bit more subtle than
simply that increases in wealth boost spending directly (May, Nodari and Rees 2019). It isn’t
so much that people wake up one morning, realise their home is worth more, and decide to go out
shopping. Rather, if their home is worth more, they can borrow more against it, which matters
for some people’s decisions to buy a car. And because rising housing prices usually occur in
the context of high rates of transactions in the market, spending on home furnishings tends to
rise and fall with housing prices. So when housing prices decline, turnover also declines. This
means there are fewer people moving house and realising their old couch doesn’t fit or they
need new furnishings in the extra bedroom.
Slow Income Growth is a Drag on Household Spending
Beyond this specific link to housing turnover, some slowdown in consumption spending is not
entirely unexpected. For several years now, we have been calling out the issue of weak income
growth and how it might test the resilience of household consumption spending. This is a
particular issue in the context of high household debt and the need to service that debt.
One aspect of economic theory that actually works in practice is the observation that people try
to smooth their consumption in the face of fluctuating incomes. Income growth is noticeably more
volatile than consumption growth. So the usual pattern is that gaps between the two resolve with
shifts in income growth, not shifts in consumption growth.
But there might be limits to how long households can continue expanding their consumption faster
than their income is rising. People are still saving, and they can do so at a slower rate. But
at some point they might conclude that this is not temporary and that low income growth will
persist. At that point they would be likely to adjust their spending plans. Consumption growth
would then slow.
So we need to establish how household income growth might indeed return back towards current
rates of consumption growth or even higher. To do that, we need to understand why it has been so
weak.
Labour Income Growth Has Recovered Somewhat
For some time, part of the story had been that labour income growth was weak. This has been true
across several dimensions. First, the growth of wage rates for particular jobs has been slow
(Graph 6). This is the measure of wages growth captured by the ABS’s Wage Price Index
(WPI). It captures changes in wages paid for a fixed pool of jobs. As I already mentioned,
growth in this measure has started increasing, though only gradually. It is still well below
what one might expect in the longer run, if inflation is to average between 2 and 3 per cent
and if productivity maintains a similar average growth rate to its average over the past decade
or so.
People’s actual incomes include bonuses and other non-wage labour income, and average labour
income depends on whether the mix of jobs in the economy is changing. For a number of years,
these factors combined to make average earnings per hour, as recorded in the national accounts,
increase much more slowly than the mix-adjusted WPI measure. It isn’t unusual for growth in
this measure of earnings to differ from growth in the WPI. They are compiled on different bases.
But in the years following the end of the mining investment boom, this gap was persistently
negative, and quite large.
Some of the compositional change might have been because people were moving out of higher-paid
jobs in mining-related activity, and had gone back to lower-paying work. It’s hard to
pinpoint how important this effect was, because the weakness in average earnings growth was seen
in some industry-level data as well. So at least some people would have had to be switching to
lower-paid jobs in the same industry. Another factor that might have been at work was that fewer
people were actually switching jobs than in the past. Surveys that track people through time,
such as the HILDA survey, show that people who change jobs often see faster income growth in the
year they switched, than people who didn’t change jobs (Graph 7).
This lower rate of job churn accords with some of the evidence we see in business surveys and the
messages coming out of our business liaison program. Many firms report that they find it hard to
find suitable labour, at least for some roles, and that this is a constraint on their
businesses, though usually not a major one (Graph 8). But when we ask our contacts what
they are doing about this problem, paying people more is not the first solution they think of.
Even poaching someone from another firm by enticing them with higher pay is not that common. The
evidence from our liaison program suggests that it has long been the case that firms first
resort to other strategies to deal with labour shortages, and only turn to faster wage increases
when the shortages are severe and persistent (Leal 2019).
But whatever the underlying drivers, the gap between the growth rates of the WPI and average
earnings has closed more recently. Slow wages growth is still a concern, but in terms of its
contribution to income growth, it is less of a puzzle than it was a few years ago. Instead we
need to seek the source of the more recent weakness elsewhere.
Non-Labour Income Remains Weak
If we break household disposable income growth into its components, we can see the drivers of the
more recent weakness (Graph 9). Labour income is not especially strong, but it no longer
seems at odds with growth in employment and other information about wages growth. Rather, growth
in other sources of income has been weak for some time, and this has continued more recently.
Within non-labour income, the main components are social assistance, rental income, other
investment income, and the earnings of unincorporated businesses. It turns out that a confluence
of factors has resulted in growth in most of these categories of income being weak recently. In
some cases, this is a trend change that is likely to persist. Some others are driven by
shorter-term factors that could reverse in coming years.
Social assistance payments have been relatively flat for a number of years (Graph 10). As
the labour market has strengthened and unemployment has come down, it is not surprising that
some forms of social assistance have not been growing. But there are a few other things going on
at the same time. Firstly, the rate of growth of age pension payments has slowed, though it is
still positive. There are a number of probable drivers of this, including the increase in the
eligibility age, as well as more people above the (higher) eligibility age remaining in the
workforce rather than drawing a pension. It is also possible that, as time goes on and the
people who are retiring have had longer to accumulate superannuation balances, more people are
receiving a part-pension together with an income stream from their superannuation.
Secondly, in recent years, growth in social welfare spending by the government has come from new
programs (like the NDIS) that are counted as government consumption, not household income, in
the national accounts. So while both disability payments and other payments to families with
children have been broadly constant in dollar terms for several years, government consumption
has been growing strongly over the same period. If we adjusted for this, the growth in the
social assistance component of household income would look much closer to its average over the
past, rather than well below average.
These factors all relate to the design of programs assisting households, and how they are
classified in the national accounts. So we would not expect them to reverse all of a sudden.
This implies that we should also not expect that measured household income from this source will
bounce back strongly any time soon.
Rental income has also been a bit weak (Graph 11). This is not surprising considering that
rents have been rising only slowly in most cities, and falling for a few years in Perth. But
rental income is only earned by 15 per cent of taxpayers, and lower cash rental income
for landlords is also lower rent paid by renters, leaving them with more money to pay for other
things.[1] So the
weakness in rental income is unlikely to be a large driver of any slowdown in consumer spending.
Income from other kinds of investments has also been a bit weak, but has recovered a bit lately.
Unincorporated business income has also been weak of late. This can be a volatile type of income
and sensitive to conditions in particular sectors. The farm sector represents a large share of
unincorporated business income, compared with their share of the economy. So one reason this
type of income has fallen has been the effect of the drought on farm incomes. A recovery here
will depend on how soon normal seasonal conditions return. Much of the rest of unincorporated
business income comes from sectors related to the property market, including building
tradespeople and real estate agents. They are also seeing lower incomes, as both construction
activity and the volume of sales of existing homes decline. Again, it can be envisaged that
these sources of income might recover at some point, but not in the very near term.
