Tag: Federal Reserve

Fed Holds Again, But Is Less Patient Now.

The Fed held their rate again, but noted that inflation is still below its target range and uncertainties have increased. The patient wording from previous releases is missing, which may suggest a rate cut sooner than later. Their massive market operations continue.

“Effective June 20, 2019, the Federal Open Market Committee directs the Desk to undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the federal funds rate in a target range of 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent, including overnight reverse repurchase operations (and reverse repurchase operations with maturities of more than one day when necessary to accommodate weekend, holiday, or similar trading conventions) at an offering rate of 2.25 percent, in amounts limited only by the value of Treasury securities held outright in the System Open Market Account that are available for such operations and by a per-counterparty limit of $30 billion per day.

The Committee directs the Desk to continue rolling over at auction the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities maturing during each calendar month that exceeds $15 billion, and to continue reinvesting in agency mortgage-backed securities the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities received during each calendar month that exceeds $20 billion. Small deviations from these amounts for operational reasons are acceptable.

The Committee also directs the Desk to engage in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve’s agency mortgage-backed securities transactions.”

Here is their statement.

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in May indicates that the labor market remains strong and that economic activity is rising at a moderate rate. Job gains have been solid, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Although growth of household spending appears to have picked up from earlier in the year, indicators of business fixed investment have been soft. On a 12-month basis, overall inflation and inflation for items other than food and energy are running below 2 percent. Market-based measures of inflation compensation have declined; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent. The Committee continues to view sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective as the most likely outcomes, but uncertainties about this outlook have increased. In light of these uncertainties and muted inflation pressures, the Committee will closely monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook and will act as appropriate to sustain the expansion, with a strong labor market and inflation near its symmetric 2 percent objective.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.

Voting for the monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michelle W. Bowman; Lael Brainard; Richard H. Clarida; Charles L. Evans; Esther L. George; Randal K. Quarles; and Eric S. Rosengren. Voting against the action was James Bullard, who preferred at this meeting to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points.

Fed Holds, Cuts Unlikely

The Fed held their rate (some were expecting a cut), and as a result, markets eased back, while bond yields rose. They underscored the patient approach ahead, but also a willingness to look though low inflation in the nearer term.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to set the interest rate paid on required and excess reserve balances at 2.35 percent, effective May 2, 2019. Setting the interest rate paid on required and excess reserve balances 15 basis points below the top of the target range for the federal funds rate is intended to foster trading in the federal funds market at rates well within the FOMC’s target range.

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in March indicates that the labor market remains strong and that economic activity rose at a solid rate. Job gains have been solid, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Growth of household spending and business fixed investment slowed in the first quarter. On a 12-month basis, overall inflation and inflation for items other than food and energy have declined and are running below 2 percent. On balance, market-based measures of inflation compensation have remained low in recent months, and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent. The Committee continues to view sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective as the most likely outcomes. In light of global economic and financial developments and muted inflation pressures, the Committee will be patient as it determines what future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate may be appropriate to support these outcomes.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.

US regulatory proposal would limit effects of large bank failures

Moody’s says on 2 April, the US Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency proposed a rule that would require US global systemically important bank (GSIB) holding companies and advanced-approaches banking organizations1 to hold additional capital against investments in total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) debt. The additional capital required for investments in TLAC debt would reduce interconnectedness between large banking organizations and the systemic effect of a GSIB’s failure, a credit positive for the US banking system.

The credit-positive proposal would require companies to deduct from their regulatory capital any investment in their own regulatory capital instrument which includes TLAC debt, any investment in another financial institution’s regulatory capital instrument, and investments in unconsolidated financial institutions’ capital instruments that would qualify as regulatory capital if issued by the banking organization itself (subject to a certain threshold). The deductions intend to discourage banks from investing in the regulatory capital instruments of another bank and improve the largest banks’ resiliency to stress and ensure a more efficient bank resolution process.

The proposal also includes additional required disclosures about TLAC debt in bank holding companies’ public regulatory filings, which would increase transparency.

The TLAC rules were first proposed in 2015 and finalized in December of 2016. However, in 2016 when the TLAC rules were finalized, regulators needed more time to determine the rule’s regulatory capital treatment for investments in certain debt instruments such as TLAC issued by bank holding companies.

Monetary policy is dead

Excellent insights from Steen Jakobsen at Saxobank, who has declared that monetary policy is dead, as Fed has thrown in the towel, and central banks are committed to defying the business cycle.

