IMF Bells The Cat On Negative Interest Rates And A Need To Ban Cash

Hot off the press – How Can Interest Rates Be Negative? – we get the latest missive from the IMF which confirms precisely what we have been saying.

But the concern remains about the limits to negative interest rate policies so long as cash exists as an alternative.

Here is the article. Read, and weep….

Money has been around for a long time. And we have always paid for using someone else’s money or savings. The charge for doing this is known by many different words, from prayog in ancient Sanskrit to interest in modern English. The oldest known example of an institutionalized, legal interest rate is found in the Laws of Eshnunna, an ancient Babylonian text dating back to about 2000 BC.

For most of history, nominal interest rates—stated rates that borrowers pay on a loan—have been positive, that is, greater than zero. However, consider what happens when the rate of inflation exceeds the return on savings or loans. When inflation is 3 percent, and the interest rate on a loan is 2 percent, the lender’s return after inflation is less than zero. In such a situation, we say the real interest rate—the nominal rate minus the rate of inflation—is negative.

In modern times, central banks have charged a positive nominal interest rate when lending out short-term funds to regulate the business cycle. However, in recent years, an increasing number of central banks have resorted to low-rate policies. Several, including the European Central Bank and the central banks of Denmark, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, have started experimenting with negative interest rates —essentially making banks pay to park their excess cash at the central bank. The aim is to encourage banks to lend out those funds instead, thereby countering the weak growth that persisted after the 2008 global financial crisis. For many, the world was turned upside down: Savers would now earn a negative return, while borrowers get paid to borrow money? It is not that simple.

Simply put, interest is the cost of credit or the cost of money. It is the amount a borrower agrees to pay to compensate a lender for using her money and to account for the associated risks. Economic theories underpinning interest rates vary, some pointing to interactions between the supply of savings and the demand for investment and others to the balance between money supply and demand. According to these theories, interest rates must be positive to motivate saving, and investors demand progressively higher interest rates the longer money is borrowed to compensate for the heightened risk involved in tying up their money longer. Hence, under normal circumstances, interest rates would be positive, and the longer the term, the higher the interest rate would have to be. Moreover, to know what an investment effectively yields or what a loan costs, it important to account for inflation, the rate at which money loses value. Expectations of inflation are therefore a key driver of longer-term interest rates.

While there are many different interest rates in financial markets, the policy interest rate set by a country’s central bank provides the key benchmark for borrowing costs in the country’s economy. Central banks vary the policy rate in response to changes in the economic cycle and to steer the country’s economy by influencing many different (mainly short-term) interest rates. Higher policy rates provide incentives for saving, while lower rates motivate consumption and reduce the cost of business investment. A guidepost for central bankers in setting the policy rate is the concept of the neutral rate of interest : the long-term interest rate that is consistent with stable inflation. The neutral interest rate neither stimulates nor restrains economic growth. When interest rates are lower than the neutral rate, monetary policy is expansionary, and when they are higher, it is contractionary.

Today, there is broad agreement that, in many countries, this neutral interest rate has been on a clear downward trend for decades and is probably lower than previously assumed. But the drivers of this decline are not well understood. Some have emphasized the role of factors like long-term demographic trends (especially the aging societies in advanced economies), weak productivity growth, and the shortage of safe assets. Separately, persistently low inflation in advanced economies, often significantly below their targets or long-term averages, appears to have lowered markets’ long-term inflation expectations. The combination of these factors likely explains the striking situation in today’s bond markets: not only have long-term interest rates fallen, but in many countries, they are now negative.

Returning to monetary policy, following the global financial crisis, central banks cut nominal interest rates aggressively, in many cases to zero or close to zero. We call this the zero lower bound, a point below which some believed that interest rates could not go. But monetary policy affects an economy through similar mechanics both above and below zero. Indeed, negative interest rates also give consumers and businesses an incentive to spend or invest money rather than leave it in their bank accounts, where the value would be eroded by inflation. Overall, these aggressively low interest rates have probably helped somewhat, where implemented, in stimulating economic activity, though there remain uncertainties about side effects and risks.

A first concern with negative rates is their potential impact on bank profitability. Banks perform a key function by matching savings to useful projects that generate a high rate of return. In turn, they earn a spread, the difference between what they pay savers (depositors) and what they charge on the loans they make. When central banks lower their policy rates, the general tendency is for this spread to be reduced, as overall lending and longer-term interest rates tend to fall. When rates go below zero, banks may be reluctant to pass on the negative interest rates to their depositors by charging fees on their savings for fear that they will withdraw their deposits. If banks refrain from negative rates on deposits, this could in principle turn the lending spread negative, because the return on a loan would not cover the cost of holding deposits. This could in turn lower bank profitability and undermine financial system stability.