Tax and Other Payments are Dragging on Disposable Income
When we think about household income available for consumption and saving, economists usually
talk about household disposable income. This is income net of taxes, net interest
payments and a few other deductions like insurance premiums. Income payable – the things
deducted from gross income to calculate disposable income – increased by nearly 6 per cent
in 2018. This was significantly faster than growth in gross household income.
Despite the relatively weak picture for household income growth, the tax revenue collected from
households has grown solidly in recent years. It’s normal for growth in tax revenue to
outpace income growth a bit: that is how a progressive tax system works. A useful rule of thumb
is that, in the absence of adjustments to tax brackets to allow for bracket creep, for every one
percentage point of growth in household income, taxes paid by households will on average
increase by about 1.4 percentage points. That’s an on-average figure, though. The
actual ratio can vary quite a bit.
In the past year, taxes paid by households increased by around 8 per cent, more than
double the rate of growth in gross household income of 3½ per cent. So the ratio
is more like a bit over two-to-one at the moment, rather than 1.4 to one. That is at the high
end of the range this ratio reaches, but as this graph shows, it is not unprecedented (Graph 12).
But this effect has cumulated over time, so that the share of income that is paid in tax has
been rising (Graph 12, bottom panel).
What is noteworthy is that for all of the past six years, growth in tax paid has exceeded income
growth by an above-average margin, at a time when income growth itself has been slow (Graph 13).
There are likely to be several things going on here. Aside from the usual bracket creep, some
deductions and offsets have declined, boosting the overall tax take. Interest rates on
investment property loans are now higher than for owner-occupiers, but overall the interest rate
structure on mortgages is lower than it was a few years ago. So landlords will have lower tax
deductions for interest payments on loans on investment properties. At the same time, the
significant run-up in housing prices in some cities over the past decade will have increased the
capital gains tax liability paid by investors selling a property. Turnover in the housing market
has declined. But as best we can tell, the price effect has dominated the effect of declining
volumes, and total capital gains tax paid has increased.
Compliance efforts and technological progress in tax collection have boosted revenue collected
from a given income. The Tax Office reports that its efforts to raise compliance around
work-related deductions have boosted revenue noticeably (Jordan 2019). The next wave of this
effort, focused on deductions related to rental properties, could result in further boosts to
revenue.
Some of these drivers boosting tax paid could persist for a while, but they aren’t permanent.
For example, the earlier period of strong housing price growth will only increase capital gains
tax revenue if the asset was owned during that period. It can be expected to become less
important, the further into history it passes. Similarly, increased compliance increases the
level of tax paid on a given level of income. It is not a change in the trend
growth rate in tax paid. That said, the effect could last for a while as efforts shift to
different aspects of compliance.
Some Recent Policy Changes Might Mitigate the Drag on Consumption
The net of all these effects is that household income growth has remained slow even as labour
market conditions have been improving. Unlike slow wages growth, though, it is less clear how
much weak non-labour income growth will weigh on consumer spending. As I already noted, slow
growth in rental income for landlords means that tenants have more money to spend on other
things. Some of the weakness in social assistance payments is because new programs are being
delivered differently from existing ones, and so they are classified as government consumption.
The net benefit to the recipients could be the same or higher.
So there might be reasons to think that weak non-labour income growth is less worrisome than weak
wages growth. But you would not want to rely on that possibility to underpin your views on the
outlook for consumption. So this is an area we need to watch closely. Household consumption
spending is a large part of economic activity. A significant retrenchment there would lower
growth and feed back into a weaker labour market, as well as into decisions to purchase housing.
Parting Thoughts
My talk today has deliberately not overlapped with what the Bank has recently said about the
housing market. But I think it’s clear that conditions in the household sector more broadly
are highly consequential for the housing sector and thus this audience. Whatever other forces
might be affecting housing market developments, fundamentally demand for housing rests on the
household sector’s confidence and capacity to take on the financial commitments involved in
the purchase or rental of a home. Without enough income, and so without a strong labour market,
that confidence and capacity would be in doubt. This is not the only reason we are watching
labour market developments closely. But the nexus between labour markets, households and housing
are crucial to our assessment of the broader outlook.
Just before the GFC hit, the then Chair of the Fed reassured that everything was going to be fine.
The subprime mess is grave but largely contained, said Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke Thursday, in a speech before the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. While rising delinquencies and foreclosures will continue to weigh heavily on the housing market this year, it will not cripple the U.S. economy, he said. The speech was the Chairmans most comprehensive on the subprime mortgage issue to date.
It of course was not. We are still reaping the QE whirlwind.
So, today, RBA Assistant Governor (Financial System) Michele Bullock spoke in Perth “Property, Debt and Financial Stability”. In Perth, of all places where prices have been falling for many years!
She concludes that “vulnerabilities from the level of household debt, the apartment development cycle and the level of non-residential commercial property valuations continue to present risks for financial stability. While so far, the financial sector has remained resilient, we continue to monitor developments in household debt and in property markets for signs that these might have more broad ranging effects on the financial system”.
As Assistant Governor (Financial System) I oversee the Bank’s work on financial stability.
But what is financial stability and what is the Reserve Bank’s role in it?
The wellbeing of households and businesses in Australia depends on growth in the Australian
economy. And a crucial facilitator of sustained growth is credit – flows of funds from
people who are saving to people who are investing. Credit provides households and businesses
with the ability to borrow on the back of future expected income to finance large outlays, for
example, the purchase of a home or equipment to establish or grow a business. A strong and
stable financial system is important for this flow of funds.
There is no universal definition of financial stability but one way to think about it is to
consider what is meant by financial instability. My colleague Luci Ellis suggested
that this is best thought of as a disruption in the financial sector so severe that it
materially harms the real economy.[1]
This leaves unsaid where the disruption might come from, but we would all recognise the outcomes
of financial stability when we see it. For example, while Australia was spared the worst impact
of the global financial crisis, internationally it demonstrated the impact that financial
instability can have on growth and hence the wellbeing of households and businesses in the
economy.
Most of you will know about the Reserve Bank’s role in conducting monetary policy. But
another key role of the Reserve Bank that you might be less familiar with is promoting financial
stability. In this area, we share responsibility with the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA). But it is APRA that has responsibility for the stability of individual
financial institutions and the tools that go along with that. So how does the Bank contribute to
financial stability?[2]
There are a number of things we do. We undertake analysis of the economy and the financial system
through the lens of financial stability, looking for financial vulnerabilities that could result
in substantial negative impacts on the economy, or economic vulnerabilities that could result in
risks to financial stability. We work with other regulators to identify signs of increasing
risks in the financial system and measures to address these risks. Where appropriate, we provide
advice to government on the potential implications for financial stability of policies. And we
talk about the risks we are seeing to help inform other regulators, participants in the
financial system, businesses and the general public of the potential risks that might have an
impact on the economy.