Current chair Jerome Powell saw himself as a new Volcker, but last night he cemented his panicky shift since the December FOMC meeting, and instead cut the figure of Alan “the Maestro” Greenspan, who set our whole sorry era of central bank serial bubble blowing in motion.

The Fed’s mission ever since has been a determined exercise in defying the business cycle, and replacing it with an ever-expanding credit cycle. 

This latest FOMC meeting has set in motion a race to the bottom, with the European Central bank currently in the lead, but the Fed and the Bank of England are gaining fast. 

I am presently in London, and on my way to China and Hong Kong with Saxo’s Gateway to China events. I am joined at these events by the impressive Dr. Charles Su of CIB Research, China. He and I agree on many things, but one in particular: 

Monetary policy is dead.

My view has long been that monetary policy is misguided and unproductive, but the difference now is that we are reaching the most major inflection point since the global financial crisis as central bank policy medicine rapidly loses what little potency it had. In the meantime, the harm to the patient has only been adding up: the economic system is suffering fatigue from QE-driven inequality, malinvestment, a lack of productivity, never-ending cheap money and a total lack of accountability. 

The next policy steps will see central banks operating as mere auxiliaries to governments’ fiscal impulse. The policy framework is dressed up as “Modern Monetary Theory”, and it will be arriving soon and in force, perhaps after a summer of non-improvement or worse to the current economic landscape. What would this mean? No real improvement in data, a credit impulse too weak and small to do anything but to stabilise said data and a geopolitical agenda that continues to move away from a multilateral framework and devolves into a range of haphazard nationalistic agendas. 

For the record, MMT is neither modern, monetary nor a theory. It is a the political narrative for use by central bankers and politicians alike. The orthodox version of MMT aims to maintain full employment as its prime policy objective, with tax rates modulated to cool off any inflation threat that comes from spending beyond revenue constraints (in MMT, a government doesn’t have to worry about balanced budgets, as the central bank is merely there to maintain targeted interest rates all along the curve if necessary).

Most importantly, however, MMT is the natural policy response to the imbalances of QE and to the cries of populists. Given the rise of Trumpism and democratic socialism in the US and populist revolts of all stripes across Europe, we know that when budget talks start in May (in Europe, after the Parliamentary elections) and October (in the US), governments around the world will be talking up the MMT agenda: infrastructure investment, reducing inequality, and reforming the tax code to favour more employment at the low end.

We also know that the labour market is very tight as it is and if there is another push on fiscal spending, the supply of labour and resources will come up short. Tor Svelland of Svelland Capital, who joins Charles and I at the Gateway to China event, has made exactly this point. The assumption of a continuous flow of resources stands at odds with the reality of massive underinvestment. 

Central bankers and indirect politicians are hoping/wishing for inflation, and in 2020 they will get it – in spades. Unfortunately, it will be the wrong kind: headline inflation with no real growth or productivity. A repeat of the 1970s, maybe?

Get ready for bigger government and massive policy interventions on a new level and of a new nature. These will be driven by a fiscal impulse to stimulate demand rather than to pump up asset prices. It will lead to stagflation of either the light or even the heavy type, depending on how far MMT is taken.

Last night, a client asked an excellent question: how much of this scenario is already priced in? Here is my take: Saxo’s macro theme since December has been the coming global policy panic, and this has now been fully realised. The Fed proved slower to cave than even the ECB, but last night saw them give up entirely. The US-China trade deal, another key uncertainty, is priced for perfection despite plenty of things that can go wrong.

The Brexit deal, however, is extremely mispriced. The UK’s biggest challenge may not even be the circus act known as Brexit, but rather the collapsing UK credit cycle which our economist Christopher Dembik has put at risking a 2% drop in UK GDP. If nothing changes over the next six to nine months, and nothing will change, the UK economy will be in free fall. Forget Brexit, UK assets are simply mispriced from the lack of credit juice in the pipeline.

The overall China-bound inflow over the next three to five years will exceed $1 trillion China is also misunderstood and mispriced. If our two talks so far with clients on China and its opening up of its markets have taught me anything, it is that the western ‘reservation’ on anything Chinese is entirely built on bias. Governance is the word that keeps coming back in discussions. I am no fan of Chinese-style governance, but… less than 10% of global AUM is currently in China. This year alone will see the inclusion of China’s bonds in global indices like Barclays, Russell, and S&P and the allocation to China in the MSCI’s emerging markets index will quadruple from 5% to 20%. The overall China-bound inflow over the next three to five years will exceed $1 trillion using very conservative estimates.