A second concern with negative interest rates on bank deposits is that they would give savers an incentive to switch out of deposits into holding cash. After all, it is not possible to reduce cash’s face value (though some have proposed getting rid of cash altogether to make deeply negative rates feasible when needed). Hence there has been a concern that negative rates could reach a tipping point beyond which savers would flood out of banks and park their money in cash outside the banking system. We don’t know for sure where such an effective lower bound on interest rates is. In some scenarios, going below this lower bound could undermine financial system liquidity and stability.

In practice, banks can charge other fees to recoup costs, and rates have not gotten negative enough for banks to try to pass on negative rates to small depositors (larger depositors have accepted some negative rates for the convenience of holding money in banks). But the concern remains about the limits to negative interest rate policies so long as cash exists as an alternative.

Overall, a low neutral rate implies that short-term interest rates could more frequently hit the zero lower bound and remain there for extended periods of time. As this occurs, central banks may increasingly need to resort to what were previously thought of as unconventional policies, including negative policy interest rates.

No, central banks are taking us down a blind alley!

IMF Warns On Link Between High Public Debt And Crises

The IMF just released a working paper* “Debt Is Not Free“. The evidence presented in this paper points to the risks, suggesting that public debt might not be free after all! In addition, low, or ultra low interest rates are not a get out of jail card!

The case for more public debt is being reinforced by weak economic activity across the globe, large investment needs, and increasing concerns that monetary policy may be reaching its limits particularly in advanced economies. And yet, the risk of fiscal crises still casts a long shadow. Therefore, as many countries remain riddled with mounting debt, one of the most pressing questions facing policymakers is whether current high debt levels are a bellwether of future crises with large economic costs.

The argument that “public debt may have no fiscal cost”is also gaining traction as many countries face historically low interest rates and the global stock of negative-yielding debt is hovering around $12 trillion by the end of 2019. The underlying rationale is that if interest rates are lower than the economic growth rate—that is, the interest-growth differential is negative—there is no reason to maintain a primary surplus as it would be feasible to issue debt without later increasing taxes.

This working paper contributes to the debate on the costs of public debt by revisiting its importance in predicting fiscal crises. In a world of ultra-low interest rates, it is tempting to believe that there may be no costs. For those that subscribe to that theory, the natural conclusion is that now may be the time to rely more heavily on debt to attend to worthy causes such as fixing a crumbling infrastructure all while propping up a frail economy. The skeptics point to history, noting that those that ignore high debt do it at their peril as excessive debt may force disruptive fiscal adjustments or eventually lead to costly crises.

They use machine learning models to confront these dueling views with evidence. Our results show that public debt in its various forms is the most important predictor of fiscal crises and it does matter always and everywhere. But public debt is not the only game in town as its interactions with other predictors also make a difference. Surprisingly, however, the interest-growth differential does not have much signaling value: it does not really matter whether it is highly positive or negative; moreover, beyond certain debt levels, the likelihood of a crisis surges regardless.

It is important to acknowledge that the machine learning techniques used do not allow us to establish causality. This is an area where computational science is still trying to make inroads. What they can confidently say is that there is a high correlation between public debt and crises and that this association is very robust. Therefore, at the current juncture, complacency about high debt levels would be ill-advised even if interest-growth differentials were to remain low. The underlying reason is that the dynamics of crises are highly non-linear and by the time the interest-growth differential may start flashing red, a crisis may well be underway catching policymakers off guard.

These findings do not mean that bringing debt down is always the right policy prescription. There are clearly cases where the use of debt for countercyclical purposes, to increase public investment, or to address other structural needs is desirable. However, the evidence presented in this paper points to the risks, suggesting that public debt might not be free after all!

*IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

How Global Banks Hold All The Cards [Podcast]

We look at an IMF working paper which maps the footprint of the top 30 banks (GSIBs) globally. They control up to 75% of business lines.

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/12/27/Post-Crisis-Changes-in-Global-Bank-Business-Models-A-New-Taxonomy-48877

Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
How Global Banks Hold All The Cards [Podcast]
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IMF On Australia: Risk To The Outlook Remains Tilted To The Downside

The IMF published their latest preliminary findings at the end of an official IMF staff visit (or ‘mission’) to Australia. They recommend preparing for risk from a rapid housing credit upswing, by introducing loan-to-value and debt-to-income limits, and possibly a sectoral countercyclical capital buffer targeting housing exposures. Plus transitioning from a housing transfer stamp duty to a general land tax to improve efficiency by easing entry into the housing market and promoting labor mobility, while providing a more stable revenue source for the States. Such reforms could be complemented by reducing structural incentives for leveraged investment by households, including in residential real estate.