This last action – communicating the risks – is the key purpose of our six-monthly
Financial Stability Review (the Review). While any individual
financial institution, business or household might think the risks they are taking on are
appropriate, they may not be adequately taking into account the risks that are arising at a
systemic level from everyone’s actions. The Review attempts to bring this
system-wide view.
Our most recent Review was published in October last year and we are currently in
the process of drafting the next one, which will come out in April. So, for the remainder of my
talk, I am going to cover some of the key risks that we see at the moment. Given the audience, I
am going to focus on risks related to residential and commercial property. First, I will give an
update on recent developments in these areas. Then I will talk a little about recent concerns
around tighter lending standards. And I will finish up with a few observations on the property
market in Western Australia.
Household Debt
Six months ago in the Review, we noted that global economic and financial conditions
were generally positive and that the Australian economy was improving. At the same time, housing
prices were declining. In this context, we highlighted a number of vulnerabilities –
issues that, were a shock to occur or economic conditions take a turn for the worse, could
manifest in a threat to financial stability. At that time, we highlighted two domestic
vulnerabilities that are relevant to my talk today – the level of household debt, and the
slowdown in housing and credit markets. Six months on, these vulnerabilities remain. If
anything, they are a little more heightened.
The Bank has highlighted the issue of household debt as a potential threat to financial stability
many times over the past few years. Although it does not capture all the important information
about household indebtedness, the ratio of household debt to disposable income is one summary
indicator. This ratio is historically high (Graph 1). The household debt-to-income ratio rose
from around 70 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s to around 160 per cent
at the time of the GFC. The ratio steadied for a few years before starting to rise again around
2013 (around the same time that housing price growth began to accelerate) and is now around 190 per cent.
I have talked previously about some of the reasons why the debt-to-income ratio has risen so much
over the past few decades.[3]
In particular, a structural decline in the level of nominal interest rates and deregulation have
eased credit constraints and increased loan serviceability. And as households have been able to
borrow more, they have been able to pay more for housing. One important driver of high household
debt in Australia is, therefore, housing. There is very little debt related to non-housing loans
such as credit cards or car loans.
Just as housing costs have been an important driver of household debt, so has the ability to
borrow more influenced the price of housing. Over the past decade, housing prices in many parts
of Australia have risen but the rise has been particularly sharp in Sydney and Melbourne, which
account for around 40 per cent of the housing stock (Graph 2). More recently, housing
prices have fallen. Since the peak in mid 2017, housing prices Australia-wide have declined by
around 7 per cent. The falls in Sydney and Melbourne have been larger. The question we
are asking ourselves is, given the high levels of debt and falling housing prices, are there any
significant implications for financial stability?
The answer would be no at this stage – the impacts are not large enough to result in
widespread problems in the financial sector. This is not to downplay the financial stress that
some households are experiencing. But most of the debt remains well secured against property,
even with the decline in housing prices. Total repayments as a share of income remain steady and
a large number of indebted households have built up substantial prepayments over the past few
years. Broadly, the debt is held by households that can afford to service it. Arrears rates,
while increasing a bit over the past few years, remain low. Banks are well capitalised and work
over recent years to improve lending standards has made household and bank balance sheets more
resilient. Loans at high loan-to-valuation (LVR) ratios and interest-only loans are less common
than they were and most households have not been borrowing the maximum amount available.
Apartment Development
One area that we have focused on in recent years in our analysis of financial stability risks is
apartment development. There has been a substantial increase in apartment construction since the
start of the decade in the largest Australian capital cities (Graph 3). In Sydney there have
been more than 80,000 apartments completed over the past few years adding roughly 5 per cent
to housing stock in Sydney. Melbourne and Brisbane have also seen relatively large additions to
the supply of apartments and, while the number of apartments being built in Perth has been small
by comparison, this has been in the context of a fairly small apartment stock.
Our main concern with this from a financial stability perspective is the potential for this large
influx of supply to exacerbate declines in housing prices and so adversely impact households’
and developers’ financial positions. By its nature, high-density development can tend to
exacerbate price cycles. Large apartment developments have longer planning and development
processes than detached housing. Purchasing the land, designing the development, getting
approvals through relevant government bodies and then actual construction of the apartment block
all take time. In a climate of rapidly rising prices, developers are willing to pay high prices
for land on which to build apartments. Households, including investors, are willing to purchase
apartments off the plan, confident that the apartment will be worth more than they paid for it
when it is finally completed. This continues as long as prices are rising. This large increase
in supply, however, ultimately sows the seeds of a decline in prices which, if large enough,
results in development becoming unattractive, new supply falling and the cycle starting again.
This presents two risks. The first is to household balance sheets. A decline in apartment prices
could negatively impact households that purchased off the plan and are yet to settle. They might
find themselves in a situation where the value of the apartment in the current environment is
less than they contracted to pay for it. And as market pricing falls, lenders will revise their
valuations down and so will be willing to lend less. Households will therefore have to
contribute more funds, either from their own savings or loans from other sources.
The second risk is to developers who are delivering completed apartments into the cooling market.
If people who had pre-purchased are having difficulty getting finance, or decide it is not worth
going ahead with the purchase, there would be increasing settlement failures. Developers would
be left holding completed apartments, reducing their cash flow and their ability to service
their loans, and impacting banks’ balance sheets.
Currently, the risks here appear to be elevated but contained. The apartment market is quite soft
in Sydney; apartment prices have declined since their peak, rental vacancies have risen and
rents are falling (Graph 4). In Melbourne and Brisbane, however, apartment prices have so far
held up. Liaison suggests that settlement failures have not increased much and, to the extent
that they have, some developers are in a position where they can choose to hold and rent unsold
apartments. Further tightening in lending standards might, however, impact both purchasers of
new apartments and developers – I will return to this in a minute.
Commercial Property
A final area worth touching on is non-residential commercial property.
Commercial property valuations have, like housing, risen substantially over the past decade, and
much more than rents so that yields on commercial property have fallen to very low levels
historically (Graph 5). This is particularly the case for office and industrial property. One
reason for this is that yields, although they have been historically low in Australia, are high
relative to overseas and to returns on other assets. Furthermore, some markets, such as the
Sydney and Melbourne office property markets, are experiencing strong tenant demand and vacancy
rates are low. But the rapid increase in commercial property prices over the past decade does
pose risks. If transaction prices and valuations were to fall sharply, for example, in response
to a change in risk preferences, highly leveraged borrowers could be vulnerable to breaching
their LVR covenants on bank debt. This could trigger property sales and further price falls,
exacerbating the cycle.