China is perhaps the country in the world least likely to treat inbound capital poorly. It has transitioned from being a capital exporter to now being an importer. It has a semi-closed capital account, which means little money flows out, but a massive inflow is beginning to stream in as global investors acquire Chinese assets. 

China and its growth model now need to share the burden of becoming an industrialised country, and Beijing knows that only the only way keep the capital flowing in 2019 is to treat investors well. On the domestic front, meanwhile, the CPC seems to be signaling that it wants domestic investors to move excess savings from the ‘frothy’ and less productive housing market to the equity market, where capital can flow to more productive enterprises. Foreign investors are more likely to want to participate in the more liquid and familiar equity market.

2019 for China is like 2018 for the US. The first 10 months of 2018 saw the US stock market near-entirely driven by the buy-back programmes fueled by Trump’s tax reform. US companies plowed over $1 trillion into buybacks over the year. This year, the Chinese government is telling its 90 million domestic retail investors to raise their allocation to the stock market while global capital allocators/investors will need to increase their exposure to China as its capital markets are reweighted.

Trend unemployment rate steady at 5.0%

Australia’s trend unemployment rate remained steady in February 2019 at 5.0 per cent, from a revised January 2019 figure, according to the latest information released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).

But there are signs of changes ahead. Have we reached the floor?

ABS Chief Economist Bruce Hockman said: “The trend unemployment rate declined 0.5 percentage points over the year, from 5.5 per cent to 5.0 per cent. The pace of decline slowed in recent months, which was consistent with the slowdown seen in recent Job Vacancies and GDP numbers.”

Employment and hours

In February 2019, trend monthly employment increased by 20,600 persons. Full-time employment increased by 12,300 persons and part-time employment increased by 8,200 persons.

Over the past year, trend employment increased by 290,700 persons (2.3 per cent) which was above the average annual growth over the past 20 years (2.0 per cent).

The trend monthly hours worked increased by 0.1 per cent in February 2019 and by 1.9 per cent over the past year. This was slightly above the 20 year average year-on-year growth of 1.7 per cent.

Underemployment and underutilisation

The trend monthly underemployment rate decreased by less than 0.1 percentage points to 8.1 per cent in February and by 0.4 percentage points over the year. The trend underutilisation rate decreased less than 0.1 percentage points to 13.1 per cent, and by 0.9 percentage points over the year.

States and territories trend unemployment rate

The trend unemployment rate increased in Tasmania, decreased in Queensland, and remained steady in all other states and territories.

Seasonally adjusted data

The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate decreased 0.1 percentage point to 4.9 per cent in February 2019, while the participation rate fell 0.2 percentage points to 65.6 per cent. The seasonally adjusted number of persons employed increased by 4,600.

The net movement of employed in both trend and seasonally adjusted terms is underpinned by around 300,000 people entering and leaving employment in the month.

Fed Holds; Signals No Rate Changes Ahead

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in January indicates that the labor market remains strong but that growth of economic activity has slowed from its solid rate in the fourth quarter. Payroll employment was little changed in February, but job gains have been solid, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Recent indicators point to slower growth of household spending and business fixed investment in the first quarter. On a 12-month basis, overall inflation has declined, largely as a result of lower energy prices; inflation for items other than food and energy remains near 2 percent. On balance, market-based measures of inflation compensation have remained low in recent months, and survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent. The Committee continues to view sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective as the most likely outcomes. In light of global economic and financial developments and muted inflation pressures, the Committee will be patient as it determines what future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate may be appropriate to support these outcomes.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.

US Bank Disclosure Reduced Again

More evidence of the peeling back of US bank disclosure, which may reduce the incentive for bank managements to continually improve their capital and risk management processes.

On 6 March, Moody’s says the US Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced the elimination of the qualitative objection in its 2019 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) for most stress test participants. Only five banks, all US subsidiaries of foreign banks, will remain subject to qualitative objection in the current stress tests cycle. In the past, the Fed has used the qualitative objection to address deficiencies in banks’ capital-planning process. Its elimination is credit negative because it reduces public transparency around the quality of banks’ internal capital and risk management processes.