Economic growth has gradually improved from the lows in the second half of 2018 but has remained below potential. Growth has been supported by public spending, including on infrastructure, and net exports, which have held up well despite headwinds from global policy uncertainty and China’s economic slowdown. However, domestic private demand has remained weak amid subdued confidence, with a widening output gap. In addition, the ongoing drought has been a drag on economic growth. Wage growth has remained sluggish, reflecting persistent labor market slack, and inflation and measures of inflation expectations have dropped to below Australia’s 2 to 3 percent target range. Following a marked adjustment over the past two years, housing prices have started to recover, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne.

Growth should continue to recover at a gradual pace. Following growth of about 1.8 percent in 2019, the economy is expected to expand by 2.2 percent in 2020.Private domestic demand is expected to recover slowly, supported by monetary policy easing and the personal income tax cuts. An incipient recovery in mining investment is also expected to contribute to growth. In addition, the house price recovery will likely reduce the drag on consumption from earlier, negative wealth effects. That said, residential and non-mining business investment are expected to take longer to recover. Over the medium term, growth is expected to reach the mission’s estimate of potential growth of about 2½ percent, supported by infrastructure spending and structural reforms. With continued labor market slack, underlying inflation will likely stay below the target range until 2021.

Risks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside.

· On the external side, Australia is especially exposed to a deeper-than-expected downturn in China through exports of commodities and services. A renewed escalation of U.S.-China trade tensions could further impair global business sentiment, discouraging investment in Australia. A sharp tightening of global financial conditions could squeeze Australian banks’ wholesale funding and raise borrowing costs in the economy.

· On the domestic side, private consumption could be weaker should a cooling in labor markets squeeze household income. Adverse weather conditions, including a more-severe-than-expected drought, could further disrupt agriculture, dampening growth. On the upside, looser financial conditions could re-accelerate asset price inflation, boosting private consumption but also adding to medium-term vulnerabilities given high household debt levels.

With below-potential growth, weakening inflation expectations, and continued downside risks, the macroeconomic policy mix should remain accommodative.

· Monetary policy has been appropriately accommodative, and continued data-dependent easing will be helpful to support employment growth, inflation and inflation expectations.

· The consolidated fiscal stance is appropriately expansionary for FY2019/20. Fiscal policy will be supportive for demand via reductions in personal income and small business corporate taxes, additional infrastructure spending, and the government’s announced support measures for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, fiscal policy aggregated across all levels of government will be contractionary in FY2020/21, as state-level infrastructure investment is expected to decline.[1] States should reconsider this and attempt to at least maintain their current level of infrastructure spending as a share of GDP to continue addressing infrastructure gaps and supporting aggregate demand.

The authorities should be ready for a coordinated response if downside risks materialize. Australia has substantial fiscal space it can use if needed. In addition to letting automatic stabilizers operate, Commonwealth and state governments should be prepared to enact temporary measures such as buttressing infrastructure spending, including maintenance, and introducing tax breaks for SMEs, bonuses for retraining and education, or cash transfers to households. In case stimulus is necessary, the implementation of budget repair should be delayed, as permitted under the Commonwealth government’s medium-term fiscal strategy. In addition, unconventional monetary policy measures such as quantitative easing may become necessary in such a scenario as the cash rate is already close to the effective lower bound.

The macroprudential policy stance remains appropriate but should stand ready to tighten in case of increasing financial risks. Australian banks remain adequately capitalized and profitable, but vulnerable to high exposure to residential mortgage lending and dependent on wholesale funding. While the risk structure of mortgage loans has been significantly improved, renewed overheating of housing markets and a fast pick-up in mortgage lending remain risks in a low-interest-rate environment. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) should continue to expand and improve the readiness of the macroprudential toolkit. This should include preparations, for potential use in the event of a rapid housing credit upswing, for introducing loan-to-value and debt-to-income limits, and possibly a sectoral countercyclical capital buffer targeting housing exposures.

Strong reform efforts to bolster the resilience of the financial sector should continue. The mission supports the authorities’ plan to further enhance banks’ capital framework, including strengthening their loss-absorbing capacity and resilience. In addition, encouraging banks to further lengthen the maturity structure of their wholesale funding would help mitigate ongoing structural liquidity risks. The authorities’ commitment to implement the recommendations made by the Hayne Royal Commission by end-2020 is welcome. The improvement in lending standards further enhances financial sector resilience, and reducing the uncertainty in the enforcement of responsible lending obligations would prevent excessive risk aversion in the provision of credit. The authorities should implement the APRA Capability Review’s recommendations to strengthen APRA’s resources and operational flexibility, enhance its supervisory approach in assessing banks’ governance and risk culture, and strengthen enforcement efforts. In addition, reinforcing financial crisis management arrangements and strengthening the AML/CFT regime should remain priorities, in line with the findings of the 2018 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).

Housing supply reforms remain critical for restoring affordability. More efficient long-term planning, zoning, and local government reform that promote housing supply growth, along with a particular focus on infrastructure development, including through “City Deals”, should help meet growing demand for housing.