Lending Standards
With that background, I want to turn to an issue that has attracted a fair bit of attention in
recent months – the role that tightening lending standards might have played in the
downturn in credit and the housing market. We published a special chapter in the October 2018
Review on this issue and the Deputy Governor discussed it in a speech in November
last year so I will only cover it briefly here.[4]
Lending standards have been tightening since late 2014, well before housing prices in the eastern
states started to turn down. The initial tightening occurred in December 2014 in response to
very fast growth in lending to housing investors and an assessment by APRA that banks’
lending practices could be improved. APRA required banks to tighten their lending practices in a
number of areas, including interest rate buffers, verification of borrower income and expenses,
and high LVR lending. The measure that got the most attention at that time, however, was
the ‘investor lending benchmark’ in which APRA indicated that supervisors would be
paying particular attention to any institutions with annual investor credit growth exceeding 10 per cent.
The idea was that it would be temporary while APRA worked with the banks on addressing lending
standards.
The benchmark and the tightening of standards didn’t have an immediate impact on the pace of
investor lending. It didn’t really start to bite until the middle of 2015 when banks
introduced higher interest rates for loans to investors. And at that point, growth in lending to
investors slowed sharply (Graph 6).
Once things settled down, however, and banks were comfortable that they were well below the
benchmark, the growth in lending to investors started to pick up again. Then, in March 2017,
APRA introduced restrictions on the share of new interest-only lending as part of its broader
suite of measures to strengthen lending practices. As part of this, APRA reinforced its investor
benchmark. While the interest-only measure was focused on reducing the volume of higher-risk
lending rather than lending to a particular type of borrower, there was a noticeable impact on
the growth in lending to housing investors since interest-only loans tend to be the product of
choice for many investors.
Both the investor lending benchmark and the interest-only lending benchmark have been removed for
banks that have provided assurances on their lending policies and practices to APRA. But the
improvements in lending practices implemented by the banks over the past few years have resulted
in credit conditions being tighter than they were a few years ago. Application processes have
been taking a bit longer as lenders are being more diligent about verifying borrower income and
expenses, borrowers are generally being offered smaller maximum loans and some borrowers are
finding it more difficult to obtain a loan. Banks are more closely adhering to their lending
policies, resulting in fewer exceptions being granted and there are fewer high LVR and
interest-only loans being approved.
There have been some concerns expressed that these developments have been a key reason for the
slowing in credit growth over the past year. Coupled with possibly some increased risk aversion
of front-line lending staff in the wake of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking,
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, the concern is that this has been impacting
housing credit growth and, by extension, housing prices. As concluded in the Banks’ February
Statement on Monetary Policy, and noted by the Governor in a recent speech, tighter
credit conditions do not appear to be the main reason for declining housing credit growth.[5] The evidence
points towards declining demand for housing credit as being a more important factor.
Nevertheless, it is possible that tighter lending standards could be impacting developers of
apartments. This could be direct, reflecting banks’ desire to reduce their exposure to the
property market, particularly high-density development. But it could also be indirect by banks
tightening their lending standards for purchases of new apartments, hence impacting pre-sales
for developers and their ability to obtain finance. The Deputy Governor noted this in a speech
in November 2018 and concluded that this was of potentially higher risk to the economy than
household lending standards.
From a financial stability perspective, prudent lending standards are a good thing. They ensure
that households and banks are resilient to changes in circumstances. But there needs to be a
balance. The regulators are not proposing any further tightening in lending standards. And the
appropriate amount of credit risk is not zero – banks need to continue to lend and that
will inevitably involve some credit losses.
Western Australia
Finally, I want to turn my focus to developments in Western
Australia. As you will have seen from some of my earlier graphs, the Western Australian
circumstances are somewhat different to those of the eastern capital cities. There are two
aspects I would like to focus on – household resilience and the commercial property
sector.
Housing prices in Perth have been declining for some years (Graph 7). The peak in housing prices
in Perth was in the middle of 2014. This followed a period of strong housing price growth as the
population of Western Australia increased strongly during the mining investment boom and housing
construction took longer to ramp up. When housing construction did respond, however, population
growth had slowed markedly and housing prices started to fall. Median housing prices have fallen
by around 12 per cent since 2014.
This has clearly been a difficult time for many homeowners in Western Australia. There are some
households that are having difficulty meeting repayments, as evidenced by a rising arrears rate
in Western Australia (Graph 8). At this stage, however, the losses are not large enough to
threaten the stability of the financial sector. We nevertheless continue to monitor the
situation for any potential systemic impacts.
Finally, office property in Western Australia has also been experiencing oversupply. Valuations
have fallen over the past decade (Graph 9). Rents have also fallen reflecting a sharp increase
in office vacancy rates in Perth’s CBD over the past few years (Graph 10). This makes for a
challenging environment for owners of these buildings, particularly for owners of older or lower
quality office buildings as tenants have taken the opportunity to move into newer buildings as
rents have come down. But again, while a difficult time for developers and owners of office
buildings, the financial stability implications seem limited.
Conclusion
Vulnerabilities from the level of household debt, the apartment development cycle and the level
of non-residential commercial property valuations continue to present risks for financial
stability. While so far, the financial sector has remained resilient, we continue to monitor
developments in household debt and in property markets for signs that these might have more
broad ranging effects on the financial system.
The RBA released their minutes today relating top the March 2019 meeting. They called out the market’s view that policy rates would be lower in 2020 (a turn around), lower retail, and slowing housing momentum, despite strong employment.
In considering the stance of monetary policy, members observed that growth in the global economy
had been above trend in 2018, although it had slowed over the second half of the year and timely
indicators suggested that this moderation had extended into 2019. Nonetheless, output growth had
remained sufficient in most advanced economies for labour markets to remain tight, putting
upward pressure on wages. Members noted the tension in a number of economies between slower GDP
growth and resilient labour markets. The transmission of tighter labour market conditions to
inflation pressures was taking longer than might be expected, based on historical experience.
The authorities had responded to slowing growth in China by putting in place policies to
increase the flow of credit to the private sector and easing fiscal policy in a targeted way to
support growth, while continuing to pay close attention to risks in the financial sector.
Slowing growth in China and ongoing trade tensions had led to lower growth in global trade, and
continued to be a source of uncertainty for the outlook for global growth.