Under the revised rules, a bank must participate in four CCAR cycles before it qualifies for exemption from a potential qualitative objection in future years. If a firm receives a qualitative objection in its fourth year, it will remain subject to a possible qualitative objection until it passes. For most of the five firms still subject to the qualitative objection, their fourth year will be the 2020 CCAR cycle. In total, 18 firms are subject to this year’s CCAR exercise, with five of them subject to a possible qualitative objection.

All five firms subject to the qualitative assessment in 2019 are foreign-owned intermediate holding companies (IHCs), most of which were first subject to the Fed stress tests on a confidential basis in 2017. If the IHC has a bank holding company subsidiary that was subject to CCAR before the formation of the IHC, then the IHC is not considered the same firm for the purpose of the four-year test.

The Fed noted that since CCAR was implemented in 2011, most firms have significantly improved their risk management and capital planning process. Going forward, its capital-planning assessments will be through the regular supervisory process. The Fed highlighted as an example the new rating system for large financial institutions, which will assign component ratings of a firm’s capital planning and positions. However, these ratings will be confidential supervisory information and unavailable to the public unless the deficiencies are so severe that they warrant formal enforcement action. The new process replaces an independent comparative assessment.

The lack of public disclosure may also reduce the incentive for bank managements to continually improve their capital and risk management processes, which the CCAR qualitative review encouraged.

As previously announced, 17 large and non-complex bank holding companies, generally with $100-$250 billion of consolidated assets, will not be subject to CCAR in 2019 because of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (the EGRRCPA), which became law in May 2018. They will next participate in 2020. Most of these banks were removed from the qualitative objection in 2017 and the Fed will only object to their capital plans if they fail to meet one of the minimum capital ratios under the stress scenarios on quantitative grounds.

The Fed’s announcement was incorporated with its release of instructions for the 2019 CCAR cycle. The Fed also provided information on allowable capital distributions for those firms whose CCAR cycle was extended to 2020. For those banks, the Fed published letters that address each bank’s individual 2019 capital plans. The Fed pre-authorized the firms to distribute, net of any issuance of capital, up to the sum of:

  • The additional capital the firm could have distributed in CCAR 2018 and remained above the minimum requirements; plus
  • Capital accretion (change in capital ratios since CCAR 2018); plus
  • its already approved capital distributions for first-quarter 2019 and second-quarter 2019; minus
  • its actual distributions for first-quarter 2019 and planned distribution for second-quarter 2019

This plan is also credit negative because it permits capital distributions based on last year’s results, which incorporated a modestly less stringent severely adverse scenario than the 2019 stress test, and it also fails to incorporate any interim changes in the banks’ risk profiles. If any of the 17 banks wants to distribute more than its maximum pre-authorized amount, it may submit a capital plan to the Fed by 5 April 2019 and will be subject to the 2019 CCAR supervisory stress test.

The Feds’s 2019 Stress Test Parameters

The Federal Reserve Board has released the scenarios banks and supervisors will use for the 2019 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and Dodd-Frank Act stress test exercises. The extreme scenario assumes a short sharp fall, in 2020.

Whilst its a theoretical exercise, kudos to the FED for making public the inputs, and of course they will publish results, to an individual firm level later (unlike or opaque APRA tests, where disclosure remains appalling).

Stress tests, by ensuring that banks have adequate capital to absorb losses, help make sure that they will be able to lend to households and businesses even in a severe recession. CCAR evaluates the capital planning processes and capital adequacy of the largest U.S. bank holding companies, and large U.S. operations of foreign firms, using their planned capital distributions, such as dividend payments and share buybacks and issuances. The Dodd-Frank Act stress tests also help ensure that banks can continue to lend during times of stress, but use standard capital distribution assumptions for all firms. Both assessments only apply to domestic bank holding companies and foreign bank intermediate holding companies with more than $100 billion in total consolidated assets.

The stress tests run by the firms and the Board apply three hypothetical scenarios: baseline, adverse, and severely adverse. For the 2019 cycle, the severely adverse scenario features a severe global recession in which the U.S. unemployment rate rises by more than 6 percentage points to 10 percent. In keeping with the Board’s public framework for scenario design, a stronger economy with a lower starting point for the unemployment rate results in a tougher scenario. The severely adverse scenario also includes elevated stress in corporate loan and commercial real estate markets.

“The hypothetical scenario features the largest unemployment rate change to date,” Vice Chairman for Supervision Randal K. Quarles said. “We are confident this scenario will effectively test the resiliency of the nation’s largest banks.”

The adverse scenario features a moderate recession in the United States, as well as weakening economic activity across all countries included in the scenario.