Efforts to boost private investment and innovation should be stepped up. Non-mining business investment, including R&D, has been sluggish, contributing to lower productivity growth. Reducing domestic policy uncertainty, supporting SMEs’ access to finance, and accelerating structural reforms would help to improve the investment environment. Building on reforms in the 2015 Harper Review, Australia can further improve product market regulations, including by simplifying business processes through the work of the Deregulation Taskforce. The ongoing policy priority on skills and education reforms is welcome to improve the environment for innovation, and consideration should be given to faster implementation of the recommended measures in the Australia 2030: Prosperity through Innovation report. Government initiatives to relieve SME financing constraints are welcome, including the Australian Business Securitization Fund and the Australian Business Growth Fund. Incentives for banks to lend more to businesses, including through reducing the concentration in mortgages, can help support business investment, as can the promotion of venture capital. Supporting new investment through tax measures, possibly including targeted investment allowances, as well as further improving the effectiveness of government R&D support for younger firms, would also be helpful.

Australia’s continued efforts supporting international cooperation are welcome. The mission welcomes the authorities’ support to enhance the effectiveness of the WTO and pursuit of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which aims to liberalize trade and improve quality and environmental standards and labor mobility throughout the Asia and Pacific region. Developing a national, integrated approach to energy policy and climate change mitigation, and clarifying how existing and new instruments can be employed to meet the Paris Agreement goals, would help reduce policy uncertainty and catalyze environmentally-friendly investment in the power sector and the broader economy.

Further reforms can help to promote female labor market participation and reduce youth underemployment. There is scope to increase full-time employment for Australian women and addressing persistently high underemployment particularly among youth. The 2018 Child Care Subsidy program and the forthcoming Mid-Career Checkpoint program are expected to support women in work. This could lay the foundation for a broader review of the combination of taxes, transfers, and childcare support to reduce disincentives for female labor force participation. Pursuing ongoing reforms in vocational training can help reduce youth underemployment.

Broad fiscal reforms would help promote efficiency and inclusiveness. Australia should continue to reduce distortions in its tax system to promote economic efficiency and in doing so should be mindful of distributional consequences considering income inequality. Recent reforms in personal and corporate income taxes have helped to improve the efficiency of the tax system. A further shift from direct to indirect taxes could be made by broadening the goods and services tax (GST) base and reducing the statutory corporate income tax rate for large firms. The impact of these reforms could be made less regressive for households through targeted cash transfers. Transitioning from a housing transfer stamp duty to a general land tax would improve efficiency by easing entry into the housing market and promoting labor mobility, while providing a more stable revenue source for the States. Such reforms could be complemented by reducing structural incentives for leveraged investment by households, including in residential real estate.

The mission would like to thank the authorities and counterparts in the private sector, think tanks, and other organizations for frank and engaging discussions.

IMF Says Growth Weakening

Global growth is forecast at 3.0 percent for 2019, its lowest level since 2008–09 and a 0.3 percentage point downgrade from the April 2019 World Economic Outlook.

Growth is projected to pick up to 3.4 percent in 2020 (a 0.2 percentage point downward revision compared with April), reflecting primarily a projected improvement in economic performance in a number of emerging markets in Latin America, the Middle East, and emerging and developing Europe that are under macroeconomic strain.

Yet, with uncertainty about prospects for several of these countries, a projected slowdown in China and the United States, and prominent downside risks, a much more subdued pace of global activity could well materialize. To forestall such an outcome, policies should decisively aim at defusing trade tensions, reinvigorating multilateral cooperation, and providing timely support to economic activity where needed. To strengthen resilience, policymakers should address financial vulnerabilities that pose risks to growth in the medium term. Making growth more inclusive, which is essential for securing better economic prospects for all, should remain an overarching goal.

Australian growth is downgraded to 1.7%

Bearing in mind our dependency on iron ore, they say: Iron ore prices increased 6.7 percent between February 2019 and August 2019. Widespread disruptions—including the Vale dam collapse in Brazil and tropical cyclone Veronica in Australia— coupled with record-high steel output in China pushed iron ore prices to five-year highs during the first half of 2019. However, the normalization of previously disrupted operations and escalating trade tensions between the United States and China triggered a sharp correction in August, partially offsetting the gains since the beginning of the year.

IMF Says Sluggish Global Growth Calls for Supportive Policies

In the IMF’s July update of the World Economic Outlook they revised downward projections for global growth to 3.2 percent in 2019 and 3.5 percent in 2020. While this is a modest revision of 0.1 percentage points for both years relative to projections in April, it comes on top of previous significant downward revisions. The revision for 2019 reflects negative surprises for growth in emerging market and developing economies that offset positive surprises in some advanced economies. From The IMF Blog.