The tightening of global financial conditions, associated with higher risk premiums required by
investors around the turn of the year, had eased. Members assessed that global financial
conditions remained accommodative, with financial market pricing indicating that little change
to the accommodative stance of monetary policy in the advanced economies was expected over the
following year or so. The terms of trade for Australia were expected to have remained above
their trough in early 2016 and the Australian dollar had remained within its narrow range of
recent times.
Domestically, there continued to be tension between the ongoing improvement in labour market
data and the apparent slowing in the momentum of output growth in the second half of 2018.
Leading indicators of conditions in the labour market, such as vacancies and hiring intentions,
pointed to further tightening in the labour market in the near term. Private sector wages growth
had picked up further in the December quarter, consistent with the Bank’s forecasts and
survey evidence that a significant share of firms were finding it difficult to attract suitable
labour.
Although output growth had slowed in the second half of 2018, the outlook for business
investment and spending on public infrastructure had remained positive. Growth in consumption
was expected to be supported by an increase in growth in household disposable income. However,
there continued to be considerable uncertainty around the outlook for consumption given the
environment of declining housing prices in some cities, low growth in household income and high
debt levels. Dwelling investment was expected to subtract from growth in output over the
forecast period and, unless pre-sales volumes started to increase, this decline could be sharper
than currently expected.
The process of adjustment in the housing market had continued. Housing prices in Sydney,
Melbourne and Perth had declined further, and turnover in the housing market had fallen
significantly. Rent inflation had remained low across most of the country despite declines in
rental vacancy rates over the previous year, except in Sydney, where rental vacancy rates had
been increasing. Credit conditions had tightened for some borrowers and the demand for housing
credit had slowed noticeably as conditions in the housing market had changed. Mortgage rates had
remained low and there was strong competition for borrowers of high credit quality.
Members noted that the sustained low level of interest rates over recent years had been
supporting economic activity and had allowed for gradual progress to be made in reducing the
unemployment rate and returning inflation towards the midpoint of the target. While the labour
market had continued to strengthen, less progress had been made on inflation. Looking forward,
the central forecast scenario was still for growth in GDP of around 3 per cent over
2019 and a further decline in the unemployment rate to 4¾ per cent over the
next couple of years. This further reduction in spare capacity underpinned the forecast of a
gradual pick-up in wage pressures and inflation. Given this, members agreed that developments in
the labour market were particularly important.
Taking account of the available information on current economic and financial conditions and how
they were expected to evolve, members assessed that the current stance of monetary policy was
supporting jobs growth and a gradual lift in inflation. However, members noted that significant
uncertainties around the forecasts remained, with scenarios where an increase in the cash rate
would be appropriate at some point and other scenarios where a decrease in the cash rate would
be appropriate. The probabilities around these scenarios were more evenly balanced than they had
been over the preceding year.
Members agreed to continue to assess the outlook carefully. Given that further progress in
reducing unemployment and lifting inflation was a reasonable expectation, members agreed that
there was not a strong case for a near-term adjustment in monetary policy. Rather, they assessed
that it would be appropriate to hold the cash rate steady while new information became available
that could help resolve the current tensions in the domestic economic data. Members judged that
holding the stance of monetary policy unchanged at this meeting would enable the Bank to be a
source of stability and confidence, and would be consistent with sustainable growth in the
economy and achieving the inflation target over time.
The Decision
The Board decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 1.5 per cent.
I will talk about how climate change affects the objectives of monetary policy and some of the challenges that arise in thinking about climate change.
Finally, I will also briefly discuss how climate change affects financial stability.
Let me start by highlighting a few of the dimensions that we need to consider:
We need to think in terms of trend rather than cycles in the weather. Droughts have
generally been regarded (at least economically) as cyclical events that recur every so
often. In contrast, climate change is a trend change. The impact of a trend is
ongoing, whereas a cycle is temporary.
We need to reassess the frequency of climate events. In addition, we need to reassess our
assumptions about the severity and longevity of the climatic events. For example, the
insurance industry has recognised that the frequency and severity of tropical cyclones (and
hurricanes in the Northern Hemisphere) has changed. This has caused the insurance sector to
reprice how they insure (and re-insure) against such events.
We need to think about how the economy is currently adapting and how it will adapt both to
the trend change in climate and the transition required to contain climate change. The
time-frame for both the impact of climate change and the adaptation of the economy to it is
very pertinent here. The transition path to a less carbon-intensive world is clearly quite
different depending on whether it is managed as a gradual process or is abrupt. The trend
changes aren’t likely to be smooth. There is likely to be volatility around the trend,
with the potential for damaging outcomes from spikes above the trend.
Both the physical impact of climate change and the transition are likely to have first-order
economic effects.
Climate Change, Economic Models and Monetary Policy
The economics profession has examined the effects of climate change at least since Nobel Prize
winner William Nordhaus in 1977. Since then, it has become an area of considerably more active
research in the profession.[4]
There has been a large body of research around the appropriate design of policies to address
climate change (such as the design of carbon pricing mechanisms), but not that much in terms of
what it might imply for macroeconomic policies, with one notable exception being the work of
Warwick McKibbin and co-authors.[5]
How does climate affect monetary policy? Monetary policy’s objectives in Australia are full
employment/output and inflation. Hence the effect of climate on these variables is an
appropriate way to consider the effect of climate change on the economy and the implications for
monetary policy. The economy is changing all the time in response to a large number of forces.
Monetary policy is always having to analyse and assess these forces and their impact on the
economy. But few of these forces have the scale, persistence and systemic risk of climate
change.
A longstanding way of thinking about monetary policy and economic management is in terms of
demand and supply shocks.[6]
A positive demand shock increases output and increases prices. The monetary policy response to a
positive demand shock is straightforward: tighten policy. Climate events have been good examples
of supply shocks. Indeed, droughts are often the textbook example used to illustrate a supply
shock. A negative supply shock reduces output but increases prices. That is a more complicated
monetary policy challenge because the two parts of the RBA’s dual mandate, output and
inflation, are moving in opposite directions. Historically, the monetary policy response has
been to look through the impact on prices, on the presumption that the impact is temporary. The
banana price episode in 2011 after Cyclone Yasi is a good example of this. The spike in banana
prices and inflation was temporary, although quite substantial. It boosted inflation by 0.7
percentage points. The Reserve Bank looked through the effect of the banana price rise on
inflation. After the banana crop returned to normal, prices settled down and inflation returned
to its previous rate.
The response to such a shock is relatively straightforward if the climate events are temporary
and discrete: droughts are assumed to end; the destruction of the banana crop or the closure of
the iron ore port because of a cyclone is temporary; things return to where they were before the
climate event. That said, the output that is lost is generally lost forever. It is not made up
again later, but rather output returns to its former level.