The adverse and severely adverse scenarios describe hypothetical sets of events designed to assess the strength of banking organizations and their resilience. They are not forecasts. The baseline scenario is in line with average projections from surveys of economic forecasters. It does not represent the forecast of the Federal Reserve.

Each scenario includes 28 variables–such as gross domestic product, the unemployment rate, stock market prices, and interest rates–covering domestic and international economic activity. Along with the variables, the Board is publishing a narrative description of the scenarios that also highlights changes from last year.

Firms with large trading operations will be required to factor in a global market shock component as part of their scenarios. Additionally, firms with substantial trading or processing operations will be required to incorporate a counterparty default scenario component.

Banks are required to submit their capital plans and the results of their own stress tests to the Federal Reserve by April 5, 2019. The Federal Reserve will announce the results of its supervisory stress tests by June 30, 2019. The instructions for this year’s CCAR will be released at a later date.

Also on Tuesday, the Board announced that it will be providing relief to less-complex firms from stress testing requirements and CCAR by effectively moving the firms to an extended stress test cycle for this year. The relief applies to firms generally with total consolidated assets between $100 billion and $250 billion.

As a result, these less-complex firms will not be subject to a supervisory stress test during the 2019 cycle and their capital distributions for this year will be largely based on the results from the 2018 supervisory stress test. At a later date, the Board will propose for notice and comment a final capital distribution method for firms on an extended stress test cycle in future years.

FED Holds Benchmark Rate, “Is Patient”

The US Federal Reserve kept rates on hold in today’s announcement. It also underscores its “patience” in terms of future movements, which is central bank speak suggests the current tightening cycle has ended for now. Plus we suspect the rate of QT will slow too, providing more support to the US economy. They are prepared to QE again if needed! The net result will be for more positive market movements, for now. They also reaffirmed inflation targeting is the core principle behind their management approach.

The Dow was higher (driven also by news from Apple, Boeing and China trade talks as well).

But the Fed also issued an “extra” comment:

After extensive deliberations and thorough review of experience to date, the Committee judges that it is appropriate at this time to provide additional information regarding its plans to implement monetary policy over the longer run. Additionally, the Committee is revising its earlier guidance regarding the conditions under which it could adjust the details of its balance sheet normalization program. Accordingly, all participants agreed to the following:

  • The Committee intends to continue to implement monetary policy in a regime in which an ample supply of reserves ensures that control over the level of the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates is exercised primarily through the setting of the Federal Reserve’s administered rates, and in which active management of the supply of reserves is not required.
  • The Committee continues to view changes in the target range for the federal funds rate as its primary means of adjusting the stance of monetary policy. The Committee is prepared to adjust any of the details for completing balance sheet normalization in light of economic and financial developments. Moreover, the Committee would be prepared to use its full range of tools, including altering the size and composition of its balance sheet, if future economic conditions were to warrant a more accommodative monetary policy than can be achieved solely by reducing the federal funds rate.

Here is the general release:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising at a solid rate. Job gains have been strong, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Household spending has continued to grow strongly, while growth of business fixed investment has moderated from its rapid pace earlier last year. On a 12-month basis, both overall inflation and inflation for items other than food and energy remain near 2 percent. Although market-based measures of inflation compensation have moved lower in recent months, survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent. The Committee continues to view sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective as the most likely outcomes. In light of global economic and financial developments and muted inflation pressures, the Committee will be patient as it determines what future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate may be appropriate to support these outcomes.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.

Do Student Loans Cramp Home Ownership Rates For Young Adults?

In an article, released by the US FED via the first issue of Consumer & Community Context, they explore the impact that rising student loan debt levels may have on home ownership rates among young adults in the US. They suggest that higher debt overall helps to explain lower home ownership.

The home ownership rate in the United States fell approximately 4 percentage points in the wake of the financial crisis, from a peak of 69 percent in 2005 to 65 percent in 2014. The decline in home ownership was even more pronounced among young adults. Whereas 45 percent of household heads ages 24 to 32 in 2005 owned their own home, just 36 percent did in 2014—a marked 9 percentage point drop

While many factors have influenced the downward slide in the rate of home ownership, some believe that the historic levels of student loan debt have been particular impediments. Indeed, outstanding student loan balances have more than doubled in real terms (to about $1.5 trillion) in the last decade, with average real student loan debt per capita for individuals ages 24 to 32 rising from about $5,000 in 2005 to $10,000 in 2014.3 In surveys, young adults commonly report that their student loan debts are preventing them from buying a home.