Growth is projected to improve between 2019 and 2020. However, close to 70 percent of the increase relies on an improvement in the growth performance in stressed emerging market and developing economies and is therefore subject to high uncertainty.

Global growth is sluggish and precarious, but it does not have to be this way because some of this is self-inflicted. Dynamism in the global economy is being weighed down by prolonged policy uncertainty as trade tensions remain heightened despite the recent US-China trade truce, technology tensions have erupted threatening global technology supply chains, and the prospects of a no-deal Brexit have increased.

Global growth is sluggish and precarious, but it does not have to be this way because some of this is self-inflicted.

The negative consequences of policy uncertainty are visible in the diverging trends between the manufacturing and services sector, and the significant weakness in global trade. Manufacturing purchasing manager indices continue to decline alongside worsening business sentiment as businesses hold off on investment in the face of high uncertainty. Global trade growth, which moves closely with investment, has slowed significantly to 0.5 percent (year-on-year) in the first quarter of 2019, which is its slowest pace since 2012. On the other hand, the services sector is holding up and consumer sentiment is strong, as unemployment rates touch record lows and wage incomes rise in several countries.

Among advanced economies—the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the euro area—grew faster than expected in the first quarter of 2019. However, some of the factors behind this—such as stronger inventory build-ups—are transitory and the growth momentum going forward is expected to be weaker, especially for countries reliant on external demand. Owing to first quarter upward revisions, especially for the United States, we are raising our projection for advanced economies slightly, by 0.1 percentage points, to 1.9 percent for 2019. Going forward, growth is projected to slow to 1.7 percent, as the effects of fiscal stimulus taper off in the United States and weak productivity growth and aging demographics dampen long-run prospects for advanced economies.

In emerging market and developing economies, growth is being revised down by 0.3 percentage points in 2019 to 4.1 percent and by 0.1 percentage points for 2020 to 4.7 percent. The downward revisions for 2019 are almost across the board for the major economies, though for varied reasons. In China, the slight revision downwards reflects, in part, the higher tariffs imposed by the United States in May, while the more significant revisions in India and Brazil reflect weaker-than-expected domestic demand.

For commodity exporters, supply disruptions, such as in Russia and Chile, and sanctions on Iran, have led to downward revisions despite a near-term strengthening in oil prices. The projected recovery in growth between 2019 and 2020 in emerging market and developing economies relies on improved growth outcomes in stressed economies such as Argentina, Turkey, Iran, and Venezuela, and therefore is subject to significant uncertainty.

Financial conditions in the United States and the euro area have further eased, as the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank adopted a more accommodative monetary policy stance. Emerging market and developing economies have benefited from monetary easing in major economies but have also faced volatile risk sentiment tied to trade tensions. On net, financial conditions are about the same for this group as in April. Low-income developing countries that previously received mainly stable foreign direct investment flows now receive significant volatile portfolio flows, as the search for yield in a low interest rate environment reaches frontier markets.

Increased downside risks

A major downside risk to the outlook remains an escalation of trade and technology tensions that can significantly disrupt global supply chains. The combined effect of tariffs imposed last year and potential tariffs envisaged in May between the United States and China could reduce the level of global GDP in 2020 by 0.5 percent. Further, a surprise and durable worsening of financial sentiment can expose financial vulnerabilities built up over years of low interest rates, while disinflationary pressures can lead to difficulties in debt servicing for borrowers. Other significant risks include a surprise slowdown in China, the lack of a recovery in the euro area, a no-deal Brexit, and escalation of geopolitical tensions.

With global growth subdued and downside risks dominating the outlook, the global economy remains at a delicate juncture. It is therefore essential that tariffs are not used to target bilateral trade balances or as a general-purpose tool to tackle international disagreements. To help resolve conflicts, the rules-based multilateral trading system should be strengthened and modernized to encompass areas such as digital services, subsidies, and technology transfer.

Policies to support growth

Monetary policy should remain accommodative especially where inflation is softening below target. But it needs to be accompanied by sound trade policies that would lift the outlook and reduce downside risks. With persistently low interest rates, macroprudential tools should be deployed to ensure that financial risks do not build up.

Fiscal policy should balance growth, equity, and sustainability concerns, including protecting society’s most vulnerable. Countries with fiscal space should invest in physical and social infrastructure to raise potential growth. In the event of a severe downturn, a synchronized move toward more accommodative fiscal policies should complement monetary easing, subject to country specific circumstances.

Lastly, the need for greater global cooperation is ever urgent. In addition to resolving trade and technology tensions, countries need to work together to address major issues such as climate change, international taxation, corruption, cybersecurity, and the opportunities and challenges of newly emerging digital payment technologies.

IMF Says New Zealand Faces Downside Risks, But Migration May Help To Mitigate Them

The IMF just published their concluding Statement of the 2019 Article IV Consultation Mission to New Zealand.