The recent IPCC report documents that climate change is a trend rather than cyclical, which makes the assessment much more complicated. What if droughts are more frequent, or cyclones happen more often? The supply shock is no longer temporary but close to permanent. That situation is more challenging to assess and respond to.
Climate Change and Financial Stability
Having talked about the macroeconomic impact of climate change and how that might affect monetary
policy, I will briefly discuss climate through the lens of financial stability implications.[10] Financial
stability is also a core part of the Reserve Bank’s mandate. Challenges for financial
stability may arise from both physical and transition risks of climate change. For example,
insurers may face large, unanticipated payouts because of climate change-related property damage
and business losses. In some cases businesses and households could lose access to insurance.
Companies that generate significant pollution might face reputational damage or legal liability
from their activities, and changes to regulation could cause previously valuable assets to
become uneconomic. All of these consequences could precipitate sharp adjustments in asset
prices, which would have consequences for financial stability.
The reason that I will only cover the implications of climate change for financial stability only
briefly today is that it has been very eloquently discussed by Geoff Summerhayes (APRA) and John
Price (ASIC) including at this forum over the past two years.[11] I would very much
endorse the points that Geoff and John have made. Geoff stresses the need for businesses,
including those in the financial sector to implement the recommendations of the Task Force for
Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).[12]
I strongly endorse this point. We have seen progress on this front in recent years, but there is
more to be done. Financial stability will be better served by an orderly transition rather than
an abrupt disorderly one.
One area that Geoff highlighted in a recent speech is that there is a data gap which needs to be
addressed:[13] ‘The
challenge governments, regulators and financial institutions face in responding to the
wide-ranging impacts of climate change is to make sound decisions in the face of uncertainty
about how these risks will play out.’ In that regard, Geoff mentions one challenge that I
spoke about earlier in the context of monetary policy. Namely, taking the climate modelling and
mapping that into our macroeconomic models. For businesses and financial markets, that challenge
is understanding the climate modelling and conducting the scenario analysis to determine the
potential impact on their business and investments.
Interesting speech from the RBA Governor today, in which he explains why home prices are falling, and says its all manageable. No mention of too loose credit and too low interest rates. Or the substantial credit tightening of recent times as the credit impulse slows!
Just remember they banked on the household sector to spend big to support the economy after the mining boom faltered, and that housing credit growth was the centre piece. This is a neat piece of misdirection in my view!
The Current State of the Housing Market
Australians watch housing markets intensely, perhaps more so than citizens of any other country.
Over the five years to late 2017, they saw nationwide housing prices increase by almost 50 per cent
(Graph 1). Since then, prices have fallen by 9 per cent, bringing them back to
their level in mid 2016.
Declines of this magnitude are unusual, but they are not unprecedented. In 2008 and 2010, prices
fell by a similar amount, as they did on two occasions in the 1980s. In the 1980s, the rate of
CPI inflation was higher than it is now, so in inflation-adjusted terms, the declines then were
larger than the current one.
These nationwide figures mask considerable variation across the country (Graph 2). The
run-up in prices over recent years was most pronounced in Sydney and Melbourne, so it is not
surprising that the declines over the past year have also been largest in these two cities. In
Perth and Darwin, the housing markets have been weak for some time, affected by the swings in
population and income associated with the mining boom. By contrast, the housing market in Hobart
has been strong recently. In Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra and many parts of regional Australia,
conditions have been more stable. Given these contrasting experiences, it is pretty clear that
there is no such thing as the Australian housing market. What we have
is a series of separate, but interconnected, markets.
Another important window into housing markets is provided by rental markets. Over recent times,
the nationwide measure of rent inflation has been running at a bit less than 1 per cent,
the lowest in three decades (Graph 3). As with housing prices, there is a lot of variation
across the country. Rents have been falling for four years in Perth and are now around 20 per cent
below their previous peak. By contrast, in Hobart rents have been rising at the fastest rate for
some years.
As is well understood, shifts in sentiment play an important role in housing markets. When prices
are rising, people are attracted to the market in the hope of capital gains. At some point,
though, valuations become so stretched that demand tails off and there is a shift in momentum.
When prices are falling, it’s the reverse. The prospect of capital losses leads buyers to
stay away or to delay purchasing. At some point, though, the lower prices draw more buyers into
the market. First home owners find it easier to buy a home, investors are attracted back into
the market, and trade-up buyers take the opportunity to upgrade to the home they have always
wanted. These shifts in sentiment and momentum are seen in most housing cycles, but their
precise timing is difficult to predict.
Some of these shifts in sentiment are evident in consumer surveys (Graph 4). Over recent
times, the number of people reporting that an investment in real estate is the wisest place for
their savings has fallen significantly. So, it is not surprising that there are fewer investors
in the market. At the same time, the number of people saying it is a good time to buy a home has
increased. Lower prices draw more people in and, eventually, this helps stabilise the market. So
it is worth closely watching these shifts in sentiment.
Explaining the Recent Cycle
An obvious question to ask is what are the underlying, or structural, drivers of the large run-up
in housing prices and the subsequent decline?
There isn’t a single answer to this question. Rather, it is a combination of factors.
Before I discuss these factors, it is worth pointing out that the current adjustment is unusual.
Unlike the other four episodes in which housing prices have declined in recent decades, this one
was not preceded by rising mortgage rates. Nor has it been associated with a rise in the
national unemployment rate. Instead, in New South Wales, where the recent decline in housing
prices has been the largest, the unemployment rate has continued to trend down. It is now at
levels last seen in the early 1970s. The unemployment rate has also trended lower in Victoria.
So, the origins of the current correction in prices do not lie in interest rates and
unemployment. Rather, they largely lie in the inflexibility of the supply side of the housing
market in response to large shifts in population growth.
It is useful to start with the national picture (Graph 5). Australia’s population growth
picked up noticeably in the mid 2000s and it took the better part of a decade for the rate of
home building to respond. It took time to plan, to obtain council approvals, to arrange finance
and to build the new homes. Not surprisingly, housing prices went up. Eventually, though, the
supply response did take place. Over recent times, the number of dwellings in Australia has been
increasing at the fastest rate in more than two decades. Again, not surprisingly, prices have
responded to this extra supply.
The population and supply dynamics are most evident in Western Australia and New South Wales
(Graph 6).
During the mining investment boom, population growth in Western Australia increased from around 1 per cent
to 3½ per cent. This was a big change. The rate of home building was slow to
respond. When it did finally respond, it was just at the time that population growth was slowing
significantly, as workers moved back east at the end of the boom. This explains much of the
cycle.