They estimate that roughly 20 percent of the decline in home ownership among young adults can be attributed to their increased student loan debts since 2005. Our estimates suggest that increases in student loan debt are an important factor in explaining their lowered home ownership rates, but not the central cause of the decline.

Estimating the Effect of Student Loan Debt on Home ownership

The relationship between student loan debt and home ownership is complex. On the one hand, student loan payments may reduce an individual’s ability to save for a down payment or qualify for a mortgage. On the other hand, investments in higher education also, on average, result in higher earnings and lower rates of unemployment. As a result, it is not immediately clear whether, on balance, the impact of student loan debt on home ownership would be positive or negative.

Since we are interested in isolating the negative effect of increased student loan burdens on home ownership from the potential positive effect of additional education, our analysis aims to estimate the effect of debt on home ownership holding all other factors constant. In other words, if we were to compare two individuals who are otherwise identical in all aspects but the amount of accumulated student loan debt, how would we expect their home ownership outcomes to differ?

To estimate the effect of the increased student loan debt on home ownership, we tracked student loan and mortgage borrowing for individuals who were between 24 and 32 years old in 2005. Using these data, we constructed a model to estimate the impact of increased student loan borrowing on the likelihood of students becoming homeowners during this period of their lives. We found that a $1,000 increase in student loan debt (accumulated during the prime college-going years and measured in 2014 dollars) causes a 1 to 2 percentage point drop in the home ownership rate for student loan borrowers during their late 20s and early 30s. Our estimates suggest that student loan debt can be a meaningful barrier preventing young adults from owning a home. Next, we apply these estimates to another interesting question: How much of the 9 percentage point drop in the home ownership rate of 24 to 32 year olds between 2005 and 2014 can be attributed to rising student loan debt?

The Rise in Student Loan Debt and Decline in Home ownership since 2005
Answering this question requires two steps. First, we calculate an expected probability of home ownership in 2005 for each individual in our sample using the estimated model from our previous research. Second, we produce a simulated scenario for the probability of home ownership by increasing each individual’s debt to match the student loan debt distribution of this age group in 2014. The difference between the probabilities calculated in these two steps determines the effect of the increased debt on the home ownership rate of the young, holding demographic, educational, and economic characteristics fixed.

This exercise captures two key dimensions of the shifts in the distribution of student loan debt between 2005 and 2014, in addition to the overall increase in the average amounts borrowed. First, the fraction of young individuals who have borrowed to fund post secondary education with debt has increased by roughly 10 percentage points over this period, from 30 to 40 percent. Second, the amounts borrowed at the upper end of the distribution increased more rapidly than in the middle.

According to our calculations, the increase in student loan debt between 2005 and 2014 reduced the home ownership rate among young adults by 2 percentage points. The home ownership rate for this group fell 9 percentage points over this period (figure 2), implying that a little over 20 percent of the overall decline in home ownership among the young can be attributed to the rise in student loan debt. This represents over 400,000 young individuals who would have owned a home in 2014 had it not been for the rise in debt.

An important caveat to keep in mind when interpreting our estimates is the difference in mortgage market conditions before and after the financial crisis. The model used to develop these estimates was built using data for student loan borrowers who were between 24 and 32 years old in 2005, so a large fraction had made their home-buying decisions before 2008, when credit was relatively easier to obtain. Following the crisis, loan underwriting may have become more sensitive to student loan debt, increasing its importance in explaining declining home ownership rates.

Student Loan Debt May Have Even Broader Implications
for Consumers

There are multiple channels by which student loans can affect the ability of consumers to buy homes. One we would like to highlight here is the effect of student loan debt on credit scores. In our forthcoming paper, we show that higher student loan debt early in life leads to a lower credit score later in life, all else equal. We also find that, all else equal, increased student loan debt causes borrowers to be more likely to default on their student loan debt, which has a major adverse effect on their credit scores, thereby impacting their ability to qualify for a mortgage.

This finding has implications well beyond home ownership, as credit scores impact consumers’ access to and cost of nearly all kinds of credit, including auto loans and credit cards. While investing in post secondary education continues to yield, on average, positive and substantial returns, burdensome student loan debt levels may be lessening these benefits. As policymakers evaluate ways to aid student borrowers, they may wish to consider policies that reduce the cost of tuition, such as greater state government investment in public institutions, and ease the burden of student loan payments, such as more expansive use of income-driven repayment.