They conclude:

New Zealand’s economic expansion lost momentum recently. The near-term growth outlook is expected to improve on the back of a timely increase in macroeconomic policy support. Downside risks to the growth outlook have increased but New Zealand has the policy space to respond should such risks materialize.

Macroeconomic policy settings are broadly appropriate, while macroprudential policy settings are attuned to macrofinancial vulnerabilities in the household sector, which have started to decline but remain elevated.

Financial sector reform in the context of the Review of the Capital Adequacy Framework and the Review of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act should provide for a welcome further strengthening of the resilience of the financial system and regulatory framework.

The government’s structural policy agenda appropriately focuses on reducing infrastructure gaps, increasing human capital, and lifting productivity, while seeking to make growth more inclusive and improve housing affordability.

Within the statement they warn that:

Risks to the outlook are increasingly tilted to the downside. On the domestic side, the fiscal stimulus could be less expansionary if policy implementation were to be more gradual than expected, and the domestic housing market cooling could morph into a downturn, either because of external shocks or diminished expectations. On the external side, global financial conditions could be tighter and dairy prices could be lower. Risks to global trade and growth from rising protectionism have increased, and this could have negative spillovers to the New Zealand economy, including through the impact on China and Australia, two key trading partners. High household debt remains a risk to economic growth and financial stability, and it could amplify the effects of large, adverse shocks. On the upside, in the near term, growth could be stronger if net migration were to decrease more slowly than expected or if the terms of trade were to be stronger.

With regard to macroprudnetial they warn:

The scope for easing macroprudential restrictions is limited, given still-high macrofinancial vulnerabilities. The shares of riskier home loans in bank assets (those with very high LVRs, high debt-to-income, and investor loans) has moderated due to the combined impact of the LVR settings and tighter bank lending standards. However, with the RBNZ’s recent easing of the LVR restrictions, improvements in some macroprudential risk factors such as credit growth have recently stalled or started to reverse. Further easing of LVR restrictions should consider the possible impact on banks’ prudential lending standards, as well as the risks to financial stability from elevated household debt.

G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting Says Growth Projected To Pick Up

The meeting in Japan has published the following communique:

  1. Global growth appears to be stabilizing, and is generally projected to pick up moderately later this year and into 2020. This recovery is supported by the continuation of accommodative financial conditions, stimulus measures taking effect in some countries, and one-off factors dissipating. However, growth remains low and risks remain tilted to the downside. Most importantly, trade and geopolitical tensions have intensified. We will continue to address these risks, and stand ready to take further action.
  2. We reaffirm our commitment to use all policy tools to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth, and safeguard against downside risks, by stepping up our dialogue and actions to enhance confidence. Fiscal policy should be flexible and growth-friendly while rebuilding buffers where needed and ensuring debt as a share of GDP is on a sustainable path. In line with central banks’ mandates, monetary policy should ensure that inflation remains on track toward, or stabilizes around targets. Central bank decisions need to remain well communicated. Continued implementation of structural reforms will enhance our growth potential. We reemphasize that international trade and investment are important engines of growth, productivity, innovation, job creation and development. We reaffirm our Leaders’ conclusions on trade at the Buenos Aires Summit. We will continue to take joint action to strengthen international cooperation and frameworks. We also reaffirm our exchange rate commitments made in March 2018.
  3. Global current account imbalances have narrowed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, notably in emerging and developing economies and they have become increasingly concentrated in advanced economies. However, they remain large and persistent, and stock positions continue to diverge. In assessing external balances, we note the importance of monitoring all components of the current account, including service trade and income balances. We acknowledge that external balances reflect a combination of cyclical factors, domestic policies and fundamentals, as well as spillovers from abroad. We share the view that, while some of the external imbalances may be in line with economic fundamentals, others may be excessive and pose risks. Factors underlying excessive imbalances may include excess corporate savings, miscalibrated fiscal policies, and barriers to trade in goods and services. In the spirit of enhancing cooperation, we affirm that carefully calibrated macroeconomic and structural policies tailored to country-specific circumstances are necessary to address excessive imbalances and mitigate the risks to achieving the G20 goal of strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth. Meanwhile, we recognize that the composition of funding also should be carefully monitored as some forms (such as foreign direct investment) provide more stable funding than others. We look forward to the IMF’s further analytical work on global imbalances.
  4. Demographic changes, including population aging, pose challenges and opportunities for all G20 members. Given the complex nature of this agenda, we held a comprehensive discussion on aging-related issues at break-out sessions, which grouped countries according to their demographic profiles. Demographic changes will require policy actions that span fiscal, monetary, financial, and structural policies. In this regard, countries should consider, as relevant:
    • Further enhancing productivity and growth, including by investing in skills, and encouraging labor market participation in particular of women and older people and promoting elderly-friendly industries;
    • Enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending as well as a well-functioning and fiscally sustainable social safety net with due consideration to intra- and inter-generational equity;
    • Designing the tax system in an equitable and growth-friendly manner, so as to better respond to the challenges posed by aging;
    • Better understanding the implications of aging for monetary policy;
    • Assisting financial institutions to make any needed adjustments to their business models and services;
    • Managing the cross-border implications of demographic changes, such as capital and migratory flows.To strengthen financial inclusion in the aging society, we endorse the G20 Fukuoka Policy Priorities on Aging and Financial Inclusion, prepared by the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) and OECD. We endorse the Proposed GPFI Work Program, and ask the GPFI to streamline its structure based on the Roadmap to 2020.
  5. We reaffirm our commitment to a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF, to preserve its role at the center of the global financial safety net. We remain committed to concluding the 15th General Review of Quotas no later than the 2019 Annual Meetings, and call on the IMF to expedite its work on IMF resources and governance reform as a matter of the highest priority. We support the progress made on work to follow up the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) proposals. We welcome the progress made towards developing possible principles for effective country platforms and look forward to further work to consolidate our views and build consensus. In addition, we welcome ongoing efforts by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency to enhance risk insurance in development finance, including the release of new standardized contracts and cooperation agreements with several MDBs. We welcome the discussion of development finance issues, in response to the relevant EPG proposals, as experienced this year at Deputies’ level in April and at Ministers’ level yesterday. We welcome the work undertaken by the international organizations on capital flows. The OECD has completed a review of its Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, which modernizes the Code to support the liberalization of capital flows and financial stability. We also welcome the MDBs’ report on value for money and look forward to further work on indicators where harmonization is relevant, affordable and provides clear benefits. We will continue our work on the EPG’s proposals, recognizing their multi-year nature.
  6. We reiterate the importance of joint efforts undertaken by both borrowers and creditors, official and private, to improve debt transparency and secure debt sustainability. We welcome an IMF-World Bank Group (WBG) Update on the recent progress of their multi-pronged approach for addressing emerging debt vulnerabilities, and support its further implementation. In particular, we call on the IMF and WBG to continue their efforts to strengthen borrowers’ capacity in the areas of debt recording, monitoring, and reporting, debt management, public financial management, and domestic resource mobilization. In the context of the review of the Debt Limits Policy and Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy, we encourage the IMF and WBG to continue their efforts to deepen their analysis of collateralized financing practices. We welcome the completion of the voluntary self-assessment of the implementation of the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing and the IMF-WBG note on the survey results and policy recommendation. We applaud the G20 and non-G20 members who completed the survey. We will continue to discuss the issues highlighted by this note, aiming to improve financing practices. We support the work of the Institute of International Finance on the Voluntary Principles for Debt Transparency to improve debt transparency and sustainability of private financing and look forward to follow up. We support the ongoing work of the Paris Club, as the principal international forum for restructuring official bilateral debt, towards the broader inclusion of emerging creditors. In that regard, we welcome India associating voluntarily with the Paris Club to cooperate in its work on a case-by-case basis.