In New South Wales it is a similar story, although it is not quite as stark. The recent rate of
home building in New South Wales is the highest in decades. At the same time, population growth
is moderating, partly due to people moving to other cities, attracted by their lower housing
prices and rents. By contrast, in cities where population patterns and the rate of home building
have been more stable, prices, too, have been more stable.
Another demand-side factor that has influenced prices is the rise and then decline in demand by
non-residents.
One, albeit imperfect, way of seeing this is the number of approvals by the Foreign Investment
Review Board (Graph 7). In the middle years of this decade, there was a surge in foreign
investment in residential property, particularly from China. This was apparent not just in
Australian cities, but also in ‘international’ cities in other countries. In
Australia, the demand was particularly strong in Sydney and Melbourne, given the global profiles
of these two cities and their large foreign student populations. More recently, this source of
demand has waned, partly as a result of the increased difficulty of moving money out of China as
the authorities manage capital flows.
The timing of these shifts in foreign demand has broadly coincided with – and
reinforced – the shifts in domestic demand. However, making a full assessment of their
impact on prices is complicated by the fact that international property developers were also
adding to supply in Australia at a time of very strong demand. More recently, these developers
have scaled back their activity.
Domestic investors have also played a significant role in this cycle. This is especially the case
in New South Wales, which was the epicentre of strong investor demand (Graph 8). At the
peak of the boom, approvals to investors in New South Wales accounted for half of approvals
nationwide, compared with an average of just 30 per cent over the five years to 2010.
More than 40 per cent of the new dwellings built in New South Wales recently have been
apartments, which tend to be more attractive to investors.
The strong demand from investors had its roots in the population dynamics. Low interest rates and
favourable tax treatment added to the attraction of investing in an appreciating asset. The
positive side to this was that the strong demand by investors helped underpin the extra
construction activity needed to house the growing population. But the rigidities on the supply
side, coupled with investors’ desire to benefit from a rising market in a low interest rate
environment, amplified the price increases.
As I discussed earlier, there is an internal dynamic to housing price cycles, and this one is no
exception. By 2017, the ratio of the median home price to income had reached very high levels in
Sydney and Melbourne (Graph 9). Finding the deposit to purchase a home had become beyond
the reach of many people, especially first home buyers if they did not have others to help them.
At the same time, the combination of high prices and weak growth in rents meant that rental
yields were quite low. So, naturally, momentum shifted. Given the big run-up in prices and the
large increase in supply, a correction at some point was not surprising, although the precise
timing is nearly impossible to predict.
No discussion of housing prices is complete without touching on interest rates and the
availability of finance. The low interest rates over the past decade did increase people’s
capacity to borrow and made it more attractive to borrow to buy an asset whose price was
appreciating. But the increase in housing prices is not just about low interest rates. The
variation across the different housing markets indicates that city-specific factors have played
an important role.
Recently, much attention has also been paid to the availability of credit. This attention has
coincided with a noticeable slowing in housing credit growth, especially to investors (Graph 10).
It is clear there has been a progressive tightening in lending standards over recent years. The
RBA’s liaison suggests that, on average, the maximum loan size offered to new borrowers has
fallen by around 20 per cent since 2015. This reflects a combination of factors,
including more accurate reporting of expenses, larger discounts applied to certain types of
income and more comprehensive reporting of other liabilities. Even so, only around 10 per cent
of people borrow the maximum they are offered. Sensibly, most people borrow less than what they
are offered, so the effect of this reduction in borrowing capacity has not been particularly
large.
It has also been apparent through our liaison that some lenders became more cautious last year.
There was a heightened concern by some loan officers about the consequences to them and their
career prospects of making a loan that might not be repaid if the borrower’s circumstances
changed. So, lenders became more risk averse. This, along with greater verification of expenses
and income, led to an increase in average loan approval times, although some lenders have
invested in people and technology to address this. Our liaison suggests that application
approval rates are largely unchanged.
Overall, the evidence is that a tightening in credit supply has contributed to the slowdown in
credit growth. The main story, though, is one of reduced demand for credit, rather than reduced
supply.
When housing prices are falling, investors are less likely to enter the market and to borrow. So
too are owner-occupiers for a while. Consistent with this, the number of loan applicants has
declined over the past year. There is also strong competition for borrowers with low credit
risk, which is not something you would expect to see if it were mainly a supply story. This
competition is evident in the significant discounts on interest rates on new loans compared with
those on outstanding loans.
Even though the slowing in credit growth is largely a demand story, we are watching credit
availability closely. It is perhaps stating the obvious to say that we want lenders who are both
prudent and who are prepared to take risk. As lenders recalibrated their risk controls last
year, the balance may have moved too far in some cases. This meant that credit conditions
tightened more than was probably required. Now, as lenders continue to seek the right balance,
we need to remember that it is important that banks are prepared to take credit risk. And it’s
important that they have the capacity to manage that risk well. If they can’t do this, then
the economy will suffer.
Impact on the Macroeconomy
This brings me to the issue of how developments in the housing market affect the broader
economy.
Movements in housing prices affect the economy through multiple channels. They influence consumer
spending, including through the spending that occurs when people move homes. They also influence
the amount of building activity that takes place. Changes in housing prices also have an impact
on access to finance by small business by affecting the value of collateral for loans. And
finally, they can affect the profitability of our financial institutions.
Today, I would like to focus on the effect of housing prices on household consumption. My
colleagues at the RBA have examined how changes in measured housing wealth affect household
spending.[1] They
estimate that a 10 per cent increase in net housing wealth raises the level of
consumption by around ¾ per cent in the short run and by 1½ per cent
in the longer run. They have also examined how this wealth effect differs by type of spending.
They find that it is highest for spending on motor vehicles and household furnishings and that
for many other types of spending the effect is not significantly different from zero (Graph 11).
Part of the effect on spending on furnishings is likely to come from the fact that periods of
rising housing prices are often associated with higher housing turnover, and turnover generates
extra spending.
Over recent years, spending by households has risen at a faster rate than household income; in
other words, the saving rate has declined (Graph 12). The results that I just spoke about
suggest that rising housing wealth played a role here. If so, falling housing prices, and a
decline in measured household wealth, could have the opposite effect.
The more important influence, though, is what is happening with household income. For many
people, the main source of their wealth is their human capital; that is, their future earning
capacity. As I have discussed on previous occasions, growth in household income has been quite
weak for a while. It is plausible that, for a time, this didn’t affect people’s
expectations of their future income growth; that is the value of their human capital. So they
didn’t change their spending plans much, despite their current income growth being weak, and
the saving rate fell. However, as the period of weak income growth has persisted, it has become
harder to ignore it. Expectations of future income growth have been revised down and it is
likely that this is affecting spending.