  7. Infrastructure is a driver of economic growth and prosperity. An emphasis on quality infrastructure is an essential part of the G20’s ongoing efforts to close the infrastructure gap, in accordance with the Roadmap to Infrastructure as an Asset Class. In this context, we stress the importance of maximizing the positive impact of infrastructure to achieve sustainable growth and development while preserving the sustainability of public finances, raising economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost, integrating environmental and social considerations, including women’s economic empowerment, building resilience against natural disasters and other risks, and strengthening infrastructure governance. Based on this understanding, and welcoming inter-thematic collaborations, we endorse the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment as our common strategic direction and high aspiration. We thank the international organizations for preparing the Reference Notes on quality infrastructure investment and a new Database of Facilities and Resources, which will help effective implementation. We look forward to continuing advancing the elements to develop infrastructure as an asset class, including by exploring possible indicators on quality infrastructure investment.
  8. We acknowledge the importance of disaster risk financing and insurance schemes as a means to promote financial resilience against natural disasters. These schemes can help governments effectively leverage private sector resources and thereby manage financial risks arising from natural disasters in a timely manner. In this regard, the WBG’s report, Boosting Financial Resilience to Disaster Shocks: Good Practices and New Frontiers, will help broaden knowledge of disaster risk financing methods, including through macro-fiscal planning.
  9. Moving towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) contributes to human capital development, sustainable and inclusive growth and development, and prevention, detection and response to health emergencies, such as pandemics and anti-microbial resistance, in developing countries. In this context, we affirm our commitment to the G20 Shared Understanding on the Importance of UHC Financing in Developing Countries. As articulated in the Shared Understanding document, a multi-sectoral approach, in particular the collaboration between finance and health authorities, with the appropriate contribution of the private sector and non-government organizations, is crucial for strengthening health financing, building on work by international organizations. In this regard, we look forward to a joint session of Finance and Health Ministers in the margins of the Leaders’ Summit. We appreciate the World Bank Group’s report, High-Performance Health Financing for Universal Health Coverage: Driving Sustainable, Inclusive Growth in the 21st Century.
  10. We underline our continued support for the Compact with Africa (CwA). This should involve closer engagement with private sector investors and enhanced bilateral engagement, including coherent contributions from development finance institutions as well as enhanced roles for participating international organizations (WBG, AfDB, IMF) based on a clear understanding of their roles in implementing the CwA.
  11. We will continue our cooperation for a globally fair, sustainable, and modern international tax system, and welcome international cooperation to advance pro-growth tax policies. We reaffirm the importance of the worldwide implementation of the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) package and enhanced tax certainty. We welcome the recent progress on addressing the tax challenges arising from digitalization and endorse the ambitious work program that consists of a two-pillar approach, developed by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS. We will redouble our efforts for a consensus-based solution with a final report by 2020. We welcome the recent achievements on tax transparency, including the progress on automatic exchange of financial account information for tax purposes. We also welcome an updated list of jurisdictions that have not satisfactorily implemented the internationally agreed tax transparency standards. We look forward to a further update by the OECD of the list that takes into account all of the strengthened criteria. Defensive measures will be considered against listed jurisdictions. In this regard, we recall the 2015 OECD report inventorying available measures. We call on all jurisdictions to sign and ratify the multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. We continue to support tax capacity building in developing countries, including coordinating through the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) and by applying the experience with medium-term revenue strategies and tailoring efforts to support domestic resource mobilization in countries with limited capacities. We welcome the first progress report of the PCT, as well as the Asia-Pacific Academy for Tax and Financial Crime Investigation in Japan.
  12. An open and resilient financial system, grounded in agreed international standards, is crucial to support sustainable growth. We remain committed to the full, timely and consistent implementation of the agreed financial reforms. We continue to evaluate their effects and welcome the FSB’s public consultation report on SME financing. We will continue to monitor and, as necessary, address vulnerabilities and emerging risks to financial stability, including with macroprudential tools. While non-bank financing provides welcome diversity to the financial system, we will continue to identify, monitor and address related financial stability risks as appropriate. We welcome the reports from the FSB and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on market fragmentation, and look forward to receiving progress updates in October including on ongoing work. We will address unintended, negative effects of market fragmentation, including through regulatory and supervisory cooperation. We continue to monitor and address the causes and consequences of the withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships, and issues on remittance firms’ access to banking services. Mobilizing sustainable finance and strengthening financial inclusion are important for global growth. We welcome private sector participation and transparency in these areas.
  13. Technological innovations, including those underlying crypto-assets, can deliver significant benefits to the financial system and the broader economy. While crypto-assets do not pose a threat to global financial stability at this point, we remain vigilant to risks, including those related to consumer and investor protection, anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT). We reaffirm our commitment to applying the recently amended FATF Standards to virtual assets and related providers for AML and CFT. We look forward to the adoption of the FATF Interpretive Note and Guidance by the FATF at its plenary later this month. We welcome IOSCO’s work on crypto-asset trading platforms related to consumer and investor protection and market integrity. We welcome the FSB’s directory of crypto-asset regulators, and its report on work underway, regulatory approaches and potential gaps relating to crypto-assets. We ask the FSB and standard setting bodies to monitor risks and consider work on additional multilateral responses as needed. We also welcome the FSB report on decentralized financial technologies, and the possible implications for financial stability, regulation and governance, and how regulators can enhance the dialogue with a wider group of stakeholders. We also continue to step up efforts to enhance cyber resilience, and welcome progress on the FSB’s initiative to identify effective practices for response to and recovery from cyber incidents.
  14. We welcome the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2462, which stresses the essential role of the FATF in setting global standards for preventing and combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. We reiterate our strong commitment to step up efforts to fight these threats. We call for the full, effective and swift implementation of the FATF Standards. We welcome the achievement of the FATF Ministerial Meeting in April this year that has given the FATF an open-ended mandate and led to strengthening the FATF’s governance, including the biennial ministerial meeting and the FATF Presidency’s term extensions. We look forward to the FATF’s Strategic Review. We welcome FATF’s commitment to monitor the risks and opportunities of financial innovation, and to ensure the FATF standards remain relevant and responsive. We ask the FATF to report back on progress in 2021. We look forward to further action by the FATF to strengthen the global response to proliferation financing.

When The Music Stops, Who’s Going To Be Left Holding The Baby?

We look at the latest IMF Financial Stability Report. Where will the systemic risks end up?

Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
Digital Finance Analytics (DFA) Blog
When The Music Stops, Who’s Going To Be Left Holding The Baby?
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