My conclusion here is that wealth effects are influencing consumption decisions, but they are
working mainly through expectations of future income growth. Swings in housing prices and
turnover in the housing market are also having an effect, but they are not the main issue. This
assessment is consistent with the data on housing equity injection (Graph 13). Over recent
years, households have been injecting substantial equity into housing and have not been using
the higher housing prices to borrow to support their other spending. This is in contrast to the
period around the turn of the century, when households were withdrawing equity.
Given this assessment, developments in the labour market are particularly important. A further
tightening of the labour market is expected to see a gradual increase in wages growth and faster
income growth. This should provide a counterweight to the effect on spending of lower housing
prices.
Taking these various considerations into account, the adjustment in our housing market is
manageable for the overall economy. It is unlikely to derail our economic expansion. It will
also have some positive side-effects by making housing more affordable for many people.
A related issue that the RBA has paid close attention to is the impact of lower housing prices on
financial stability.
In 2017, APRA assessed the ability of Australian banks to withstand a severe stress scenario, in
which housing prices declined by 35 per cent over three years, GDP declined by 4 per cent
and the unemployment rate increased to more than 10 per cent.[2] The estimated
impact on bank profitability was substantial, but importantly, bank capital remained above
regulatory minimum levels. This provides reassurance that the adjustment in our housing market
is not a financial stability issue. We have not experienced the very loose lending practices
that were common in the United States before the housing crash there a decade ago. Nor have we
seen significant overbuilding around the country.
Non-performing housing loans in Australia have risen recently, but they remain low at less than 1 per cent
(Graph 14). The increase is most evident in Western Australia, where the unemployment rate has
risen.
The national experience has been that low levels of unemployment and low interest rates allow
most people to service their loans, even if weak income growth means that household finances are
sometimes strained. Our estimate is that currently, less than 5 per cent of indebted
owner-occupier households have negative equity, and the vast bulk of these households continue
to meet their mortgage obligations. One factor that has helped here is that the share of new
loans with high loan-to-valuation ratios (LVRs) has declined substantially (Graph 15). The
nature of Australian mortgages – in which there is an incentive to make
prepayments – has also helped.
Monetary Policy
I would like to conclude with some words about monetary policy and highlight some of the issues
we focused on at yesterday’s Reserve Bank Board meeting.
As you are aware, the current setting of monetary policy has been in place for some time. A cash
rate of 1.5 per cent is very low historically and it is clearly stimulatory. It is
supporting the creation of jobs and progress towards achieving the inflation target.
Looking forward, a key issue is the labour market. Achieving full employment is an important
objective in its own right. But, in addition, a strong labour market is the central ingredient
in the expected pick-up in inflation. We are expecting that as the labour market tightens, wages
growth will increase further. In turn, this should boost household income and spending and
provide a counterweight to the fall in housing prices. The pick-up in spending is, in turn,
expected to put upward pressure on inflation. Of course, it is possible that inflation could
move higher for other reasons, although the likelihood of this at the moment seems low. This
means that a lot depends upon the labour market.
The recent data on this front have been encouraging. Employment growth has been strong, the
vacancy rate is very high and firms’ hiring intentions remain positive. The latest reading
of the wage price index also confirmed a welcome, but gradual, pick-up in wage growth,
especially in the private sector.
Other indicators of the economy, though, paint a softer picture. We will receive another reading
on GDP growth later this morning, but growth in the second half of 2018 was clearly less than in
the first half. This is similar to the picture internationally. In a number of countries,
including our own, there is growing tension between strong labour market data and softer GDP
data. We are devoting significant resources to understanding this tension.
The global economy grew above trend in 2018, although it slowed in the second half of the year. The slower pace of growth has continued into 2019. The outlook for the global economy remains reasonable, although downside risks have increased. The trade tensions remain a source of uncertainty. In China, the authorities have taken further steps to ease financing conditions, partly in response to slower growth in the economy. Globally, headline inflation rates have moved lower following the earlier decline in oil prices, although core inflation has picked up in a number of economies. In most advanced economies, unemployment rates are low and wages growth has picked up.
Overall, global financial conditions remain accommodative. They have eased recently
after tightening around the turn of year. Long-term bond yields have declined,
consistent with the subdued outlook for inflation and lower expectations for future
policy rates in a number of advanced economies. Also, equity markets have risen,
supported by growth in corporate earnings. In Australia, short-term bank funding costs
have moderated, although they remain a little higher than a few years ago. The
Australian dollar has remained within the narrow range of recent times. While the terms
of trade have increased over the past couple of years, they are expected to decline over
time.
The Australian labour market remains strong. There has been a significant increase in employment and the unemployment rate is at 5 per cent. A further decline in the unemployment rate to 4¾ per cent is expected over the next couple of years. The vacancy rate is high and there are reports of skills shortages in some areas. The stronger labour market has led to some pick-up in wages growth, which is a welcome development. The improvement in the labour market should see some further lift in wages growth over time, although this is still expected to be a gradual process.
Other indicators suggest growth in the Australian economy slowed over the second half of 2018. The central scenario is still for the Australian economy to grow by around 3 per cent this year. The growth outlook is being supported by rising business investment, higher levels of spending on public infrastructure and increased employment. The main domestic uncertainty continues to be the strength of household consumption in the context of weak growth in household income and falling housing prices in some cities. A pick-up in growth in household income is nonetheless expected to support household spending over the next year.
The adjustment in the Sydney and Melbourne housing markets is continuing, after the earlier large run-up in prices. Conditions remain soft in both markets and rent inflation remains low. Credit conditions for some borrowers have tightened a little further over the past year or so. At the same time, the demand for credit by investors in the housing market has slowed noticeably as the dynamics of the housing market have changed. Growth in credit extended to owner-occupiers has eased further. Mortgage rates remain low and there is strong competition for borrowers of high credit quality.
Inflation remains low and stable. Underlying inflation is expected to pick up over the
next couple of years, with the pick-up likely to be gradual and to take a little longer
than earlier expected. The central scenario is for underlying inflation to be 2 per cent
this year and 2¼ per cent in 2020. Headline inflation is expected to decline in the near
term because of lower petrol prices.
The low level of interest rates is continuing to support the Australian economy. Further
progress in reducing unemployment and having inflation return to target is expected,
although this progress is likely to be gradual. Taking account of the available
information, the Board judged that holding the stance of monetary policy unchanged at
this meeting would be consistent with sustainable growth in the economy and achieving
the inflation target over time.